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Abstract
The IPE literature on compliance has presented three theoretically competing 
mechanisms to induce compliance with international regulatory regimes: externality- 
based, market, and domestic compliance mechanisms. However, most studies on 
compliance have limited their analytic focus to formal compliance with explicit 
provisions of regimes, neglecting the question as to whether formal compliance 
enhances regime effectiveness, which is the fundamental issue of compliance. Yet, 
although national authorities implement an international regulatory regime, they 
frequently manipulate the implementation to help regulatory targets formally comply 
with its explicit provisions but still allow them, in practice, to defect from its objectives. 
This study introduces the concepts of cosmetic compliance and comprehensive 
compliance, and it analyses the effectiveness of the three compliance mechanisms in 
ensuring comprehensive compliance by addressing compliance with a momentous 
international financial regulatory regime, the 1988 Basel Capital Adequacy Accord, in 
three important Asian countries, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, from 1988 to 2003.
All three countries were formally in compliance with the regime throughout most of 
the period. However, Japan’s compliance was consistently cosmetic, while Korea and 
Taiwan also complied cosmetically during much of the period. A high degree of 
comprehensive compliance occurred only in Taiwan during the early 1990s and in 
Korea during the late 1990s and early 2000s. All three compliance mechanisms 
contributed to formal compliance. However, the externality-based compliance 
mechanism and the market compliance mechanism were not effective in ensuring 
comprehensive compliance. The operation of the domestic compliance mechanism was 
necessary for comprehensive compliance; yet, its effectiveness relied on the capacity of 
national authorities to implement it. As a result, the actual outcome of the operation of 
the domestic compliance mechanism was affected by domestic factors, in particular, the 
capacity to deal with formal compliance failures by regulatory targets, the domestic 
distributional effects of compliance, and the independence of the regulatory authority.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This thesis addresses compliance with a single international regulatory regime, the 
Basel Capital Adequacy Accord of 1988 (hereafter “the Basel Accord” or “the BIS 
standard”).1 I compare compliance across three important Asian countries: Japan, South 
Korea (hereafter Korea), and Taiwan during the period of 1988 to 2003. The BIS 
standard has been the international standard since its establishment, and has been 
adopted in some form by more than hundred countries (BCBS 2004a). As a result, the 
BIS standard has achieved symbolic significance for regime compliance. Indeed, a vast 
number of international relations (IR) studies have researched the establishment of, 
international convergence on, or global compliance with the Basel Accord.2 However, 
the intention of most of these studies is to explain how this event in the history of 
international economic relations was achieved, without questioning the nature of 
compliance with the BIS standard. In this study, I provide an in-depth analysis of this 
issue, drawing attention to the need to rethink the significance of global compliance.
Over the past fifty years, the number and range of international regimes have 
expanded rapidly with the development of rules governing economic, social, 
communications, environmental, and human rights behaviour. This mushrooming of 
international regimes has led IR scholars to devote a good deal of theoretical and 
empirical study to explaining why states have entered into this vast web of agreements, 
therefore sacrificing a degree of legal sovereignty (Simmons 1998: 7S-76).4 In recent 
years, studies of international regimes have made significant progress by going beyond 
the traditional major theme of regime formation and change to address issues of regime
1 BIS is the abbreviation for the Bank for International Settlements. In this study, the term Basel 
Accord is used when referring to the Basel Capital Adequacy Accord as an international 
agreement, while the term BIS standard is employed when referring to it as a regulatory 
standard.
2 See, for example, Ho (2002), Kapstein (1989; 1992; 1994), Oatley and Nabors (1998), Reinicke 
(1995), Simmons (1998), Singer (2004), Tamura (2003b), and Tobin (1991).
3 For example, by September 2005, the number o f multilateral treaties under the auspices o f the 
United Nations reached more than five hundreds (see United Nations 2005).
4 Dominant IR views generally argue that governments make commitments to international 
regimes in order to secure policy changes from others or to gain influence over other states’ 
policies (Simmons 1998: 76).
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compliance.5 In addition, scholars have begun to tackle the compliance not only of 
governments but also of businesses, which are the real targets of a growing number of 
regulatory regimes in areas such as accounting, the environment, finance, health, and 
labour (Borzel 2000: 2-3; Chayes and Chayes 1993: 193).6
However, despite the burgeoning interest in compliance issues, the concept of 
compliance applied in most studies is so narrow that these studies have difficulty 
linking their analysis to the issue of regime effectiveness, which is the fundamental 
question of compliance. Much research limits its analytic focus to formal compliance 
with explicit rules prescribed in international regimes, while defining noncompliance 
strictly as behaviour in breach of them.7 Yet, in certain circumstances, national 
authorities do implement an international regulatory regime, but they manipulate the 
implementation in a way that helps domestic actors to formally comply with its explicit 
provisions but still allows them, in practice, to defect its objectives. In this situation, 
both the national authorities and the regulatory targets are in formal compliance, but this 
compliance is only cosmetic. Cosmetic compliance can be a menace to the effectiveness 
of international regimes, because they cannot solve the problems they were established 
to solve. Nevertheless, cosmetic compliance is vastly underexplored.
A growing number of studies suggest that cosmetic compliance is not an 
extraordinary problem, but rather a common phenomenon in various international 
regulatory regimes. A recent report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2004) 
indicates that cosmetic compliance is prevalent in financial regulatory regimes. The 
report analyses the implementation of three international financial standards in the 
banking, insurance, and securities sectors in thirty-six IMF member (consisting of ten 
industrialised countries, twelve emerging market countries, and fourteen developing 
countries from Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere).
The report argues that although the majority of countries formally implemented those 
standards, significant weaknesses existed in actual regulatory practice, reducing the 
effectiveness of regulation.8 In another study, Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. 
Jacobson (1998) demonstrate that the compliance with five environmental regimes in
5 For a review o f the literature on regime development and change, see Haggard and Simmons 
(1987) and Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997).
6 See, for example, Mitchell (1994) and Kollman and Parakash (2001).
7 A notable exception that addresses compliance in a broader sense is Weiss and Jacobson 
(1998).
8 Andrew Walter (2003) also argues that even after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, a number of 
the crisis-hit countries failed to implement the BIS standard strictly for political economy 
reasons, as will this thesis argue.
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the United States, the European Union, Japan, the Russian Federation, Hungary, China, 
India, Cameroon, and Brazil was frequently weak. Cosmetic compliance is a serious 
challenge to the effectiveness of a range of international regulatory regimes.
What determines compliance with international regulatory regimes? Why does 
cosmetic compliance occur? To answer these questions, this study analyses the 
effectiveness of three main compliance mechanisms presented by existing literature— 
compliance pressures from foreign countries, from the markets, and from domestic 
actors—, and examines the factors influencing the operation of these compliance 
mechanisms. I argue that although external compliance pressures may induce formal 
compliance with an international regulatory regime, they are less effective in restricting 
cosmetic compliance. National regulatory authorities can manipulate the 
implementation of international regimes in their jurisdictions. The willingness and the 
capacity of national regulatory authorities to comply are, accordingly, critical for the 
compliance that enhances regime effectiveness. Second, even if national regulatory 
authorities are willing to implement an international regulatory regime in earnest, their 
implementation capacity and, in turn, the actual compliance outcomes, are affected by 
domestic factors. In particular, I argue that the likelihood of compliance failure— 
including cosmetic compliance—increases when governments lack the capacity to deal 
with formal compliance failures by the regulatory targets, when compliance costs are 
diffused from regulatory targets to politically important sectors, or when the 
independence of the regulatory authorities is low.
1.1 Central concepts
An essential first step in the analysis of compliance with an international regulatory 
regime is to possess a clear definition of compliance. In this study, compliance is 
defined in relation to regime effectiveness. Accordingly, the concept of regime 
effectiveness should be firmly established in advance. In addition, this research analyses 
compliance with the BIS standard by examining how it was implemented, and therefore 
the analysis should have a clear definition of implementation. Before proceeding further, 
I define these three concepts: regime effectiveness, compliance, and implementation.
Regime effectiveness. The effectiveness of an international regulatory regime can be
viewed from diverse angles. Oran R. Young (1994: 142-152) articulates six distinct
dimensions of regime effectiveness: problem-solving effectiveness, goal-attainment
14
effectiveness, behavioural effectiveness, process effectiveness, constitutive 
effectiveness, and evaluative effectiveness. Problem-solving effectiveness is a measure 
of the extent to which an international regime operates to solve the problems that it was 
established to solve. Goal-attainment effectiveness asks whether an international 
regime’s (stated or unstated) goals are achieved. Behaviour effectiveness refers to the 
effect of an international regime on the behaviour of the national authorities that 
established it or of the regulatory targets under their jurisdiction. Process effectiveness 
refers to the extent to which the provisions of an international regime are incorporated 
into the member countries’ domestic legal and political system, as well as the extent to 
which those subject to the regime’s rules actually comply with the requirements. 
Constitutive effectiveness asks whether an international regime gives rise to new social 
practices. Finally, evaluative effectiveness concerns the extent to which an international 
regime produces the desired results in a cost-effective manner.
In this study, which is based on Young’s first dimension of regime effectiveness, the 
effectiveness of an international regulatory regime is defined as the extent to which it 
attains its fundamental objectives.9 Therefore, the BIS-standard regime is considered 
effective when it has achieved the objectives of the Basel Accord. It may not always be 
easy to measure regime effectiveness of this kind; the lack of necessary economic data 
may hinder the evaluation of an international regulatory regime’s effectiveness. 
However, this measurement problem may be solved to some extent by examining 
observable effects of an international regulatory regime (that is, whether its members 
adjust their behaviour to comply with the ultimate objectives) (see Keohane, et al. 1994: 
7-8; Miles, etal. 2001:4-13).10
It is worth noting that the concept of regime effectiveness is distinguished from that 
of regime consequences, which refer to the more general impacts of international 
regimes, whether intended or not, issue-specific or general. An international regime may 
affect not only the behaviour of those regulated by it, but also the distribution of 
capacities, the cognition of different factors, or the values and interests of participants 
and non-participants (Zum 1998: 632). These factors may be influenced by the regime 
in ways that enhance its effectiveness. However, the operation of the regime may also 
give rise to factors that reduce its effectiveness. Therefore, while the consequences of an
9 This definition o f regime effectiveness is commonly employed in environmental studies. See, 
for example, Jacobson and Weiss (1998b: 5), Miles, et al. (2001: 4-13), and Victor, Raustiala, 
and Skolnikoff(1998: 6).
10 The problem-solving effectiveness o f an international regime may require its effectiveness in 
the other five dimensions.
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international regime affect its effectiveness, the relationship between the two can be 
either positive or negative.
Compliance: cosmetic, and comprehensive. Most studies of compliance with 
international regimes define compliance in line with Young’s (1979: 3) 
conceptualisation of compliance in his groundbreaking research on compliance with 
international public authority. He suggests that compliance occurs “when the actual 
behaviour of a given subject conforms to prescribed behaviour,” and, inversely, 
noncompliance or violation refers to the state in which “actual behaviour departs 
significantly from prescribed behaviour.” In other words, this traditional definition of 
compliance/noncompliance narrowly focuses on behavioural conformity to explicit 
provisions of international regimes.
This narrow definition of compliance seems useful for empirical studies, as it may 
increase the operational clarity of the concept by distinguishing compliance from 
noncompliance in clear and replicable ways (Mitchell 1994: 429). However, restricting 
a study to formal compliance with the explicit provisions of international regimes may 
fail to address the effectiveness of the regime. Given that the provisions of an 
international regime are generally constructed in ways to achieve its ultimate objectives, 
a high degree of formal compliance may typically be positively related with the 
effectiveness of the regime. Yet, where an international regime is inadequately designed, 
a high level of compliance can be easily attained without a substantive impact on the 
problems the regime was established to solve (Jacobson and Weiss 1998b: 5; Simmons 
1998: 77-78). Alternatively, international regimes where formal compliance levels are 
high may explicitly require a low degree of behavioural change (see Downs, et al. 1996: 
382-387). The usefulness of a narrow definition of compliance becomes more doubtful 
when addressing the effectiveness of a regulatory regime where cosmetic compliance 
occurs.
The term cosmetic compliance refers to the state in which the behaviour of national
authorities and regulatory targets is formally in compliance with the explicit provisions
of the international regime of concern (in other words, national authorities incorporate
them into the domestic regulations and the regulatory targets are in compliance with the
provisions), but the authorities manipulate the implementation of the regime to allow
the regulatory targets to defect from its objectives. In this situation, the formal
compliance of the national authorities and the regulatory targets does not make an actual
contribution to the regime’s effectiveness. Cosmetic compliance may not be regarded as
16
noncompliance from a legal point of view. However, it can nullify the effectiveness of 
an international regulatory regime by hindering it from solving the problem it was 
formed to solve. Thus, cosmetic compliance should be considered a form of 
noncompliance in terms of regime effectiveness.
The term comprehensive compliance refers to the state in which the behaviour of 
national authorities and regulatory targets is in line with not only the formal provisions 
but also with the ultimate objectives of the international regulatory regime of concern.11 
Comprehensive compliance augments the effectiveness of the regime by facilitating the 
achievement of its objectives. The distinction between these two different types of 
compliance makes it easier to evaluate the significance of compliance in terms of 
regime effectiveness.
Implementation. In an influential study of domestic policy, Daniel A. Mazmanian and 
Paul A. Sabatier (1983: 4) conceptualised (policy) implementation as “those events and 
activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative public policy directives, which 
include the effort to administer and the substantive impacts on people and events.” This 
study adopts this common-sense definition of implementation, but refines it to some 
extent to increase its adaptability for international regulatory regimes. In this study, the 
implementation of an international regulatory regime refers to activities or measures of 
national authorities through which the provisions of the regime are put into practice. 
This concept of implementation highlights three salient points.
Firstly, the implementation of international regulatory regimes is not necessarily 
positively related to their effectiveness. Implementation is simply a process through 
which international regulatory regimes are put into practice. It may be carried out in a 
way that strengthens comprehensive compliance, but also may be a way to induce 
cosmetic compliance. Accordingly, the nature of compliance with an international 
regulatory regime is influenced by the attitude of those who implement it towards its 
objectives and provisions.12 Secondly, the concept of implementation brings the 
intended behaviour of the actors into focus, while compliance can occur without 
implementation. When the rules prescribed in an international regulatory regime match
11 The definition o f comprehensive compliance is similar to the concept o f “substantial 
compliance”, which was used by Jacobson and Weiss (1998b: 4)
12 Andrew Gouldson and Joseph Murphy (1998: 15-16) point out that agencies and actors who 
are responsible for implementation can exercise discretion in such a way as that the key 
principles and objectives o f a policy are interpreted, prioritised and delivered, thereby 
determining the nature o f policy as practice.
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the existing behaviour of the regulatory targets, implementation is not necessary and 
compliance is automatic (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002: 539). In other words, to use 
Arild UnderdaPs (1998: 6) terms, “compliance by default” does not require 
implementation.13 Compliance can also occur due to uncontrollable external events.14 
Therefore, compliance is not always the causal outcome of implementation. Finally, this 
definition of implementation confines it to activities carried out by national authorities, 
which is a common usage of implementation in literature.15 Although activities or 
measures that are employed by other actors—domestic or foreign—affect 
implementation, they are not regarded as implementation per se.
1.2 Theories of compliance
What determines compliance with international regulatory regimes? Literature on 
compliance is generally categorised into two schools of thought, which have been 
labelled the “management school” and the “enforcement school” since a seminar debate 
occurred between Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (1993, 1995) and George 
W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom (1996) in the mid-1990s. These two 
schools are vividly differentiated by the compliance strategies they propose. The 
management school emphasises problem-solving approaches, such as the improvement 
of dispute resolution procedures, capacity building, or the development of transparent 
information systems, while the enforcement school stresses coercive measures against 
noncompliant states by other states.16 However, this simple categorisation of the 
literature does not fully capture the relevant literary contributions to compliance study, 
namely on harmonisation/convergence and on the effect of international institutions on 
state behaviour. In addition, management theorists do not pay much attention to the 
issue of why states comply, arguing that compliance with international agreements is
13 The level o f compliance with international treaties in the area o f tariffs or arms control is high 
because most treaties required states to make only modest departures from what they would 
have done in the absence o f the treaties (Downs, et al. 1996: 380).
14 For example, the economic collapse o f the Soviet Union caused its compliance with a number 
of environmental agreements (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002: 539).
15 See, for example, Jacobson and Weiss (1995), Simmons (1998), and Underdal (1998).
16 For the work from the management school, see Chayes and Chayes (1993), Chayes and
Chayes (1995), and Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell (1998). For the work from the enforcement 
school, see, Dom and Fulton (1997), Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996), and Oye (1986a). A 
few scholars argue that the compliance strategies proposed by the two schools are in practice 
complementary. See, for example, Tallberg (2002).
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generally quite good;17 meanwhile, the enforcement approach tends to assume that 
international regimes are designed to solve collective action problems, even though 
there exist international regimes established for different purposes (see Botcheva and 
Martin 2001: 3). I review the body of compliance literature by categorising it into three 
broad perspectives—systemic, market-based, and domestic—according to the source of 
compliance pressure.
The systemic perspective
Systemic theorists conceive states as rational actors that behave only to further their 
own interests in the anarchic structure of the international system. States make 
compliance decisions based on cost/benefit calculations. Meanwhile, 
compliance/noncompliance of states may have an effect on other states’ interests. 
Accordingly, states that will suffer from negative externalities generated by 
noncompliance by others may have the incentive to put pressure on them to comply.
The systemic perspective argues that this compliance pressure from foreign states on 
other states may ensure their compliance by raising the costs of noncompliance. In this 
study, this compliance pressure is labelled the externality-based compliance mechanism.
States may voluntarily comply with international regimes without external 
compulsion if compliance increases their interests. For instance, in regimes whose 
nature is a coordination game, states have a common interest in avoiding a particular 
outcome. Such a regime may be difficult to establish when states disagree about the 
choice of preferred equilibrium. Yet, once established, compliance with the regime tends 
to be self-enforcing, because any state that departs from it would hurt only itself. One 
example of a coordination regime is the rule of the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, which requires every flight control centre to have enough English- 
speaking staff on duty to direct pilots (Stein 1982: 313-315).
However, international regimes whose nature is a collaboration game face the 
problem of monitoring and compliance. In the collaboration game, which can be 
typically depicted by the Prisoners’ Dilemma, actors have mixed motives: to cooperate, 
and to defect. Each actor prefers mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD), but 
also successful cheating (DC) to mutual cooperation and mutual defection to 
victimisation by another’s cheating (CD). Overall, each actor’s preference ordering is:
17 Management theorists focus on finding factors that hinder compliance and how to improve it.
19
DOCC>DD>CD. In short, even though the actors can gain from cooperation, they can 
gain even more from defection. Therefore, collaboration-game regimes are vulnerable to 
defection (Oye 1986b: 7-8; Stein 1982: 304-308, 312-313). For example, a state may 
increase its interests in an international trading regime when it exports to foreign 
markets but it closes its own markets to foreign countries. Likewise, in an international 
monetary regime, a state may strengthen its international competitiveness by devaluing 
its currency unilaterally (Gilpin 2001: 90). The prospect of compliance may become 
gloomier if states seek not only absolute gains but also relative gains (see Grieco
1 o
1988). In these circumstances, punishments exacted by states on others for 
noncompliance through a means such as tit-for-tat (see Axelrod 1984) may ensure 
compliance, as they raise the costs of noncompliance.19
According to Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996: 382-387), the magnitude of 
enforcement needed to ensure compliance increases in collaboration-game regimes as 
what they call “depth of cooperation,” the extent to which an international regime 
requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence, grows. They 
introduce a bilateral trade-game model, in which the temptation to cheat rises rapidly 
along with the cooperativeness of a treaty, while the treaty benefits rise less rapidly. The 
increase in the ratio of the benefit of defecting to that of cooperating suggests that 
increasingly severe punishment is necessary to prevent defection as the benefits of the 
treaty and corresponding restrictiveness of its requirements increase. Therefore, they 
argue that the punishment for noncompliance has to hurt defecting states to a point at 
least equal to that which could be gained by the violation.
Moreover, international regimes may not be always uniformly Pareto-superior to 
non-cooperative national policies (Gilpin 2001: 86; Simmons 2001: 591). Some 
international regimes may be established by the dominant state or by a limited group of 
powerful states in order to promote their own interests. Such a regime may be 
considered generally benign if a majority of states can benefit from compliance with the 
regime. However, some states may be reluctant to comply without compulsion, because 
their costs of compliance may exceed the benefits gained due to compliance (not 
because they may gain more from defection), while their noncompliance generates
18 While neoliberals emphasise absolute gains that states obtain from cooperation, realists focus 
on both absolute and relative gains. Duncan Snidal (1991) argues that relative gains impede 
cooperation in a special case o f the two-state interaction, in which the actors have a high 
concern for relative gains and nearly disregard absolute gains, while the significance o f relative 
gains is attenuated where there are more than two states or where states care about a mixture o f  
absolute and relative gains.
19 The enforcement school is generally in line with this argument.
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negative externalities for others. In such a situation, compliance of these states may be 
forced by other states that have an interest in their compliance. The control of money 
laundering may provide one example, although it is not a highly institutionalised regime. 
Some small states (for example, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, or Luxembourg) and some 
developing economies had a number of reasons not to adopt tight anti-money 
laundering regulations. Nevertheless, led by the United States (with Europe’s eventual 
support), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries created the Financial Action Task Force in 1989; the task force pressured both 
its members and non-members to implement stricter controls over money laundering.
As a result, a large number of countries, including almost all industrialised economies, 
agreed by the early 2000s that money laundering should be considered a crime 
(Simmons 2001: 605-609).
It is worth noting that both schools of systemic theorists, the realists and the 
neoliberals, emphasises the role of foreign states in ensuring compliance through 
pressure, despite the difference in their views of international regimes. Realists argue 
that international regimes are epiphenomena of the international power distribution. The 
dominant state in the international system establishes international regimes in 
accordance with its own interests, and, accordingly, it forces other states to comply with 
the regimes. The theory of hegemonic stability offers a classic example of the realist 
argument (see Gilpin 1981; Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976). On the other hand, 
neoliberals view international regimes as decentralised institutions that provide joint 
gains to the member states. They argue that international regimes can enhance the 
prospect of punishment of noncompliant states through retaliation based on reciprocity 
by other member states or through penalisation by third parities of those with bad 
reputations, by providing information about states’ compliance or by linking issues to 
one another (in other words, by creating open-ended Prisoners’ Dilemma) (Axelrod and 
Keohane 1986: 237-238, 249-250; Keohane 1984: 98-106,1992: 178).20 While realists 
and neoliberals disagree on the centrality of the source of compliance pressure, they do 
agree that compliance may be enhanced by pressure on states from other states that will 
suffer from the negative externalities of their noncompliance.
20 Mitchell (1994) and Botcheva and Martin (2001: 11-12) argue that even within a single issue 
area an international regime with well-designed compliance systems can facilitate compliance.
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The market-based perspective
The market-based perspective argues that market forces can facilitate compliance with 
international regulatory regimes that are accepted by the market. Rules established by 
an international regulatory regime may provide a focal point for market actors against 
which they can evaluate the competitiveness of the relevant regulatory targets. If market 
participants accept the rules as reliable, those who do not conform to them may be 
considered non-competitive by market participants and accordingly may be penalised. 
Market pressures to comply with the regime’s rules can appear in diverse forms—for 
example, differentiated credit ratings, borrowing spreads, or asset allocations. The term 
market compliance mechanism in this study refers specifically to compliance pressure 
based on such competitive pressure from markets.
It should be noted that although the market-based perspective highlights competitive 
pressures from markets, it is not bound by the rigidity of the “race-to-the-bottom” thesis. 
The thesis claims that fierce competition generated by the globalisation of the world 
economy tends to produce a strong tendency towards regulatory laxity across 
countries.21 However, there are a number of studies to provide counterevidence to this 
thesis.22 Indeed, it is widely recognised that the optimal system for economic activities 
is not a regulation-free world, although there is little agreement on what is or would be 
optimal regulation.
The market compliance mechanism has attracted substantial attention from 
international financial institutions as a means to promote compliance with “international 
(or global) standards” or “best practices.” For instance, the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF), which comprises key financial regulators and supervisors worldwide, has put 
significant emphasis on enhancing market incentives as a main strategy to foster the 
implementation of “the 12 key international standards for sound financial system,” 
which consist of Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial 
Policies, Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, Special Data Dissemination 
Standard/General Data Dissemination System, Principles and Guidelines for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor Rights System, Principles of Corporate Governance, 
International Accounting Standards, International Standards on Auditing, Core 
Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, The Forty Recommendations
21 See, for example, Mckenzie and Lee (1991) and Chan and Ross (2003)
22 See, for example, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004), Busse (2004), Glyn (2004) and Prakash 
and Kollman (2003).
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of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, and Insurance 
Core Principles (see FSF 2000a, 2000b, 2001).23
There are a few findings supporting the market-based perspective. A study by the 
Institute of International Finance indicates that subscribers to the of Special Data 
Dissemination Standard, set by the IMF, are able to borrow at a rate that is 200-300 
basis point (b.p.) lower than the rate paid by non-subscribers (FSF 2001: 5). Rafael La 
Porta, et al. (2002) argue that better protection of outside investors of firms, which is a 
key element of the Insolvency and Corporate Governance Standards, tends to promote 
the firms’ corporate value; well-protected outside investors are willing to pay more for 
the financial assets of the firms, as they expect to receive more of the firms’ profits as 
interest or dividends as opposed to being expropriated by the entrepreneurs who control 
the firms. In addition, Simmons (2001) argues that market forces may provide 
incentives for small countries to emulate the unilateral regulatory innovations of the 
dominant state (the United States) in the international financial system. She presents the 
case of accounting standards for public offerings as an example; a number of foreign 
firms have adopted the U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, which are the 
standards any firm listed on a U.S. exchange must use.24
A noteworthy element of the market-based perspective is that the importance of the 
implementation capacity of national authorities in ensuring compliance by regulatory- 
target firms may decrease under the effective operation of the market compliance 
mechanism. Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante, and Nlandu Mamingi (1998), for 
example, show that pollution control regulations were effectively implemented in 
developing countries—Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines—despite the 
incompetent implementation capacities of the national regulatory authorities. They 
argue that in lieu of fines or penalties used by the regulatory authorities, capital markets 
penalised firms with adverse environmental incidents and rewarded firms with positive 
environmental news. Market-based theorists do not preclude the possibility that national 
authorities concerned with the competitiveness of firms in their jurisdiction may lead 
the firms to comply with international regulatory regimes. Yet, they stress regulatory- 
target firms’ voluntary compliance, which is induced by the direct effect of market
23 eStadnards Forum, which is a private entity, provides information on more than eighty 
countries’ compliance with the twelve standards on its website, 
www.estandardsforum.com/servlet/home.
24 Simmons (2001) also attributes the international harmonisation o f bank capital regulations on 
the BIS standard mainly to market pressures.
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pressures on their own compliance-related cost/benefit calculations.
The domestic perspective
Domestic politics may also affect compliance. In this view, government policy is 
influenced by the underlying identities, interests, and power of domestic groups who 
constantly put pressure on the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with 
their preferences (Moravcsik 1997: 518). Domestic groups that have ideological 
preferences for, or economic interests in, certain international regulatory regimes may 
pressure their governments to comply with the regimes. Andrew Moravcsik (1995), for 
example, shows that international human rights regimes could be remarkably successful 
in western Europe due to the maturity of civil societies, which pressured their 
governments to comply with the regimes in order to improve their own democratic 
systems. In this study, such pressure from domestic groups for compliance with 
international regimes is termed the domestic compliance mechanism.
The effectiveness of the domestic compliance mechanism depends on the capacity 
of domestic groups to influence government policy. In a study of immigration policy in 
Japan, Amy Gurowitz (1999) argues that the attitude of government, which has its own 
preference towards international standards, is an important variable that affects the 
influencing ability of domestic groups. The Japanese government had become sensitive 
to the issue of internationalisation and international reputation since the 1990s. Pro­
immigrant groups could induce changes in Japanese migration law by exploiting the 
sensitivities of the government towards international standards, asserting that 
government policy did not meet the international standard. Meanwhile, in a study of 
human rights campaigns, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) show that 
domestic groups that lack domestic channels to influence government policy can use 
international allies (transnational actors) to apply pressure to the government to change 
policies from the outside.
Xiuan Dai (2005) provides a framework to analyse governments’ decisions
concerning compliance, with a focus on the domestic distributional consequences of
international regimes. Compliance with an international regime has domestic
distributional consequences. Within a country, some groups may gain while others may
lose due to the government’s degree of compliance with the regime. Trade treaties, for
instance, affect import competing firms and consumers differently. Meanwhile,
domestic constituents have the power to sanction the government through various
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mechanisms, because national leaders should be accountable to a variety of 
constituencies with competing claims in order to remain in office. Therefore, in making 
a decision on the degree of compliance with an international regime, policymakers have 
to consider how it may affect the welfare of each different group of constituents. On the 
one hand, large interest groups that have significant electoral influence may induce the 
government to make the compliance decision biased to their interests. On the other hand, 
compliance decisions may reflect special interests if they are better informed about the 
policy process vis-a-vis other groups.25 Accordingly, Dai argues, a government’s 
compliance decision is determined by the electoral leverage of domestic constituencies 
and their informational status.
Although the domestic perspective stresses compliance pressure from domestic 
groups, it, along with other compliance perspective, also pays attention to the role of 
international regimes. International regimes may create focal points in the domestic 
arena (Checkel 2001: 558). International organisations may also increase the number of 
those who favour compliance through a means such as writing compliance provisions 
into international agreements and providing the information to potential victims of 
noncompliance. Alternatively, they may enhance the capacity of domestic groups to 
monitor their governments by publishing information associated with compliance and 
making it easier to assess the governments’ compliance or by publishing government 
reports and thereby enabling domestic groups to check them (Dai 2005: 384). In this 
way, international regimes may facilitate domestic enforcement of compliance.
Of note is that rationalists and constructivists hold different views of actors’ 
preferences. Rationalists assume the stability of preferences. Actors’ interests may 
change, but change occurs slowly and as a function of the new incentive structures they 
face (Checkel 2001: 556). Accordingly, for rationalists, the existence of pre-formed 
domestic groups that favour compliance is essential in generating domestic enforcement. 
In contrast, constructivists argue that compliance can occur due to changes in the actors’ 
preferences, which generate new patterns of behaviour, through social learning (Checkel 
2001: 560-564).26 Transnational networks such as epistemic communities, which are 
“network[s] of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or
25 The relatively better-informed group is more likely to determine its approval o f the 
government based on the actual policy rather than on noise in the policy process (Dai 2005).
6 The literature on policy transfer provides rich analyses o f important issues in regard to 
learning, such as who leams, what is learned, and what effects on resulting policies emerge as a 
result o f learning. For a review o f the literature, see Bennett and Howlett (1992).
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issue-area” (Haas 1992: 3), are important sources that provide learning. For 
constructivists, international regimes may generate new domestic supporters of 
compliance by changing their preferences (Checkel 2001: 567-570; Haas 1992: 4).
1.3 The argument
This study demonstrates that while all three case countries—Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan—formally complied with the BIS standard throughout the 1990s and the early 
2000s, comprehensive compliance occurred only in Korea and Taiwan for limited time 
periods. The regulatory authorities in all these countries incorporated the BIS standard 
into the domestic regulations, and most banks in each of the countries met its formal 
provisions during the 1990s and the early 2000s. However, the formal compliance by 
the banks made little contribution to their actual capital soundness, the key objective of 
the Basel Accord. The national regulatory authorities even adopted policies that had an 
adverse effect on the banks’ capital soundness in order to ensure that they complied with 
the BIS standard formally. Comprehensive compliance occurred only in Taiwan during 
the early 1990s and in Korea after the financial crisis of 1997. Did the compliance 
mechanisms indicated by the three perspectives operate for the BIS standard? What 
factors explain the differences in compliance between these countries and over different 
time periods?
Explicit or potential compliance pressures from foreign countries and from the 
markets—along with the domestic compliance mechanism where it operated—played a 
key role in inducing formal compliance with the BIS standard in all three countries. The 
regulatory authorities in all the countries expected that banks not complying with it 
would be penalised in the foreign markets or in international financial markets. This 
concern for banks’ international business activities gave the regulatory authorities a 
strong incentive to adopt and maintain the BIS standard. These external compliance 
pressures also led, to some extent, to formal compliance with the BIS standard by banks, 
although the primary incentive for the banks for formal compliance stemmed from 
potential penalties from their regulatory authorities.
However, the compliance pressure from foreign countries and the pressure from the 
markets were not effective in ensuring comprehensive compliance with the BIS 
standard. Foreign countries forced or encouraged the case countries to comply with the 
BIS standard formally. Yet, the costs to a country of requiring a foreign country to 
comprehensively comply with the BIS standard were higher than simply requiring
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formal compliance. As a result, there was no substantial pressure from foreign countries 
on the three case countries to comply with the BIS standard comprehensively 
throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. There was one exception: Korea under the 
IMF programme. In this case, the costs for the IMF to force Korea to comprehensively 
comply with the BIS standard were lowered since Korea was bailed out by the IMF. Yet, 
even in this case, the IMF could not fully impose its policy measures on the country due 
to strong domestic opposition.
Meanwhile, whereas there was market pressure on banks in the case countries to 
formally comply with the BIS standard, the markets did not put pressure on the banks to 
comply with it comprehensively. For the market compliance mechanism to operate for 
the BIS standard, market participants should have had to agree not only on its generic 
principles and objectives, but also on its detailed rules. However, market participants 
did not credit or sufficiently value the BIS standard, which was established by national 
regulators, with a reliable regulatory framework. Consequently, there was no market 
pressure for comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard. In fact, the market 
pressure for formal compliance with the BIS standard was not compliance pressure 
based on the market compliance mechanism referred to in this study. The market 
pressure was based on market participants’ expectations that banks failing to comply 
with official regulations would be punished by the regulatory authorities. In other words, 
the market pressure was a reflection of the domestic implementation of the BIS standard 
in the three case countries.
Pressure to achieve comprehensive compliance arose mainly when the domestic 
compliance mechanism operated. The operation of the domestic compliance mechanism 
was based on the voluntary agreement by domestic groups on both the objectives and 
the specific rules of the BIS standard; as a result, the compliance mechanism operated 
for comprehensive compliance with it. A key potential domestic group to support 
compliance with the BIS standard was the national bank regulatory authority. 
Accordingly, the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism in a country was 
affected by the compatibility between the BIS standard and the country’s bank 
regulatory arrangements. Where the compatibility was low, the domestic compliance 
mechanism did not operate effectively, even if the regulatory authority helped banks’ 
formal compliance due to external compliance pressures. Conversely, where the 
compatibility was high, the regulatory authority was willing to achieve comprehensive 
compliance. Comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard depended primarily on
the willingness and the capacity of the national regulatory authorities.
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Yet, the implementation of the BIS standard by national regulatory authorities was 
influenced by domestic economic and political conditions. In particular, this study 
identifies three salient domestic factors: the capacity to deal with compliance failures by 
banks, the domestic distributional effects of compliance, and the independence of the 
regulatory authorities. A country’s capacity to deal with the negative consequences of 
the banks’ failure to formally comply with the BIS standard was an important 
precondition for the bank regulatory authority to implement the standard in earnest. A 
stricter implementation of the BIS standard could increase the number of formal 
compliance failures by banks. Therefore, when a country had no capacity to effectively 
deal with the negative consequences of compliance failures by banks, the government 
could not implement the BIS standard strictly. This capacity problem frequently 
stemmed from political sources rather than resource constraints.
Even if a country did not face the substantial negative consequences of formal 
compliance failures, the regulatory authority had to overcome domestic opposition to 
compliance, not only from banks but also from other domestic groups adversely 
affected by compliance with the BIS standard, in order to achieve comprehensive 
compliance. Where the capital ratios of banks were low, the costs of compliance with 
the BIS standard were diffused from the banks to firms as the banks reduced loans in 
order to comply with the BIS standard. As a result, opposition to the strict 
implementation of the BIS standard emerged from the firms, as well as from the banks. 
In this situation, even if the regulatory authority overcame opposition from the banks, 
the implementation of the BIS standard was affected by the degree of independence of 
the regulatory authority from the pressure to protect the firms. When a regulatory 
authority was vulnerable to the pressure, it could not implement the BIS standard 
strictly in spite of its own willingness. Only where the domestic compliance mechanism 
operated for the BIS standard and these three domestic factors did not negatively affect 
its operation, could a high degree of comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard 
be achieved.
Before proceeding further, I should be explicit about what this study does not try to 
do. First, this research does not attempt to conduct an in-depth analysis of banks’ own
97regulatory capital arbitrage independent from regulatory policies. Banks’ regulatory
27 One primary example o f regulatory capital arbitrage by banks is cherry-picking, which refers 
to the practice o f shifting the portfolio’s composition towards lower quality credits within a 
particular risk-weight category (Jackson, et al. 1999: 22-26). For more practices o f regulatory 
capital arbitrage by banks, see Jackson et al.(1999: 22-26).
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capital arbitrage may be considered a form of cosmetic compliance with the BIS 
standard, and it is a crucial concern of economists and bank regulators. However, in this 
study, the analysis of measures of cosmetic compliance confines its focus mainly to 
those stemming from regulatory policies.28 Second, this study is not intended to be a 
defence of or support for “international standards” or “best practice.” This study does 
not argue that a country’s comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard necessarily 
increases its welfare or the global welfare. Although the stability of the international 
banking system may be a public good, it is not clear whether comprehensive 
compliance with the BIS standard is always positively related to it.29 The BIS standard 
is simply viewed in this study as a benchmark to understand compliance with 
international regulatory regimes, and to explain the factors that affect decisions 
regarding compliance with them.
1.4 Methods and organisation
The main methodology used in this research is a comparative study. Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan are selected as the case countries for four reasons. First, the traditional bank 
capital adequacy regulations in the three Asian countries until the late 1980s suggest 
that these countries’ regulatory authorities had little need for the adoption of and 
compliance with the BIS standard from the perspective of bank regulation per se when 
the BIS standard was established in 1988.30 Whereas there was growing emphasis on 
bank capital adequacy in Western countries—especially in the United States and the 
United Kingdom—through the early and mid-1980s, the case countries paid little 
attention to the issue during this period. Nevertheless, all the three countries adopted the 
BIS standard and banks in the countries complied with it at least formally throughout 
the 1990s and the early 2000s. Therefore, why these countries adopted the BIS standard 
and banks in the countries formally complied with it is an important question for the 
study of compliance with international regulatory regimes.
28 Successful regulatory capital arbitrage by banks may have reduced the need for regulatory 
forbearance. This may be a potential problem o f this research. However, this study deals with 
this problem by investigating regulatory authorities’ attitudes towards the BIS standard.
29 In fact, there was a growing consensus that the BIS standard was in some ways dysfunctional, 
and, as a result, the new capital adequacy framework to replace the BIS standard was 
established by the Basel Committee in 2004. However, there was no formal interstate agreement 
about the non-efficiency o f the BIS standard and its replacement by a new capital adequacy 
framework until June 1999, when the Committee issued the first consultative paper on the new 
capital adequacy framework.
30 This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
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Secondly, there were significant differences in the three countries in the factors that 
may have influenced the operation of the three compliance mechanisms and, in turn, 
compliance with the BIS standard.31 Japanese banks’ engagement in international 
banking was far higher than Korean or Taiwanese banks. Therefore, the magnitude of 
negative externalities that would have been generated by noncompliance by these banks 
with the BIS standard varied substantially. In this regard, differences in the compliance 
pressure from foreign countries on the case countries can be expected. Banks’ 
sensitivity to market forces also varied across the countries; it was higher for Japanese 
banks than Korean or Taiwanese banks. Accordingly, the incentives for these banks to 
respond to market compliance pressures may have differed. The degree of compatibility 
between the BIS standard and bank regulatory authorities’ preferences, which was a 
potential key variable affecting the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism, 
was different across the countries; the compatibility increased in Taiwan from the late 
1980s and early 1990s, while in Korea and Japan it increased only from the late 1990s. 
Accordingly, comparison of the three cases can shed light on the effect of the degree of 
compatibility on compliance with the BIS standard.
Thirdly, these case countries also differed in the three main domestic factors that 
affected the capacity of regulatory authorities to implement the BIS standard—the 
capacity to deal with compliance failures, the domestic distributional effects of 
compliance, and the independence of the regulatory authorities.32 In addition, Japan 
was a member of the Basel Committee, which established the Basel Accord, while 
Korea and Taiwan were not. Therefore, the selection of both Japan and the countries not 
on the Basel Committee has an advantage of investigating whether formal membership 
of the BIS-standard regime influenced compliance.33
Finally, the three case countries may make “comparable” cases for, in John S. Mill’s 
(1843) term, “method of difference,” or in Adam Preseworski and Henry Teune’s (1970) 
term, “most similar systems” design. In terms of the socio-economic system, these 
countries are broadly described as “Confucian capitalism” countries, sharing the 
common cultural heritage of the Confucian tradition (such as emphasis on a strong state 
and political authority, education and self-cultivation, frugality and thrift, hard work and 
discipline, social harmony and group orientation, social civility, the role of intellectuals,
31 The differences between the case countries will be discussed in detail in later chapters.
32 The differences between the case countries will be discussed in detail in later chapters.
33 The establishment o f the Basel Accord will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
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and so forth) (Jun 1999: 192).34 The politico-economic systems of the countries share, 
to some extent, characteristics of a “developmental state”—for example, the
i f
competence of the bureaucracy. The corporate finance systems in these countries are 
commonly characterised as a bank-centred system. In addition, financial liberalisation 
was augmented in all the countries during the 1980s and the 1990s.36 Therefore, the 
selection of the three countries for comparison allows one to hold constant a large 
number of cultural, political, and economic variables in explaining their compliance 
with the BIS standard.37
The observation period of compliance is from 1988 to 2003. Compliance with the 
BIS standard during this long period may have consisted of a series of games, and they 
may have differed systemically from those of earlier phases in terms of patterns of 
actors’ participation and the distribution of their influence. Therefore, in addition to the 
cross-country comparison, this research adopts a longitudinal comparative study in 
analysing compliance with the BIS standard within a single country. The periods of 
compliance within a single country are divided according to any substantial change in 
the nature of the compliance. However, this research does not neglect the possibility that, 
even if the nature of compliance was consistent on the surface for a certain period, the 
factors explaining it may have differed over the period. The adoption of a longitudinal 
comparative study for each of the case countries increases the number of observations 
of compliance while improving the control of variables.
The state is conceived as a complex organisation, instead of a unitary entity. This 
perception of the state is helpful in addressing domestic politics surrounding compliance 
with the BIS standard. While it was the government that made a formal commitment to 
the BIS standard and incorporated it into domestic regulations, the real purpose of the 
BIS standard was not to affect state behaviour but to regulate bank behaviour. As a 
result, there was the possibility that noncompliance with the BIS standard was caused 
by implementation failures.38 The assumption of the state as a unitary actor risks the
34 For Confucian capitalism, see Berger and Hsiao (1988), Tai (1989), and Tu (1996)
35 For the developmental state, see Amsden (1989), Cheng, Haggard and Kang (1996), Evans 
(1995), Johnson (1982), Wade (1990), Weiss and Hobson (1995), and Woo (1991).
36 For financial liberalisation in the case countries, see Calder (1997), Dwyer (1997),
Rosenbluth (1989), Thurbon (2001), Woo-Cumings (1997), and Zhang (2002).
37 Japan is qualitatively different from Korea and Taiwan in terms o f economic size and level of 
economic development (see Park 1994: 6). Nonetheless, Korea and Taiwan are most developed 
economies along with Japan (and Singapore and Hong Kong) among Asian countries. Therefore, 
the selection o f these two countries along with Japan increases comparability, while maintaining 
the advantages o f making a comparison between Asian countries.
38 Robert D. Putnam (1988: 438) uses the term “involuntary defection” in referring to the
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neglect of this important cause of noncompliance. In addition, it was certain domestic 
groups that favoured compliance with the BIS standard or faced external pressures to 
comply with the BIS standard. Therefore, the conceptualisation of the state as a 
complex organisation is necessary for the study to explain the domestic politics of 
compliance.
In analysing compliance, this research focuses not only on compliance records but 
also on implementation. Given that compliance may occur without implementation, a 
compliance study concentrating exclusively on compliance records may be trapped by 
the problem of endogeneity (Downs, et al. 1996: 382-383). In contrast, the study of 
implementation may provide an analysis of the extent to which compliance records have 
intended or unintended consequences. In addition, implementation failure/success is not 
only a matter of will, but also a matter of the capacity of the implementing bodies (Hanf 
2000: 15). Accordingly, the study of implementation can provide a careful analysis of 
what factors affect compliance.
Although the main subject of this study is compliance with the BIS standard, this 
study also addresses why countries made a commitment to the BIS standard: for Japan, 
one of the countries that created the Basel Accord, the reason that the country agreed to 
establish it, and, for Korea and Taiwan, which were not formally required to adopt it, the 
reason that they made a decision to adopt the BIS standard voluntarily. It should be 
emphasised here that this research does not assume that compliance with the BIS 
standard is a mixed-motive game— in other words, a country would gain from 
compliance, while it would gain more from defection. The assumption of compliance 
with the BIS standard as a mixed-motive game hinders the analysis of the reason that 
countries not formally obliged to comply with the BIS standard did adopt it, but 
complied with it only cosmetically. The nature of commitment may make different 
patterns of demands for compliance (see Smith and Clarke 1985: 6). Thus, research 
about a country’s commitment to the BIS standard is critically important in 
understanding the country’s compliance with the BIS standard. Of course, this study 
demonstrates the awareness that compliance decisions in later stages may be different 
from initial compliance decisions at the commitment stage, due to changes in the 
compliance and implementation environments.
The following chapters are organised to provide a thorough examination of why and 
how the case countries complied with the BIS standard. Chapter 2 builds the analytical
inability o f a government to comply with an international agreement because o f the failed 
domestic ratification o f the agreement.
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framework of this research. The dependent variable of this research, the extent of 
compliance with the BIS standard, is clarified in the chapter, based on the analysis of 
the objectives and provisions of the Basel Accord and the factors affecting the 
effectiveness of its compliance. The chapter also constructs hypotheses relating to the 
operations and the compliance outcomes of the key explanatory variables, the three 
compliance mechanisms, and discusses how to test them.
It is necessary to analyse the traditions of bank regulation, including capital 
adequacy regulation, in the case countries prior to the establishment of the Basel Accord, 
because they may have affected the views of bank regulators and banks in the country. 
Chapter 3 addresses this issue, and in it, I clarify which entity had the primary authority 
in bank regulation in the case countries, focusing not only formal but also on the 
informal institutional arrangements. Then, I investigate whether the regulatory 
authorities had a strong tradition of prudential regulation and how the existing 
arrangements of bank regulation influenced the authorities’ view of the BIS standard. 
This chapter highlights the difference between bank regulators in Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan in terms of their views on the desirability of the adoption of the BIS standard.
Chapter 4 considers the role of external pressures from foreign countries and 
markets to comply with the BIS standard. The study of external compliance pressures 
addresses bank regulatory authorities’ and banks’ perception of external compliance 
pressures, as well as the actual operation of those compliance pressures. The analysis of 
compliance pressure from foreign countries begins with an examination of the 
establishment of the Basel Accord and extends into the post-establishment period. The 
analysis of compliance pressure from markets is carried out with a focus on how market 
participants assessed the BIS standard and how they incorporated banks’ compliance 
into their analysis of the banks’ soundness. Along with the previous chapter, this chapter 
provides a concrete analysis of the commitment decisions made by the bank regulatory 
authorities and banks.
Chapters 5 through 7 address in detail compliance with the BIS standard in Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan respectively. These chapters are structured similarly, assessing the 
nature of compliance with the BIS standard in the countries by examining their 
domestic regulations related to the BIS standard and comparing the regulations with the 
objectives and the provisions of the Basel Accord. The chapters analyse the effects of 
the operation of each of the three compliance mechanisms on banks’ compliance with 
the BIS standard by presenting an in-depth study of the banks’ compliance records. 
Additionally, the chapters address why the bank regulatory authorities exercised
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regulatory forbearance in implementing the BIS standard. Despite the common structure, 
each chapter is organised in such a way to highlight the major domestic factors that 
influenced compliance with the BIS standard in the country it addresses.
In the final Chapter 8 ,1 summarise the major findings of this study and 
comprehensively analyse what determined compliance with the BIS standard by 
revisiting the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 and comparing compliance in the three 
case countries. I also specify the contribution of this research to the literature on 
compliance, discussing the applicability of the findings to other issue areas, and its 
implications for international political economy (IPE) in general. This study concludes 
by making a brief comment about Basel II, the new international capital adequacy 
framework, which will replace the BIS standard from 2006.
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CHAPTER 2
Conceptual Framework
Chapter 2 outlines this study’s analytical framework to address compliance with an 
international regulatory regime whose real object is to regulate private firms, in 
particular, the BIS-standard regime. To analyse the nature of compliance with the BIS 
standard, the meaning of the effectiveness of the capital adequacy regime based on the 
BIS standard should be firmly established. Therefore, this chapter begins with an 
examination of the rationale for bank capital adequacy regulation. It then presents the 
objectives and the provisions of the Basel Accord and clarifies the conditions for 
compliance with the BIS standard to be effective in terms of its objectives. It is then 
specified how to assess the extent of compliance, the dependent variable of this research, 
by articulating the key areas to observe. Thereafter, hypotheses are constructed relating 
to the operation and the compliance outcome of each of the three compliance 
mechanisms, the key explanatory variables, and the testing of these hypotheses in the 
context of the BIS standard is then discussed.
2.1 Capital adequacy regulation
For the analysis of compliance with a regulation, the characteristics of the regulation 
should be addressed first. The BIS standard was a minimum capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) regulation for banks, which meant that banks had to maintain their capital over a 
certain level. This section analyses the rationale for capital adequacy regulation and the 
objectives and provisions of the Basel Accord, and subsequently discusses the 
accounting rules that affect the effectiveness of the capital adequacy regulation.
The case for bank regulation and the role o f bank capital
The core rationale for the (government-imposed) regulation of banks is pertinent to the 
prudential concern of the stability of financial systems. The range of negative effects of 
bank failures is not limited to directly concerned parties, such as depositors or investors. 
Banks have a pivotal position in the economy in that they manage the payments system.
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Therefore, if the banking system is placed in jeopardy, the resultant financial disruption 
is likely to cause larger negative externalities to the financial system than other financial 
institutions. Furthermore, the failure—or the perceived threat of failure—of one bank 
may make other sound banks face runs, which can culminate in a systemic crisis 
(Goodhart, et al. 1998: 10-11).39 Stability of banking is an essential pillar of general 
financial stability, which is in turn a crucial ingredient for economic growth (Barth, et al. 
2001b: 1). Martin S. Feldstein (1991: 15), a prominent Harvard economist, argues:
The banking system as a whole is a “public good” that benefits the nation over and 
above the profits that it earns for the banks’ shareholders. Systemic risks to the banking 
system are risks for the nation as a whole. Although the managements and shareholders 
o f individual institutions are, o f course, eager to protect the solvency o f their own 
institutions, they do not adequately take into account the adverse effects to the nation of 
systemic failure. Banks left to themselves will accept more risk than is optimal from a 
systemic point o f view. That is the basic case for government regulation o f banking 
activity and the establishment o f capital requirements.
Indeed, even though there is still no consensus among academics on whether banks 
need to be regulated, and, if so, how they should be regulated (see Santos 2000), 
banking is, in practice, one of the most heavily regulated industries, even among 
financial institutions.
Bank capital regulation is justified by the rationale that it will reduce the probability 
of bank insolvency. Capital provides a buffer for banks to absorb unexpected losses. 
Therefore, highly-capitalised banks are more likely to be able to withstand asset losses 
and consequently are less likely to fail. As a result, capital can provide public 
confidence. Indeed, bank regulators have traditionally asserted that “strong banks” are
39 Banks are prone to runs due to their provision o f liquidity services. To provide liquidity 
services, a bank needs to operate with a balance sheet in which the liquidation value o f its assets 
is less than the value o f liquid deposits. Under these circumstances, a bank may face a run 
without the release o f negative information about the bank or even when perfect information 
exists about the bank’s assets, given that depositors’ expectations about the value o f their 
deposits depend on their place in line at the time of withdrawal because o f the “first come, first 
served” rule. If depositors panic, they may try to withdraw their deposits before others, and this 
can force an otherwise sound bank into bankruptcy. When there is asymmetry o f information 
about banks’ assets, banks are susceptible to an additional source o f runs; the release of 
information on the value o f a bank’s assets can cause a run against the bank. Bank runs are 
costly because they force the premature liquidation of assets, thus disrupting the production 
process (Santos 2000: 5-6). Distress selling o f assets may induce insolvency in what would 
otherwise be a solvent bank, because the market is unable to assess the quality o f the assets 
being sold due to problems resulting from asymmetric information (Goodhart, et al. 1998: 11).
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those with relatively high levels of capital, while “weak banks” are highly leveraged 
(Kapstein 1992: 275-276). In addition, in most countries, bank regulators have required 
banks to hold adequate capital against potential losses arising from their business 
operations. “Adequacy” is expressed as the minimum numerical ratio which banks are 
expected to maintain (Cooke 1990: 312).
On the other hand, capital has a significant impact on the competitiveness of banks. 
Where the cost of capital surpasses marginal interest rates, a more leveraged bank 
enjoys a cheaper cost of funds. Equity is usually costlier than debt because equity is 
more risky and receives less favourable tax treatment.40 Thus, a bank with a lower 
capital level may enjoy a competitive advantage over a bank with a higher capital level 
by allowing the former to charge borrowers a lower rate of interest and making the same 
spread (profit) as highly-capitalised banks (Scott and Iwahara 1994: 5). Highly- 
capitalised banks may have to charge more to obtain the same return as a weakly- 
capitalised one. However, with asymmetric information, market participants may 
evaluate the two banks similarly, and as a result, the weak bank may increase its market 
share. Therefore, in the absence of minimal regulatory capital, there may be a tendency 
for banks to hold less than socially optimal amounts of capital, and banks with less 
capital may dominate markets (Kapstein 1992: 276).
To summarise, the main rationale of capital adequacy regulation is that the failure of 
a bank may trigger a systemic crisis. Regulatory capital requirements are justified in that 
they may reduce bank failures, and, in turn, may be conducive to the stability of 
financial systems. Also, different levels of capital between banks can have a significant 
effect on their competitiveness. This understanding of the role of capital was reflected in 
the Basel Accord.
The Basel Accord
The Basel Accord was established by the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation 
Supervisory Practices (typically called the Basel Committee) in 1988 41 The Basel 
Committee was established by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten (G10) 
countries at the end of 1974. Its members are represented by their central banks and by 
the authority with formal responsibility for the prudential supervision of the country’s 
banking business (where this is not the central bank). The Committee meets four times a
40 Interest payments are tax deductible, but dividends are not (Berger, et al. 1995: 395).
41 The Committee was renamed as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1990.
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year, and its major function has been to formulate supervisory standards and guidelines 
and recommend statements of best practice (BCBS 2002).42 The Committee presented a 
proposal for the Basel Accord in December 1987, and after a consultative process it 
published International Convergence o f Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 
which has been known as the Basel (Capital Adequacy) Accord, in July 1988. The 
Accord established a common capital adequacy framework for Committee member 
countries.
The Accord had two fundamental objectives.43 One was to strengthen the soundness 
and stability of the international banking system. The Accord was designed to prevent 
the decline of banks’ capital below a certain level. The minimum capital ratio 
requirement was expected to help banks withstand unexpected losses and therefore 
reduce the probability of their failures. The other objective was to level the playing field 
between banks. If other things are equal, disparities in national capital regulations give 
competitive advantages to banks subject to more lenient regulations (Kapstein 1992: 
276). The establishment of a common framework to measure capital adequacy and a 
common minimum capital ratio requirement was expected to diminish competitive 
inequality stemming from different capital levels.
The Accord’s capital adequacy ratio (hereafter BIS CAR) was computed by dividing 
total capital by total risk-weighted assets on a consolidated basis. Capital was divided 
into tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital was composed of permanent 
shareholders’ equity (issued and fully paid ordinary shares/common stock and perpetual 
non-cumulative preference shares) and disclosed reserves (created or increased by 
appropriations of retained earnings or other surplus, for example, share premiums, 
retained profit, general reserves and legal reserves). Tier 1 capital was the core capital, 
because its elements were common in the banking systems of all the countries, because 
it was wholly visible in the published accounts and was the basis on which most market 
judgements of capital adequacy were made, and because it had a crucial bearing on 
profit margins and a bank’s ability to compete. Tier 2 capital was the supplementary 
capital, comprising undisclosed reserves, asset revaluation reserves, general 
provisions/general loan-loss reserves, hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments and 
subordinated debt.
The sum of tier 1 and tier 2 elements formed the total capital base, but there were
42 See Tamura (2003a: ch. 2) for a detailed explanation about the role and activities o f the 
Committee.
43 The Basel Accord is available at the website o f the BIS, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ.htm.
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some restrictions. The total of tier 2 elements was limited to a maximum of 100 percent 
of the total of tier 1 elements. Subordinated term debt was limited to a maximum of 50 
percent of tier 1 elements. The amount of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves 
eligible for inclusion in capital was limited to a maximum of 1.25 percent of risk assets. 
Only 45 percent of unrealised gains on securities holdings could be included in capital. 
Goodwill was deducted from tier 1 capital. Investments in subsidiaries engaged in 
banking and financial activities that were not consolidated in national systems were 
deducted from the total capital base to prevent multiple uses of the same capital 
resources in different parts of a banking group.44 Banks’ holdings of capital issued by 
other banks and financial institutions— in other words, double-gearing—were deducted 
from their capital bases, but, where no deduction was applied, banks’ holdings of other 
banks’ capital instruments bore a risk weight of 100 percent.
The capital adequacy framework adopted a weighted-risk ratio, in which capital was 
related to different categories of assets or off-balance sheet exposures, weighted 
according to broad categories of relative risk. Five categories of risk weight (0, 10, 20, 
50, and 100 percent) were used, and this categorisation was based on credit risk (the risk 
of counterparty failure) and country transfer risk, which was a further aspect of credit 
risk. In this categorisation, countries were classified into two groups, OECD and non- 
OECD, and claims on OECD countries were allocated lower risk weights. Off-balance- 
sheet engagements were converted to credit risk equivalents by multiplying the nominal 
principal amounts by a credit conversion factor (0, 20, 50 or 100 percent), the resulting 
amounts then being weighted according to the nature of the counterparty. National 
authorities could choose either the current exposure method or the original exposure 
method in assessing the credit risk on interest and exchange rate related items.
A required minimum CAR was set at 8 percent. This capital adequacy framework 
was intended to be applied to internationally active banks. International banks 
incorporated in all Committee countries were expected to meet the BIS standard in full 
by the end of 1992. During a transitional period employed to assist banks in meeting the 
standard, an interim standard was set and banks were required to improve their CARs to 
7.25 percent by the end of 1990.
The Committee introduced an amendment to the 1988 Basel Accord in 1996 to 
incorporate market risks (that is, risks of losses in on- and off-balance-sheet positions 
arising from movements in market prices), and Committee countries implemented the
44 Assets representing investments in subsidiaries whose capital was deducted from that o f the 
parent were not included in the total risk assets in computing the BIS CAR.
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1996 amendment from the end of 1997. However, this research mainly focuses on the 
original 1988 Basel Accord. This is because the 1996 amendment maintained the core 
elements of the 1988 Accord, because it was not implemented in Korea until 2002 and a 
limited number of Korean banks were applied to the amendment,45 and because, even 
though Japan implemented it from the end of (fiscal year) 1997, an extremely small 
proportion of Japanese banks were regulated by the 1996 amendment.46
The effectiveness o f  the BIS standard
The Basel Accord did not cover all areas that affected CARs of banks. Consequently, its 
effectiveness in achieving its objectives required more than faithful compliance with its 
explicit provisions. Appropriate accounting standards in the areas that influenced the 
capital level of banks had to be in place for their BIS CARs to be a meaningful guide to 
their strengths. Some of the most critical areas were the rules of provisioning and asset 
classification. Their importance to the effectiveness of the Accord was recognised by the 
Basel Committee itself.
The soundness of a bank depends largely on the level of provisions held by the bank 
outside its capital against assets of doubtful value (BCBS 1988: 2). General, unforeseen 
risks are to be covered by capital. Meanwhile, losses that arise or are likely to arise from 
certain assets are to be covered by specific provisions built up against those losses 
(Dziobek, et al. 1995: 11). In other words, capital is supposed to be used as a buffer 
against unexpected losses, which specific provisions do not cover; therefore, a bank has 
to maintain an adequate level of specific provisions against expected losses for its BIS 
CAR to reflect its ability to withstand unforeseen losses.
However, the Accord did not set detailed rules of provisioning, although it 
prohibited banks from including specific provisions in the regulatory capital. As a result, 
national authorities had full discretion in deciding the level of provisions that banks 
were required to maintain. Where the level of provisions held by banks was not 
sufficient to absorb expected losses, the banks’ tier 1 capital was inflated as much as the 
difference between the adequate level of specific provisions and the actual level. In this
45 In Korea, the 1996 amendment was applied only to banks whose assets and liabilities under 
trading exceeded 10 percent of their total assets or one trillion won; this did not include regional 
banks (FSS Weekly Newsletter, 5 January 2002). In Taiwan, the 1996 amendment was adopted in 
1998.
46 As o f the end o f September 2003, the 1996 amendment was applied to only 9 out o f a total of 
132 Japanese banks.
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situation, the banks’ BIS CARs could not be a meaningful indicator of their soundness, 
as the ratios were boosted at the expense of provisioning (Dziobek, et al. 1995: 13).
Required levels of provisions for certain assets are usually determined by their risk 
levels, and, as a result, standards on asset classification also affect the reliability of BIS 
CARs of banks in reflecting their soundness. If a country’s regulations for asset 
classification underestimate the risks of assets, the required level of specific provisions 
will be lower than the level adequate to cover losses from the assets, or such provisions 
may be categorised as general provisions. In either case, the result is the inflation of the 
BIS CARs of banks in the country: in the first case through an increase in tier 1 capital, 
while in the second case through a rise in tier 2 capital. Also, inadequate disclosure of 
the actual volume of risky assets, including non-performing loans (NPLs), artificially 
increases BIS CARs of banks by inflating income. Thus, adequate rules for asset 
classification and provisioning were a critical pre-condition for compliance with the BIS 
standard to be effective.47
2.2 The observation of compliance
The dependent variable of this research is the extent of compliance, which ranges from 
comprehensive compliance to noncompliance. In analysing a country’s compliance with 
the BIS standard, this research explores whether it was implemented in the country in 
line with its objectives—the strengthening of the stability of the international banking 
system, and the diminishing of competitive inequality among international banks. An 
increase in the soundness of banks in a country has a positive effect on the stability of 
the international banking system. Also, the strengthening of the capital soundness of 
banks in a country reduces competitive inequality among banks across countries, 
because the low capital adequacy of banks from certain countries is a source of 
competitive inequality 48 Accordingly, the effectiveness of the Basel Accord may have 
been achieved when the real capital ratio of banks improved. Therefore, the focus of this
47 This raises the question o f why the Basel Committee did not negotiate additional rules on 
such important areas alongside the Basel Accord. One possible answer may have been the 
difficulty for the Committee to reach agreement on such broad areas. Indeed, it took five years 
for the Committee to agree to establish the Accord. Its establishment process will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4.
48 Obviously, competitive equality among international banks cannot be achieved simply by 
their compliance with the BIS standard, even if  compliance is comprehensive. Macroeconomic 
policies such as monetary policy arrangements and fiscal treatments can have a substantial 
impact on banks’ international competitiveness (Cooke 1990: 311). However, the effect o f such 
macroeconomic policies on banks’ competitiveness is beyond the scope o f this study.
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analysis of compliance with the BIS standard is whether the BIS standard was 
implemented in a way that strengthened the actual capital soundness of banks. In 
assessing the capital soundness of banks, this study mainly addresses the following four 
areas: banks’ formal compliance, the compatibility of the national BIS CAR formula 
with the Accord, adjusted CARs, and national discretionary areas. The analysis of these 
areas includes implementation by national authorities, as well as compliance records.
Banks\formal compliance. The first step in assessing compliance with the BIS 
standard is to examine whether banks actually complied with the required regulatory 
minimum BIS CAR. The lower were compliance costs of banks, the more easily they 
could achieve higher BIS CARs and be in compliance with the required minimum CAR. 
In other words, even if most banks in a country complied with the regulatory minimum 
CAR, the compliance record per se did not necessarily show whether the compliance 
was the result of adjustments made by the banks. Therefore, this research also 
investigates the costs incurred by banks in achieving compliance with the BIS standard 
in order to understand how their compliance was achieved.
The compatibility o f  the national BIS CAR formula with the Basel Accord. A 
country’s formula of the BIS CAR calculation may have explicitly or implicitly violated 
the Basel Accord. The amount of both the numerator (capital) and the denominator 
(risk-weighted assets) of the formula could have been manipulated by national 
regulatory authorities. National regulatory authorities may have defined capital leniently, 
by including capital elements prohibited from being counted as regulatory capital in the 
Accord, or by including capital elements too ambiguous to be regarded as a violation of 
the Accord but having a negative effect on the actual soundness of the banks. Likewise, 
national regulatory authorities may have allocated inadequately low risk weights for 
certain assets.
Adjusted CARs. The reliability of the BIS CAR as an indicator of banks’ soundness
may have been undermined by national regulatory authorities’ violations of the Basel
Accord in implementing it, as discussed above. In addition, accounting standards that
were not addressed by the Accord but affected the effectiveness of its compliance (for
example, those for asset classification and provisioning) may have influenced the
credibility of banks’ BIS CAR as a meaningful guide to their capital strengths.
Therefore, I adjust disclosed BIS CARs of banks by taking into account such factors
that affected the actual capital soundness of the banks and estimate their actual CARs.
The comparison between disclosed BIS CARs and adjusted CARs shows the extent to
which the BIS CARs are artificially inflated without an increase in the banks’ actual
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soundness. Accordingly, the estimation of adjusted CARs is expected to demonstrate 
quantitatively whether compliance with the BIS standard in a country was effective in 
terms of the objectives of the Accord.
National discretionary areas. The Basel Accord allowed for a degree of national 
discretion in certain areas of its application. National differences in the areas may not 
have had a substantial impact on the effectiveness of compliance with the BIS standard. 
However, they may have reflected the attitudes of the national authorities towards the 
BIS standard. Those who adopted stricter rules in the areas at their discretion may have 
had a stronger incentive to use the BIS standard to strengthen the soundness of banks, 
and vice versa. This research concentrates on five areas: the scope of the application of 
the BIS standard, the required minimum BIS CAR, the elements of tier 2 capital, the 
risk weight for claims on domestic public-sector entities (excluding central government), 
and claims guaranteed by such entities, and the timing of the implementation of the BIS 
standard.
First, although the Accord was designed to be applied to “internationally active 
banks” (BCBS 1988: 2), it did not provide a clear definition of the term. It simply 
declared that “[a]ll banks undertaking significant cross-border business will be expected 
to meet the [BIS] standard,” without clarifying the meaning of “significant cross-border 
business” (BCBS 1988: 14). As a result, national authorities were accorded the 
discretion to decide the range of banks to which the Accord applied. Second, the BIS 
CAR requirement of 8 percent was a minimum target ratio. National authorities were 
free to adopt arrangements that set minimum BIS CAR requirements higher than 8 
percent (BCBS 1988: 2). Third, national authorities had discretion in determining 
whether to include each of the five elements of tier 2 capital in the regulatory capital 
(BCBS 1988: 4). Fourth, the Accord allowed national authorities to choose either 0, 10, 
20 or 50 percent risk weight for claims on domestic public-sector entities, excluding 
central government, and loans guaranteed by such entities (BCBS 1988: 11). Finally, 
while Basel Committee countries were required to implement the BIS standard in full 
by the end of 1992, non-Committee countries were not obliged to comply with it and 
were therefore free to decide whether and when to adopt it.
The lack of the development of descriptive dependent variables allowing for focused 
comparison has been identified as a part of the difficulty in developing and testing 
hypotheses about regime effectiveness (see Ziim 1998: 641). The four broad areas this 
research addresses in assessing compliance with the BIS standard can hardly be 
converted into a single quantitative measure. However, the development of clearly
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defined and measurable components of the capital soundness of banks is expected to 
provide a focused comparison of compliance with the BIS standard in the case countries.
2.3 Three mechanisms of compliance
The key explanatory variables of this research are the operation of the compliance 
mechanisms proposed by the three perspectives on compliance. The three compliance 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive in inducing compliance. All three compliance 
mechanisms may operate at the same time, and the operation of each of them may 
induce compliance to some extent. Therefore, the question is not which compliance 
mechanism induces compliance, but under what situations the compliance mechanisms 
actually operate and the actual compliance outcome of the operation of each compliance 
mechanism. In this section, I introduce hypotheses concerning the operation and the 
effects of the compliance mechanisms. All the hypotheses are stated with the “all else 
equal” clause and in probabilistic terms. The hypotheses are constructed in general 
terms, not confined to the BIS-standard regime. I also clarify how to test the hypotheses 
in the specific context of the regime.
The externality-based compliance mechanism
The externality-based compliance mechanism operates because states wish to prevent 
negative externality caused by noncompliance of other states. The magnitude of 
negative externalities of noncompliance varies across international regimes.49 However, 
it may differ according to country, and even within a single international regulatory 
regime. Therefore, it can be anticipated that the degree of compliance pressure on 
countries within a single international regulatory regime will vary according to the 
extent of negative externalities caused by their noncompliance. There may be stronger 
compliance pressure from states on others whose noncompliance generates a higher 
negative externality. As discussed earlier in the case of money laundering, the negative- 
extemality compliance mechanism may operate even for countries that are not official 
members of the regime of concern, if the negative externalities of their noncompliance 
with the regime are sufficiently high. The first hypothesis regarding the operation of the
49 Botcheva and Martin (2001) argue that divergence o f state behaviour— compliance or 
noncompliance— emerges due to domestic politics in international regimes that address issues 
where the externalities to state behaviour are small or nonexistent.
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externality-based compliance mechanism is built as follows:
Hypothesis 1: the externality-based compliance mechanism is more likely to operate 
towards a country whose noncompliance generates high negative 
externality to other countries.
The extent of the negative externality of noncompliance with the BIS standard may 
be determined by the degree of engagement of banks in international finance. Failures 
of banks with higher international activities may pose a higher risk to the stability of 
international financial system and/or increase competitive inequality among 
international banks. As a result, the negative externality of noncompliance with the BIS 
standard by such banks may be more extensive. Accordingly, the externality-based 
compliance pressure should have been directed more at countries whose banking 
industry was highly connected to the international financial system.
Meanwhile, from the standpoint of states facing compliance pressure from others, 
they may have less incentive to comply if they are less vulnerable to compliance 
pressures, and vice versa. States can exercise pressure on others to comply with 
international regulatory regimes in diverse ways. However, enforcement methods to 
which states can resort may differ across regimes, depending on the regimes’ 
“noncompliance response systems,” which comprise actors, rules, and processes 
governing the formal and informal responses used to induce those in noncompliance to 
comply (Mitchell 1994: 430). The vulnerability of a country to foreign compliance 
pressures may be determined by the likelihood that it will be punished by the 
noncompliance response system of the regime of concern. Accordingly, the second 
hypothesis of the externality-based compliance mechanism is constructed as follows:
Hypothesis 2: the externality-based compliance mechanism is more likely to be effective
\
fo r  a country susceptible to the noncompliance response system other 
countries can employ.
The Basel Accord was not. accompanied by a well-developed noncompliance 
response system. The Basel Committee has no formal supranational supervisory 
authority. Although it established the Accord, implementation in a country was the 
responsibility of the national authorities (BCBS 2002). Furthermore, the Accord carried
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no legally binding obligations to any countries, including Committee members.50 Nor 
did the Committee monitor compliance with the Accord (Whitehead 2005: 39). After all, 
the major noncompliance response system for the BIS standard consisted of sanctions 
by individual countries. In such a regime, if enforcement costs are high, countries may 
seek to be free-riders on the willingness of others to compel compliance.
For certain international regulatory regimes, including the BIS-standard regime, in 
which regulatory targets are international actors, states may have an effective means to 
punish noncompliance. In these regimes, states can directly force foreign regulatory 
targets operating in their jurisdictions to comply with the regimes. This form of 
compliance enforcement may be less costly than pressuring governments, since the de 
jure scope of enforcement is limited to their jurisdictions. In addition, the operation of 
the compliance mechanism may bring about “voluntary” compliance by the regulatory 
targets even in the absence of compliance pressure from their home countries, given that 
they are directly exposed to compliance pressure from foreign countries. This would 
also be consistent with the “national treatment” norm. Therefore, the enforcement 
ability of the regulatory targets’ domestic regulatory authorities may not have had a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of the compliance mechanism for such an 
international regime. Accordingly, for the BIS standard, the externality-based 
compliance mechanism may have been more effective for countries whose banks were 
more internationalised.
Finally, enforcement costs lead to the anticipation that countries may be reluctant to 
put pressure on others to comply with international regulatory regimes beyond their 
explicit provisions. The higher the enforcement costs are, the more reluctant states will 
be to exercise compliance pressures.51 For the political costs of enforcement to be low, 
enforcement should have firm grounds. Yet, a number of international agreements tend 
to choose a more general formulation of the obligation,52 since it is more difficult to 
obtain wide support for more precision, or because it is often more effective to define a 
general direction rather than to establish a series of detailed regulations (Chayes and 
Chayes 1993: 188-189). There is also the fact that diversity within each country makes
50 The Basel Committee (2002) explicitly declares: “[i]ts [the Committee’s] conclusions do not, 
and were never intended to have legal force.” Indeed, simple and informal languages were used 
in writing the Basel Accord, deliberately avoiding legalese (Slaughter 2000: 183).
51 Enforcement problems can also arise when it is difficult to identify defectors, when countries 
are unable to focus retaliation on defectors, or when the defection o f a country does not damage 
any one country substantially, even though the aggregate effect o f the defection is large 
(Axelrod and Keohane 1986: 235; Mitchell 1996: 16).
52 As discussed earlier, the Basel Accord is one such international agreements.
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precise and detailed rules that apply internationally difficult to make. As a consequence, 
international regimes often define international regulatory requirements in general terms, 
relying on the bona fide of the member states to effectively implement the regulations.53 
As a result of this tendency towards general rather than specific obligations, even if 
“cosmetic” compliance by a country is detected, it would be difficult to say with 
precision whether it is a violation of the international agreement from a legal 
perspective.54 This is more likely if cosmetic compliance stems from the areas that the 
international agreement does not formally address. Accordingly, countries exercising 
extensive compliance pressure may have to bear considerable political costs in their 
relations with the target country. These countries may also face retaliation from the 
target country in other areas.55 In view of the above, the operation of the externality- 
based compliance mechanism may induce only formal compliance.
Of course, in peculiar circumstances in which states exercising extensive 
compliance pressures do not incur high costs for particular reasons, the externality- 
based compliance mechanism may operate for comprehensive compliance. Yet, even in 
this case, if foreign compliance pressures operate through the government of the target 
country, rather than directly towards the regulatory targets in the country, for the foreign 
compliance pressures to be effective, the government has to overcome domestic 
opposition to compliance. In view of the above, the last hypothesis regarding the 
externality-based compliance mechanism is constructed as follows:
Hypothesis 3: the operation o f the externality-based compliance mechanism is likely to 
induce only formal compliance, unless enforcement costs are low.
The market compliance mechanism
In analysing the role of markets in compliance with international regulatory regimes, it 
is important to recognise that there are two different kinds of market pressure. One is 
the market compliance mechanism, which the market-based perspective usually 
proposes. Market compliance pressures of this type emerge when market participants 
accept the desirability of the international regulatory regime of concern. The other type
53 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
54 Interpretations can be deliberately invoked in order to evade obligations.
55 Of course, the ability to retaliate differs according to country and the facts of each particular 
case.
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of market compliance pressure operates as a reflection of compliance enforcement from 
regulatory authorities. As the natures of these two types of market compliance pressure 
differ, the conditions for their operations and their effects on compliance may also differ.
For the market compliance mechanism to operate in an international regulatory 
regime, market participants should agree both on the desirability of regulation of the 
issue area (that is, the objectives of the regime) and on the appropriateness of the 
specific regulatory methods prescribed in the regime. Accordingly, once the compliance 
mechanism operates, it may induce not only formal but also comprehensive compliance. 
In addition, the operation of the market compliance mechanism may not be affected by 
political borders. Thus, the formal membership of the regime may not affect the 
operation of this compliance mechanism. Insofar as market participants accept the 
regime, regulatory targets in member and non-member countries will face compliance 
pressures from markets.
Nevertheless, the key precondition for the operation of the market compliance 
mechanism is not likely to be easily met, especially for international regulatory regimes 
established by national regulatory authorities.56 In general, national regulatory 
authorities tend to put more weight on the “public good” aspect of regulations, while 
market participants tend to weigh efficiency more heavily. Also, regulations by national 
authorities tend to lag behind market innovations (Tamura 2003a: 48-49). Therefore, 
market participants may not agree on the detailed provisions of an international 
regulatory regime, even if they do agree on the generic objectives or principles of the 
regime. In short, the acceptance of international regulatory regimes by markets is not
• S7automatic. Nonetheless, much research from the market-based perspective has paid 
less attention to providing concrete evidence of the actual operation of the market 
compliance mechanism, and instead presumed it when market actors appeared to agree 
with the generic principles of the regime.58 However, the operation of the market
56 The participation of market actors in setting international standards has been increasing. The 
1996 amendment o f the Basel Accord and the Basel II are two such examples. For the 
establishment o f the 1996 amendment, see Tamura (2001).
57 Indeed, the Financial Stability Forum (2001) reported that it had to make efforts to encourage 
market participants to accept the twelve international standards highlighted by the Forum in 
order to promote their implementation. In situations where it is unclear what the most efficient 
rules are, there is a possibility that the rules promulgated by national regulators may provide a 
focal point for market expectations, generating market compliance pressure. (I thank Andrew 
Walter for this point) However, for the rules to provide a focal point for market expectations, 
there should be an agreement in markets that the rules are at least a second-best choice. Where 
the rules are not accepted by market participants as reliable, the rules cannot provide a focal 
point, and, consequently, the market compliance mechanism is not likely to operate effectively.
58 See, for example, Ho (2002) and Simmons (2001).
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compliance mechanism is a subject not to be assumed, but to be empirically tested. In 
this regard, I build the following first hypothesis regarding market compliance 
pressures:
Hypothesis 4: the market compliance mechanism will promote fu ll regime compliance 
only when market participants accept both its generic principles and its 
detailed rules.
The second type of compliance pressure from markets is fundamentally different 
from the market compliance mechanism. Once an international regulatory regime has 
been implemented in a country and there are regulatory penalties for noncompliance, 
noncompliant regulatory targets will suffer from them. Such penalisation will have a 
negative effect on the targets’ business. Moreover, given that regulatory targets’ 
compliance failure would trigger regulatory actions, their failure to meet such important 
standards may imply that they have serious problems. Therefore, market participants 
pay attention to compliance of firms with regulations to which they are subject, and 
penalise those failing to meet the regulations. In other words, there may be pressures 
from markets on firms to comply with regulations even if market participants do not 
accept the regulations as reliable. This market compliance pressure is an additional 
compliance pressure stemming from the expectation of compliance enforcement by 
regulatory authorities. Accordingly, this market compliance pressure may require firms 
to comply with regulations only to the point where the level of compliance is sufficient 
to avoid enforcement penalties. Additionally, it may not induce firms that are not subject 
to certain regulations to adopt them.
Hypothesis 5: compliance pressures may come from markets as a reflection o f domestic 
enforcement, but will not induce compliance above and beyond that 
required by regulatory authorities.
Regarding the BIS standard, the operation of the market compliance mechanism 
may induce banks to strengthen their actual capital adequacy regulations. However, the 
compliance mechanism might effectively operate only when market participants agreed 
on the desirability of the regulation of bank capital adequacy and believed in a strong 
relationship between a bank’s official BIS CAR and its actual capital soundness. 
Meanwhile, even if market participants did not accept the BIS standard as reliable, the
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implementation of the BIS standard in a country might lead market participants to put 
pressure on banks to comply with it due to expectations of domestic enforcement. 
However, in this case, the market compliance pressure was not likely to induce banks to 
comply above the level of avoiding enforcement penalties. If such penalties were 
applied only to formal noncompliance, the market compliance pressure might require 
banks to comply with the BIS standard only formally. Also, the market compliance 
pressure was unlikely to lead banks that were not regulated by the BIS standard to adopt 
it.
The effectiveness of market compliance pressures may depend on the sensitivity of 
regulatory targets to market forces, regardless of the type of compliance pressure. As in 
the case of the externality-based compliance mechanism, compliance through the 
operation of market pressures occurs due to the expected cost of noncompliance, that is, 
penalisation by markets. Therefore, market compliance pressures may be more effective 
if noncompliant regulatory targets incur higher costs in markets. The final hypothesis of 
market compliance pressures is as follows:
Hypothesis 6: market compliance pressures (of both types) are more likely to be
effective fo r  a country in which regulatory targets are vulnerable to market 
forces.
In the case of the BIS standard, it is not an easy task to measure the sensitivity of 
banks to market forces. Banks are vulnerable to market forces insofar as they raise 
funds from markets.59 Nevertheless, the degree of market force may be different across 
markets. Banks can rely to some extent on their relationships with their traditional 
lenders or borrowers in raising funds. Therefore, the degree of the operation of market 
disciplines may be lower when banks raise more funds from domestic markets than 
from foreign markets, and vice versa. In this regard, in analysing banks’ sensitivity to 
market forces, I examine the degree to which banks rely on foreign funds.
59 Banks are also sensitive to market forces if they are excluded from transactions that require 
minimum credit ratings. For example, many swaps transactions require bank counterparties to 
be highly rated. This market pressure would apply mainly to large international banks. (I thank 
Andrew Walter for this point.)
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The domestic compliance mechanism
The prerequisite of the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism for an 
international regulatory regime is the existence of domestic actors whose preferences 
are in accord with compliance with the regime. The existence of a domestic group that 
favours compliance with a particular regulatory regime may be determined by the 
compatibility between domestic actors’ preferences and the objectives of the regime. Yet, 
compatibility between the preferences and the specific methods the regime prescribes to 
achieve the objectives is also necessary for the operation of the domestic compliance 
mechanism. The compliance mechanism may not operate, despite domestic actors’ 
agreement on the objectives of the regime, if they do not agree on the effectiveness or 
the desirability of the prescribed methods in achieving the objectives. The logic of 
compatibility leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7: the domestic compliance mechanism is more likely to operate when there 
is a high level o f compatibility between domestic groups ’preferences and 
both the overall objectives o f  the regime and its specific provisions.
In analysing domestic pressures for compliance with the BIS standard, this study 
focuses on a specific part of government, the bank regulatory authority, as the key 
domestic group that may have favoured compliance with the BIS standard, although it 
does not neglect the possibility that there were other domestic groups supporting 
compliance. For financial regulations, unlike regulations in areas such as the 
environment or human rights, there are few non-government groups that put organised 
pressure on the government to comply with specific international regimes, partly due to 
the high degree of technical knowledge required to understand such regulations. Even if 
some financial experts support the idea that financial institutions comply with certain 
financial regulatory standards, such support is usually sporadic and scattered. Moreover, 
such a demand for compliance has to be accepted by the financial regulatory authority 
in order to make regulatory changes. Therefore, the focus on bank regulatory authorities 
as the potential source of domestic compliance pressure may not cause a serious 
analytic problem.
Whether a bank regulatory authority actually functioned as the source of the
domestic compliance mechanism may have been determined, firstly, by the
compatibility between its preferences and the key objective of the BIS standard, the
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strengthening of capital soundness of banks. In general, bank regulatory authorities have 
two main concerns in designing the regulatory system: stability and competitiveness. 
The maintenance of the soundness of individual banks and of the stability of the overall 
banking system is the primary responsibility of bank regulatory authorities. Inadequate 
regulations will result in costly failures, of which an extreme instance is a financial 
crisis. In addition, bank regulatory authorities have to pay attention to the 
competitiveness of banks because overregulation will put domestic banks at a 
competitive disadvantage to foreign banks, lowering profits and, eventually, 
capitalisation. Thus, bank regulatory authorities have to balance stability with 
competitiveness in structuring regulations in such a way that provides the desired 
degree of stability at the minimum cost to competitiveness (Singer 2004: 536; Walter 
2002: 18).60 An optimum regulatory structure may differ across countries, depending on 
the relative weight bank regulatory authorities attach to stability and competitiveness.61 
The more emphasis a bank regulatory authority puts on stability, the more they may 
have insisted on compliance with the BIS standard.
However, the BIS standard was a very specific regulation requiring banks to raise 
their CARs above 8 percent based on a specific formula. Accordingly, there was another 
crucial condition for the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism: bank 
regulatory authorities perceived that banks’ maintenance of a BIS CAR of 8 percent 
would enhance the stability of the banking systems in their countries. The improvement 
of capital levels of banks may have been expected to enhance the stability of the 
banking systems in some countries. However, there may not have been a substantial 
positive relationship between the two variables in others, for example, if the bank 
regulatory authorities maintained a policy that did not allow any banks to fail. In such a 
case, a requirement of high capital levels for banks would only result in a decrease in 
the competitiveness of the banks. Thus, the regulatory practice of bank regulatory 
authorities in the specific area of bank capital may have influenced whether or not they 
insisted on compliance with the BIS standard.
The compatibility between domestic groups’ preferences and an international 
regulatory regime may change when their attitudes towards the desirability of the
60 A trade-off between stability and competitiveness may be less strong in the long term than in 
the short term. A long run trade-off between the two is not clear given that stability and 
competitiveness are strongly positively related to each other in the long term. (I thank Andrew 
Walter for this point.)
61 Decisions on an optimum regulatory structure are made based on “what i f ’ hypotheticals, as 
any improvements in financial stability due to the establishment o f any regulation can only be 
measured in terms o f costs that otherwise would have been incurred (Walter 2002: 18).
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regime’s objectives or the appropriateness of its specific methods to achieve them 
change due to learning. Learning is more likely to occur when domestic groups have 
few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the regime (Checkel 2001: 563). 
Also, learning may occur when domestic groups find themselves in a new and uncertain 
situation which may be caused by a crisis or policy failure and which drives them to 
search for new information (Checkel 2001: 562; Haas 1992: 14).62 The conditions of 
learning generate the second hypothesis regarding the domestic compliance mechanism:
Hypothesis 8: compatibility between domestic groups ’preferences and an international 
regulatory regime is more likely when the following two conditions are 
met:
. The domestic groups do not have prior, strong beliefs inconsistent with 
the objectives o f the regime and its methods to achieve the objectives.
. The domestic groups are in new and uncertain environments.
Accordingly, the compatibility between a bank regulatory authority’s preference and 
the BIS standard may have increased when the authority had not traditionally 
maintained regulatory arrangements that would invalidate the effect of compliance of 
the BIS standard on the stability of the banking system. Alternatively, the compatibility 
may have become higher when the authority’s regulatory practice that did not adhere to 
the BIS standard resulted in severe policy failures such as a financial crisis. Under these 
circumstances, the domestic compliance mechanism may have been more likely to 
operate for the BIS standard.
Pressure from domestic groups for compliance with an international regulatory 
regime stems from their voluntary agreement on its desirability, in terms of both its 
objectives and its specific provisions.63 Thus, domestic compliance pressure may 
favour comprehensive compliance. If there is strong external pressure on a country to 
comply with the BIS standard, the regulatory authority may require banks to comply 
with the BIS standard, but may help them in practice defect from it. However, in such a 
case the compliance pressure from the regulatory authority would not be the. operation 
of the domestic compliance mechanism; it would be a reflection of the external
62 Mitchell (1996: 8) argues that economic and technological changes over time can affect 
national governments’ compliance decisions about whether to comply with an international 
regime.
63 Therefore, the domestic compliance mechanism may operate in both member and non- 
member countries o f the international regulatory regime.
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compliance mechanism. The following hypothesis is introduced for the operation of the 
domestic compliance mechanism:
Hypothesis 9: The operation o f the domestic compliance mechanism is likely to result in 
pressure for comprehensive compliance.
The actual outcome of the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism is 
influenced by a number of factors. For the mechanism to operate effectively, domestic 
groups supporting compliance must have sufficient enforcement power and the country 
should have the capacity to comply with the relevant international regulatory regime. 
The following section elaborates these issues.
2.4 Factors affecting implementation capacities
Even if domestic compliance pressures exist for compliance with an international 
regulatory regime, the capacity and ability of the relevant national authorities to 
implement and enforce the regime will influence the level of compliance.64 Their lack 
of implementation capacity may hinder comprehensive compliance, may give rise to 
cosmetic compliance, or may even cause noncompliance. Capacity limitations can stem 
from diverse sources, including administrative, economic, or political sources (see 
Chayes and Chayes 1993: 193-195; Jacobson and Weiss 1998a: 529-535; Vogel and 
Kessler 1998). However, it is impossible for this study to address all the factors that 
influence implementation capacities. Instead, this study presents three particular 
domestic factors—the domestic distributional effects of compliance, the independence 
of regulatory authorities, and the capacity to deal with compliance failures—as 
important factors that affect implementation capacities. The domestic distributional 
effects of compliance influence the composition of domestic opposition to, as well as 
domestic support for, compliance. The independence of regulatory authorities affects the 
extent to which domestic opinions on compliance can be reflected in regulatory policies.
64 As noted earlier, the operation o f the market compliance mechanism provides regulatory 
targets with an incentive to comply voluntarily even in the absence o f implementation by the 
domestic regulatory authorities. Also, for certain international regulatory regimes, including the 
BIS-standard regime, the operation of the externality-based compliance mechanism can put 
compliance pressure directly on regulatory targets. However, when the externality-based 
compliance mechanism operates through enforcement by the regulatory authorities in the 
countries subject to foreign compliance pressures, the implementation capacities o f the 
regulatory authorities can also affect the effectiveness o f the compliance mechanism.
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The capacity to deal with compliance failures is a critical pre-condition for the strict 
implementation of international regulatory regimes.
The domestic distributional effects o f compliance
Compliance with international regulatory regimes has domestic distributional effects. 
While some domestic groups benefit from compliance, others may have to bear costs 
generated by the compliance. Thus, the domestic distributional effects of compliance 
with international regulatory regimes have a critical effect on compliance because they 
generate domestic opposition to and support for compliance. Because the manner in 
which domestic support for international regulatory regimes may arise has been 
addressed by the analysis of the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism in the 
last section, this section concentrates on how the domestic distributional effects of 
international regimes affect domestic opposition to compliance. The literature on 
compliance/implementation does recognise that domestic opposition affects compliance 
outcomes. Nevertheless, there are few studies that develop a sophisticated analysis of 
domestic opposition to compliance. Yet, the understanding of how domestic opposition 
groups are formed is crucial to explaining compliance failures.
It may be obvious that regulatory targets’ opposition to compliance with the
international regime will increase as their compliance costs grow. Yet, where
compliance costs are diffused from regulatory targets to other sectors of the economy,
domestic opposition to compliance may also arise from those who are not regulatory
targets. The extent of the diffusion of compliance costs from regulatory targets to other
sectors may be determined by the economic linkage between them. If the linkage is
weaker, compliance costs tend to be imposed exclusively on regulatory targets, and
compliance opposition from non-target sectors will be accordingly lower. Conversely,
when the linkage is stronger, the diffusion of compliance costs will be more extensive,
and a larger number of domestic groups outside regulatory targets will be opposed to
compliance. The success of the compliance opposition by non-target groups will be
affected by their power to influence government policy. If the sectors are politically
important or influential, and the sectors’ potential damage is substantial, the likelihood
of political intervention to oppose the compliance and protect these non-target sectors
will increase. Under the circumstances, even if the national regulatory authority is
willing to force the regulatory targets to comply with the regulatory regime of the
concern in earnest and can overcome the regulatory targets’ own opposition, the
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regulatory authority may fail to implement the regime in earnest. I build the following
hypothesis as to compliance failure:
Hypothesis 10: compliance failure is more likely to occur when compliance costs are
diffusedfrom regulatory targets to other sectors comprised o f  politically 
important actors.
In complying with the BIS standard, banks could increase their CARs by increasing 
capital or by decreasing risk-weighted assets. In general, banks should adjust their 
balance sheets in the least-costly way of meeting the BIS standard. When it was not 
costly to raise capital in markets—for example, during economic booms—, banks may 
have preferred increasing capital to curtailing risk-weighted assets. Yet, when it was 
costly—for example, during economic downturns— , it may have been necessary to 
reduce their risk-weighted assets in order to comply with the BIS standard (see Jackson, 
et al. 1999: 15-19). A reduction in risk-weighted assets may have been achieved with 
the least effect on total assets by curtailing lending, whose risk weight was the highest at 
100 percent and typically the largest component of total assets (Jackson, et al. 1999: 15- 
19; Woo 1999: 8).65 Given the role of banks as the core financial intermediary, their 
efforts to comply with the BIS standard by reducing lending may have had a significant 
negative effect upon other sectors in the economy. In other words, costs to comply with 
the BIS standards could be diffused from the regulatory targets (banks) to other sectors 
relying on bank loans. Banks may consciously threaten to comply via reduced lending 
in order to reduce compliance pressure from the authorities.
When banks reduced loans in order to comply with the BIS standard, the overall 
corporate sector may have been negatively affected by the reduction of bank loans.66 
However, in general, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may have been 
damaged more severely than large firms, because SMEs tended to have difficulty in 
finding alternative sources of funding to bank loans, while larger firms were able to 
raise funds more easily in capital markets.67 There may have been a difference in the
65 Much economic research on the BIS standard has found that banks with lower BIS CARs in 
Japan and in the United States tended to increase capital and/or reduce risk-weighted assets (see 
Hall 1993a; Ito and Sasaki 2002; Jackson, et al. 1999).
66 Of course, householders may also be negatively influenced by a decrease in bank loans. 
However, given that they hardly exercise organised pressure on the government, this study 
concentrates on the effect o f compliance with the BIS standard on the corporate sector.
67 There was some indication that small firms may have been affected by pressure on bank 
capital in the United States in the early 1990s (see Jackson, et al. 1999: 27-35).
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political importance of SMEs across countries. However, the difference was not likely 
to be significant, given that in most countries SMEs accounted for the majority of the 
employees—that is, voters—and, as a result, they were politically important actors. 
Accordingly, where SMEs were substantially negatively affected by banks’ compliance 
with the BIS standard, national authorities may have hesitated to force banks’ 
compliance with it.
Independence o f the regulatory authorities
Institutional settings that influence the policy-making process in governments may also 
have an effect on the outcome of the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism. 
Domestic compliance pressures and compliance opposition are transmitted through 
governments or, in certain cases, come directly from them. Thus, the institutional 
arrangements of the government policy-making process can influence the effect of the 
domestic compliance mechanism.
The key institutional arrangement highlighted in this study is the independence of 
the regulatory authority responsible for the domestic implementation of the international 
regulatory regime of concern. Regulatory authorities usually participate in their 
governments’ decisions as to whether to commit to relevant international regulatory 
regimes. Moreover, they are ultimately accountable for the domestic implementation of 
the international regulatory regimes. Therefore, they are in a key position to determine 
the overall compliance decisions related to the regimes. Yet, their capacity to make 
compliance/implementation decisions and to put those decisions into practice may be 
influenced by their independence from pressure from politicians or businesses. Even if 
regulatory authorities themselves favour compliance with international regimes, if there 
are strong domestic pressures against compliance and the regulatory authorities are 
vulnerable to pressures, compliance failure is likely to occur. Accordingly, I build the 
following hypothesis regarding the effect of domestic institutional settings on 
compliance:
Hypothesis 11: where the independence o f regulatory authorities is lower, compliance 
failure is more likely to occur, even i f  the regulatory authorities 
themselves favour compliance.
In fact, for monetary policy, it is controversial whether an independent central bank
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necessarily increases monetary stability for the economy. Adam S. Posen (1993), among 
others, argues that central bank decision-makers respond to risks that anti-inflationary 
policies could lead to changes in the autonomy and powers of the central bank itself, 
and that, as a consequence, independent central banks find it difficult to implement anti- 
inflationary policies when they lack the support of key social groups. If this argument 
relating to central bank independence and monetary stability can be applied to financial 
regulatory policy, the appropriateness of this hypothesis may be questioned. This 
problem is dealt with through analysis of the effect of the independence of the bank 
regulatory authority on compliance with the BIS standard by addressing whether bank 
regulatory authorities have the capacity to actually formulate and implement regulatory 
policies in accordance with their preferences, going beyond formal legal arrangements. 
This broad conceptualisation of independence reflects Posen’s insight given that the 
capacity of a bank regulatory authority is affected by its level of support from powerful 
allies in society and/or government.
The capacity of a bank regulatory authority is influenced by the formal and informal 
institutional status of its regulatory separation from the executive and legislative 
branches of government. Factors such as the type of regulatory authority, the terms of 
appointment and dismissal of senior personnel of the regulatory authority, the regulatory 
authority’s governance structure, and the openness and the transparency of its decision­
making affect the institutional status of the regulatory authority. Additionally, the 
independence of bank regulatory authority is influenced by the ability to set, within the 
confines of the law, technical rules and regulations for the sectors under supervision,68 
the ability to carry out on-site inspections and off-site monitoring, sanctioning and 
enforcement of sanctions,69 and the way in which the executive/legislature is involved 
in the determination of the size of the regulatory authority’s budget and its use (Quintyn 
and Taylor 2002: 13-22).70
68 In countries where primary and secondary legislation are so detailed that little room is left for 
rules and regulations, the independence o f the regulatory authority is limited. Conversely, in 
countries where primary and secondary legislation is kept general so that there is ample room 
for regulatory initiatives at the technical or implementation level, the regulatory authority has a 
higher degree o f independence (Quintyn and Taylor 2002: 14-16).
69 Legal protection o f bank supervisors for supervisory activities and the adoption o f a rules- 
based system o f sanctions and interventions, appropriate salary levels and clear career streams 
for supervisors, as well as proper restriction of appeals by institutions that have been sanctioned 
by supervisors, may enhance this ability (Quintyn and Taylor 2002: 17-20).
70 Regulatory authorities that are funded directly from the budget or through a ministry that 
oversees their operations may be prone to various types o f political interference. In the same 
way, when regulatory agencies are funded from the regulated industry, there is a risk o f industry 
capture (Quintyn and Taylor 2002: 21-22).
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The capacity to deal with compliance failures
Even if the domestic compliance mechanism operates, and the regulatory authority is 
willing to steer towards compliance and is able to overcome compliance opposition 
from particular sectors, compliance failure can arise due to implementation problems 
emerging at the national level. Among diverse sources of systemic incapacity,71 this 
research pays particular attention to the capacity to deal with compliance failure. This 
capacity problem has attracted little attention from compliance studies. However, it may 
have a significant effect on compliance with certain international regulatory regimes.
The failure of regulatory targets in a country to comply with an international 
regulatory regime can cause the country substantial negative systemic consequences 
beyond the noncompliant regulatory targets themselves. This situation may occur, for 
example, when external penalisation, by foreign countries or by markets, of 
noncompliant regulatory targets in a country has a systemic effect on the country. In this 
situation, the government may be concerned about the negative consequences of 
noncompliance with the regime so that complete noncompliance is not likely to occur. 
Yet, in general, comprehensive compliance is more costly to achieve than simple formal 
compliance. Accordingly, the stricter implementation of the international regulatory 
regime in the country may increase the likelihood of compliance failures by the 
regulatory targets. Therefore, the government should have the capacity to deal with 
negative systemic consequences generated by the compliance failures of the regulatory 
targets in order to implement the international regulatory regime in earnest. Where the 
government lacks such a capacity, it may induce the regulatory targets to comply with 
the regime, but may also try to reduce compliance costs in order to avoid the negative 
consequences that can be generated by their noncompliance. In this regard, I build the 
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 12: when the cost o f compliance for regulatory targets in a country is high, 
and the government lacks the capacity to deal with compliance failures 
by the regulatory targets, cosmetic compliance is more likely to occur.
If there was pressure from foreign countries or markets on banks to comply with the 
BIS standard, the immediate negative consequences of the banks’ noncompliance may
71 See, for example, Chayes and Chayes (1993: 194-195), Jacobson and Weiss (1998a: 529-535), 
and Vogel and Kessler (1998).
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have been the penalisation of their business activities in foreign countries or markets.
The banks’ expansion into foreign countries may have been prohibited, or they may 
have been required to pay more in raising funds in markets. Such costs of 
noncompliance may have damaged the individual noncompliant banks in the first place. 
However, given the role of banks in the economy, such costs were likely to be diffused 
to the overall economy, especially when compliance failure was prevalent in the country. 
For example, noncompliance by a large number of banks in a country may have 
increased the cost of funds to the real economic sector, negatively affecting the overall 
economy. When a government was not able to bear such negative systemic 
consequences of banks’ compliance failure, the bank regulatory authority may have 
implemented the BIS standard in such a way to reduce banks’ compliance costs and 
thereby help them to comply. As a result, the compliance was likely to be cosmetic 
rather than comprehensive.
Moreover, the failure by a majority of banks in a country to comply with the BIS 
standard had the possibility to cause a systemic crisis in the country. Under the 
implementation of the BIS standard, the failure by a large number of banks in a country 
to comply with the required regulatory minimum CAR of 8 percent could signal to 
markets that the banking sector had serious problems. The stricter implementation of the 
BIS standard may have made banks’ compliance with the BIS standard more difficult, 
increasing the likelihood of systemic instability. In this situation, if the government 
lacked a means to deal with troubled banks— in other words, if it did not have an 
adequate financial safety net—, the stability of the banking system could be at risk.72 
Therefore, where the financial situation of the overall banking sector was not sound, and 
there was no adequate financial safety net to deal with troubled banks, cosmetic 
compliance was likely to occur.
72 Financial safety nets refer to an amalgam of policies that are designed to prevent failures of 
financial institutions or to limit their effects (Memirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 1999: 2), including 
explicit or implicit deposit insurance, “lender o f last resort” facilities o f the central bank, 
“bailout” policies, bank closure, and so forth. Deposit insurance provides protection for 
unsophisticated and small depositors so that stability in payment and credit systems is 
maintained and contagious bank runs avoided (Barth, et al. 2001b: 10). Lender o f last resort 
facilities, according to classical theory, provide lending for illiquid but solvent institutions 
(using good collateral and at a premium price) in order to solve a failure in market provision for 
liquidity (Freixas and Santomero 2003: 17-18). Although the bailout policy is never announced 
ex ante, governments do carry out bailout operations for banks— especially for “too big to fail” 
banks— due to concerns about negative externalities caused by the failures. Given that 
bankruptcy cost is a result o f the bankruptcy resolution scheme, the mechanism for orderly 
liquidation forms a part o f the financial safety net (Freixas and Santomero 2003: 18-20). Capital 
adequacy regulation, whose aim is to avoid bank failures, is also an important pillar o f financial 
safety nets (Freixas and Santomero 2003: 15-17).
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National regulatory authorities may not have the capacity to deal with compliance 
failures as a result of resource constraints per se, or for political reasons. In general, the 
less developed a country is the more likely it is to suffer from this problem, since 
financial and/or technological development tends to be low in such countries. However, 
even developed countries may face the capacity problem because of political factors that 
hinder governments from using the resources necessary to implement the international 
regulatory regime of concern in earnest. Therefore, in examining the capacity problem, 
it is necessary to distinguish whether the problem is in essence political, or whether it is 
resource-driven.
Conclusions
This chapter has laid out the groundwork for analysing compliance with the BIS 
standard. Compliance with the BIS standard can be regarded as effective only when it is 
carried out in a way that increases the soundness of banks. Accordingly, compliance 
with the BIS standard will be analysed in terms of its effect on the actual capital 
soundness of banks. The compliance outcomes for the BIS standard in any particular 
country may have been determined by which of the three compliance mechanisms were 
more important in any given case. Therefore, this chapter has developed the analysis of 
the three compliance mechanisms and has built hypotheses in regard to their operation 
and the extent of compliance that may result from their operation. The following 
chapters provide an empirical analysis of compliance with the BIS standard in the case 
countries of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, drawing upon the analytical framework 
presented in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Original Views of Regulators on Capital Adequacy 
Regulations
The regulatory authority’s attitude towards the BIS standard was a critical factor that 
influenced compliance with the BIS standard in each country because it was the 
potential main source of the domestic compliance mechanism and also because it could 
affect the implementation of the BIS standard in the country. Did the regulatory 
authorities in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan wish to adopt the BIS standard in order to 
strengthen their capital adequacy regulations? To answer this question, I address the 
tradition of financial administration in the countries until the late 1980s, the time period 
in which the Basel Accord was established. In particular, given that the main goal of the 
BIS standard as a prudential regulation was to reduce the probability of bank failures, 
the major focus of the analysis will be on the countries’ policies governing bank failures.
3.1 Japan
A few scholars argue that the Japanese bank regulatory authority may have intended to 
use the Basel Accord in order to strengthen Japanese banking regulations.73 However, 
most of the arguments are based on a very general assumption that a strong bank capital 
regulation would be necessary to maintain the stability of the banking system. In this 
section, I explain why a capital adequacy regulation was not important—or even 
necessary— in Japan by examining Japanese banking regulations and then analysing 
how the Japanese bank regulatory authority coped with the international trend of 
strengthening bank capital regulations during the 1980s.
The convoy system and the low needfor capital adequacy regulations
Japan’s statutory regulatory authority of financial institutions, including banks, was the
73 See, for example, Kapstein (1992: 283), Granirer (1994: 255-256,270-272), and Tamura 
(2003a).
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Ministry of Finance of Japan (MFJ), until the establishment of the Financial 
Supervisory Agency, the new financial regulatory authority, in June of 1998. The 
ministry was not just a legal authority but became the actual supreme authority in the 
country’s financial regulations. The central bank, the Bank of Japan (BoJ), shared some 
responsibility with the ministry in supervising banks. The Examination Bureau of the 
BoJ carried out regular audits on banks and collected information, and the Banking 
Bureau of the MFJ relied on the Examination Bureau to gather detailed information on 
individual banks. As a result, these two bodies were often seen as tightly united. 
However, the BoJ was the secondary regulator, subordinate to the ministry, which won 
the commanding position in the country’s financial administration.74 In the area of bank 
capital regulation, the Banking Bureau of the MFJ monopolised authority domestically, 
and was the main negotiator in international negotiations. Although the BoJ was also the 
other Japanese member of the Basel Committee, it was a secondary participant (Hall 
1993b; Sawabe 2002: 401; Tamura 2003a: ch. 4).
The MFJ had put the foremost emphasis on stability in financial administration. The 
emphasis on stability had a long history, going back the early 1900s. After the great 
financial crisis of 1927, when a number of banks failed, the Japanese bank regulatory 
authority shifted its focus from the maintenance of a competitive financial system to 
regulation and safety. This attitude of the regulatory authority was strengthened after the 
devastation and disruption of World War II because they aimed to rebuild a very safe 
financial system which could effectively transfer the savings of the Japanese people to 
corporate business in order to finance new factories, equipment, and other investment 
(Hoshi and Kashyap 1999: 4; Patrick 2001: 4-5).
To ensure stability, the MFJ had implemented the “convoy system” in bank 
regulation (Amyx 2001; Hoshi 2002; Patrick 2001).75 The core characteristics of the 
convoy system were the tight control of competition and the safety of every bank. The 
MFJ heavily regulated the banking industry through measures such as the strict 
segmentation of business activities between different types of financial institutions, 
interest rate controls, the prohibition of new entries into the banking system, the control 
of banks’ establishment and relocation of their head offices and branches, and the
74 The BoJ did not have full independence from the government until 1998.
75 The term convoy stemmed from the World War II story that destroyers and battleships had to 
slow down and maintain a speed equal to the slowest ships, such as large cargo ships, in the 
convoy so that all o f them could arrive at the destination safely (Hoshi 2002: 157). Likewise, 
the convoy system ensured that no banks would be left behind and that none could move 
forward so fast that they would endanger the viability o f others (Amyx 2001: 53-54; Hoshi 
2002; Patrick 2001).
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control of the types of financial instruments banks could offer, in order to restrain 
competition and thereby prevent the emergence of failing banks (FBAJ 1989: 41; 
Kitagawa and Kurosawa 1994: 83-89; Mabuchi 1993: 137-139; Suzuki 1990: 35-44). 
When these regulatory measures could not prevent the financial deterioration of a bank 
and it was on the verge of failure, the MFJ arranged a merger between the failing bank 
and a healthy bank (sometimes more than one bank) in order to rescue the bank. The 
MFJ encouraged the healthy banks to absorb the failed bank by providing both 
personnel and financial assistance. In general, the assets and liabilities and the 
employees of a failed bank were taken over by a healthy bank, but the incumbent 
managers of the failed bank were forced to resign (Hoshi 2002: 159-161).76
The system of the rescue merger of a failed bank by a healthy one relied on 
regulatory rents generated by the heavily-regulated financial system. The rescue or 
merger of an ailing bank by a healthy bank caused substantial costs to the healthy bank. 
However, such costs were compensated by regulatory rewards by the MFJ, and, as a 
result, the healthy bank could expect to gain some regulatory favours from the ministry 
by cooperating with it. For example, the MFJ rewarded cooperative banks by allowing 
them to expand their business by opening more branches. Given strict interest rate 
controls, Japanese banks had a strong incentive to open new branches in a quest for 
more cheap deposits. Using such regulatory rewards, the MFJ could create incentives 
for healthy banks to rescue troubled banks (Hoshi 2002: 162-164; Kitagawa and 
Kurosawa 1994: 84, 88).
Under the convoy system, the BIS capital adequacy regulation could not make much 
of an impression among the Japanese.77 The capital adequacy regulation was based on 
the rationale that a certain CAR was necessary to prevent bank failures. However, in the 
convoy system, troubled banks were absorbed by healthy banks, as arranged by the MFJ. 
This system provided a strong and effective bank safety net to secure the reliability of 
banks in the country. As Hugh Patrick (2001: 5) argued, the convoy system was not 
based on the assumption of “too-big-to-fail,” but on the assumption that no live bank 
should die. No banks would be allowed to go bankrupt, and accordingly there was a low
7Rneed for the implementation of the BIS standard. The main focus of the MFJ in
76 See Hoshi (2002: 158-161) for examples o f such rescue mergers.
77 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa (former Director-General o f Banking Bureau, 
MFJ, 1994-96), Tokyo, 5 March 2004. In this thesis, Japanese, Korean, and Chinese names are 
kept in original format, in which family name is followed by the given name, except for the 
References.
78 It is worth noting that the United States, which led the establishment o f the Basel Accord,
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ensuring the soundness o f  banks was traditionally on their asset qualities instead o f  their 
capital levels.79
Indeed, the M FJ had traditionally paid little attention to the regulation o f  banks’ 
capital adequacy. A capital adequacy regulation which required a bank to maintain their 
capital o f  no less than 10 percent o f  the total deposits was in place from 1954 to 1986, at
which point it was replaced by the new regulations based on capital to total assets
80ratios. However, the capital ratios o f  m ost Japanese banks were far below the required 
m inim um  throughout the period.81 For instance, between fiscal years 1976 and 1985, 
Japanese banks’ capital ratios to deposits were, on average, lower than 6 percent, hitting 
a low o f  3.7 percent at the fiscal end o f  1984 (see Figure 3 .1).82 In fact, the M FJ had no 
intention o f  enforcing the regulation, as they thought the required m inim um  was too 
high for Japanese banks, so that the m inistry did not penalise banks for noncom pliance 
(Sawabe 2002: 404-405). Annual reports o f  the m inistry’s Banking Bureau never 
expressed any serious concerns or warnings about the low capital ratios o f  banks. They 
never even com pared disclosed capital ratios to the regulatory m inim um  (Hoshi 2002: 
158).
Figure 3.1 The average of capital to deposit ratios of Japanese banks, FY1974-1985
(end o f  fiscal year; %)
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Source: Federation o f  Bankers Associations o f  Japan, various issues o f  Zenkok Ginkou Zaimushyohyou 
Bunseki (Analysis o f  Financial Statements o f  All Banks).
experienced about 470 bank failures between 1985 and 1987 (Singer 2004: 556).
79 A uthor’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa.
80 Capital in the capital to deposit ratio regulation included paid-in capital, capital reserves, and 
other reserves.
81 Japanese banks disclosed their capital ratios publicly.
82 The Japanese fiscal year ends in the end o f March o f the following calendar year.
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Note: In Japan, “major banks” include “city banks”, “long-term credit banks”, and “trust banks”; “all 
banks” include “major banks” and “regional banks”.
Although Japan’s financial system began to be gradually deregulated from the 1970s 
on, the MFJ could effectively rely on rescue mergers in preventing bank failures. As a 
result, the neglect of the importance of capital adequacy regulation by the MFJ 
continued, until the convoy system began to unravel during the mid-1990s.83 Also, as 
long as the economy prospered and the banking system was sound (until the early 
1990s), there was a social consensus in the country that the convoy system worked well 
and the oversight and management of the banking system was best done by the MFJ, 
who were perceived by the Japanese to be the best and the brightest Japanese university 
graduates (see Patrick 2001: 8). Consequently, around the time when the Basel Accord 
was established, there were few Japanese who argued for the necessity of a new capital 
adequacy regulation to strengthen the soundness of the banking sector.
Lowering banks ' compliance costs for common capital adequacy standards
While the Japanese did not feel the necessity to strengthen capital adequacy regulations, 
foreign banks regulators in major countries began to put growing emphasis upon bank 
capital in the 1980s. In the meantime, Japanese banks were rapidly expanding their 
business in foreign countries. As a result, the MFJ began to worry that Japanese banks 
might face pressure from foreign bank regulatory authorities to increase their capital 
levels. To cope with possible foreign pressure, the ministry deliberately modified their 
capital regulations to increase the disclosed CARs of Japanese banks, but without 
raising their actual capital levels.
The international trend in capital regulation and Japanese banks in the 1980s
From the early 1980s on, bank regulators in major countries— in particular, the United 
States and the United Kingdom—began to put great emphasis on capital adequacy. As 
U.S. banks’ capital levels consistently fell over the 1970s, U.S. regulatory authorities— 
the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency jointly—adopted 
a gearing ratio approach, which related capital to total assets, in 1981 in order to halt the 
erosion in banks’ capital. In mid-1984, the three pillars of the U.S. regulatory
83 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa.
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authorities—the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—released coordinated proposals for minimum 
capital standards.84,85 After the failure of Continental Illinois, the eighth largest bank in 
the country, in the same year, the U.S. regulatory authorities’ efforts to strengthen 
capital regulations intensified, and, as a consequence, they issued a joint proposal to 
adopt a risk-weighted capital ratio approach in January 1986 (Vernon, et al. 1991: MO- 
141). In the United Kingdom, capital had not been traditionally a major concern of the 
bank regulatory authority. However, the collapse of a number of undercapitalised banks 
during the 1970s made them put greater emphasis on capital. As a result, U.K. 
regulators adopted a capital to risk-weighted asset ratio measure in 1980 (Kapstein 
1989:338, 1992:279).
The Basel Committee also began to monitor the CARs of leading international 
banks from the beginning of the 1980s. In 1982, the Committee presented a report to the 
central bank governors seeking their endorsement of a collective stand to take action to 
halt the deterioration in the levels of banks’ capital, in the light of a rapid growth in their 
international lending. The 1982 debt crisis accelerated the debate on capital adequacy in 
the Committee. Furthermore, U.S. regulatory authorities began to make efforts to build 
a common capital adequacy framework among Committee members from 1983. As a 
result, the Committee constructed its first framework to compare national capital 
adequacy standards and the relative capital position of banks from different countries in 
the year, and tested the framework by applying it to a representative sample of 
international banks from each of Committee countries (Cooke 1990: 313-322; Reinicke 
1995: 163-164).
Meanwhile, in Japan, as the internationalisation of the financial system became an 
important issue in the early 1980s, particularly after the U.S.-Japan Yen-Dollar 
Committee in 1983, the MFJ paid attention to the international trend of the increasing 
concern over bank capital. The MFJ noted that regulatory authorities in the United
84 The demand for strengthening banking regulations emerged in the U.S. Congress in 1983, in 
which U.S. bank regulatory authorities sought to increase the U.S. quota in IMF resources by 
approximately USD 8.4 billion in order to deal with U.S. commercial banks’ weakness caused 
by the debt crisis (Oatley and Nabors 1998: 42). Congress blamed the regulatory authorities’ 
failure to prevent the banks’ imprudent lending, and forced them to tighten bank regulations by 
imposing stricter capital adequacy standards (Reinicke 1995: 143-153).
85 Prior to the 1980s, each o f the U.S. bank regulatory authorities had established its own capital 
regulations, and their regulations were not intended to be stricter than any o f the others’ 
(Kapstein 1992:278).
86 See Rosenbluth (1989: 68-89) for the Yen-Dollar Committee.
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« fi7States and in the United Kingdom put a growing emphasis upon bank capital. The 
ministry’s concern about the U.S. and the U.K. bank regulations were natural because 
New York and London were the most important financial centres in the world and 
because Japanese banks were rapidly expanding their business in these countries 
through the 1980s.88
In these circumstances, the MFJ began to worry that if the Japanese capital 
adequacy regulations were not comparable with those in major countries, it would have 
a negative effect on the overseas business of Japanese banks. In other words, “Japanese 
regulators anticipated that the neglect of capital in the Japanese regulations could 
provoke foreign pressures [on Japanese banks to raise their capital levels].”89 In fact, 
during the 1980s, Japanese banks’ CARs were at the lowest level among Basel 
Committee countries in terms of the capital to asset ratio (see Oatley and Nabors 1998: 
47-48), while their market share in the international lending market was rapidly 
increasing.90 As a result, Japanese banks were facing heavy criticism from their U.S. 
and European competitors, who were accusing them of raising their international market 
share by taking advantage of the domestic regulations which allowed them to hold a 
lower capital level (Kapstein 1992: 277).
The new capital adequacy regulations of 1986
Even though the MFJ strongly believed that Japanese banks did not need to hold more 
capital, the international trend of strengthening bank capital led the ministry to embark 
on modifying the bank capital regulations in order to cope with potential foreign 
pressure. Accordingly, this modification of the capital regulations was deliberately 
carried out in such a way as to balance two different goals: to bring the regulations more 
in line with those in major countries, but not to increase the actual capital levels that 
Japanese banks had to hold. The Financial System Research Council, which was an 
advisory body to the MFJ, was responsible for the task of designing new capital 
regulations.91
87 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa.
88 This issue will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
89 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa.
90 This issue will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
91 The council consisted o f senior business, financial industry representatives and others. 
However, the ministry’s Banking Bureau officials also attended in the council as advisors, and 
MFJ officials played key roles in screening potential members, setting agendas, and conducting 
meetings (Tamura 2003a: ch. 4).
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The Council made a suggestion in the second interim report of The Present Situation 
o f Financial Liberalisation and Its Management of June 1984 that it would be desirable 
to change the then capital to deposit ratio regulation for the overseas business of 
Japanese banks (MFJ 1984: 359-364). In its final report of 1985, the Council provided a 
specific framework for the change. In the framework, the capital to deposit ratio 
regulation was replaced by the capital to total asset ratio regulation, and a part of 
unrealised gains on share holdings was included in the regulatory capital (MFJ 1985: 
338-343). Based on the framework, the MFJ issued a new administrative guidance on 
bank capital adequacy in May 1986 (MFJ 1986: 36-38).92
The MFJ clearly expressed that the new capital adequacy regulations reflected the 
international trend of strengthening capital adequacy and the foreign criticism of the lax 
Japanese capital adequacy regulations (see MFJ 1986: 32). Also, during later 
negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom for a common capital 
regulatory framework in 1987, a MFJ official commented:
There are criticisms on the behaviour o f Japanese banks overseas, ... With those 
backgrounds, the last year’s amendment o f the balance sheet regulation on banks [the 
1986 capital adequacy regulations] was one o f our steps to build a regulatory standard 
which can stand against the criticism from overseas (recited from Sawabe 2002: n. 48).
The new regulations employed regulatory elements that were generally accepted by 
Basel Committee countries at the time. The previous capital to deposit ratio regulation 
was replaced by a capital to asset ratio regulation, which was a rule employed by a 
number of Basel Committee countries (the United States, Canada, Italy, and 
Luxembourg).93 Some off-balance-sheet transactions were included in assets. Special 
loan loss provisions were not counted as capital. Also, the calculation method of the 
amount of total assets was changed from the term-end balance to the term-average 
balance in order to increase the reliability of CARs (MFJ 1986: 33-34).
However, the new capital adequacy framework was designed to raise disclosed CAR 
without increasing Japanese banks’ costs to comply with the regulations. The capital 
framework employed two different minimum CARs. While all banks had to maintain
92 In March 1985, the MFJ allowed banks to issue foreign currency denominated convertible 
bonds in overseas markets, which was expected to help banks increase their capital bases (MFJ 
1985:34).
93 Most European countries in the Basel Committee used capital to risk-weighted asset ratio 
approaches (Cooke 1990: 314).
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their CARs above only 4 percent from 1990 on, only international banks, which referred 
to banks with overseas branches, were required to maintain their CARs over 6 percent 
from 1987 on. The higher minimum CAR requirement of 6 percent for international 
banks was intended to reduce the foreign criticism of the low capital levels of Japanese 
banks.94 Yet, the MFJ allowed international banks to include 70 percent of unrealised 
gains on share holdings in the regulatory capital.95 Also, the new capital framework 
allowed banks to include tax effects in relation to provisions and depreciations in the 
regulatory capital (MFJ 1986: 33-35).
The inclusion of 70 percent of unrealised gains on share holdings in the regulatory 
capital was a deliberate effort on the part of the MFJ to help Japanese banks with 
overseas branches to meet capital adequacy standards in major countries. In fact, the 
inclusion of unrealised gains on share holdings in the regulatory capital could have been 
a problem from the perspective of prudential regulation during both economic booms 
and economic downturns (Sawabe 2002: 410-412).96 However, the required minimum 
CARs in major countries were generally higher than the capital level of Japanese banks; 
for instance, U.S. regulations had required banks to maintain their CARs over 5.5 
percent since 1985 (Reinicke 1995: 150), which was almost double of the Japanese 
banks’ capital level of about 3 percent. Meanwhile, Japanese banks traditionally had a 
huge amount of unrealised gains on securities holdings. In these circumstances, the MFJ 
concluded that without the inclusion of unrealised gains on share holdings it was 
impossible for Japanese banks to increase their CARs to a level that foreign regulators 
might require them to hold.97
Highlighting the inclusion of 70 percent of unrealised gains on share holdings, 
Tamura (2003a: ch. 4) argues that the 1986 capital framework was the failure of MFJ’s 
efforts to strengthen the Japanese capital adequacy regulations due to Japanese banks’ 
opposition.98 However, although it was Japanese bankers who provided the idea of
94 The MFJ emphasised that the 6 percent regulation was necessary to cope with the 
international trend of strengthening capital adequacy regulations (see MFJ 1986: 33-35).
95 The figure o f 70 percent was decided based on past fluctuations o f stock prices (MFJ 1986: 
35).
96 In a bull market, banks’ unrealised gains on securities holdings and in turn their CARs could 
be inflated so that the capital adequacy rule could fail to induce the banks to behave prudently; 
meanwhile, in an economic down, banks’ unrealised gains and CARs could contract along with 
declining stock prices and, as a result, the inclusion o f the unrealised gains in the regulatory 
capital could threaten the soundness the banks (Sawabe 2002: 410-412). However, note that at 
that time the Japanese regulatory authority expected that the country’s economy and stock 
market would continue to grow.
97 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa.
98 Tamura (2003a: ch.4) also indicated that the 1986 administrative guidance on capital
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including unrealised gains on share holdings in the regulatory capital, the MFJ agreed to 
it without opposition." In fact, Japanese banks did not like the idea of showing their 
unrealised gains, which had been formally invisible on their balance sheets, because it 
would reduce their managerial freedom (Sawabe 2002: 412-415). When the MFJ later 
negotiated with foreign bank regulators for the establishment of a common capital 
adequacy framework (the Basel Accord), the ministry tried to bring the common capital 
framework close to the 1986 capital regulations in order to protect the competitiveness 
of Japanese banks.100
Summary
The Japanese bank regulatory authority, the MFJ, maintained the convoy system in 
administering the country’s banking system. The convoy system provided a very strong 
bank safety net, by not allowing any banks to fail, and it did work very well throughout 
the 1980s. Therefore, even though bank regulators in major countries began to put 
growing emphasis on bank capital adequacy from the early 1980s, the need for 
strengthening the capital adequacy of banks was low in Japan. However, the MFJ 
considered the possibility that foreign regulators might impose strict capital adequacy 
requirements on Japanese banks, which would have a negative effect on their 
international business activities. As a result, the MFJ modified the Japanese bank capital 
regulations to become in line with those in major countries in 1986. Nevertheless, the 
new capital framework did not require the banks to raise their actual capital soundness. 
The idea of capital adequacy regulation was alien to the Japanese until the mid-1990s, 
when the convoy system stopped working properly and Japanese banks began to go 
bankrupt.
3.2 South Korea
Korea’s bank regulatory authority traditionally tended to neglect prudential regulation 
for banks. As a result, the BIS standard was not deemed necessary by the regulatory 
authority in order to strengthen the stability of the country’s banking system. I will first
adequacy did not provide the MFJ with a legal means to impose the new capital standards. 
However, MFJ’s administrative guidance had traditionally carried no legally-binding obligations, 
but Japanese banks complied with them in most cases.
99 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa.
100 This issue will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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analyse the country’s bank regulatory structure, which hindered the regulatory authority 
in developing prudential regulation. Then, I will examine the relations between the 
government and banks, which reduced the necessity to implement capital adequacy 
regulations.
The subordination o f bank regulators to the Ministry o f  Finance
The banking regulatory institutional framework in Korea was different from those in 
Japan and in Taiwan. Bank regulation was carried out by finance ministries in those 
countries (in Japan until 1998 and in Taiwan until 2004). In contrast, Korea’s bank 
regulatory authority, the Office of Bank Supervision (OBS), was located in the central 
bank, the Bank of Korea (BoK), until the establishment of the new financial regulatory 
authority, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) in the wake of the 1997 
financial crisis. However, although the OBS was legally independent from the Ministry 
of Finance of Korea (MFK),101 it was, in practice, subordinate to the ministry. This 
regulatory institutional framework hindered Korean bank regulators in attaching the 
priority to prudential regulation, including capital adequacy regulation.
Korea’s supreme legal authority to govern commercial banks—“nationwide banks”, 
“regional banks”, and foreign bank branches—was the Monetary Board. The Board was 
composed of nine members representing various groups in the economy: the Minister of 
Finance (ex officio), the Governor of the BoK (ex officio), one member recommended 
by the Minister of Economic Planning, two members recommended by banks (the 
Korea Federation of Banks), two members recommended by the Minister of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, and two members recommended by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry. The Board was responsible for the formulation and implementation of 
monetary credit policies and the direction and supervision of the operations, 
management and administration of the BoK. The Board also exerted direct control over 
commercial banks under the General Banking Law, regulating market entry, scope of 
banking business, capital adequacy, and so forth, in order to ensure prudential banking 
practices (OBS 1992a: 10).
The OBS was established within the BoK under the Bank of Korea Act as the bank 
supervisory executive branch of the Monetary Board (and also the BoK). Although the 
OBS was subject to instructions and direction of the Board, the authority for the bank
101 The ministry was reorganised to the Ministry o f Finance and Economy (MoFE) in 1994 
when it merged with the Economic Planning Board. MFK refers to MoFE from this point on.
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regulatory administration was largely delegated to the OBS from the Board. For 
instance, the 1992 ‘Prudential Management Guidelines for Banking Institutions,’ which 
was a broad framework of prudential regulations and which included a provision 
requiring banks to keep their capital to risk-weighted assets ratios—that is, BIS CARs— 
over 8 percent, was formally formulated by the Board. However, the OBS had a 
mandate to design ‘Detailed Enforcement Regulations for Prudential Management 
Guidelines for Banking Institutions,’ which included the calculation method of the 
Korean BIS CAR, asset classification rules, provisioning requirements, and so on. In 
short, the OBS had a high degree offormal institutional independence in formulating 
regulations.
The OBS carried out periodic examinations on the head offices and about 10 percent 
of bank branches at least once a year without prior notice, and the scope of the periodic 
examinations covered all activities and operation of the banks. It also conducted a 
special examination when a bank’s situation raised imminent policy issues or there were 
other serious problems. The OBS reported the results of the examinations to the Board 
(Shim 2000: 18). Moreover, Korean banks were heavily under government control until 
the late 1990s, functioning as almost development institutions. The low management 
autonomy of the banks implied that it was almost impossible for them to oppose 
government policies.102 Given the relations between the government and the banks, the 
OBS also appeared to have a good degree of independence in supervising the banks.
In addition, although the OBS was a branch of the BoK, the OBS largely had 
budgetary and institutional independence from the central bank. The Governor of the 
BoK had the authority to control, administer and direct the business operation and 
management of the entire BoK. However, the BoK paid little attention to prudential 
regulation, focusing on the area of monetary stability rather than the area of financial 
stability. In addition, although the OBS was part of the BoK, the Governor could 
intervene in the operation of the OBS only as a member of the Monetary Board due to 
the control of the Board over the OBS (Shim 2000: 17-18). In actual fact, the BoK and 
the OBS behaved as almost separate institutions (Kim 2003: 77; NARK 1999c: 1). As a 
result, the OBS exercised discretionary control over its personnel management and 
budget (OBS 1992a: 12).
However, the OBS had, in practice, no independence from the MFK, which 
occupied the supreme position in the country’s financial administration. Although the
102 The government control over banks will be addressed in the following section.
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MFK had no legal power to govern the OBS (Shim 2000: 56), the ministry effectively 
controlled it. For example, the MFK exercised critical influence on the appointment of 
senior personnel to the OBS. The Superintendent of the OBS was appointed by the 
President upon the recommendation of the Monetary Board for a four-year term, and the 
Deputy Superintendent and Assistant Superintendents were appointed for three-year 
terms by the Board upon the request of the Governor of the BoK, as recommended by 
the Superintendent of the OBS (OBS 1992a: 12). Therefore, the Board had the power to 
appoint the senior personnel of the OBS. Yet, it was the MFK that effectively controlled 
the Board: in addition to the ex-officio membership of the Finance Minister, the 
ministry could recommend another member of the Board; the two Board members
recommended by the Korea Federation of Banks were, in reality, appointed by the
1 (1^MFK; accordingly, the MFK could choose a majority of the Board members (Kim 
2003: 65-66).104 The Superintendents of the OBS had not come from the OBS or BoK 
staff, but were former MFK officials. As a result, the OBS was under the direct control 
of the MFK, and the OBS conducted bank regulations in accordance with directions 
from the ministry.105
It is important to note that there was generally no conflict in policy preference 
between the OBS and the MFK.106 In practice, the OBS was not an independent bank 
regulatory agency with the primary goal of maintaining stability in the banking system. 
Instead it functioned as a branch of the MFK. The hierarchical system between the 
MFK and the OBS hindered the OBS in developing its own policy goals. In fact, 
although “prudential regulation” became a buzzword inside the OBS in the early 1990s, 
as a number of countries were strengthening prudential regulations, most of the staff did 
not understand what it actually meant.107 As a result, the policy stance of the OBS in 
coping with the Basel Accord was in conformity with the policy of the government, 
especially the MFK, which administered its implementation largely within the
103 After candidates for these two appointments had been named by the Finance Minister, the 
staff o f the Board obtained signatures on the nomination forms from the members o f the Korea 
Federation o f Banks (Kim 2003: 65-66).
104 Also, the Finance Minister had the casting vote on resolutions o f the Board, in his capacity 
as the Chairperson. In addition, the minister had the power to request the Board to reconsider 
resolutions already adopted. As there was no limit to the power to request reconsideration, the 
minister could exercise the power whenever she or he disagreed with a resolution o f the Board. 
When the minister made a request o f reconsideration, the Board was bound to review its 
position (Shim 2000: 17).
05 Author’s confidential interview with a senior MoFE official, Seoul, 21 February 2005.
106 Author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 31 January 2005.
107 Author’s confidential interview with a FSS official, Seoul, 15 February 2005.
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framework of the ministry’s macroeconomic policy framework.108
The Ministry o f  Finance and the role o f  banks in Korea’s economic development
The MFK held the highest authority in all areas of the country’s financial administration, 
including regulatory and monetary affairs, until the establishment of the FSC and the 
independence of the BoK in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis.109 In addition to 
effective control over OBS, which regulated commercial banks, the MFK directly 
supervised specialised banks.110 The ministry was responsible for drafting and 
presenting banking regulatory bills to the National Assembly (the legislature), and it had 
the power to issue ministerial decrees. The ministry was also responsible for the 
supervision of non-bank financial institutions such as development institutions, savings 
institutions, securities institutions, and life insurance institutions. Although securities 
firms and insurance firms were also supervised by the Securities Supervisory Board and 
the Insurance Supervisory Board, respectively, the Boards were under the control of the 
MFK (OBS 1992a: 8). In addition, the ministry held a prominent position over the 
central bank by holding supervisory authority over the business of the BoK.111 As a 
result, the MFK had control over monetary policies (Shim 2000: 18-19, 39).
In administering financial policies, the key objective of the MFK—that is, the 
government—was historically economic growth.112 The priority on growth was, in part, 
related to the weak legitimacy of the authoritarian regimes from the 1960s to the 1980s. 
The Park Chung Hee administration (1961-79) and the Chun Doo Hwan administration 
(1980-88) took the power by a military coup, and, as a result, the political legitimacy of 
their administrations was fragile.113 Therefore, they put the pre-eminent emphasis on 
rapid economic growth in order to justify their ruling, often sacrificing economic
108 This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
109 The MFK continued to exercise a strong influence in regulatory policies despite the presence 
o f the FSC during the late 1990s and early 2000s. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 6.
110 The OBS had the legal authority to examine some o f specialised banks, such as the National 
Agricultural Cooperative Federation, the National Federation o f Fisheries Cooperatives and the 
National Livestock Cooperatives Federation (OBS 1992a: 7), while the MFK supervised trust 
accounts in commercial banks in accordance o f the Trust Business Act, although their banking 
accounts were regulated by the OBS (Kim 2003: 72).
111 The MFK had the responsibility to approve amendments o f the Bank o f Korea Act, received 
the statement o f accounts o f the BoK, appointed the auditor o f the BoK, and examined the 
business o f the BoK (Shim 2000: 18-19, 39). See also Kim (2003: 56-90).
112 See also Kim (2003).
113 The political legitimacy o f President Rho Tae-Woo (1988-93), who was another former 
military general and close friend o f Chun Doo Hwan, was also not high.
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stability for the sake of growth, in contrast to the Taiwanese government (Cho and Kim 
1997:27-28, 52-54). " 4
The MFK controlled financial institutions tightly in driving economic growth. When 
the government embarked on the industrialisation of the country in the early 1960s, they 
wanted to control the behaviour of industrialists in order to make their economic 
activities conform to the “national interest.” The major policy instrument for the 
government to use in order to direct firms’ behaviours was control over finance. 
Commercial banks were nationalised in 1961, and the BoK was relegated to the status 
o f a virtual rubber stamp for MFK decisions and served as a ready source of 
government debt financing by the amendment of the Bank of Korea Act in 1962 (Cho 
and Kim 1997: 3, 22, 34; Choi 1993: 26-27; Kim 2003: 64-70). Although the 
commercial banks were re-privatised in the early 1980s, the MFK continued to exercise 
a strong influence over their management, including the appointment of top managers 
and even the day-to-day management, through administrative guidance and moral 
suasion until the late 1990s (Park and Kim 1994: 192). As a result, credit policy was 
formulated by the MFK as part of the development strategy, and its effectiveness was 
determined within the overall structure of the ministry’s industrial and macroeconomic 
policy (Cho and Kim 1997: 30-47; Choi 1993).
In the suppressed financial system, Korean banks functioned almost as a treasury 
unit of the government to support its financial policies. Policy loans were a typical 
example. One type of policy loans was explicitly earmarked credit programmes, such as 
those for exports, agriculture, fisheries or SMEs, in which borrowers received loans at 
preferential rates. Although the amount of these policy loans declined over time, they 
accounted for about 30 percent of total credit available in the economy in the 1980s. 
Banks (including specialised banks) financed about 62 percent of the policy loans 
between 1973 and 1991. However, banks had no voice in the allocation of policy loans 
of this kind and had to accommodate these loans irrespective of their portfolio 
strategies.115 The other type of policy loans was loans allocated through government 
directive, administrative guidance or ad hoc interventions. Their lending conditions 
were the same as those of general bank loans. Yet, as real interest rates were negative, 
the allocation of bank credit itself was a great favour. Although it is not possible to
114 Calls for controlling inflation were usually overshadowed by the MFK’s growth-oriented 
development strategy, in which the central bank financed various credit programmes and the 
government’s expansionary fiscal policies (Cho and Kim 1997: 27-28, 52-54).
There were some 221 types o f policy loans o f the kind among a total o f 298 types o f bank 
loans in 1981 (Woo-Cumings 1997: 63).
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estimate the exact amount of this type of policy loan, it seems to have been substantial 
(Cho and Kim 1997: 48-51; Woo-Cumings 1997: 63).
Banks financed their policy loans partly through government support. From 1973 to 
1991, about 35 percent of the first type of policy loans made by banks were financed by 
central bank credit. Although the share of the banks’ policy loans supported by the 
central bank declined over time, about 27 percent of such policy loans were still 
financed by the BoK. Also, it should be noted that Korean banks heavily depended on 
the central bank in mobilising funds available for loan in general. For instance, between 
1981 and 1990, the annual average ratios of central bank discount loans to total bank 
loans in the country amounted to about 23 percent, compared to about 2 percent in 
Japan and about 9 percent in Taiwan during the same period (Cho and Kim 1997: 52-54). 
This funding practice of Korean banks reflected the close relations between the 
government and the banks.
Government's protection o f banks and weak prudential regulation
In return for financial repression, the government provided strong protection from 
failure for banks. The government did not allow any banks to go bankrupt, partly using 
the central bank as the lender of last resort for Korean banks in a broad sense. For 
instance, there was the BoK Special Loan, which was introduced in 1972, and remained 
until 1982. There were two types of the Special Loans available to commercial banks in 
the 1972 system: B1 and A l. The BoK supplied B1 loans for banks when they had 
difficulty maintaining the reserve requirement due to “relief lending” to insolvent firms 
in order to ensure the banks’ liquidity. Al loans were used in liquidating insolvent 
companies. Also, in 1985, the government forced the BoK to introduce and lend new 
special loans, which were termed A2 loans, to banks at an annual interest rate of 3 
percent, in order to reduce the financial pressure on the banks facing a growing amount 
ofNPLs (Shim 2000: 48-49).116 Indeed, the country did not experience the failure of
116 The process o f the government rescue o f troubled banks was not transparent. In accordance 
with the order o f the MFK, a special section of the BoK, supporting its lender o f last resort 
function, did not disclose information about insolvent banks to the Monetary Board or to other 
parts o f the central bank. The information was kept secret by the MFK, which decided the 
operation o f special loans and then requested that the Board to issue them. Special loans were 
made without the knowledge o f the market and they carried no penalty charge. As a result, 
banks even sought to receive special loans. In fact, some BoK officials sarcastically referred to 
the lender o f last resort function o f the BoK as “the lender o f first resort function” (Kim 2003: 
171-172).
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any financial institutions, including small and mutual savings and finance companies, 
until the 1997 financial crisis (Song 1998: 11).
In the presence of the strong government protection of banks, they did not pay much 
attention to risk management, carrying a huge amount ofNPLs. During the 1960 and 
the 1970s, the ratio ofNPLs to total credit in nationwide banks was at a manageable 
level of about 3 percent.117 However, the ratio drastically rose during the 1980s, as the 
financial system began to be liberalised, long covered-up NPLs were disclosed all at 
once, and industrial restructuring was carried out by the government. The ratio rose 
from 2.7 percent in 1980 to 7.3 percent in the following year, and it reached a scary 
double digit height of 10.5 percent in 1986.118 Meanwhile, the capital level of Korean 
banks was not high. During the early 1970s, the ratio of net worth to total assets in 
nationwide banks was below 4 percent. The ratio rose to 5.9 percent by 1979, but it then 
proceeded to fall until the late 1980s, when the banks offered a massive amount of 
stocks in the rising stock market, dropping to 3.8 percent in 1985 (Kim 1994: 302-310). 
At the end of 1984, according to an estimate by the BoK, NPLs in nationwide banks 
were 2.6 times as high as their total net worth (Park and Kim 1994: 209).
However, neither the MFK nor the OBS paid much attention to strengthening capital 
adequacy regulations for banks because they did not allow the banks to fail.119 
Although there were capital adequacy regulations prior to the implementation of the 
BIS standard, they were not enforced by the bank regulators. In 1979, the OBS 
introduced a capital to deposit ratio guideline, which required banks to maintain their 
ratios above 10 percent (OBS 1994c: 106-107). In 1988, the capital regulation was 
replaced by capital to total asset ratio regulations.120 The required minimum capital 
ratios were 6 percent for nationwide banks and 8 percent for regional banks. The ratios 
were raised to 8 and 9 percent respectively in 1991 in order to cope with the
191implementation of the BIS standard in Basel Committee countries from 1992.
However, the ratios for a large proportion of Korea banks—particularly, nationwide
1,7 NPLs consisted o f only “doubtful”, and “estimated loss” loans for the period prior to 1976, 
but “fixed” loans were included to NPLs from the year (Kim 1994: 305).
118 The ratio began to fall in 1987 and dropped to 5.9 percent in 1989 (Kim 1994: 305).
119 Author’s confidential interview with a former senior OBS official, Seoul, 3 February 2005.
120 The implementation o f the 1988 regulations was not related to the establishment o f the Basel 
Accord (author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 28 January 2005).
One possible explanation of the change may be that the Korean regulatory authority intended to 
modernise their bank supervisory system by adopting the new Japanese capital regulations (the 
1986 capital regulations), given that Korean bureaucrats adopted the Japanese economic model 
until the 1997 financial crisis.
121 Author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 28 January 2005. See also 
OBS (1990a).
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banks—were lower than the required minimums throughout most of the period. Half of 
the nationwide banks did not meet the required 6 percent minimum at the end of 1988. 
The ratios of the banks rose in 1989, but they dropped in 1991 and all five major 
nationwide banks failed to comply with the required minimum ratio of 8 percent (see 
Table 3.1). Nevertheless, the OBS did not penalise banks for compliance failure (Shim 
2000: 107).
Table 3.1 Capital to total asset ratios of Korean banks, 1987-1991
(end o f  period; %)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Cho Hung Bank 4.7 5.7 9.1 7.4 7.0
The Commercial Bank of Korea 4.7 5.7 8.6 7.2 6.8
Korea First Bank 5.0 5.9 9.8 8.0 7.7
Hanil Bank 5.1 6.2 10.0 8.5 7.9
Bank o f Seoul 4.7 6.0 9.1 7.7 7.5
Average o f five major 
nationwide banks 4.8 5.9 9.3 7.7 7.4
Korea Exchange Bank 5.4 5.7 5.7 5.3 6.3
Shinhan Bank 5.4 6.9 17.2 18.7 12.9
KorAm Bank 4.4 6.1 14.5 10.5 8.9
Donghwa Bank - - 21.6 19.9 15.2
Dong Nam Bank - - 21.8 17.3 12.3
Dae Dong Bank - - 27.7 19.4 13.1
Hana Bank - - - - 20.8
Boram Bank - - - - 17.5
Average o f all nationwide banks 4.8 6.0 9.5 8.5 8.2
Daegu Bank 4.7 8.5 15.4 11.9 10.4
Pusan Bank 4.8 7.5 9.8 8.0 7.9
Chung Chong Bank 7.1 11.1 15.8 12.4 . 11.2
Kwangju Bank 7.8 11.8 19.2 14.3 14.4
Bank o f Cheju 9.0 10.6 17.1 14.7 13.7
Kyungki Bank 7.3 12.0 17.3 13.0 11.4
Jeonbuk Bank 9.7 22.4 27.5 22.9 18.9
Kangwon Bank 14.0 20.6 24.2 18.7 13.6
Kyongnam Bank 4.7 10.4 16.1 12.5 11.1
Chungbuk Bank 5.0 16.5 21.9 18.5 14.1
Average o f all regional banks 6.1 11.4 16.5 13.0 11.6
Average o f all banks 5.0 6.8 10.5 9.1 8.7
Source: Office o f  Bank Supervision, various issues o f Unhaeng Gyeongyeong Tonggye (Bank Statistics).
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Likewise, the MFK and the OBS had little intention of using the BIS standard in 
order to strengthen the domestic capital regulation. As in Japan, in the presence of the 
“no bank failure” policy of the government, the BIS standard, which was a regulation to 
prevent bank failure, could not make much of an impression among Koreans.122 Song 
Inwon (1998: 11), who was a former Deputy Director of OBS, wrote:
... Korea has provided financial institutions with an implicit safety net by its continued 
policy stance o f not allowing any financial institutions to fail. ... In this environment, 
prudential supervision measures were long seen as not very important.
Few people in the country—and also a number of foreign observers— saws the failure of 
Korean banks as likely irrespective of capital adequacy (Park and Kim 1994: 217), until 
they witnessed the closure of banks in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis. The 
incentives for the regulatory authority to adopt the BIS standard came from the outside, 
which will be discussed in the following chapter.
Summary
The OBS was Korea’s bank regulatory agency. However, even though the OBS had a 
good degree of formal independence, it was in practice subordinate to the government, 
especially the MFK. As a result, the OBS did not develop its own policy goals to 
promote financial stability or prudential regulation. Meanwhile, the primary goal of the 
Korean government in economic development was growth. To achieve the goal, the 
government repressed the banking sector, using banks as a tool to mobilise and allocate 
credit according to the government’s economic policy. In return, the government 
provided the banks with strong protection against insolvency. In these circumstances, 
capital adequacy regulations to prevent bank failures and prudential regulation in 
general did not attract much attention in the country until the outbreak of the 1997 
financial crisis.
3.3 Taiwan
Taiwan’s bank regulatory authority, like their Japanese and Korean counterparts, did not
122 Author’s confidential interviews with senior FSS officials, Seoul, 31 January 2005 and 15, 
16 February 2005.
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take heed of the capital adequacy of Taiwanese banks until the late 1980s. While the 
Taiwanese government traditionally put a great emphasis on financial stability, this 
emphasis on financial stability led the government to build a banking system in which 
the necessity of capital adequacy regulations was not high. However, the domestic need 
to strengthen the country’s capital adequacy regulation emerged in the late 1980s. This 
provided an incentive for the regulatory authority to adopt the BIS standard as a means 
to ensure stability in the banking system.
Priority for stability
Pursuant to the Banking Law, the Ministry of Finance of Taiwan (MFT) was the primary 
authority of administrative regulation and operational supervision of the financial 
system in Taiwan. The ministry had authority in the areas of issuing and revoking a 
banking license, regulating minimum capital and business items, granting permission to 
merge or reorganise a bank and establish a branch, and determining penalties for 
violations of the Banking Law. Also, the ministry could, at any time, require banks to 
submit financial statements for examination. These responsibilities of the ministry were 
mainly conducted by its Department of Monetary Affairs, which was reorganised as the 
Bureau of Monetary Affairs (BoMA) in order to meet the regulatory need caused by 
financial liberalisation in July 1991.123 Meanwhile, the central bank, the Central Bank 
of China (CBC), was in charge of controlling the money supply, foreign exchange and a 
portion of the operational supervision of the financial system (BoMA 1992: 31-36).
As it was in the case of Korea, the MFT— in other words, the Kuomintang (KMT) 
government, which governed the country for five decades until 2000—maintained a 
strong control over the financial sector in order to administer the country’s economic 
development. The government directed the allocation of credit through government- 
owned commercial banks and specialised banks. Interest rates were controlled until 
1989, when they were totally liberalised. Tight foreign exchange controls were in place 
(Shea and Yang 1994: 220-228; Wade 1990: 165-172). The degree of financial control 
in Taiwan was less severe than in Korea but greater than in Japan, and its form was 
different from Korea’s. Nevertheless, financial control was crucial to the country’s 
economic development, as it was in Korea (Cheng 1993: 56-57; Johnson 1987: 149; 
Patrick 1994; Wade 1990: 165-172).
123 When the Financial Supervision Commission, the new financial supervisory authority, was 
established in July 2004, the BoMA became a subordinate agency to the Commission.
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However, whereas the Korea government placed the top priority on growth during 
the country’s economic development, the Taiwanese government put more emphasis on 
monetary and financial stability than growth when these two goals conflicted (see 
Cheng 1994: 163).124 The overriding concern of the Taiwanese government for 
economic stability was deeply rooted in their perception that the hyperinflation and 
currency crisis during the civil war period (1946-49) in the mainland was a primary 
cause for their defeat by the Communists in 1949 (Cheng 1993: 57-58; Ho and Lee 
2Q01: 73). In addition, the isolated diplomatic position of Taiwan made the government 
very cautious about financial instability.125 The country’s dwindling position in 
international relations meant, in principle, that it could not hope for aid from 
international organisations or foreign countries; it should survive on the basis of self- 
help in a financial crisis (Chu 1999: 191; Noble and Ravenhill 2000: 102). Therefore, 
the government had to pay keen attention to the stability of the country’s financial 
system.126
In fact, the KMT government built a strong independent central bank in order to 
protect the country’s economic stability and, also, the political security of the KMT 
regime. The CBC occupied the commanding heights of the country’s economic 
bureaucracy, and its governor was regarded as the most senior economic minister.127 
Even though the formal authority in the country’s financial administration was the MFT, 
the ministry, in practice, played secondary fiddle to the CBC in the area of banking 
regulation, at least until the late 1980s. Under the steering authority of the orthodox 
central bank, financial as well as macroeconomic stability was a primary and enduring 
economic policy objective in Taiwan (Cheng 1993: 63; Chu 1999: 189-193; Thurbon 
2001:251; Wade 1990: 208).
124 Between 1960 and 1989, the annual increase o f inflation was, on average, 5.4 percent in 
Taiwan, while the corresponding figure reached 13.8 percent in Korea (4.9 percent in Japan) 
during the same period (Park 1994: 5). Also, financial liberalisation was far more cautious in 
Taiwan than in Korea (see Thurbon 2001; Zhang 2002).
125 Author’s interview with Chen Zhan-Shen (President o f CDIC), Taipei, 8 September 2004. 
Taiwan was forced to withdraw from the United Nations in 1971 and to sever formal diplomatic 
ties with Japan and other major Western countries in 1972 (Cheng 1993: 71). Also, the country 
lost its membership o f the IMF in 1978 (Chu 1999: 191). Only twenty-nine countries (mostly 
mini-countries) had diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1997 (McBeath 1998: 186).
126 Taiwan’s government built up not only a huge amount o f foreign exchange reserves, but also 
an exceptionally large volume of oil and food reserves (Chu 1999: 191).
127 Some Ministers o f  Finance were formerly Vice Governors o f the CBC (Chu 1999: 189).
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The state ownership o f  banks and the regulation o f capital adequacy
The concern with economic stability and, also, the anxiety towards the rise of big 
indigenous capitalists led the government to restrict the private ownership of banks, 
along with that of major non-financial enterprises. The KMT government’s memory of 
private banks’ behaviours during the 1940s made them conclude that the private 
ownership of banks would have a negative effect on economic stability: during the last 
wartime period (1943-45), private banks improperly profited from credit allocation and 
took advantage of inflation and the currency reform by the government during the civil 
war period was not supported by financial capitalists (Cheng 1993: 77; Ho and Lee 
2001: 73). Also, the sub-ethnic position of the mainlander-dominated KMT regime 
made them anxious about the emergence of powerful indigenous capitalists, who might 
someday pose a challenge to the KMT regime. The KMT government was an “alien” 
regime in Taiwan when it relocated to the island after its defeat on the mainland. Only 
15 percent of the country’s inhabitants were emigrating mainlanders, while the 
remaining 85 percent were native Taiwanese. However, it was difficult for the 
government to build a strong support base, in particular, in the urban areas, in which the 
Taiwanese-dominated business sector grew rapidly.128 Therefore, the KMT government 
had a strong incentive to avoid the formation of big native capital (Cheng 1993: 59).
As a result, the government owned most domestic banks and strictly controlled the 
new entry of private banks until the 1990s, when it allowed the establishment of a large
1 “70number of new private banks. At the end of 1990, a total of five specialised banks 
and seven commercial banks, including the “big three” commercial banks (First 
Commercial Bank, Huan-Nan Commercial Bank, and Chang-Hwa Commercial Bank), 
out of a total of ten commercial banks, were owned by the government.130 Also, in 
terms of asset size, government-owned banks dominated the country’s financial system: 
the aggregate assets of commercial banks, specialised banks, the Central Trust of China 
and the CBC accounted for more than 62 percent of the total assets of all financial
128 Gregory W. Noble and John Ravenhill (2000: 102) raise doubts about the argument that the 
government’s decision not to encourage the growth o f large Taiwanese enterprises reflected an 
ethnic spilt between the mainlanders-dominated government and a Taiwanese-dominated 
business sector.
129 Whereas Korea privatised commercial banks in the early 1980s, there was no public 
discussion o f the privatisation o f banks in Taiwan until the mid-1980s (Wade 1990: 161).
130 The three private commercial banks were the Overseas Chinese Commercial Bank, the 
Shanghai Savings and Commercial Banks, and United World Chinese Commercial Bank. The 
KMT government licensed these banks to draw political support from overseas Chinese and to 
facilitate trade with them (Cheng 1993: 65-77).
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institutions in the country at the end of 1990 (BoMA 1992: 6)131 and government- 
owned commercial banks accounted for more than 90 percent of the total assets of all 
commercial banks at the end of 1991 (Semkow 1992: 37). Overshadowed by 
government-owned banks, private banks were on the periphery of the banking system.
The government had strong control over government-owned banks. Chairmen of the 
banks were mostly ex-MFT or CBC officials, and senior bank officials were appointed 
by the government. The government set salary scales and the annual bonuses of bank 
staff (Wade 1990: 161-162). Furthermore, there were serious penalties against 
imprudent loan making: bankers who made bad loans were required to repay them and 
those who could not make restitutions were jailed. Partly because of such legal
punishments, the overriding concern of government-owned banks was to protect the
1 ^security of their lending. As a result, they functioned like pawnshops rather than 
modem financial institutions, requiring very stringent collateral conditions for loans 
(Cheng 1993: 80; Wade 1990: 163; Yang 1994: 312-313). In making loans, the banks 
required collateral of about the same value as the amount of the loans and also they 
usually deliberately undervalued those assets.133 Accordingly, banks incurred limited 
losses even though the borrowers defaulted (Kuo 2000: 15). The NPL ratios of 
Taiwanese banks were not high.134 For specialised banks, the ratio was 6 percent in 
1980, but it dropped to 2.9 percent in 1988. For government-owned banks, the ratio was
4.4 percent in 1980, and it continued to decline through the 1980s, falling to 3 percent in 
1988. The ratio of private banks was not high either. It was 3.8 percent in 1980, and, 
although it rose to 7 percent in 1985, it dropped to 3.2 percent in 1988 (Yang 1994: 312- 
313).
131 The other monetary institutions— medium business banks, credit cooperative associations, 
and credit department o f farmers’ and fishermen’s associations— accounted for about 19 percent 
of the total, while the share o f non-monetary institutions— investment and trust companies, the 
postal savings system, insurance companies, bills finance corporations, and securities finance 
companies— was less than 17 percent (BoMA 1992: 6).
132 The information about the financial conditions o f Taiwanese firms was unreliable, and this 
also made Taiwanese banks very conservative in making loans (Cheng 1993: 81; Wade 1990:
163).
133 Requiring collateral for loans was a common practice for Japanese and Korean banks. 
However, the required level o f collateral was the highest in Taiwan among the three countries. 
However, Taiwanese banks began to relax collateral conditions in the 1980s (Kuo 2000: 15).
134 NPLs herein consisted o f “bad loans”, “called accounts”, and “overdue loans”. Overdue 
loans were those late in being paid. Called accounts were overdue loans that were overdue for 
six months or those that were overdue less than six months but their collateral was claimed by 
creditors. Overdue loans and called accounts were deemed bad loans when they could not be 
paid back or when they were overdue for two years and had been called but not paid or when 
their collateral was not enough to cover the balance remaining on the loans (Yang 1994: 311- 
312).
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Yet, the government’s ownership of banks meant that there was no risk of their 
insolvency, with the exception of the government’s default, and, therefore, the country’s 
bank regulators did not pay much attention to the capital adequacy of government- 
owned banks. Taiwan’s bank capital adequacy regulation prior to the adoption of the 
BIS standard was that the volume of liabilities a bank could hold had to be lower than a 
certain multiplier of the amount of its net worth. This regulation was laid down in the 
Banking Law in 1975, and the MFT, with consultation with the CBC, could decide the 
multiplier (BoMA 1993b: 1500). However, there is little evidence of how the MFT 
carried out the capijtal regulation.135 Because of limited information of the ministry’s 
practice of the regulation, this study analyses the capital to asset ratios of Taiwanese 
banks. Although this is an analytic turnaround, the analysis of the ratios has the 
advantage of increasing the comparability of the banks’ capital levels with their 
Japanese and Korean counterparts, whose capital to asset ratios during the 1980s are 
available.136
Figure 3.2 shows the average net worth to asset ratio of Taiwanese banks during the 
1980s. Commercial banks, specialised banks, and medium business banks were
117covered. Private banks’ capital ratios were high, amounting to 9.2 percent on average, 
during the period. Although their average ratio dropped to 5.7 percent in 1988, it 
recovered to 11.2 percent in the following year. However, government-owned banks 
made a vivid contrast to the private banks. For specialised banks, the average capital 
ratio was 6.9 percent during the period, and the lowest was 4.7 percent in 1987. The 
capital ratios of government-owned commercial banks were even lower. During most of 
the period, their average capital ratio was barely higher than 4 percent, falling to 3 
percent in 1987. The capital position of the big three commercial banks, which were 
government-owned, was the worst, hovering around just 2 percent on average from 
1986 to 1989, while the banks accounted for more than 30 percent of total deposits in 
domestic banks.
135 It may imply that the capital regulation was not, in fact, important.
136 As discussed earlier, Japanese banks’ average capital to asset ratio was about 3 percent in the 
mid-1980s, while the average ratio for Korean nationwide banks was about 5 percent in 1987 
and about 6 percent in 1988. Yet, there is a limitation in comparing the capital levels o f these 
banks with that o f Taiwanese banks by using these ratios because the definitions o f capital or 
assets employed in these three countries were not identical.
137 Mutual savings and loan companies were reorganised to medium business banks in 1975. 
These banks dealt primarily with the supply o f medium and long-term credits to SMEs (BoMA 
1992: 12). There was one government-owned medium business bank and seven private medium 
business banks in total.
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Figure 3.2 T he average net w orth to assets ratio o f Taiw anese banks, 1980-1989
(end o f  period, %)
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Source: Central Bank o f  China, various issues o f  Jinron Jigou Yewu Gaikuang Nianbao (Financial 
Institutions Business Operation Annual Report).
Note: 1. Assets are composed o f  loans and investments; 2. outliers are not included in the calculation.
This analysis o f  CARs o f  Taiwanese banks during the 1980s may imply that the 
Taiwanese regulatory authority adopted dual approaches in supervising capital adequacy 
o f the banks at that time. On the one hand, the regulatory authority’s traditional 
emphasis on financial stability might have led them to supervise the capital adequacy o f  
private banks strictly, as their solvency was not guaranteed by the government. On the 
other hand, the regulatory authority may have not taken much heed o f  the capital 
adequacy o f  government-owned banks, as there was virtually no risk o f  their insolvency. 
Yet, even though the CARs o f  private banks were at a higher level than those o f  
government-owned banks, it would be an exaggeration to argue that Taiwan had a 
strong tradition o f  capital adequacy supervision. As discussed above, private banks 
played a very limited role in the country’s banking system. Based on the capital 
adequacy supervision for government-owned banks, which dominated the banking 
system, it would be more plausible to conclude that Taiwan’s bank regulators 
traditionally did not put much emphasis on supervising banks’ capital adequacy and that 
the major banks were lowly capitalised by international standards.
The domestic need for the adoption fo r  the BIS standard
The MFT liberalised the banking sector drastically in the late 1980s, as the strong
government control over the banking sector generated inefficiency in the financial
system, especially during the second half o f  the 1980s. Government-owned banks’
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ultraconservative credit allocation was unable to allocate credit effectively.138 As a 
result, various forms of informal, unregulated finance expanded in the country. This 
resulted in a series of financial scandals in the 1980s, which culminated in the collapse 
of the Tenth Credit Co-op in 1985. Furthermore, the economy faced excess liquidity due 
to chronic trade surpluses in the mid-1980s. The excess money flooded into speculative 
activities in the stock market and real estate markets through informal and unregulated 
finance, while formal financial institutions failed to meet the credit demand in the 
economy. This situation threatened the stability of the financial system, and led the MFT 
to reform the banking sector by amending the Banking Law in 1989 (Bernard 1997: 
236-238; Cheng 1993: 60, 89; Yang 1994: 292-293; Yin 2000: 141-142; Zhang 2002: 
420-422).
The 1989 amendment of the Banking Law introduced various liberalisation 
measures. Restrictions on interest rates were totally abolished. Commercial banks were 
allowed to receive savings deposits while savings banks were allowed to receive 
checking account deposits. The disposition period of real estate or securities acquired by 
a commercial bank through foreclosure of mortgage was extended. The regulation of the 
interest rates of time savings deposits when they were withdrawn prior to the date of 
maturity was modified. Most of all, the MFT lifted the ban on establishing new private 
banks (BoMA 1993b: 1487-1645). As a result, sixteen new private commercial banks 
and one commercial bank reorganised from the China Trust Investment Company 
entered into the banking market by the end of 1993 (BoMA 1996b: 61).
As the MFT was preparing for the liberalisation of the banking sector, the ministry
11 0also planned to introduce a new capital adequacy regulation. The ministry perceived 
that the strengthening of prudential regulations, especially, the capital adequacy 
regulation, was necessary due to the removal of restrictions on forming new banks 
{Journal o f  Commerce 9 January 1989). When the MFT was seeking a new capital 
adequacy regulation, the establishment of the BIS capital adequacy standard in 1988 
provided the MFT with a ready-made formula. The MFT thought that the BIS standard 
was a capital adequacy regulation that had been developed for many years by bank 
regulators from advanced economies. In addition, it was difficult for the MFT to 
develop a new capital adequacy formula for itself.140 Also, as will be discussed in detail
138 Forty percent o f bank deposits were not lent out in 1987 (Cheng 1993: 90).
139 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih (former Director o f the BoMA, President o f  
Central Trust o f China), Taipei, 1 September 2004.
140 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih.
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in the next chapter, the MFT perceived that the BIS standard was the international 
standard in the area of bank capital regulation and that they had to follow the 
international standard to avoid endangering the international business of Taiwanese 
banks.141 Although the MFT thought that the BIS standard was not the perfect capital 
adequacy regulation, the ministry expected that the adoption of the BIS standard would 
strengthen the soundness of Taiwanese banks.142
In addition, the isolated diplomatic position of the country seemed to intensify the 
MFT’s preference for the international standard; one reason for the MFT adopted the 
BIS standard was simply that it was the international standard.143 In the late 1980s, the 
Taiwanese government accelerated its efforts to enhance the country’s international 
status. Lee Teng-Hui, who assumed the presidency after Chiang Ching-Kuo’s death in 
1988, actively embarked on the international campaign to advance Taiwan’s 
international position. Following his direction, the government began to make 
aggressive efforts to join international organisations, including an attempt to join the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in 1991 (McBeath 1998: 186-187). The adoption of 
the BIS standard may have been expected to increase Taiwan’s international image.
As a result, the BIS standard was adopted by the MFT in the 1989 amendment of the 
Banking Law. Article 44 of the amendment required banks to maintain their capital to 
risk-weighted asset ratios at no less than 8 percent. Along with the new capital adequacy 
regulation, the amendment also adopted several other prudential regulatory measures, 
such as share-holdings ceilings on single investors, the increase of the required ratio of 
legal reserves to net profits, the qualification for bank officials, and the protection of 
bank customers’ private information (BoMA 1993b: 1487-1645).
Summary
Despite the emphasis upon financial stability, the government ownership of most
141 The most important reason why the MFT adopted the BIS standard was their concern for the 
international business o f Taiwanese banks (author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih).
142 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interview with a senior 
BoMA official, by email, 2 September 2004.
143 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih. The Taiwanese authorities’ emphasis on building 
a financial system coherent with international standards or best practices was consistent 
throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. The implementation o f the 1996 amendment o f the Basel 
Accord, the 1998 amendment o f the Deposit Insurance Act, and the creation o f the Financial 
Supervisory Commission, the new financial supervisory agency, in 2004 were driven with the 
catchphrase o f “to be in line with international standards.” Although not always successful, it 
was always the policy o f Taiwan government to keep pace with international standards.
domestic banks made the Taiwanese bank regulators pay little attention to the capital 
adequacy of Taiwanese banks, especially government-owned banks, until the late 1980s. 
However, the domestic need for the adoption of the BIS standard emerged when the 
MFT allowed the entry of new private banks into the market in the late 1980s. The MFT 
began to seek a new capital adequacy regulation to preserve the stability of the banking 
sector. In this situation, the BIS standard was a ready-made option for the MFT. In 
addition, Taiwan’s efforts to increase its international status seemed to provide an 
additional incentive for the regulatory authority to adopt the BIS standard, which they 
considered the international standard in the area of bank capital adequacy regulation.
Conclusions
The economic rationale of the Basel Accord was that banks had to maintain their capital 
over a certain level to prevent their failures against unexpected losses. Thus, the 
implementation of the BIS standard may have increased the stability of a banking 
system in a country where bank failures existed. To the contrary, the necessity of the 
capital adequacy regulation was not high in a country where the government provided a 
strong financial safety net so that the risk of bank failure was significantly low. In such 
a country, the cost of a strict capital adequacy regulation might overwhelm its benefits, 
by reducing the competitiveness of banks vis-a-vis foreign competitors or simply 
limiting the banks’ operations, while making a trivial contribution to the stability of the 
banking system.
In Japan and Korea, the bank regulatory authorities maintained strong financial 
safety nets to prevent bank failures. The MFJ adopted the convoy system in which the 
ministry arranged a merger between a weak financial institutions and a strong one. The 
Korean government also did not allow any banks to fail by providing special loans to 
ailing banks, if necessary. These government-backed safety nets were working 
effectively in the late 1980s and there were no bank failures (until the mid-1990s). 
Accordingly, there was very little domestic need or voice to strengthen the capital 
adequacy regulations, and the BIS standard did not make much of an impression among 
the Japanese or the Koreans, including bank regulators, even though the Japanese 
participated in the Basel Committee. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
adoption of the BIS standard in Japan and Korea was attributable exclusively to direct 
or indirect external pressures.
The view of the Taiwanese regulatory authority on the BIS standard was different
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from their Japanese and Korean counterparts. There was almost no risk of bank failure 
in Taiwan until the late 1980s, because most domestic banks were owned by the 
government. As a result, the MFT did not pay much attention to the capital adequacy of 
Taiwanese banks. However, as the MFT planned to allow the entry of new private banks 
in the late 1980s, the ministry felt the necessity to adopt an advanced capital adequacy 
regulation to supervise the liberalised banking sector. In this situation, the BIS standard 
was the most attractive option available to the MFT. Even though external pressure was 
another factor that led the ministry to adopt the BIS standard, as will be discussed in the 
following chapter, its adoption in the country was partly due to the Taiwanese bank 
regulatory authority’s own need. The different motivations for adopting the BIS 
standard in these countries were reflected by the differences in their implementation of 
the BIS standard, especially during the first half of the 1990s.
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CHAPTER 4
External Compliance Pressure
Why did Japan agree to establish the BIS standard and why did Korea decide to adopt 
it? Were there other factors that led Taiwan to adopt the BIS standard? This chapter 
addresses the influence of external pressures, pressure from foreign countries and 
pressure from the market, on the adoption and the compliance with the BIS standard by 
these three countries. The analysis of pressure from foreign countries begins with an 
analysis of the establishment of the BIS standard and the extent to which such pressure 
played a role in the adoption of the BIS standard by Korea and Taiwan and is followed 
by an analysis of whether this gave the three countries a strong incentive to comply with 
it. The analysis of market pressure first examines whether the BIS standard was actually 
accepted by the market and then shows how the bank regulatory authorities and banks 
perceived the market’s response to the BIS standard.
4.1 Compliance pressure from foreign regulators
Pressure from major countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom was 
an important element in both creating the Basel Accord and maintaining compliance 
with the BIS standard. The idea of a common capital adequacy regulation was proposed 
by the United States, and the threat of market closure by the United States and the 
United Kingdom induced Japan to accede to create the Basel Accord. In addition, 
although Korea and Taiwan did not face explicit pressure from foreign countries to 
adopt the BIS standard, concern for their banks’ business in major countries led them to 
adopt it as a precaution. The risk of foreign market closure remained persistent 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, and this gave the countries a strong incentive to 
comply with the BIS standard.
The initiation o f the Basel Accord and threat o f  market closure
The establishment of the Basel Accord was largely a result of pressure from the United 
States and the United Kingdom on the other members of the Basel Committee to agree
on a common capital adequacy framework. As mentioned earlier, U.S. regulatory 
authorities and legislators began to make efforts to strengthen capital adequacy 
regulations in the country from the early 1980s. However, it was concluded at the time 
that improving capital adequacy regulations in a sustainable and appropriate manner 
necessitated an international solution. Given the global integration of financial markets, 
purely domestic regulatory actions could have been insufficient to protect the U.S. 
financial system. In addition, the unilateral strengthening of domestic capital regulations 
could have placed U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign banks 
which were governed by less stringent regulations. In this situation, international 
regulatory harmonisation at a more stringent level provided a better solution for the U.S. 
government, as it could strengthen capital regulations without hurting U.S. banks’ 
competitiveness with foreign banks (Oatley and Nabors 1998; Reinicke 1995; Singer 
2004).'44 The U.S. strategy of targeting the international harmonisation of capital 
adequacy standards was reflected in the International Lending Supervisory Act of 
November 1983, which directed the U.S. regulatory authorities to seek an international 
agreement on a common capital adequacy framework in the Basel Committee (Oatley 
and Nabors 1998: 45; Reinicke 1995: 162-163).I4S
Although Committee members may have agreed on the general need to address the 
capital adequacy of banks, according to Peter Cooke (1990: 324-326), the then chairman 
of the Committee, there was little prospect of immediate harmonisation of capital 
adequacy regulations at that time.146 There was no consensus on the definition of capital 
as well as an appropriate minimum level of capital among bank regulatory authorities, 
who defended their own national standards in the light of differences in national 
banking structures and in the competitive ability of domestic banks (Kapstein 1994: 
103-119; Oatley and Nabors 1998; Reinicke 1995: 162-166; Singer 2004: 546). In 
addition, the European Commission had been pursuing its own capital adequacy 
standards as part of the 1992 project, and France and several other European 
Community (EC) members did not want to cede regulatory leadership to the Basel
144 In explaining the U.S. incentive to seek the international harmonisation o f capital adequacy 
standards, Thomas Oatley and Robert Nabors (1998) put emphasis on the role o f the legislature 
whereas David A. Singer (2004) stresses on the role o f the U.S. regulatory authorities.
145 U.S. regulatory authorities were required to report to Congress periodically on the progress 
towards an international agreement (Kapstein 1994: 108; Reinicke 1995: 167).
146 Although the U.S. regulatory authorities’ efforts to harmonise capital regulations led the 
Committee to establish the 1983 framework that compared capital adequacy standards, it was no 
more than a confidential observation framework (Cooke 1990: 324-326; Reinicke 1995: 163-
164).
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Committee (Kapstein 1992: 276-277). As a result, when Paul Volker, the then chairman 
of the Federal Reserve Board, presented the idea for convergent capital adequacy 
standards in Basel in 1984, his remarks were “greeted with a yawn” by central bankers 
(Kapstein 1994: 108). At a meeting in Basel in early 1986, central bankers commented 
that the introduction of standard capital requirements was unlikely (Reinicke 1995: 166).
Frustrated with the Committee’s failure to produce a common capital adequacy 
framework, the U.S. Federal Reserve launched a bilateral agreement on bank capital 
adequacy with its U.K. counterpart, the Bank of England, in January 1987. The United 
Kingdom joined the United States because it needed to strengthen domestic bank capital 
adequacy regulation, and also because it was opposed to capital adequacy standards that 
had been discussed in the EC (Kapstein 1992: 281;1994: 113).147 The bilateral 
agreement set a two-tier definition of capital, adopted a risk-weighted approach, and 
included off-balance-sheet transactions in risk assets.148 Although a minimum level of 
required capital was not proposed in the agreement, the U.S. and the U.K. regulatory 
authorities announced that they would agree on a common minimum capital level and 
make it public in the then near future (MFJ 1987: 40-42).149
The bilateral agreement was not the result of the United States and the United 
Kingdom abandoning their plan to create a multilateral agreement in the Committee. 
Rather, the bilateral agreement was a decisive strategy to achieve a favourable 
multilateral agreement.150 The bilateral agreement forced the other Basel Committee
147 In 1984, the Bank o f England provided a rescue package for Johnson Matthey Bankers, 
which became insolvent after it concentrated its lending to a small number o f high-risk firms. 
This event shook U.K. voters’ confidence in the financial stability o f banks, and U.K. bank 
regulators were ignominiously summoned to Parliament to discuss their role leading up to the 
insolvency o f the bank (Singer 2004: 556-557).
148 The bilateral capital adequacy framework divided risk-weights into five categories (0, 10, 25, 
50, and 100 percent) (MFJ 1987: 40-42).
149 As the negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom for the bilateral 
agreement were conducted in great secrecy, the bilateral agreement shocked other bank 
regulators (Vemon, et al. 1991: 129). The bilateral agreement was regarded, at least at first sight, 
to be potentially counter-productive to the multilateral developments in the Basel Committee 
(Cooke 1990:325).
150 In the early February 1987, Robin Leigh-Pemberton, Governor o f the Bank o f England, 
commented: “The most important thing is that we should make an early start to widen the 
convergence initiative. ... We recognise that international convergence cannot be fully or 
properly launched in just two centres, and I do very much hope that what we have done will 
rapidly be followed by other authorities— notably the Japanese and our partners in Europe” (The 
Times 3 February 1987). See also Kapstein (1989: 340), Oatley and Nabors (1998: 50), Reinicke 
(1995: 170), Singer (2004: 546, 557), and Vemon, Spar, and Tobin (1991: 146). In fact, the 
bilateral agreement specified that if the Committee did not reach a prompt agreement, the U.S. 
and the U.K. would implement the bilateral agreement from May 1987; yet, they delayed the 
implementation for a multilateral agreement in the Committee (Reinicke 1995: 168, 173).
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members to seek a multilateral capital adequacy agreement, by creating, in Ethan B. 
Kapstein’s (1994: 106) words, a “zone of exclusion.” The bilateral agreement posed a 
threat to Committee members since the international activities of their own banks would 
be reduced if they did not adopt a new broadly equivalent capital standard.151 Given the 
financial market power of New York and London, the threat of market closure put 
substantial pressure on the Committee members to move to seek a multilateral 
agreement (Kapstein 1989: 340-341, 1992: 282; Oatley and Nabors 1998: 50).152
It was particularly important for the United States and the United Kingdom to 
ensure the adoption by Japan of equivalent capital adequacy standards, as their banks 
faced growing competition throughout the 1980s from Japanese banks, whose capital 
levels were at the lowest level among banks from Committee countries. Nine out of the 
world’s top ten banks in terms of asset size were Japanese by 1989. More importantly, 
the expansion of Japanese banks in the U.S. and U.K. markets was remarkable during 
the period. For example, the assets of the U.S. branches of Japanese banks increased 
315 percent between 1981 and 1988, while those in the U.K. rose 232 percent. By 1988, 
about 20 percent of the total assets of Japanese banks were held in the two countries 
(Terrell, et al. 1990). Japanese banks dominated the assets of the U.S. branches (and 
agencies) of foreign banks throughout the 1980s, increasing their share to nearly 60 
percent by 1988 (Houpt 1999: 611). Japanese banks also had the largest foreign banking 
presence in London, with about a 15 percent share of sterling deposits by the mid-1980s 
(Rosenbluth 1989: 76-77).153 In 1985, international lending by Japanese banks was 
greater than that by U.S. banks for the first time (Singer 2004: 554). As a result, U.S. 
and U.K. banks contested that Japanese banks were taking advantage of low capital 
adequacy levels to raise their international market share (Kapstein 1992: 277).
The United States and the United Kingdom put explicit pressure on Japan to join a 
common capital adequacy framework. On the day when the bilateral agreement was 
launched, U.S. regulators announced that they hoped that it would be a model for bank 
regulators of other countries, particularly Japan (Financial Times 8 January 1987).154
151 In early 1987, Volcker announced that the United States would apply the bilateral agreement 
to foreign banks seeking expansion in the country (Oatley and Nabors 1998: 50).
152 The MFJ (1988: 34) reported that the bilateral agreement forced the Committee to begin to 
work for a common capital adequacy framework in earnest.
153 Japanese banks’ share o f Euro deposits in London financial markets, the centre o f Euro 
transactions, rose rapidly during the 1980s. By 1982, Japanese banks had surpassed U.S. banks 
in London Euro deposits, and began to account for the largest single share in the market, 
reaching 40 percent in 1988 (EPA 1988: 167-169).
154 In fact, the President o f the Federal Reserve Bank o f New York, who was in Tokyo on the
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The head of banking supervision at the Bank of England also commented: “If I were a 
Japanese banker or bank supervisor I would be a little worried about being thought to be 
lagging behind,” and added: “I would be very disappointed if this initiative were to 
founder on a negative reaction from the Japanese” (Reinicke 1995: 169). Also, Gerald 
Corrigan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated in the U.S. Senate 
Budget Committee in May 1987: “While the areas mentioned above are important, the 
single item on which I place great emphasis relates to bank capital adequacy standards 
and specifically to the goal of moving Japanese bank capital standard into closer 
alignment with emerging international standards” {The American Banker 30 July 1987).
Indeed, the threat of market closure to Japanese banks materialised when the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York required five Japanese banks (Yasuda Trust & Banking, 
Sumitomo Trust & Banking, Norinchukin Bank, Bank of Tokyo, and Toyo Trust & 
Banking) which applied to set up subsidiaries or expand their operations to provide data 
in line with the rules in the bilateral agreement in early February 1987.155 The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York announced that they needed the data to complete a review of 
the banks’ applications {The American Banker 12 March 1987; Financial Times 21 May 
1987). Two Japanese banks (Mitsui Trust & Banking and Taiyo Kobe Bank), which had 
submitted applications to set up trust offshoots in New York in May 1987 and in June 
1987 respectively, were also required by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
provide information about their capital ratios. In addition, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York withheld approval of another Japanese bank’s (Long-Term Credit Bank of 
Japan) application to buy a stake in Greenwich Capital Markets, a U.S. primary dealer, 
by commenting: “the political environment was not right” {The American Banker 12 
March 1987; Murphy 1988).
The timing of the information requirements by the U.S. bank regulatory authorities 
and their inquiry of Japanese banks’ capital adequacy clearly reflected their intention to 
bring Japan into negotiations for a common capital adequacy framework. In fact, under 
the U.S. banking laws, if a bank decided to establish new operations or activities 
through internal growth without making a new acquisition, the U.S. regulatory 
authorities used to require merely that it receive prior notice where the new activities
day, attempted to put informal pressure on the Japanese to fall into line with the bilateral 
agreement {Financial Times 17 March 1987).
155 The required data included the banks’ unrealised gains on securities holdings, which the 
bilateral agreement did not include in the definition o f regulatory capital and which were not 
required to be reported to the Japanese Finance Ministry at that time {The American Banker 12 
March 1987; Financial Times 21 May 1987).
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were in a traditional line of bank business. In general, such applications were processed 
by the U.S. regulatory authorities within thirty days on pro forma basis (Legal Times 8 
June 1987). After all, the U.S. authority’s extraordinary scrutiny of the Japanese banks’ 
capital bases was an apparent economic sanction to bring Japan into line. Indeed, 
approval of the Japanese banks’ applications was frozen until Japan agreed with the 
United States and the United Kingdom to establish a common capital adequacy 
framework.
Japan’s agreement on the establishment o f the Basel Accord
The threat of market closure generated by the bilateral agreement forced Japanese banks 
to change their behaviour; they began to raise their CARs. An official at the Federation 
of Bankers Associations of Japan (FBAJ) commented:
Without one bank failure in recent history, our attitude is why change a successful 
system? At the same time, we know that if we do not comply, the friction between Japan 
and the West will get even hotter, and we will have a hard time doing business in New  
York and London. {The American Banker 24 June 1987)
Led by the Industrial Bank of Japan in June 1987, ten major Japanese banks announced 
plans to raise, in aggregate, capital to the value of USD 7 billion or more in the 
following couple of months through convertible bonds and right issues. Some banks 
also planned to reduce their assets, principally poorly performing ones.156 The 
minimum target CAR of Japanese banks of 5.5 percent, the required minimum primary 
capital to total assets ratio required under the U.S. regulations, reflected the Japanese 
banks’ fear of market closure by the United States.157 The MFJ helped them raise their 
CARs, for example, by lifting a ban on issuing convertible bonds in domestic capital 
markets in April 1987 (MFJ 1987: 39).
In the meantime, the MFJ entered into negotiations for a common capital adequacy
1 ^8framework with the U.S. and U.K. counterparts. As discussed earlier, the MFJ had
156 See Financial Times (8 July 1987), International Banking Report (17 July 1987), Jiji Press 
(12 June 1987, 28 July 1987), Japan Economic Journal (15 August 1987), Japan Economic 
Newswire (17 July 1987a), Journal o f  Commerce (22 June 1987), The Guardian (13 June 1987), 
and United Press International (19 August 1987).
157 The required minimum capital to total assets ratio was 6 percent (MFJ 1987).
158 In January 1987, right after the announcement o f the bilateral agreement, the three countries 
agreed to hold talks to formulate a common capital regulation framework {Jiji Press 9 January
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little desire to strengthen the domestic capital adequacy regulations. The attitude of the 
MFJ did not change despite the bilateral agreement. Indeed, when Japanese banks were 
required by the U.S. regulatory authorities to provide the data according to the bilateral 
agreement, the MFJ initially prevented the banks from submitting the information to the 
U.S. regulatory authorities {The American Banker 12 March 1987). However, the MFJ 
worried that if Japanese banks did not comply with the U.S. and U.K. rules, it would be 
difficult for them to do business in U.S. and U.K. markets. The MFJ also believed that 
following the U.S. and U.K. rules would help Tokyo develop as a world financial centre. 
As a result, although there was limited commitment to strengthening the domestic 
capital regulations, the MFJ, in principle, determined to be in line with the United States 
and the United Kingdom.159
Accordingly, MFJ’s primary objective in negotiations with the United States and the 
United kingdom was to reduce the costs of Japanese banks complying with an emerging 
common capital adequacy framework by connecting the negotiations to the Japanese 
capital adequacy guidelines of 1986 (see MFJ 1987: 41-42). A major issue in the 
negotiations was the inclusion of unrealised gains on securities holdings in the 
definition of regulatory capital. While the Japanese capital adequacy guidelines of 1986 
allowed banks to count 70 percent of such gains, the U.S. and the U.K. regulations did 
not recognise them because of the volatility of the underlying equity markets (Ito and 
Sasaki 2002: 374; Tobin 1991: 236). The MFJ insisted on the inclusion of the unrealised 
gains in order to preserve the competitiveness of Japanese banks in international 
markets.160 After a series of negotiation, the United States and the United Kingdom 
made a compromise with Japan to recognise 45 percent of the unrealised gains on 
securities holdings for capital adequacy purposes.161 By September 1987, the three
1987).
159 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa.
160 The MFJ commented: “[considering that a country’s financial industry has become its 
important strategic industry in this post-industrialisation society, the competitive conditions for 
financial industries should not be neglected” (MFJ 1987: 42, emphasis added). The ministry 
also stated that Japan had to actively participate in the international cooperation to harmonise 
capital adequacy standards “in a way to properly reflect the situation o f Japanese banks” (MFJ 
1987: 42).
161 The figure o f 45 percent was a decision to reflect the fact that 50 to 60 percent o f such gains 
were taxed in Japan (Tamura 2003a: 113). In July 1987, the United States and the United 
Kingdom expressed that unrealised gains on securities holdings could function the same way as 
owned capital for Japanese banks {Jiji Press 15 June 1987). In the same month, Japan 
announced that that the country, in principle, agreed to go along with the bilateral agreement 
(see Financial Times 12 June 1987). After this sign from Japan for a common capital framework, 
the U.S. regulatory authorities began to approve the frozen applications o f Japanese banks to 
expand business in U.S. markets (see Japan Economic Newswire 17 July 1987b; Murphy 1988).
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countries also came to an agreement on other major issues, namely, the adoption of a 
two-tier structure of capital, and the use of a system of risk-weighted assets (Tobin 
1991: 241-242). The trilateral agreement by Japan, the United States and the United 
Kingdom accelerated multilateral talks in Basel, which went at a slower pace than the 
trilateral discussions. As a consequence, the Basel Committee published a consultative 
paper containing proposals for a common capital adequacy framework in December 
1987.
The compromise by the United States and the United Kingdom appeared to be 
necessary. After the announcement of the bilateral agreement, the regulatory authorities 
in the United States and the United Kingdom faced strong opposition from domestic
banks and other institutions that its bilateral imposition would hurt the competitiveness
1 £{)of U.S. and U.K. banks. Moreover, the U.K. regulatory authority indicated to their 
U.S. counterpart that they might have to withdraw their commitment to the bilateral 
agreement as a result of the European objections to the agreement (Tobin 1991: 240).163 
Therefore, it was almost indispensable for the United States and the United Kingdom to 
conclude an agreement with Japan, and this situation gave Japan leverage in 
negotiations.164 In addition, it should be emphasised that the ultimate reason why the 
United States and the United Kingdom sought an international capital standard was to 
strengthen their domestic capital regulations.165 Accordingly, insofar as Japan agreed on 
a common capital adequacy framework, the United States and the United Kingdom 
were open to making a compromise.166
For the Japanese banks and the MFJ the agreement was satisfactory, particularly due 
to the inclusion of the 45 percent of unrealised gains on securities holdings in the
1A7regulatory capital. Even though Japanese banks initially demanded the recognition of
162 Peter Skorpil, Citicorp Japan division head, commented: “If the Japanese are not willing to 
live by the same rules, then we cannot afford to put Fed ratios into effect” (The American 
Banker 18 June 1987). Douglas A. Warner, Senior Vice President and General Manager o f the 
London branch of Morgan Guaranty Trust, also said that the bilateral agreement would place 
U.K. and U.K. banks at a competitive disadvantage to European and Japan banks (The American 
Banker 20 January 1987). See also Kapstein (1989: 340, 1994: 114).
163 See also Kapstein (1992: 282, 1994: 114-115).
164 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa.
165 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the U.S. bank regulatory authorities announced the 
adoption o f a risk-weighted capital ratio approach in January 1986 in order to strengthen 
domestic bank regulations. However, U.S. banks protested this unilateral measure (Kapstein 
1989: 339).
166 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa. In fact, there was some opposition from the 
U.S. Congress when the U.S. regulatory authorities made an agreement with Japan and began to 
approve Japanese banks’ applications for business in the U.S (Murphy 1988; Singer 2004: 552).
1 7 Another important area in which Japan’s preferences were reflected was the risk weight o f
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70 percent of such gains, this appeared to be a strategic demand for negotiation. During 
the 1980s, stock prices increased rapidly in Japan, and this led Japanese bank regulators 
and banks to hold a very positive view of Japan’s economic growth. As a result, 
Japanese banks and bank regulators believed that the inclusion of 45 percent of such 
gains would be enough for the banks to achieve a CAR of 10 percent.168 Indeed, after 
the establishment of the Basel Accord, the MFJ stated: “[w]e tried to reflect the peculiar 
situation of Japanese banks in the Accord. The Accord appears to fairly reflect our 
demand” (MFJ 1990: 46).169 A senior Japanese banker also revealed that the perception 
in some quarters that Japanese banks were unhappy with the Committee’s proposals of 
December 1987 was false {The American Banker 3 January 1988).170 Moreover, some 
foreign observers even argued that the Basel Accord increased the international 
competitiveness of Japanese banks (Tamura 2003a: 113-114).171
After all, it was external pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom 
that forced Japan to accede to the Basel Accord. The Japanese, including the MFJ, had 
little intention of strengthening the domestic capital regulations, and, accordingly, what 
Robert D. Putnam (1988) referred to as “reverberation” effects did not occur within 
Japan, despite the launch of the bilateral agreement. Meanwhile, given the competitive 
threat from Japanese banks, the negative externalities that would have resulted for the 
U.S. and the U.K. banks as a consequence of noncompliance by Japanese banks with a 
common capital adequacy framework were enormous. In this situation, it was
claims on domestic public entities, excluding central government. The United States and the 
United Kingdom initially sought to allocate a risk weight o f 20 percent to those assets, while the 
MFJ insisted on no risk weight for them or the same level as for claims on central government. 
In the end, reflecting Japan’s demand, the Basel Committee allowed the regulatory authorities to 
choose either 0, 10, 20, or 50 percent at the national discretion (Jiji Press 13 July 1988, 15 July
1988).
168 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa. The Japanese expected that the Tokyo stock 
market index would rise more than double in the mid-1990s (Tamura 2003a: 113-114).
169 Finance Minister Miyaza Kiichi highly praised the Accord, saying “many proposals put 
forward by Japan have been accepted by the Cooke Committee” {Japan Economic Newswire 12 
July 1988). Also, after the burst o f the bubble economy in the early 1990s, Nishimura 
Yoshimasa, Director General o f the Banking Bureau (1994-96), regretted that it was the 
ministry’s misjudged strategy to find a point o f a compromise with the West by incorporating 
unrealised gains into capital (see Sawabe 2002: 412 n. 43).
170 In June 1988, Kusukawa Toro, Deputy President o f Fuji Bank, a major Japanese bank, 
commented: “we feel the Japanese banks are for the present standards” {The American Banker 9 
June 1988).
171 Standard & Poor’s, a major credit rating company, expected that it would be easier for 
Japanese banks to comply with the Basel Accord than with the 1986 capital adequacy guidelines 
{Financial Times 9 June 1988). Meanwhile, Salomon Brothers, a major investment bank, 
anticipated that U.S. banks would find it difficult to meet the BIS standard {The Economist 12 
December 1987).
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imperative for the United States and the United Kingdom to force Japan to join a 
common capital adequacy framework. Accordingly, they put direct pressure on Japan by 
effectively closing their markets to Japanese banks. This situation altered the choice set 
for Japan, given the market power of the United States and the United Kingdom; 
maintaining the status quo was no longer an optimal choice for Japan. As a result, Japan 
decided to agree a common capital adequacy framework. Yet, the MFJ succeeded in 
concluding the agreement in a manner that did not involve significant compliance costs 
for Japanese banks.172 Thus, there was no significant domestic opposition to the Basel 
Accord in Japan. External pressure from foreign regulatory authorities and the low 
compliance costs explain why Japan agreed to accede to the Basel Accord.173
Non-member incentives to follow
Did non-members of the Basel Committee also face pressure from the United States 
(and/or the United Kingdom) or from the Basel Committee to adopt and comply with 
the BIS standard? Unlike the case of Japan, there was no strong direct pressure from 
major countries on non-Committee countries, including Korea and Taiwan, to comply 
with the BIS standard. In fact, around 90 percent of international assets and liabilities of
172 Therefore, obviously, the Basel Accord did not eliminate competitive inequality between U.S. 
and U.K. banks and Japanese banks completely. Yet, as discussed above, after the establishment 
of the U.S.-U.K. bilateral agreement, the U.S. and U.K. bank regulatory authorities were in a 
situation where they had to conclude a multilateral agreement, especially with Japan. It is not 
clear how U.S. and U.K. banks and regulators viewed the effect o f the Basel Accord on the real 
capital adequacy of Japanese banks during the late 1980s. However, the fact that Japanese banks 
withdrew their initial demand for the 70 percent o f inclusion o f unrealised gains on securities 
holdings was likely to help the U.S. and the U.K. bank regulatory authorities pacify domestic 
opposition to the Basel Accord in these countries. Moreover, although Japanese banks were 
actually satisfied with the Accord, they, on the surface, expressed that it would be difficult for 
them to achieve the required minimum CAR of 8 percent (see, for instance, Jiji Press 22 
December 1987). In addition, it is noteworthy that the United States and the United Kingdom 
put pressure on Japan to liberalise its financial markets, while negotiating a common capital 
adequacy framework, and, as a result, the Japanese government allowed U.S. commercial banks 
to operate securities units in the Japanese market. The explicit linkage between this and the 
Basel Accord is not clear, but there was the possibility that the Japanese government allowed 
U.S. commercial banks to enter these markets in order to reduce pressure from the U.S. 
government on capital adequacy, or that the U.S. government used capital adequacy as a level to 
force greater access to the Japanese market for American banks (Oatley and Nabors 1998: 51). 
All these factors increased U.S. and U.K. bank regulatory authorities’ incentives to make a 
compromise with their Japanese counterpart in concluding the negotiations for a common 
capital adequacy framework.
173 Therefore, the establishment o f the Basel Accord is not an instance o f what Oatley and 
Nabors (1998) call “redistributive cooperation.” Also, it differs from Kapstein’s (1989, 1992, 
1994) account, which is based on the theory o f joint gains, given that there were few benefits to 
Japan in terms o f the soundness o f its banking system.
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all banks in the world were held by banks from Committee countries, while banks from 
all the other countries in aggregate accounted for the remaining 10 percent (see Table 
4.1). Therefore, Committee countries were not likely to have a strong incentive to make 
costly efforts to compel non-Committee countries to comply with the BIS standard. As a 
result, Korea and Taiwan did not experience explicit pressure from foreign countries— 
and from foreign banks—to adopt the BIS standard.174
Table 4.1 International positions of banks by country, selected years, 1988-2002
(end o f  period; %)
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Assets
Basel Committee 91.4 88.0 90.9 91.8 90.9 89.9 89.3 89.3
(Japan) (38.3) (33.9) (27.8) (27.0) (24.5) (18.0) (14.2) (10.9)
The others 8.6 12.0 9.1 8.2 9.1 10.1 10.7 10.7
(Korea) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
(Taiwan) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (0.7) (0.7)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Liabilities
Basel Committee 91.0 87.4 90.2 91.2 90.8 88.5 88.3 88.5
(Japan) (37.5) (33.0) (25.4) (23.9) (20.0) (13.4) (9.9) (6.6)
The others 9.0 12.6 9.8 8.8 9.2 11.5 11.7 11.5
(Korea) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
(Taiwan) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (0.7) (0.7)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank for International Settlements, various issues o f BIS Quarterly Review.
Note: The data covers cross-border positions in all currencies plus the local foreign currency positions o f  
banks.
Yet, it is important to note that Committee countries did adopt certain low-cost 
measures to induce non-Committee members to comply the BIS standard. In fact, the 
Basel Accord expressly provided in its second paragraph as follows:
This document [the Basel Accord] is being circulated to supervisory authorities 
worldwide with a view to encouraging the adoption o f this framework in countries 
outside the G 10 in respect of banks conducting significant international business.
The Committee encouraged non-G 10 countries to adopt the BIS standard by 
providing technical assistance (Simmons 2001: 605). Also, in international meetings 
of bank regulatory authorities, it was suggested that non-Committee countries adopt 
the BIS standard. For example, at the Fifth International Conference of Banking
l74Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS 
official, Seoul, 28 January 2005.
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Supervisors in 1988, which was held in two months following the establishment of 
the Accord, and in which about 180 bank regulators from 89 countries participated, 
non-Committee countries were urged to adopt capital adequacy standards similar to 
the BIS standard (Japan Economic Newswire 13 October 1988). In addition, even 
though the U.S. regulatory authorities 4id not close U.S. markets to foreign banks 
merely because their home countries did not implement the BIS standard,175 the 
U.S. authorities certainly did take into account BIS standard implementation in 
approving the applications of foreign banks to expand their activities in U.S. 
markets (FSF 2001:54).
Such activities targeted at BIS standard adoption by non-Committee countries did 
not lead the Korean regulatory authority to agree that the BIS standard was a desirable 
means of strengthening the soundness of the country’s banking system. Yet, this 
encouragement for non-Committee countries to adopt the BIS standard gave the bank 
regulatory authorities in Korea and also in Taiwan a perception that the strengthening of 
capital adequacy standards was an international trend and that the BIS standard would 
become the main reference point for international banking standards.176 Indeed, on its 
establishment, the BIS standard began to be cited as the international standard for 
capital adequacy regulation by the financial media and by leading international financial 
institutions. Accordingly, the Korean and Taiwanese regulatory authorities came to 
conclude that it would be necessary to adopt the “international standard” to avoid 
endangering business of Korean and Taiwanese banks in major countries (OBS 
1991b).177 This perception was not necessarily irrational given that there was a real 
chance that Basel Committee countries might tighten their rules on foreign bank 
affiliates at some point in the future.
The regulatory authorities’ fear of foreign market closure for banks not complying
175 In applying for the establishment o f representative offices or branches, foreign banks from 
countries that did not implement the BIS standard were required to provide information 
regarding the capital standards applied by their home countries. The adoption o f the BIS 
standard was not a necessary requirement to be qualified as “well-capitalised” under either the 
Banking Holding Company Act or the Gramm-Leach-Biley Act to engage in non-banking 
activities. Foreign banks whose home country supervisors did not adopt the BIS standard might 
calculate their CARs under their home country standards. Insofar as CARs o f foreign banks 
were deemed equivalent, not necessarily identical, to those required o f U.S. banks, their 
operations in the U.S. market were not prohibited under U.S. regulations (Burand 1993; Hansen, 
et al. 2000).
176 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih.
177 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interviews with a senior 
BoMA official, by email, 2 September 2004, and a former senior OBS official, Seoul, 3 
February 2005.
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with the BIS standard was likely to have been strengthened by their notice that one 
express objective of the Accord was to provide a “level playing field” among 
international banks and its establishment was largely attributable to the threat of market 
closure from the United States and the United Kingdom (see Kim 1991: 46-47). In 
addition, foreign branches of banks from non-BIS standard countries— including 
Korean and Taiwanese banks—were required to submit their BIS CARs to the foreign
17ftbank regulatory authorities (KEB 1991). Even though no Korean or Taiwanese banks 
in Committee countries were subject to actual market closure due to their non-adoption 
of the BIS standard, the Korean and Taiwanese regulatory authorities perceived such a 
possibility to exist.179
Moreover, the Basel Concordat, which was an agreement by the Basel Committee 
on principles for the supervision of banks’ foreign establishments, specified that a host 
country could forbid the operation of foreign establishments in its territory if the home 
country supervision of the parent institutions of such establishments was inadequate 
(BCBS 1983).180 This principle was reemphasised in the 1992 revision of the Concordat 
(BCBS 1992). Besides, the 1992 revision stressed that “host country and home country 
authorities should at a minimum, give weight to the strength of banks’ capital” in 
reviewing their proposals for expansion (BCBS 1992). In this situation, the adoption of 
the BIS standard was expected to work as a bulwark against foreign criticism of their 
banking supervision. Wang Jiunn-Chih, former Director of BoMA, who was in charge 
of constructing the Taiwanese BIS standard, commented: “If anybody criticises us, we 
could defend ourselves by arguing that we are in compliance with the international
178 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih.
179 In fact, Korean banks did establish overseas footholds in Committee countries, including the 
United States and United Kingdom, during the late 1980s and the early 1990s before Korea 
formally implemented the BIS standard from 1993 (see KFB, 1998). However, the approvals o f 
the applications o f the Korean banks to establish the overseas footholds appeared to reflect the 
foreign regulatory authorities’ evaluation that the capital levels o f those banks were equivalent 
to the BIS CAR of 8 percent or were expected to meet the level. For instance, in the approval o f  
the application by the Bank o f Seoul to become a bank holding company by acquiring the Seoul 
Bank o f California, a de novo bank, in August 1988, the U.S. regulatory authority pointed out 
that the bank’s ratios o f tier 1 and tier 2 capital to risk assets exceed the 1990 transition 
standards in the Basel Accord (see Banking Expansion Reporter 3 October 1988).
180 The U.S. Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act o f 1991 provided that a foreign bank 
seeking to establish or expand operations in the United States had to be subject to 
comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis by its home country’s supervisory authority, 
including requiring the information on the applicant’s capital adequacy, although the capital 
adequacy o f foreign banks was assessed on the basis o f “capital equivalency,” which prescribed 
that capital ratios o f foreign banks had to be equivalent, but not necessarily identical, to those 
required o f U.S. banks (Burand 1993; Hansen, et al. 2000: 198-199).
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standard [the BIS standard].”181
The Korean and the Taiwanese regulatory authorities therefore had a strong 
incentive to build such a bulwark by adopting the BIS standard, given that the majority 
of overseas establishments of Korean and Taiwanese banks were located in Committee 
countries, especially the United States. There were a total of 117 overseas 
establishments (48 branches, 54 representative offices, and 15 subsidiaries) of Korean 
banks at the end of September 1988; more than 60 percent of these establishments (73 
establishments: 40 branches, 28 representative offices, and 5 subsidiaries) were located 
in the United States (18 branches, 9 representative offices, and 5 subsidiaries), Europe 
(10 branches and 12 representative offices), and Japan (12 branches and 7 representative 
offices) (see Son and Choi 1989: 71).182 Likewise, there were a total of 32 overseas 
branches and agencies or representative offices (18 branches and 14 agencies or 
representative offices) of Taiwanese banks in 1990 and, among them, 20 establishments 
(12 branches and 8 agencies or representative offices) were located in Committee 
countries, including 12 (8 branches and 4 agencies or representative offices) in the 
United States (see BoMA 1992: 8).
In addition, the Korean regulatory authority was encouraging Korean banks to 
establish branches to support the rapidly developing internationalisation of Korean 
firms (Lee, et al. 2004: 539-542).183 In particular, as Korean banks were advancing into 
the markets of EC countries in preparation for EC integration, the implementation of the 
BIS standard by EC countries was expected to affect the business of Korean branches in 
EC countries (.Baengkeo February 1991). The Taiwan government was also striving for 
the internationalisation of Taiwanese banks during the late 1980s and the 1990s in order 
to develop their international banking activities, to promote international trade, and to 
meet the demand of Taiwanese firm for investment and marketing abroad (BoMA 1992: 
51, 1996b: 63-65). From 1988, the Taiwan government began to actively encourage and 
assist Taiwanese banks in establishing overseas establishments. As a result, while only 
three Taiwanese banks had eighteen overseas footholds in 1984, ten Taiwanese banks
181 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih.
182 The five major Korean nationwide banks had a total o f 31 overseas branches, 14 overseas 
representative offices and 8 overseas subsidiaries at the end of October 1988, and, among them, 
27 branches, 5 representative offices and 4 subsidiaries were located in Committee countries 
(see Son and Choi 1989: 75).
183 The government encouraged Korean firms to engage in direct foreign investments in order to 
advance into foreign markets as Korea’s current account balance turned into surplus from 1986. 
The total volume o f foreign direct investment by Korean firms was only USD 650 million over 
the period o f 1966 to 1986. However, the figure reached USD 150 million in 1988 and rose to 
USD 890 million by 1990 and to USD 3690 million by 1996 (EPB 1991; MoFE 1997).
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had fifty four overseas establishments in 1992 (BoMA 1993a: 24, 1996b: 64).184 In 
these circumstances, the Korean and Taiwanese regulatory authorities had to avoid 
endangering the overseas activities of Korean and Taiwanese banks.
Persistent fears o f market closure, little pressure for comprehensive compliance
The risk of market closure in foreign countries gave the bank regulatory authorities in 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan a strong incentive to adhere to the BIS standard. The 
incentives strengthened, especially for the Korean and the Taiwanese bank regulatory 
authorities, as the internationalisation of Korean and Taiwanese banks developed further 
throughout the 1990s. The number of Korean banks with overseas establishments 
almost doubled from 1990 to 1997, and the number of overseas establishments also 
almost doubled during this period. Although the internationalisation of Korean banks 
reduced after the 1997 financial crisis, the previous trend towards internationalisation 
continued from the early 2000s.185 The number of Taiwanese banks with overseas 
footholds also more than doubled between 1991 and 2000, and the number of their 
overseas establishments rose more than three times during the period. Japanese banks 
also increased their overseas establishments until the mid-1990s, from 355 in 1990 to 
437 in 1994, despite their weakening financial condition. Although the international 
presence of Japanese banks drastically declined from 1997/98, most major banks 
maintained their overseas establishments. Thus the Japanese regulatory authority also
I o z
had an incentive to maintain the BIS standard (see Table 4.2).
184 The total number o f Taiwanese banks (domestic general banks) was thirty two in 1992.
185 The size o f the assets o f U.S. branches or agencies o f Korean banks grew from USD 6.4 
billion to USD 16.6 billion between 1990 and 1996 (Houpt 1999: 611).
186 Japan’s defection from the BIS standard could also have had a negative impact on the 
effectiveness o f Japan’s delegation within the Committee (Whitehead 2005: 28).
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Table 4.2 The international presence of Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese banks, 1990- 
2003
(end o f  fiscal year; number)
Overseas establishments Banks with overseas establishments
Japan Korea Taiwan Japan Korea Taiwan
1990 355 109 N/A 49 13 9
1991 377 119 54 54 14 10
1992 392 122 54 54 14 13
1993 422 131 70 53 15 14
1994 437 134 79 52 16 13
1995 428 149 91 53 18 14
1996 427 168 111 50 19 17
1997 404 190 131 43 21 20
1998 300 127 151 35 14 22
1999 243 102 156 26 11 23
2000 226 93 172 26 11 23
2001 165 79 N/A 21 9 N/A
2002 151 80 N/A 16 8 N/A
2003 N/A 84 N/A N/A 8 N/A
Source: Japanese Bankers Association (formerly, FBAJ), various issues o f Zenkok Ginkou 
Zaimushyohyou Bunseki (Analysis o f  Financial Statements o f All Banks); Office o f  Bank Supervision 
(Financial Supervisory Services, from 1998), various issues o f  Unhaeng Gyeongyeong Tonggye (Bank 
Statistics); and Bureau o f  Monetary Affairs, various issues o f Caizhengbu Jinrongju Nianbao (Annual 
Report Bureau o f  Monetary Affairs Ministry o f Finance).
Note: 1. Overseas establishments include branches, representative offices and subsidiaries for Korean and 
Taiwanese banks, but only branches and representative offices for Japanese banks; 2. For Japanese banks, 
all banks are included; for Korean banks, all commercial banks are included; and for Taiwanese banks, all 
general banks are included.
In addition, the Basel Committee began to increase its efforts to strengthen the 
prudential regulatory framework in non-Committee countries from the mid-1990s. After 
the Mexican Peso crisis of 1995, the Group of Seven (G7) urged international financial 
organisations at the Lyon summit in 1996 to promote prudential regulatory measures in 
emerging markets in order to prevent the recurrence of a financial crisis in developing 
countries. As a result, the Basel Committee issued the Basel Core Principles in 
September 1997 (Jiji Press 29 April 1997; OBS 1997).187 The Principles, which 
included the BIS standard, were intended to be implemented in “all countries and 
internationally,” and the Committee suggested that the IMF, the World Bank and other 
interested organisations use the Principles in assisting countries strengthen their 
regulatory framework and supervisory arrangements (BCBS 1997: 2).188 Moreover, 
following the establishment of the Principles the U.K. regulatory authority took their
187 The IMF also issued Toward a Framework for Sound Banking in March 1997 with a purpose 
similar to that o f the Principles (OBS 1997).
188 Indeed, as will be discussed later, when Korea entered into a stand-by arrangement with the 
IMF in the wake o f the 1997 financial crisis, the country was required to improve its financial 
regulations to meet the Principles.
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implementation into account as a primary factor in approving the applications of foreign 
banks to expand their activities in U.K. markets (FSF 2001: 51). The growing emphasis 
on the BIS standard was likely to strengthen the incentives of the bank regulatory 
authorities in Japan, Korea and Taiwan to adhere to the BIS standard.
Meanwhile, somewhat surprisingly, no foreign countries or international 
organisations compelled Japan, Korea or Taiwan to implement the BIS standard in 
earnest, except for Korea in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, even though their 
compliance was cosmetic for most of the 1990s and the early 2000s.189 Foreign 
countries and international organisations did resort to exerting symbolic informal 
pressure on these countries—especially on Japan— in order to improve the soundness of 
their banking sectors (Whitehead 2005: 34).190 However, there was no further foreign 
pressure accompanied by actual sanctions. None of the countries faced substantial 
foreign pressure to cure their cosmetic compliance, insofar as they were formally in 
compliance.191 Also, even though some countries set a required minimum CAR higher 
than 8 percent, banks did not face serious problems in doing business in those countries 
insofar as they were in compliance with their home country regulations.192
The absence of strong pressure for comprehensive compliance appeared to be 
attributable to the high costs that a country had to bear in exercising such extensive 
pressure. The Basel Committee overtly agreed that the regulatory authority in each 
Committee member country would implement the Basel Accord according to its 
individual legal structure and existing supervisory arrangements (BIS 1990: 10). In 
addition, so-called international standards were not established in most of the important 
accounting areas that could affect the effectiveness of compliance with the BIS standard. 
Under the circumstances, countries may have had to bear sizeable political costs in 
forcing others that were already formally in compliance with the BIS standard to
189 This issue will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.
190 In the summer o f 1995, the IMF released a report heavily criticising Japanese authorities for 
their dealing with Japanese banks’ NPL problems (Cargill, et al. 1997: 140). In 1998, G7 
ministers and central bank governors requested that Japan’s leaders use public funds to 
recapitalise Japanese banks. This call was reiterated by the IMF, World Bank, and the East Asia 
Economic Summit (Whitehead 2005: 35).
191 Author’s interviews with Ito Takatoshi (Deputy Vice Minister for International Affairs, MFJ, 
1999-2001), Tokyo, 1 March 2004, and Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interview with a 
senior FSS official, Seoul 18 February 2005. In fact, some foreign bank supervisory authorities, 
including the U.S. ones, carefully observed the CAR calculation process o f Taiwanese banks 
with overseas branches in their jurisdictions. Nevertheless, foreign supervisory authorities did 
not demand the banks to improve their capital bases, either qualitatively or quantitatively 
(author’s confidential interview with a banker o f a major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 
2004).
192 Examples will be presented later in the country case studies.
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strengthen their capital regulations. The extraordinary case was Korea under a stand-by 
arrangement with the IMF, because the arrangement lowered the costs for the IMF to 
exercise extensive compliance pressure.193
This argument that high enforcement costs prevented countries from exerting strong 
pressure on others to strictly implement the BIS standard is supported by the fact that 
some countries employed less costly measures to improve the capital adequacy of 
foreign banks. The diplomatic and political costs to a country of insisting that foreign 
banks operating its jurisdiction meet capitalisation standards equivalent to those of the 
domestic banks were lower than the costs of pressuring the banks’ home regulatory 
authorities to strictly implement and enforce the BIS standard, given that the former 
would be consistent with the “national treatment” norm. Indeed, the U.S. bank 
regulatory authorities required both U.S. and foreign banks to be “well-capitalised”, 
which was defined as total CAR of a minimum of 10 percent and a tier 1 ratio of a 
minimum 6 percent, in order to engage in a broader range of nonbanking activities 
(Hansen, et al. 2000: 199-200, 225-226).194 However, this regulation had little effect on 
the behaviour of Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese banks, because first nonbanking 
activity was not a major international business for these banks, and secondly because 
the banks could engage in nonbanking business through their foreign subsidiaries 
incorporated in the United States (FBAJ 1989: 66, 1994: 63).195
It is also worth noting that the incentive for major countries to put pressure on Japan, 
Korea, or Taiwan to strictly implement the BIS standard was not high during most of the 
1990s and the early 2000s because of the limited competitive threat posed by banks 
from these countries. As Table 4.1 showed, banks from non-Basel Committee countries 
were never a serious competitive threat to major international banks, which were 
incorporated mostly in Basel Committee countries. Also, as mentioned earlier, the 
international presence of Japanese banks drastically declined after the mid-1990s.196 
Therefore, from the perspective of competitive equality and advantage, major countries 
did not have a strong incentive to force Japan, Korea, or Taiwan to implement the BIS 
standard in earnest.197
193 The magnitude o f the negative externality generated by the Korean financial crisis also led 
the IMF to exercise such extensive compliance pressure on Korea.
194 The CAR might be calculated according to the home country standards.
195 Korean and Japanese banks’ BIS CARs were lower than 10 percent and their tier 1 ratios 
were lower than 6 percent during most o f the 1990s, while BIS CARs o f a majority o f 
Taiwanese banks were lower than 10 percent during the late 1990s and early 2000s.
196 This issue will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
197 This analysis does not explain the absence o f strong foreign pressure on Japan to
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4.2 Com pliance pressure from the market
The Basel Committee itself and most IR scholars who have studied the establishment of 
the Basel Accord have argued that there was strong pressure from the markets on bank 
regulatory authorities and/or banks to comply with the BIS standard.198 However, they 
have presented few empirical findings to support their arguments, and have given 
limited information how such market pressures actually operated.. Rather, they seem to 
take for granted the operation of the market compliance mechanism. This section 
provides a comprehensive analysis of market compliance pressures, by focusing on how 
credit ratings agencies (CRAs) incorporated banks’ BIS CARs in rating them. This 
analytical short cut is appropriate given that credit ratings are an integral part of 
investors’ risk management and, accordingly, banks’ credit ratings affected their 
operations in markets, including their costs of borrowing.199
Market response to the BIS standard
From the outset, the Basel Accord faced criticism for its failure to incorporate key 
insights from finance theory (see Thomson’s International Banking Regulator, 25 
October 1991).200 Its risk measurement framework did not generate a capital advantage 
for banks with well-diversified portfolios, even though finance theory indicates that 
they should be treated as less risky than banks with concentrated portfolios. Its system 
of five risk-weight categories was crude. The 8 percent minimum CAR was arbitrary, as 
it was not based on any particular insolvency probability standard. The different risk 
weights for OECD and non-OECD countries were also arbitrary and politically
comprehensively comply with the BIS standard during the early 1990s; this is explained by the 
analysis based on enforcement costs.
198 See, for example, BIS (1990: 11, 1992: 20), Ho (2002), Kapstein (1994), Simmons (2001), 
and Singer (2004).
199 According to a survey carried by the Japan Center for International Finance (JCIF) (2000), 
approximately 90 percent of 259 respondents (leading financial institutions and business 
corporations) regarded credit ratings as “one o f the most important sources o f information for 
determining ratings internally” or as “one o f a variety o f external sources o f credit data (though 
not the most important) taken into account when assessing credit risk internally.” See also FFH 
(2003) and JCIF (1999,2001). According to an estimate, an ‘AAA’ bank could issue debt 
offering interest o f between 0.1 and 0.6 percent less than an ‘AA’ bank due to the greater 
security it offered (The Times 5 March 1991a). Ito and Harada (2000: 18) also shows that news 
on rating downgrading had a negative effect on “Japan Premium”, which was a premium 
imposed on Japanese banks’ borrowing rate by U.S. and European banks in the Eurodollar and 
Euroyen market. See Sinclair (2005) for an IPE study o f CRAs.
200 See also Karacadag (2000: 5).
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motivated, and, as OECD membership expanded, the risk weights appeared to favour 
some countries that were less creditworthy than other non-OECD members.201 The 
Accord did not cover various forms of risk such as operating risk. In addition, 
innovation by financial markets, in some cases with the intention of circumventing the 
Accord, eroded its effectiveness further (Greenspan 1998: 165; Karacadag and Taylor 
2000: 5-7). As a result, the relationship between a banks’ compliance with the BIS 
standard and its soundness was doubtful.202
Accordingly, the BIS standard was not accepted by CRAs as a reliable solvency 
regulation, and, in turn, the CRAs did not consider the BIS CAR a dependable solvency 
indicator. • They did examine the BIS CARs of banks, and also frequently referred 
to them when they altered credit ratings for the banks; however, after they examined 
banks’ BIS CARs they adjusted them to calculate the economic capital ratios by taking 
into account various factors 205 It was these capital ratios that influenced CRAs’ rating 
decisions, and CRAs relied on their in-house models when they evaluated banks’ 
economic capital ratios.206 In addition, for CRAs, the appropriate levels of capital that 
banks needed to hold differed according to their risk profiles.207
As a result, in allocating ratings for banks, CRAs were indifferent to whether they 
adopted the BIS standard or not. An analyst at Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s), a “big three”
201 Moody’s sovereign rating o f Taiwan, which was not an OECD country, was Aa3 in March 
1994, while the rating for Korea, which became a member o f the OECD in 1996, was lower at 
A1 from April 1990 to October 1997.
202 An IMF working paper (Sundararajan, et al. 2001) argues that credit risk and bank 
soundness are primarily influenced by macroeconomic and macroprudential factors and that the 
direct influence o f compliance with Basel Core Principles on credit risk and soundness is 
insignificant. A World Bank working paper (Barth, et al. 2001b: 34) also suggests that there is 
no robust link between capital regulations and bank fragility.
203 The bank ratings methodologies o f the three major CRAs— Moody’s Investors Service, 
Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings— are available from their websites: www.fitchratings.com, 
www.moodys.com, and www2.standardandpoors.com.
204 There was the likelihood that less sophisticated market participants used the disclosed BIS 
CARs o f banks in evaluating the banks’ soundness due to a shortage o f their resources for 
analysis.
205 There is no official definition o f economic capital, but the underlying logic was that a bank’s 
true economic capital should be permanent and readily available to compensate for massive 
losses before general creditors would be affected in any ways (Moody’s 1999a: 37).
206 For instance, Fitch Ratings introduced “pure tier 1 capital”, which was defined as tier 1 
capital less tax effect, public funds and other preferred instruments, in assessing Japanese banks’ 
actual capital soundness. Likewise, a number of institutions used their in-house assessments 
rather than external assessments such as IMF’s Reports on Observance o f Standards and Codes, 
when they took account o f observance o f international standards (FSF 2001: 7).
207 Alan Greenspan (1998: 166), former Chairman of the Board o f Governors o f the Federal 
Reserve System, argued that the inconsistencies between internally required economic capital 
and the regulatory capital standard might result in overrating the true capital condition o f the 
bank, based on its disclosed regulatory CAR.
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CRA, commented: “Standard & Poor’s did not [penalise banks that did not adopt the 
BIS standard]. Rather, Standard & Poor’s relies on its own assessment of the 
appropriate level of capital it considers a bank would require given the bank’s risk
908profile.” In other words, it was not a form of CAR but the actual soundness of a bank 
that affected its credit ratings. Thus, CRAs did not put pressure banks to adopt the BIS 
standard. In fact, even though the Daiwa Bank, a major Japanese bank, switched to the 
domestic capital standard and withdrew from the BIS standard in March 2000, its S&P’s 
long term credit rating did not change, remaining stable at BB+ from December 1998 to 
September 2001.
Given this, it not surprising that there was no positive association between BIS CAR 
and bank credit ratings. Moody’s Investors Service (hereafter Moody’s) (1999a: 29), 
another big three CRA, explicitly stated in its bank rating methodology: “[M]oody’s 
sees no automatic correlation between a bank’s level of regulatory capital and its credit 
ratings.” It also said: “Regulatory ratios give a very imprecise indication of capital 
strength. This is so even when regulatory capital ratios are based on risk-weighted 
models, such as the Basle criteria” (Moody’s 1999b: 32, emphasis added). In relative 
terms, capital was more important in emerging markets than in developed countries, 
given that volatility was greater in emerging markets (Moody’s 1999b: 31). Yet, 
Moody’s (1999b: 31) stressed: “Even in emerging markets, small adjustments in capital 
ratios are often of little consequence.” Fitch Ratings (2003b), the other big three CRA, 
also reported that the correlation between its long-term credit rating and tier 1 capital 
ratio was mildly negative, except for a group of major international banks. In other 
words, the market compliance mechanism, insofar as it was gauged by the CRA credit 
ratings, did not operate for the BIS standard.209
It should be noted that the neglect of the official BIS CARs by CRAs was not just a 
recent (after the late-1990s) phenomenon.210 Even during the early 1990s, the link 
between the official BIS CAR and bank credit ratings was weak.211 For instance, the 
credit ratings of most major Japanese banks remained stable during this period despite a
208 Author’s confidential interview with a Standard &Poor’s analyst, by email, 11 August 2004.
209 Clear evidence that markets in general followed CRAs in assessing official BIS CARs is the 
change o f the “Japan Premium” during the 1990s and early 2000s. The Japan Premium will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. Also, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, depositors did not 
shift money according to banks’ compliance with the BIS standard in Taiwan.
210 As noted earlier, the Basel Committee began discussions to replace the 1988 Basel Accord 
with a new capital adequacy framework in 1999. See note 29.
211 In fact, in 1993, the Basel Committee issued a consultation paper, which discussed the 
amendment o f the 1988 Basel Accord to incorporate market risks (Tamura 2003a: ch. 6).
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fluctuation in their BIS CARs. For example, the S&P’s Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating 
of Daiwa Bank was A+ in March 1990 (from August 1989) and remained the same in 
the subsequent rating assessment of April 1991, although its BIS CAR declined from
10.1 percent to 9.7 percent between March 1990 and March 1991.212 The rating of Fuji 
Bank was stable at A+ in the three consecutive rating assessments in March 1992, in 
November 1994, and in August 1995, while its BIS CAR rose from 8.0 percent to 8.7 
percent from March 1992 to March 1995 (to 9.0 percent in September 1995). The rating 
of Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank was A- in the two consecutive rating assessments in March 
1991 and in June 1993, while its BIS CAR increased from 8.8 percent to 9.4 percent 
between March 1991 and March 1993; the rating stayed at A+ in the three consecutive 
rating assessments in October 1993, in November 1994, and in August 1995, although 
its BIS CAR fell from 9.4 percent to 8.7 percent from September 1993 to March 1995. 
The rating of Sumitomo Bank was stable at AA in the two consecutive rating 
assessments in March 1991 and in October 1992, although its BIS CAR fell from 8.9 
percent to 8.4 percent between March 1991 and March 1992. Similarly, the rating of 
Sakura Bank remained stable at A+ in the two consecutive rating assessments in April 
1990 and in April 1991, while its BIS CAR fell below 8 percent, to 7.9 percent, in 
March 1991 from 8.0 percent in March 1990. The rating of Sanwa Bank did not change 
at AA- in the three consecutive rating assessments in December 1992, in November 
1994, and in August 1995, although its BIS CAR increased from 8.1 to 9.3 percent 
between March 1992 and September 1995. The rating of Tokai Bank was A- in the three 
consecutive rating assessments in March 1993, in November 1994, and in December 
1997, although its BIS CAR fluctuated from 8.5 to 9.5 percent between March 1993 and 
September 1997. The rating of Mitsubishi Trust and Banking was A- in the two 
consecutive rating assessments in April 1993 and in November 1994, while its BIS 
CAR rose from 9.8 to 10.5 percent from March 1993 to September 1994. The rating of 
the Industrial Bank of Japan was stable at A+ in the four consecutive rating assessments 
in March 1994, in November 1994, in December 1995, and in February 1996, while its
212 Bank credit ratings are broadly categorised into two categories: traditional standard ratings 
and stand-alone ratings in terms of the factors that affect ratings. While traditional standard 
ratings take into account external credit risks and credit support elements, stand-alone ratings 
represent CRAs’ opinion o f the banks’ intrinsic safety and soundness, excluding such elements. 
Fitch Ratings introduced stand-alone ratings, Individual Ratings, in 1980, and Moody’s 
introduced its own, Bank Financial Strength Rating, in 1995. Meanwhile, S&P’s has not issued 
stand-alone ratings. A S&P’s Issuer Credit Rating is the CRA’s “opinion o f an obligor’s overall 
financial capacity (its creditworthiness) to pay its financial obligations” (S&P’s 2003: 44). This 
rating “focuses on the obligor’s capacity and willingness to meet its financial commitment as 
they come due” (S&P’s 2003: 44).
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BIS CAR ranged from 8.6 to 9.1 percent between March 1994 and March 1996.213,214
In fact, there was limited pressure from CRAs on banks to comply with the BIS 
standard comprehensively, although this pressure was not directly related to the BIS 
standard. Even though CRAs did not accept the specific rules in the Basel Accord, they 
agreed on its generic object that a bank had to maintain capital soundness. As a result, 
CRAs, to some extent, put pressure on banks to improve their actual levels of capital 
adequacy. They took into account the quality of the composition of the regulatory 
capital in assessing the creditworthiness of banks, usually discounting the value of tier 2 
capital. Credit ratings of banks were also influenced by the CRAs’ perception of the 
actual condition of assets, of which key indicators were the actual level of NPLs and the 
level of loan loss provisions. This is all driven by the CRAs’ need to rate individual 
banks on an ordinal scale that is used globally.
However, the pressure from CRAs on banks to maintain actual capital soundness 
was not consistent. CRAs frequently did not downgrade ratings of banks, including 
stand-alone ratings, despite the deterioration of the banks’ actual capital conditions.
This may have been partly attributable to the CRAs’ shortage of resources for analysis 
of the actual capital conditions;217 the resource limitation may have hindered the CRAs 
in analysing the banks’ capital conditions properly.218 Yet, sometimes CRAs did not 
downgrade a bank in spite of their acknowledgement of the bank’s weakness. This 
happened mainly where there were clear signals from the government to support the 
bank.219 As a result, CRAs could not put persistent significant pressure on banks to
213 There were a total o f twenty one Japanese “major banks” in March 1993: eleven “city 
banks” (Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Sakura Bank, Fuji Bank, Mitssubishi Bank, Asahi Bank, Sanwa 
Bank, Sumitomo Bank, Daiwa Bank, Tokai Bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and Bank of  
Tokyo), three “long-term credit banks” (Industrial Bank of Japan, Long-Term Credit Bank of  
Japan, and Nippon Credit Bank), and seven “trust banks” (Mitsui Trust and Banking, Mitsubishi 
Trust and Banking, Yasuda Trust and Banking, Tokyo Trust and Banking, Chuo Trust and 
Banking, Nippon Trust and Banking, and Sumitomo Trust and Banking).
214 Also, the rating o f Korea First Bank remained stable at A- during the three consecutive 
rating assessments in June 1993, in December 1993, and in June 1995, while its BIS CAR fell 
from 10.2 to 8.7 percent between December 1993 and December 1995. Nor did the bank’s 
S&P’s Short-Term Issuer Credit Rating change during the three consecutive rating assessments 
in June 1993, in June 1995, and July 1996.
2,5 I thank Andrew Walter for this point.
216 For stand-alone ratings, see note 212.
217 The problem o f resources for analysis is common to most market participants (Karacadag 
and Taylor 2000: 16-17).
218 Insufficient disclosure by banks may have aggravated the problem o f analysis (see Moody’s 
1999b).
219 This statement should not have been applied to bank stand-alone ratings. However, note that, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 6, stand-alone ratings o f Korean banks, in general, did not 
change during the mid-1990s until the outbreak o f the 1997 financial crisis, even though their
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improve their actual capital soundness.220
The perception o f market pressure
Surprisingly, despite the neglect of the BIS CAR by CRAs, it appeared that there was a 
common belief among banks and the bank regulatory authorities that the BIS CARs 
affected bank credit ratings. The following description by Moody’s (1999a: 36) 
illustrates this tendency:
One common misconception is that the higher the level o f capital the stronger the bank, 
regulatory solvency being considered as the defining factor for bank safety.... More 
specifically on ratings, some market observers, investors, and banks themselves assume 
sometimes that there is a direct correlation between the level o f bank capital and 
Moody’s bank ratings. Sometimes banks inform Moody’s analysts o f a capital hike, and 
appear to expect a rating upgrade as a consequence. Conversely, bank managers 
contemplating a stock repurchase are apprehensive about a rating downgrade.
The perception that failure of banks to comply with the BIS standard would be 
penalised in the markets was prevalent.
Indeed, concern for banks’ competitiveness, in international financial markets was, 
along with concern over banks’ business in major countries, the main reason why the 
Korean regulatory authority adopted the BIS standard. The regulatory authority 
anticipated that creditworthiness of Korean banks could be downgraded if the BIS 
standard was not adopted, and that Korean banks would have to pay higher costs when 
borrowing in international markets.221 At that time, Korean banks always paid high 
interest rates when borrowing funds from international financial markets. As will be 
discussed in detail in a later chapter, foreign loans traditionally played an important role
BIS CARs and actual capital conditions were declining.
220 Examples o f how CRAs responded to actual capital conditions o f banks will be presented in 
the country case studies.
221 Author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 31 January 2005. Even 
when the BIS standard was not yet implemented in Korea, the regulatory authority perceived 
that the Korea Exchange Bank, which was one o f the major banks that provided foreign capital 
to the country, began to face problems in its international business due to its (estimated) low 
BIS CAR level o f about 5 percent (NARK 1991: 24).
222 Author’s confidential interview with a former senior OBS official, Seoul 3 February 2005. 
For example, in 1991, Korean banks’ borrowing interest rates were on average 36 b.p. higher 
than London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR: the interest rate at which banks offer to lend 
funds in the international interbank market, widely used as a reference rate for interest rate 
products) (see MFK and KDB 1993). See also Chae (1994).
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in Korea’s economic development until the 1997 financial crisis (see Table 4.3). Thus, 
the regulatory authority had to avoid a further downgrade in Korean banks’ 
creditworthiness, and the adoption of the BIS standard was expected to help ensure 
this.223
Table 4.3 Shortage of domestic savings as a percentage of GNP by country, 1986-2003
(%)
saving rate - investment rate
Japan Korea Taiwan
1986 4.1 N/A 21.3
1987 3.4 N/A 18.3
1988 2.6 9.2 11.4
1989 2.1 3.8 8.2
1990 1.4 0.1 6.8
1991 1.9 -2.1 6.7
1992 2.9 -0.4 4.0
1993 2.9 1.0 3.1
1994 2.7 -0.6 2.7
1995 2.0 -1.5 2.1
1996 1.4 -3.6 3.9
1997 2.2 -0.6 2.4
1998 2.9 12.4 1.3
1999 2.5 6.0 2.8
2000 2.5 2.6 2.9
2001 2.1 2.3 6.4
2002 2.8 2.1 8.9
2003 3.1 3.1 9.9
Source: The Bank o f Korea, http://ecos.BOK.or.kr; Directorate-General o f Budget, Accounting and 
Statistic, Executive Yuan, Republic o f  China, August 2005, Guomin Jingji Dongxiang Tongji Jibao 
(Quarterly National Economic Trends).
Note: Saving Rate = (GNP-consumption+net current transfers)/GNP or (1-consumption/GDP); 
investment Rate = Investment/GNP(GDP).
Given that Japan and Taiwan experienced surplus capital for investment, the market 
competitiveness of banks was not likely to be related to the macroeconomy in the 
countries as strongly as in Korea. Yet, the Japanese and Taiwanese regulatory authorities 
were not different from their Korean counterpart in believing that banks’ noncompliance 
with the BIS standard would place them at a disadvantage in international financial 
markets. In addition, the Taiwan government had encouraged banks to operate 
international financial activities by providing various incentives for internationalisation 
since the early 1980s. This was likely to give the Taiwanese regulatory authority an 
incentive to adopt the BIS standard in order to protect or enhance Taiwanese banks’
223 Author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 28 January 2005.
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business in international financial markets.224 The Taiwanese regulatory authority’ 
belief in market pressure for compliance remained firm through the 1990s and the early
7752000s. For the Japanese regulatory authority, unlike their Korean and the Taiwanese 
counterparts, concern about the market pressure was not a major reason for the adoption 
of the BIS standard. In fact, Japan agreed with the United States and the United 
Kingdom to the principle of a common capital adequacy regulatory framework before 
any significant indication of the market pressure to comply with the BIS standard 
emerged. However, after the establishment of the BIS standard, the Japanese regulatory 
authority began to express the view that banks that failed to meet the BIS standard 
would suffer higher international funding costs (see The American Banker 20 April 
1992).
The formation o f the perception o f market pressure
The conflicting findings that first the BIS standard was not accepted by market 
participants as a reliable solvency regulation and secondly that regulatory authorities 
and banks perceived that banks noncompliant with the BIS standard would be penalised 
in markets propose a puzzle: where did the perception of market pressure for 
compliance come from? It can be argued that the following three factors played an 
important role in generating the misperception: the necessity of capital adequacy 
regulations; the “legitimacy” of the BIS standard; and confusing signals from market 
participants themselves.
There is a consensus in the financial markets that a bank has to be governed by an 
appropriate capital regulatory framework in order to reduce the probability of its failure, 
even though there is no universal agreement on the best form of capital regulatory 
framework. Under information asymmetries and conditions for imperfect information, 
capital adequacy regulations can convey important information on the financial stability 
and soundness of a bank governed by the regulations (Simmons 2001: 602). In this
224 For instance, the Taiwan government enacted the Offshore Banking Act in 1983, and 
approved the establishment o f offshore banking units o f Taiwanese banks from 1984. The 
operation o f offshore banking units was exempted from domestic regulations. In addition, 
offshore banking units were exempted from the reserve requirements on deposit and 
nonperforming loans, business income tax and stamp duties. As a result, the number o f  
Taiwanese banks’ offshore banking units had surged to twelve by 1990 (BoMA 1992: 12, 
1996b: 64) and the total assets o f offshore banking units grew five times between 1984 and 
1990, from USD 4.3 billion to USD 21 billion.
225 Author’s confidential interview with a senior BoMA official, by email, 2 September 2004.
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situation, it may be plausible to expect that poorly-regulated banks would be penalised 
in markets because of their higher probability of failure. Conversely, banks governed by 
an appropriate capital regulatory framework may have a competitive advantage in the 
markets (Simmons 2001: 602). Yet, most market actors may agree that it would be 
infeasible to build an optimal capital regulatory framework, given such factors as real­
time variations in bank risk-taking, uncertain volatilities associated with given risk 
positions, and so on (Freixas and Santomero 2003: 15-16). Therefore, in reality, market 
participants may accept a second-best regulatory framework as the appropriate one.
In these circumstances, the BIS had the “legitimacy” to be the second-best choice, in 
that it was established by the Basel Committee, which consisted of bank regulators from 
G10 countries, in other words, the most advanced economies in the world. This 
membership of the Committee may have granted the Committee the symbolic authority 
as the group of the world’s bank regulatory authorities and experts. In addition, even 
though there were debates on other forms of bank capital regulatory frameworks, none 
of the alternative ideas for capital regulation were actually accepted by a large number 
of major countries. In other words, there was no capital regulatory framework that could 
effectively compete with the BIS standard in the real word. As a result, the BIS standard 
was globally acknowledged from the outset as representing best practice in the area of 
bank capital regulation.226 Accordingly, it was not without foundation to expect or 
predict that banks not meeting the BIS standard would be penalised in markets.
In addition, major market participants themselves contributed to strengthening the 
perception of the market compliance pressure by sending confusing signals that may 
have led observers to make hasty conclusions on a positive link between banks’ 
compliance with the BIS standard and their market competitiveness. On 19 June 1987, 
the Financial Times reported that Moody’s was considering downgrading four major 
Japanese banks—Bank of Tokyo, Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Mitsubishi Trust, 
and Sanwa Bank—due to their weak capital bases; Moody’s actually downgraded the 
credit ratings of the four banks the following month {The Bond Buyer 26 August 1987). 
Given that this downgrading occurred after the launch of the U.S.-U.K. bilateral 
agreement and that it was no secret at that time that Japanese banks’ CARs were 
relatively low,227 the downgrading by Moody’s may have generated the perception that
226 The media played an important role in creating this perception. For instance, The Banker, a 
leading banking magazine, began to use capital, as well as assets, as the criteria to list the 
world’s top banks after the establishment o f the BIS standard.
227 The Chairman of the Bank o f Tokyo severely criticised Moody’s, saying: “It’s no secret that 
Japanese capital ratios are lower than British or U.S. banks” {Financial Times 19 June 1987).
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CRAs would downgrade the credit ratings of banks that did not comply with 
“advanced” capital standards or “international standards.”
Moreover, as mentioned above, CRAs began to examine the BIS CARs of banks 
after the establishment of the Accord. CRAs’ bank rating manuals expressly put the BIS 
CAR on the list of factors taken into account in rating banks, although there were 
variations among CRAs in their bank rating methodologies. CRAs requested banks to 
submit their BIS CARs in rating them, even where their home country regulatory 
framework did not adopt the BIS standard.228 CRAs also frequently mentioned the BIS 
CARs of banks when credit ratings for banks changed. Even though such activities of 
CRAs were just part of their processes to determine the actual capital adequacy of banks, 
they were likely to foster the strengthening perception of the positive link between 
banks’ compliance with the BIS standard and their credit ratings.
In addition, although CRAs did not credit the BIS standard with reliable solvency 
regulations, they did stress that it was important for banks to comply with the BIS 
standard in order to avoid regulatory actions for noncompliance. Once the BIS standard 
was implemented, a bank’s compliance failure could be punished by the regulatory 
authority, and regulatory penalties could have negative consequences for a bank’s 
investors, general creditors and counterparties (Moody’s 1999a: 37, 1999b: 32; TRC 
2004). This pressure from the CRAs on the banks to comply with the BIS standard was 
not the market compliance mechanism that the market-based theorists usually argue but 
a reflection of the need to comply with the relevant domestic regulatory framework. 
Nevertheless, it was clear that banks that were regulated by the BIS standard had to 
meet at least the required minimum CAR of 8 percent in order to avoid being penalised 
in markets.
Thus, there were reasonable grounds for the perception that noncompliance with the 
BIS standard would be penalised in markets. The perception of the market compliance 
pressure remained firm through the 1990s and the early 2000s.229 A pertinent issue that 
follows these findings may be whether the regulatory authorities perceived that market 
compliance pressure was for comprehensive compliance or for formal compliance. This 
study does not address this issue directly, but we can provide an indirect answer by 
considering whether the perceived market pressure induced the regulatory authorities to
228 Korean banks were requested by CRAs to submit their BIS CARs even before the 
implementation o f the BIS standard in Korea (KEB 1991).
229 On the significance o f perception in decision making under uncertainty, see Axelrod and 
Keohane (1986: 247-248).
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implement the BIS standard in a way to increase comprehensive compliance. This issue 
will be discussed in detail in the country case studies.
4.3 Banks and external compliance pressures
The analysis of the compliance pressures from foreign countries and from the market 
has suggested that the bank regulatory authorities led the adoption of the BIS standard, 
especially in Korea and in Taiwan. What was the response of banks to the BIS standard? 
Did they also feel pressure from foreign regulatory authorities or from markets to 
comply with the BIS standard? If so, how did they respond to the compliance pressure?
Banks in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan appeared to share with their regulatory 
authorities the view that the adoption of the BIS standard was necessary given the threat 
of market closure. As discussed earlier, as Japanese banks faced the direct threat of 
market closure from the United States in 1987, they began to raise their CARs and 
forced the Japanese authorities to negotiate with their U.S. (and U.K.) counterparts. A 
small number of Taiwanese banks with low capital levels were initially opposed to the 
adoption of the BIS standard, but they retracted their opposition as Taiwanese banks 
seeking to expand their operations in foreign countries were required by the foreign
9 inregulatory authorities to submit details of their BIS CARs. Korean banks were also 
requested by foreign regulatory authorities to submit their BIS CARs, and, as a result, 
they agreed to the necessity of adopting the BIS standard in Korea.231
Banks in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan also appeared to believe that their failure to meet
919the BIS standard would be punished in the markets. The degree of banks’ market 
sensitivity did not seem to make a difference in this belief of the banks. Table 4.4 
presents the data of banks’ reliance on foreign funds, which was used as an index to 
examine banks’ sensitivity to market compliance pressures in this study. As the data 
shows only the size of funds raised from foreign sources, an exact comparison of the
911degree of the banks’ reliance on foreign funds is difficult; nevertheless, it is shown
230 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih.
231 Author’s confidential interview with a senior banker o f a major Korean bank, by phone, 26 
August 2005.
232 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interviews with a banker o f  
a major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 2004 and a senior banker o f a major Korean bank, 
by phone, 26 August 2005.
233 It would be better to divide the figures in Table 4.4 by the banks’ total liabilities in order to 
gain an idea o f their relative dependence on foreign funds. However, because o f the problem o f  
accessibility to the necessary data, this research provides only the size o f banks’ funds raised
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that Japanese banks in aggregate raised more funds from foreign sources than did 
Korean or Taiwanese banks. However, no significant difference in the belief that failure 
to meet the BIS standard would be punished in the markets was found among banks in 
the three countries.234
Table 4.4 The size of banks’ funds raised from foreign sources, by country, 1997-2005
(end o f  March o f  the year; USD billion)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Japan 704.6 648.9 562.6 477.5 545.1 482.3 515.2 548.2 649.9
Korea N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 54.2
Taiwan N/A N/A N/A N/A 25.8 26.0 33.8 51.4 57.5
Source: Bank for International Settlements, various issues o f BIS Quarterly Review.
Note: the figures refer to the size o f the liabilities recorded as external loans and deposits.
In fact, the banks’ perception of market compliance pressure for the BIS standard 
was not based on evidence or concrete research. Instead, the perception appeared to 
stem from their general attitude of risk aversion. As banks generally do not want to 
draw negative attention to themselves, this provided an incentive for compliance with 
the BIS standard. Even if the banks did not have a clear understanding of the potential 
market costs of noncompliance with the BIS standard, it would be reasonable and 
rational for them to comply with the BIS standard in order to avoid being singled out in 
markets. Furthermore, particularly if the BIS standard was a weak regulation, not being 
able to meet it could still serve as a proxy of bank weakness 236 Indeed, most banks in 
the countries did not anticipate that they would be significantly penalised in 
international markets because of their CAR levels or the quality of their CARs, insofar 
as their CARs were higher than the required 8 percent minimum;237 nonetheless, most 
of them had a tendency to keep their CARs some points higher than 8 percent, if the 
costs were not high, simply because major foreign banks’ CARs were around 10 
percent.238
from foreign sources.
234 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interviews with a banker o f 
a major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 2004 and a senior banker o f a major Korean bank, 
by phone, 26 August 2005.
235 Authors’ interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interviews with a banker o f  
a major Taiwanese banks, Taipei, 27 August 2004 and a senior banker o f a major Korean bank, 
by phone, 26 August 2005.
236 I thank Andrew Walter for this point.
237 Author’s confidential interviews with a banker o f a major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 
2004 and a senior banker o f a major Korean bank, by phone, 26 August 2005.
238 Author’s confidential interviews with a banker o f a major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August
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Yet, despite their belief in the positive relationship between their compliance with 
the BIS standard and their market image, it should be emphasised that banks played 
only a passive role in adopting the BIS standard in Korea and in Taiwan. In other words, 
they were not opposed to the adoption, but they did not request it, either.239 Also, 
although a number of Japanese banks that were not required to employ the BIS standard 
voluntarily did so, most of them abandoned the BIS standard suddenly from 1998, when 
a Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) system was implemented in Japan 240 The attitude of 
banks towards the adoption of the BIS standard was affected by their CAR levels. Once 
the BIS standard became the domestic capital standard in a country, banks in the 
country faced the immediate risk of regulatory punishment from the domestic regulatory 
authorities for compliance failure. Therefore, banks with low CARs were reluctant to 
support the adoption of the BIS standard. Indeed, Korean banks were expected to have 
difficulties in meeting the required minimum of 8 percent before the implementation of 
the BIS standard in the country.241 As mentioned above, the Taiwanese banks that were 
initially opposed to the adoption of the BIS standard were those with low CARs. 
Japanese banks also stopped adopting the BIS standard voluntarily as the likelihood that 
they would face regulatory actions for compliance failure drastically increased due to 
the implementation of a PCA system. The immediate risk of regulatory penalties from 
the domestic regulatory authorities made banks with lower CARs hesitant to adopt the 
BIS standard.
Once the BIS standard was implemented in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, banks in these 
countries faced pressure from the markets to comply with it. As discussed above, banks’ 
failure to meet the BIS standard, which became their domestic regulations, could trigger 
regulatory actions against the banks, and, in turn, this could prompt market actors to 
lower their assessment of the banks. Furthermore, the adoption of the BIS standard 
provided a defined floor or benchmark, and falling below this would alert observers to 
the fact that a bank was having serious problems. This was because the regulatory 8 
percent minimum was a ratio that every bank had to take care to meet, since not to do so
2004 and a senior banker o f a major Korean bank, by phone, 26 August 2005.
239 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interview with a senior 
BoMA official, by email, 2 September 2004, senior FSS officials, Seoul, 28 January 2005 and 
16 February 2005, and a former senior OBS official, Seoul, 3 February 2005.
240 PCA refers to a regulation which establishes pre-determined levels o f bank solvency 
deterioration which forces automatic enforcement actions (Barth, et al. 2001a: 19). This issue 
will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
241 Even though the BIS CARs of most Korean banks were over 8 percent in the late 1980s, the 
ratios were expected to fall below 8 unless they would adjust their behaviour (OBS 1991b; Song 
1998: 14).
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would involve regulatory penalties, which could include an order to liquidate; a bank’s 
failure to conform to meet such an important requirement could signal to the market that 
it clearly had serious problems (Moody’s 1999b: 32).242 Even in the absence of 
regulatory penalties, as mentioned above, if the markets regarded the BIS standard as a 
weak regulation, it was reasonable for the markets to assume that only weak banks 
could not meet the standard.
In addition, it was requisite for banks in the countries that adopted the BIS standard 
to comply with the BIS standard if they intended to do business in foreign countries. 
This was also because the BIS standard became their home regulatory standard. Foreign 
banks had to comply, at least, with their home country regulations to expand their 
business in most countries, and capital adequacy was a salient factor for bank regulatory 
authorities to take into account in evaluating foreign banks’ financial soundness.243 
Therefore, international banks incorporated in Japan, Korea or Taiwan had to comply 
with the BIS standard, insofar as it remained as their home country regulatory standard.
After all, once banks were domestically subject to the BIS standard they faced 
external compliance pressures from the foreign regulatory authorities and from the 
markets. It is not easy to analyse the independent effects of these external compliance 
pressures and of domestic regulatory enforcement on compliance when all of them were 
in operation at the same time. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the pre-eminent 
reason why banks complied with the BIS standard was to avoid regulatory actions from 
the domestic regulatory authorities, insofar as there were domestic regulatory penalties 
for compliance failure.244 This was because domestic regulatory actions could pose an 
immediate threat to banks’ managerial freedom, which was the primary concern of most 
banks. Although the penalties from foreign countries or from markets could result in 
limiting the business activities of the banks, they were less likely to affect the banks’ 
management. Indeed, as indicated above, banks were reluctant to support the adoption 
of the BIS standard despite the potential costs of non-adoption when their CARs were 
low and there was a significant possibility that the banks and their management would 
be threatened by domestic regulatory penalties.
242 As mentioned above, even without regulatory penalties, if  the BIS standard was weak, it was 
reasonable for markets to assume that only weak banks could not meet it.
243 For capital adequacy regulations o f foreign banks in major countries, see FSF (2001: 43-57) 
and Gruson and Reisner (2000).
244 Author’s confidential interviews with a senior banker o f a major Korean bank, by phone, 26 
August 2005, and bankers o f major Taiwanese banks, Taipei, 27 August 2005 and 1 September 
2005.
Conclusions
The externality-based compliance mechanism was an important element both in creating 
the BIS standard and in inducing countries to comply with it. The United States (and the 
United Kingdom) led the establishment of the common capital adequacy framework by 
the Basel Committee, seeking to reduce negative externalities that could have been 
generated by lenient regulations in other countries. In particular, the United States put 
direct pressure on Japan to join the common framework, as its failure to join could have 
generated serious negative externalities. Meanwhile, Basel Committee countries did not 
put substantial pressure explicitly on non-Committee countries to adopt the BIS 
standard, because the engagement of banks from these countries in international 
banking was limited. Nevertheless, the Committee did encourage the countries to 
implement the BIS standard, and this gave the regulatory authorities in Korea and in 
Taiwan the perception that non-adoption of the BIS standard would hurt the overseas 
business of Korean and Taiwanese banks. Concern for banks’ business in major 
countries was persistent in Japan, Koran, and Taiwan throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s, and thereby provided them with an incentive to adhere to the BIS standard 
during this period.
The operation of market compliance pressures was more complex than that of the 
externality-based compliance mechanism. Market participants did not accept the BIS 
standard as an appropriate capital regulation due to its flaws in terms of finance theory. 
As a result, the market compliance mechanism did not actually have a significant 
influence on the adoption of and the compliance with the BIS standard. Nevertheless, 
there was a common perception that banks that were not in compliance with the BIS 
standard would be penalised in the markets. This perception appeared to have been 
generated by various factors such as the consensus on the necessity that banks had to be 
regulated by an appropriate capital adequacy regulation, the fact that the BIS standard 
was established by the Basel Committee, and confusing signals from market 
participants themselves. This conception of market compliance pressure was another 
key factor that led Korea and Taiwan to adopt the BIS standard. Meanwhile, once banks 
were regulated by the BIS standard, they actually faced market pressure to comply with 
it formally, which was partly a reflection of the relevant domestic regulations.
While the analysis in this chapter has centred mainly around the adoption of the BIS
standard in the case countries, the following three chapters will address the actual
implementation of the BIS standard in these countries, providing a deeper analysis of
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the effects of the three types of compliance pressures. The first country that will be 
addressed is Japan.
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CHAPTER 5
Japan: Persistent Cosmetic Compliance
The environment for Japan’s compliance with the BIS standard was radically changed 
during the 1990s. The economy collapsed, the financial condition of banks deteriorated, 
and, as a result, the cost for the banks to comply with the BIS standard soared. The 
changed circumstances substantially affected the implementation of the BIS standard. 
The first section addresses the change of the compliance costs. The second section 
examines Japan’s compliance with the BIS standard and analyses the effect of 
compliance mechanisms on the compliance. The last two sections address the main 
factors that explain Japan’s cosmetic compliance with the BIS Standard.
5.1 The change of compliance costs
The costs for Japanese banks to comply with the BIS standard changed considerably 
with the turning point of the early 1990s. The MFJ constructed the Japanese BIS 
standard in a way to reduce the compliance costs of Japanese banks by fully exploiting 
the national discretionary elements in the Basel Accord. As a result, the banks were 
expected to have little difficulty complying with the BIS standard. However, Japan’s 
economy collapsed in the early 1990s, and the economic downturn, which continued to 
the early 2000s, raised Japanese banks’ compliance costs significantly.
The Japanese BIS standard o f 1988
The Basel Accord was incorporated into Japan’s banking regulations when the MFJ 
issued new administrative guidance in December 1988. There were two main concerns 
of the ministry in constructing the Japanese BIS standard. One was to formulate it 
comparably with BIS standards in other Basel Committee countries. Given that the main 
reason that the MFJ agreed to establish the BIS standard was to avoid foreign criticism 
and to protect Japanese banks’ business in foreign markets, to maintain the 
comparability between the Japanese BIS standard and other Committee countries’ BIS
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standards was necessary for the MFJ.245 The other main concern of the MFJ was to 
reduce costs for banks to comply with the new capital regulation. As a result, the MFJ 
formulated the Japanese BIS standard by taking active advantage of the national 
discretionary elements in the Basel Accord in order to lower the compliance costs of 
Japanese banks, but within the boundary allowed in the Accord (see Table 5.1).246
Table 5.1 The Japanese BIS standard of 1988
A. Capital elements 
Tier 1
(a) Consolidated subsidiaries’ minority interest
(b) Capital on consolidated balance sheet
(c) Paid-in capital
(d) Capital reserves
(e) Retained earnings
(f) Non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock 
Tier 2
(a) 45 percent o f unrealised gains on securities holdings
(b) General loan loss reserves
(c) Hybrid capital instruments
(d) Subordinated term debt
B. Deduction from the capital base
\
From tier 1
The amount equivalent to goodwill and consolidation adjustment debt 
From total capital
Holdings o f capital instruments issued by other banks aimed at artificially raising capital ratios
C. Risk weights by category of on-balance-sheet asset 
0%
(a) Cash
(b) Claims on OECD central government and central banks
(c) Claims on non-OECD central government and central banks denominated in national 
currency
(d) Claims collateralised by the lender’s own account or securities issued by OECD central 
governments
(e) Claims guaranteed by OECD central governments 
10%
(a) Claims on Japanese public sector entities
(b) Claims guaranteed by Japanese public sector entities______________________________
245 In fact, even though the MFJ initially planned to issue a new administrative guidance to 
carry the BIS standard in September 1988, the ministry did not issue it until it found that the 
BIS standards in other Committee countries were not significantly different from the Japanese 
BIS standard (Japan E conom ic N ew sw ire  15 August 1988; J iji P ress  2 September 1988; MFJ 
1990: 46; The A sso c ia ted  P ress  16 December 1988).
246 Japanese banks requested the MFJ to include provisions for retirement allowances and 
reserves set up under specific laws in tier 2 capital, but the ministry did not allow it as they were 
earmarked provisions {Eurom arket R eport 25 April 1988).
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20%
(a) Claims on multilateral development banks and claims collateralised by the securities issued 
by these institutions
(b) Claims on credit institutions incorporated in the OECD and claims guaranteed (or accepted 
or endorsed) by OECD-incorporated credit institutions
(c) Claims on bank incorporated outside the OECD with a residual maturity o f up to one year 
and claims with a residual maturity o f up to one year guaranteed by these banks
(d) Claims on OECD public sector entities (excluding central government), excluding Japanese 
ones, and claims guaranteed by such entities
(e) Cash items in the process o f collection 
50%
Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property owned or rented out by the borrower 
100%
All other claims and assets______________________________________________________________
Source: Ministry o f  Finance o f Japan. 1989. Dai 38-Kai Ginko-Kyaku Kirryu Nenpo (The 38th Annual 
Report o f  Banking Bureau), pp. 48-51.
The most noteworthy characteristic of the Japanese BIS standard was that only 
“international banks” had the obligation to comply with the BIS standard. The Basel 
Accord was formally intended to be applied to “internationally active banks,” but it did 
not provide a clear definition of the term. Therefore, the Japanese regulation to apply 
the BIS standard to international banks only was not in breach of the Basel Accord. 
However, the Japanese definition of international bank was narrow, referring only to 
bank with overseas subsidiaries or branches. Therefore, although other banks engaged 
in transactions with foreign banks, they were not required to comply with the BIS 
standard under the Japanese regulations. “Domestic banks” were governed by the 
domestic capital adequacy standard, which was more lenient than the BIS standard. The 
domestic capital standard set the minimum CAR (capital to total assets ratio) at 4 
percent and included all kinds of reserves in the regulatory capital. Thus, the application 
of two different sets of capital standards provided weakly-capitalised banks with room 
to retreat from the BIS standard. Domestic banks were allowed to adopt the BIS 
standard on condition that they would not reapply the domestic capital regulation once 
they employed the BIS standard. Yet, as will be discussed later, this condition was 
abandoned later to allow banks to switch to the domestic standard.247
The inclusion of 45 percent of unrealised gains on securities holdings in the 
regulatory capital initially substantially lowered Japanese banks’ costs of compliance
247 In addition, note that in establishing the 1996 amendment o f the Basel Accord, the MFJ 
wanted to minimise its application scope, as the ministry worried that further regulations would 
put undue pressure on Japanese banks that were already struggling. The MFJ’s requirement was 
accepted by the Basel Committee. As a result, the MFJ expected that the additional burden of  
Japanese banks to comply with the 1996 amendment would be trivial (Thomson’s International 
Banking Regulator 23 March 1992; MFJ 1993: 37). See also note 46 for the Japanese 
implementation o f the 1996 amendment.
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with the BIS standard. Stock prices sharply rose during the 1980s, and, as a result, 
unrealised gains on securities holdings accounted for about half of the total capital bases 
of Japanese banks. This Japanese treatment was in sharp contrast to the corresponding 
German regulation. German banks also had a substantial amount of unrealised gains on 
securities holdings. However, the German regulatory authority held an austere view on 
them so that they allowed banks to count hidden reserves as part of tier 2 capital only up 
to 1.4 percent and then only after they had attained a tier 1 ratio of 4.4 percent (The 
Banker January 1993).
The Japanese BIS standard also reduced the volume of banks’ risk-weighted assets. 
A risk weight of 10 percent was applied to claims on local public sector entities or 
government-related institutes and claims guaranteed by them, while the corresponding 
rule was 20 percent in the United Kingdom, and 20, 50 or 100 percent in the United 
States (Hall 1993b: 201). In fact, the MFJ initially planned to apply zero percent on the 
claims but decided on a 10-percent application due to opposition from the Basel 
Committee. Yet, the MFJ continued to insist on a zero-percent application on the claims 
in the Committee, and in the end, the Committee concluded in January 1994 that there 
was no significant problem in adopting it. One month after the committee’s decision, the
9 4 o
MFJ lowered the risk weight for the claims to zero percent (MFJ 1994: 25).
In addition, the Japanese BIS standard was lax in the area of supervision. The MFJ 
investigated banks’ compliance with the BIS standard on a basis of end-period assets 
twice a year, at the end of March (the end of the fiscal year) and the end of September 
(the end of the mid-fiscal year). The lax supervisory practice contrasted with U.S. 
supervision under which banks were expected to comply with the BIS rules at all times 
and were subject to random checks of such compliance. The Japanese supervisory 
practice made it possible for banks to window-dress their balance sheets; there was a 
rumour that non-Japanese banks guaranteed commercial credits for Japanese banks for a 
day, reducing risk-weights of Japanese credits from 100 percent to 20 percent (Scott and 
Iwahara 1994: 55).249
Moreover, the MFJ did not take punitive action against banks that failed to meet the 
capital adequacy regulations, either BIS or domestic, until a PC A system was 
introduced in 1998. In fact, the MFJ was not equipped with a statutory instrument to
248 The application o f the low risk weight on the claims partly aimed to encourage the supply o f  
funds for local public entities (MFJ 1994: 22).
249 In other words, the difference between the calendar year accounting period for non-Japanese 
banks and the end-March accounting period for Japanese banks was exploited (Scott and 
Iwahara 1994: 55).
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enforce banks to meet the capital regulations until the introduction of the PAC system. 
Although the amendment of the Banking Law in 1992 established a new article 
empowering the MFJ to establish standards to assess banks’ capital soundness related to 
their assets, there were, in contrast to Korea’s and Taiwan’s banking laws, no provisions 
to empower the regulatory authority to punish banks for noncompliance with the 
standards.250 However, the ministry was able to penalise banks effectively for 
noncompliance with administrative guidance if it was willing to do so, at least until the 
mid-1990s. Therefore, regulatory enforcement for banks to comply with the capital 
adequacy regulations was not a matter of ministerial capacity but of willingness. 
However, the MFJ had no willingness to enforce compliance, and merely suggested that 
noncompliant banks raised their CARs.251
The Japanese implementation of the BIS standard effectively lowered costs of 
Japanese banks to comply with the BIS standard. The average BIS CARs of major 
banks surpassed the 8 percent minimum in September 1989, which was far earlier than 
the formal deadline of the end of March 1993.252 In addition, the volume of total assets 
in all banks increased by about 20 percent during fiscal years 1988 to 1990. In the 
meantime, the Japanese BIS standard was formally in accordance with the Basel Accord, 
although the Japanese regulatory authority had no intention of complying with the BIS 
standard comprehensively.
Rising compliance costs
Japanese banks began to face difficulty in complying with the BIS standard from the 
early 1990s. In mid-1989, the BoJ started to raise interest rates to curb asset price 
inflation, paving the way for the asset price bubble to burst in 1991. Stock and land 
prices started falling rapidly and the economy remained stagnant throughout the 1990s 
and the early 2000s. The prolonged economic downturn placed unprecedented 
downward pressure on the CARs of Japanese banks.253
A drastic fall in stock prices rapidly eroded the volume of unrealised gains on 
securities holdings and consequently the capital bases of banks. After hitting a record
250 Nor were enforcement decrees or detailed enforcement regulations for the new article 
established.
251 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa.
252 This finding challenges Oatley and Nabor’s (1998) account o f the establishment o f the Basel 
Accord.
253 During 1991 to 2002, growth rates averaged only 1 percent per annum, compared to 4 
percent during the 1980s.
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high o f  38,916 in December 1989, the Nikkei 225 Stock Average Index began to 
collapse. It lost more than half o f  its value by early 1992, and kept a downward trend, 
with cyclical fluctuations, falling to a 20-year low o f  7,607 in April 2003. As a result, 
the volume o f unrealised gains on securities holdings contracted substantially, losing 
about 80 percent in value by the end o f March 1995 and eventually became negative for 
the first time during m id-1998, when the stock index fell below 15,000 (see Figure 5.1). 
According to an estimate by the government, a 1000-yen drop in the index pulled down 
CARs by 0.2 percentage points during the mid-1990s (EPA 1998: 265). The value o f  
unrealised gains on securities holdings remained negative in the early 2000s. Although a 
change in accounting rules temporarily allowed banks not to record losses in their 
securities holdings between fiscal years 1998 and 2000, an introduction o f  mark-to- 
market accounting in fiscal year 2001 forced banks to deduct 60 percent o f  unrealised 
losses on securities holdings from their capital.254
Figure 5.1 The decline of unrealised gains on securities holdings in Japanese banks, FY 
1988-2002
(fiscal year; JPY billion)
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Source: Bank o f  Japan, Japanese Banks' Financial Statements', Nikkei NEED-MT Macro-Data.
In addition, a huge amount o f  loans held by banks turned into NPLs due to the 
prolonged economic weakness. The official volume o f  NPLs, Risk Management Loans 
(RMLs), in all banks reached JPY 42 trillion, which accounted for about 9 percent o f  the 
total loans at the end o f March 2002. In consequence, banks suffered considerable 
losses in disposing o f  NPLs. They lost more than JPY 5 trillion in writing o ff NPLs,
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2 5 0 0 0
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1 5 0 0 0
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5 0 0 0
254 The change o f the accounting rules will be discussed in the next section.
130
either directly or indirectly, every year from fiscal year 1994. Since then total losses on 
disposal o f  N PLs surpassed operating profits (see Figure 5.2). The cum ulative losses on 
the disposal o f  N PLs am ounted to alm ost JPY 90 trillion (about 18 percent o f  2003 
GDP) by the end o f  M arch 2003. The loan losses encroached on the banks’ profits and 
consequently their capital.255 M eanwhile, banks faced difficulties in raising new capital 
at affordable rates in the midst o f  a bearish market.
Figure 5.2 Disposal of NPLs in Japanese banks, FY 1992-2002
(end o f  fiscal year; JPY billion)
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Source: Financial Services Agency, 2003, Total Losses on D isposal o f  Non-Performing Loans o f  All 
Banks; Bank o f  Japan, Japanese Banks' Financial Statements.
Note: 1. The definition o f  RMLs was strengthened in fiscal years 1995 and 1997; 2. For RMLs, the data 
are composed o f  only major banks from fiscal years 1992 to 1994.
Japanese banks were able to w ithstand the downward pressure on capital to some 
extent during the early 1990s ow ing to the huge size o f  unrealised gains and new CA R 
raising m easures, such as subordinated debt, preferred stocks and asset securitisation, 
introduced by the M FJ.256 However, CARs o f most m ajor banks (city banks), on
255 A collapse in land prices impaired the value o f collateral o f extended loans, in many cases 
below the value o f the loans they secured. According to an estimate by S& P’s, a 10-percent 
decline in collateral values forced banks to make JPY 1 trillion in additional provisions (Rixtel 
2002: 240).
256 The MFJ set out to devise the measures to help banks meet the BIS rules during the late 
1980s (MFJ 1988: 37-38, 1989: 52), and accelerated the task as the banks’ capital bases 
contracted due to the fall in unrealised gains (author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa). 
The issuance o f subordinated convertible bonds with coerced conversion and foreign currency 
denominated perpetual subordinated bonds in overseas markets was allowed in July 1992. 
Banks were allowed to issue perpetual subordinated loans in September 1992. Euroyen 
denominated perpetual subordinated bonds and perpetual subordinated bonds with a condition 
o f equity conversion were allowed in March 1993. A trust method was introduced for the
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average, dropped below 9 percent in fiscal year 1994 for the first time since fiscal year 
1992. The financial condition of Japanese banks was even more aggravated during the 
financial crisis of 1997 to 1998 and kept faltering throughout the remainder of the 1990s 
and the early 2000s. Consequently, the costs of Japanese banks to comply with the BIS 
standard have remained very high since the mid-1990s.257
. 5.2 Compliance of Japanese banks
Despite high and increasing compliance costs for banks, Japan formally remained a BIS 
standard country. However, Japan’s compliance with the BIS standard was a clear 
example of cosmetic compliance; the Japanese regulatory authority implemented the 
BIS standard in a way to reduce compliance costs at the expense of the actual capital 
soundness of banks. External compliance pressures, along with domestic regulatory 
penalties from the late 1990s, induced Japanese banks’ formal compliance with the BIS 
standard. Yet, there was no substantial pressure on Japanese banks to comply with the 
BIS standard comprehensively.
Cosmetic compliance record
At a glance, Japanese banks seemed to show a fair record on compliance with the BIS 
standard. Most of banks that adopted the BIS standard complied with the required 8 
percent minimum. There were only six compliance failures by the banks between fiscal 
years 1992 and 2002 on an annual basis: one in fiscal year 1992, two in fiscal year 1994, 
two in fiscal year 1996, and one in fiscal year 1998. In addition, CARs of BIS-standard 
banks on average surpassed 10 percent by the end of March 1998 and stayed over 10 
percent afterwards (see Figure 5.3). This compliance record of Japanese banks made a 
remarkable contrast with their tattered compliance with the previous capital to deposits
securitisation o f commercial loans in December 1992 and of loans to local public entities in 
April 1994 (MFJ 1994: 26-27). Some city banks issued preferred stocks in domestic markets 
and Euroyen denominated step down exchangeable subordinated bonds in overseas markets in 
March 1994. Others amended their corporate bylaws to ease issuing preferred stocks in June 
1994.
257 The value o f the yen to the dollar was another important macroeconomic variable that 
affected Japanese banks’ CARs. Banks held a huge volume o f dollar-denominated assets during 
the 1980s. The depreciation o f the yen, therefore, expanded the value o f the assets in yen terms 
and, in turn, encroached on banks’ CARs. However, given that Japanese banks rapidly retreated 
from international markets from the early 1990s, the effect o f fluctuations in the exchange rate 
on the banks’ CARs appeared to be limited during the 1990s and the early 2000s.
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ratio regulation.
Figure 5.3 The average CAR of Japanese BIS-standard banks, FY 1992-2002
(end o f  fiscal year; %)
1992 93 94 9S 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02
Source: Japanese Bankers Association, various issues o f  Zenkok Ginkou Zaimushyohyou Bunseki 
(Analysis o f  Financial Statements o f  All Banks).
Note: Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank and Fuji Trust & Banking are not included for the estimate for fiscal year 
1999, and Mizuho Trust & Banking for fiscal years 2000 and 2001.
However, Japanese banks’ com pliance record should not be overvalued. The num ber 
o f  Japanese banks that em ployed the BIS standard sharply declined through the 1990s 
and early 2000s. Out o f  a total o f  150 banks, 90 banks adopted the BIS standard at the 
end o f M arch 1993, the deadline for the im plem entation o f  the BIS standard set by the 
Basel Accord. Yet, the MFJ removed the condition that prevented banks that had 
adopted the BIS standard from switching to the dom estic capital standard one day 
before the introduction o f  a PCA system in April 199 8.258 H alf o f  the BIS-standard 
banks sw itched to the dom estic capital standard on that day, and only about one tenth o f  
Japanese banks— 17 out o f  a total o f  134 banks— adhered to the BIS standard by the end 
o f  M arch 2003 (see Figure 5.4). Although Japan officially rem ained as a BIS standard 
country, in practice, a very limited proportion o f  Japanese banks were regulated by the 
BIS standard from 1998.
258 Author’s interview with Hirokawa Hitoshi (Deputy Director o f Supervisory Bureau, FSA), 
Tokyo, 2 April 2004.
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Figure 5.4 The number of Japanese BIS-standard banks, FY 1992-2002
(end of fiscal year; number)
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Source: Japanese Bankers Association, various issues o f  Zenkok Ginkou Zaimushyohyou Bunseki 
(Analysis o f  Financial Statements o f  All Banks).
In addition, BIS CARs o f  Japanese banks were inflated, failing to reflect the actual 
capital condition o f the banks, due to lenient accounting rules. During the period before 
the PCA system  was im plem ented, the inflation o f the banks’ BIS CARs resulted m ainly 
from the M F J’s avoidance o f  recognising the actual scale o f  N PLs in banks.259 RM Ls, 
the official definition o f  N PLs, included only loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy and 
loans in arrears by six months or more during the first half o f  the 1990s. The definition 
o f RM L was extended in 1995 by including a part o f  restructured loans. However, the 
definition o f  restructured loans was limited and loans less than six months in arrears 
were not included in RM Ls. The definition o f  RM L was strengthened equivalent to the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Com m ission in 1997, by including a broad range o f 
restructured loans and loans in arrear by three m onths or more. N evertheless, the 
reliability o f  the volum e o f  disclosed N PLs remained doubtful. A ccording to estim ates 
by several U.S. and European investm ent banks, NPLs at m ajor Japanese banks were 
alm ost double the disclosed figures (Rixtel 2002: 181). The limited disclosure o f  N PLs 
raised banks’ CARs by reducing the volume o f  otherw ise direct or indirect write-offs.
Once the PCA system was introduced, the regulatory forbearance in regard to the
259 The handling o f  NPLs through the Cooperative Credit Purchasing Company (CCPC) 
represented the M FJ’s policy to deal with NPLs during the period. The CCPC commenced 
operations o f the purchase and sale o f NPLs with real estate as collateral in January 1993. The 
MFJ treated sales o f NPLs by banks to the CCPC as if they were actual resolutions, excluding 
the figures o f NPLs from their balance sheets. However, banks had to lend money to the CCPC 
for the purchase o f NPLs without earning interest and any NPLs sold to the CCPC were not 
repaid until the underlying collateral was sold. Thus, in practice, the NPLs still remained in the 
banks’ account (.Financial Regulation Report 1 February 1994). By 1997, the CCPC had sold 
less than 5 percent o f  its portfolio (Kanaya and Woo 2000: 11).
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capital adequacy regulation became more extensive. Along with the introduction of the 
PCA system, the new Financial Inspection Manual was introduced in April 1998.260 
According to the Manual, although the quality of loans to “needs attention” borrowers 
was problematic, provisions for the loans were categorised as general provisions, 
inflating banks’ tier 2 capital.261 Tier 1 capital was also artificially increased because 
NPLs in banks were highly under-provisioned due to a low level of provisioning 
requirements, especially for general provisions.262 If all NPLs in banks had been 
provisioned, their tier 1 capital would have been exhausted by 2002.263
The regulatory authority also changed several accounting rules in order to help 
banks maintain their BIS CARs beyond the minimum 8 percent. As banks’ unrealised 
gains on securities holdings were expected to be negative, the regulatory authority 
permitted them not to record their unrealised losses from 1998. In the meantime, they 
were allowed to count 45 percent of unrealised gains on land holdings as tier 2 capital,
260 Along with the introduction o f the Manual, banks were instructed to “self-assess” their assets 
and calculate the amount o f write-offs and loan loss provisions based on their self-assessment 
results. The self-assessment scheme classified assets into four categories— category I 
(unclassified), II, III and IV— according to financial conditions o f borrowers and collectibility 
of loans. Borrowers were classified as “normal”, “needs attention”, “in danger of bankruptcy”, 
iide facto  bankrupt”, and “bankrupt” according to their ability to repay the obligation. “Needs 
attention” borrowers were subdivided into “special attention”’ borrowers and other “needs 
attention” borrowers (FSA 2003).
261 A large proportion o f borrowers were kept out o f lower categories only because creditor 
banks continued to promise support to borrowers that were not expected to recover. For instance, 
the Japanese regulatory authority rated Aoki, a battered construction company, merely as a 
“need attention” borrower at the end of March 2001, although creditor banks waived its debts 
based on a 20-year restructuring plan that was too long to be convincing (The Economist 14 July 
2001). Also, banks evaluated their borrowers based on their ability to repay interest, which 
meant virtually nothing in the extremely low interest environment. The IMF (2003b: 19) 
asserted that the provisions for “needs attention” borrowers should not be included in tier 2 
capital, insisting that the accounting practice was not consistent with the Basel Accord, which 
prohibited the inclusion of special provision in the regulatory capital.
262 Japanese banks were required to build provisions for loans to “need attention” borrowers that 
excluded “special attention” borrowers equal to prospective losses that they were expected to 
incur only over the following one-year period in view o f their average loan loss ratio for the past 
three calculation periods. As a result, the ratio o f loan loss provisions to RMLs for major 
Japanese banks ranged only from 30 to 60 percent from fiscal years 1992 to 2002, reaching 
about 40 percent at the end o f the period. The ratio was significantly low compared with the 
ratio o f loan loss provisions to NPLs in U.S. banks, which was above 160 percent from 1994 to 
1999 (Fukao 2003a: 12-15). Although general provisions could be counted as tier 2 capital, their 
amount eligible for inclusion in tier 2 capital was limited to 1.25 percent o f the risk-weighted 
assets and also tier 2 capital could not surpass the volume of tier 1 capital. Therefore, given that 
tier 2 capital in Japanese banks almost reached the level o f tier 1 capital, most o f an increase in 
general provisions could not be counted as capital, while reducing tier 1 capital by being 
recorded as loss.
263 According to a market estimate, under-provisioned NPLs in the four largest Japanese banks 
amounted to JPY 17,900 billion yen in 2002 (The Banker July 2002), while the amount o f tier 1 
capital in all major banks was JPY 3,713 billion at the end of the fiscal year.
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even though this practice was in conflict with the accounting standard for unrealised 
losses on securities holdings.264 Banks were allowed to deduct the amount of time 
deposits from the lending balance of their clients in calculating CARs if the time 
deposits were to expire after the bank loans fell due (Jiji Press 26 March 1998). The risk 
weight applied to loans guaranteed by the Credit Guarantee Corporation was also 
reduced from 100 to 10 percent {Japan Economic Newswire 17 February 1998).265
Deferred tax accounting in calculating CAR was another problem. Japanese banks 
were allowed to include deferred tax assets (DTAs) in tier 1 capital from the end of 
March 1999. However, DTAs were not a reliable bank capital base because they 
lacked the availability to meet losses in the event of bank failure, which was one of the 
prime characteristics of bank capital (IMF 2003b: 18).267 Moreover, there was no limit 
to the amount of DTAs that Japanese banks could claim as capital as a percentage of tier 
1 capital {TheAsahi Shimbun 29 January 2003).268 As a result, for major banks, DTAs 
accounted for more than 20 percent of the tier 1 capital from fiscal year 1998, reaching 
52 percent at the end of March 2003 (Cabinet Office 2003). However, DTAs depended 
on banks’ ability to generate future income. Accordingly, the maximum amount of 
DTAs a bank could post should have been based on its future taxable profits. Yet, 
Japanese banks were too optimistic in calculating DTAs in spite of their weak future 
earning power.269
264 Although the accounting change was initially planned as a temporary measure to last until 
fiscal year 1998, the duration o f the accounting change was extended so that banks could count 
unrealised gains on land holdings as capital as o f April 2004.
265 In addition, restrictions on the sale o f property-backed securities and the issuance o f 
perpetual bonds were lifted (Asia Pulse 6 August 1997; Financial Times 1 April 1997), and 
banks were allowed to borrow subordinated loans from listed companies (Japan Economic 
Newswire 4 August 1997).
266 jypAs were credits against taxes on future taxable income. Japanese banks generated DTAs 
mainly with the following two factors. Firstly, the Japanese tax rules allowed loss carry forward 
for five years. As a result, when banks accumulated losses in taxable income, they could show 
DTAs up to combined tax rates (about 40 percent) o f estimated taxable income in the following 
five years. Secondly, rules on the write-off o f NPLs were stricter in tax accounting than in bank 
accounting. As a result, banks sometimes could not recognise losses in their statements for tax 
purposes, while they could in their financial statements. The over-paid tax on loan losses could 
be carried as DTAs (Fukao 2003b: 17).
267 DTAs had no liquidation value because the tax authority would not reimburse them in the 
case o f a bankruptcy o f the bank.
268 The U.S. regulatory authority limited DTAs to less than 10 percent o f tier 1 capital or one 
year’s profit (IMF 2003b: 18). In Korea, DTAs were completely prohibited from being included 
as capital.
269 For instance, Resona Bank, which received public funds in May 2003, had more than JPY 
400 billion o f DTAs, which was larger than its shareholders’ equity o f JPY 366 billion. However, 
the bank reported losses in the three period ending in March 2003. To realise the recorded DTAs 
in the coming five years, the bank had to earn JPY 200 billion every year and its after tax return
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In addition, a large part of Japanese banks’ capital was composed of public funds 
injected into the banks from 1998 in order to boost their weak capital bases. The 
government injected public funds of JPY 1.8 trillion into twenty-one banks, including 
eighteen major banks, in March 1998 and JPY 7.5 trillion into fifteen banks, including 
fourteen major banks, in March 1999 through the purchase of convertible preferred 
shares and subordinated bonds/loans (DICJ 2003a). The public funds raised the major 
banks’ CARs by 2 to 3 percentage points to 10 percent or more. However, in a strict 
sense, the public funds were not a reliable capital base as they were debts that had to be 
paid back to the government.
Figure 5.^ provides an estimate of the actual capital condition of major Japanese 
banks during fiscal years 1992 to 2002. Their disclosed tier 1 ratio was estimated by 
dividing their aggregate tier 1 capital by their aggregate risk-weighted assets, and then 
the disclosed tier 1 ratio was adjusted by deducting tax effects— including DTAs—and 
public funds from the tier 1 capital. The banks’ disclosed tier 1 ratio was well beyond 
the required minimum of 4 percent during the period. However, the quality of tier 1 
capital rapidly deteriorated due to an increase in the weaker capital elements from the 
late 1990s. The adjusted tier 1 ratio dropped to zero percent in March 2003. Given that 
this estimation did not take into account other problems related to the banks’ regulatory 
capital—such as under-provisioning—their actual capital condition was likely to be far 
worse than the adjusted tier 1 ratio.270
on equity had to be as high as 32 percent. This was clearly an unrealistic scenario (Fukao 2003b: 
17-18).
270 In fact, Hokkaido-Takushoku Bank, which went bankrupt in October 1997, had a CAR of
9.3 percent at the end o f March 1997. Long Term Credit Bank, which failed in October 1998, 
maintained a CAR o f 10.4 percent at the end of March 1998. The CAR of Nippon Credit Bank, 
which went bankrupt in December 1998, was 8.2 percent at the end of September 1998.
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Figure 5.5 The adjusted tier 1 ratio of major Japanese banks, FY 1992-2002
(end o f fiscal year; %)
■  Disclosed Her I ratio 0  Adjusted tie r I
Source: The author’s own estimation based on the data obtained from Fitch Ratings.
Note: The number o f  major banks varies according to year.
Implications o f  the compliance record
The compliance record o f Japanese banks, firstly, confirms that the operation o f  the 
external compliance pressures, both from foreign regulatory authorities and from 
markets, contributed to the formal compliance o f Japanese banks with the BIS standard. 
As mentioned earlier, the MFJ did not penalise banks for noncompliance with the 
capital adequacy standards until the implementation o f the PCA system in April 1998.
In other words, there was no domestic compliance mechanism in operation during the 
pre-PCA period. Nevertheless, most banks that adopted the BIS standard complied with 
the required 8 percent minimum. Banks with lower BIS CARs made more effort than 
those with higher CARs in order to comply, by reducing loans or issuing more 
subordinated debts (Ito and Sasaki 2002). The compliance record o f BIS-standard banks 
made a sharp contrast with the compliance record o f  domestic-standard banks, 
especially during the pre-PCA period; the number o f  compliance failures o f  domestic- 
standard banks reached about ten every year during the period (see Table 5.2). The 
comparison o f  compliance o f  the two groups o f  banks clearly shows that compliance o f  
BIS-standard banks was induced by external compliance pressures, from foreign 
regulatory authorities and from markets.
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Table 5.2 Compliance failures of Japanese banks, F Y 1992-2002
(fiscal year; number)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
BIS-standard banks 1 0 2 0 2 0
Domestic-standard banks 12 11 9 10 12 1
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
BIS-standard banks 1 0 0 0 0 N/A
Domestic-standard banks 4 7 0 0 1 N/A
Source: Japanese Bankers Association, various issues o f  Zenkok Ginkou Zaimushyohyou Bunseki 
(Analysis o f  Financial Statements o f  All Banks).
Secondly, the operation of external compliance pressures led some Japanese banks 
to voluntarily employ the BIS standard, particularly during the pre-PCA period. 
Approximately 40 percent of Japanese banks without overseas branches or 
representative offices chose to adopt the BIS standard during the period (see Table 5.3). 
Some of the banks employed the BIS standard because they had a plan to expand 
business in foreign markets. For example, in 1989, nine banks without overseas 
footholds announced adoption of the BIS standard in preparation for their future 
advance into international business (Jiji Press 15 February 1989). The remaining banks 
that had no overseas establishments, but opted to adopt the BIS standard, appeared to do 
so in order to improve their market images. External compliance pressures both from 
foreign countries and from markets induced banks’ voluntary compliance with the BIS 
standard.
Table 5.3 Japanese banks’ adoption of the BIS standard by bank category, FY 1992-2002
(end o f fiscal year; number)
BIS-standard 
banks(A)
International 
banks(B)
Domestic
banks (A)-(B)
1992 90 54 97 37
1993 89 53 97 37
1994 89 52 98 36
1995 86 53 97 36
1996 82 50 99 39
1997 45 43 105 10
1998 35 35 109 9
1999 27 26 119 1
2000 26 26 115 5
2001 21 21 117 5
2002 .17 16 118 1
Source: Japanese Bankers Association, various issues o f  Zenkok Ginkou Zaimushyohyou Bunseki 
(Analysis o f  Financial Statements o f All Banks).
Note: International banks herein refer to banks with overseas branches or representative offices; domestic 
banks refer to banks with no overseas branches or representative offices.
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Thirdly, as Table 5.2 showed, Japanese banks’ compliance with the capital adequacy 
regulations, both BIS and domestic, improved after the implementation of the PCA 
system. This demonstrates that the threat of regulatory penalties from the domestic 
regulatory authority was the key incentive for banks’ formal compliance with the capital 
adequacy regulations.271 The PCA system required the regulatory authority to 
automatically take punitive actions against banks with CARs below certain thresholds, 
of which the highest was the required minimum CARs. Regulatory penalties ranged 
from the formulation and implementation of management improvement plans to the 
suspension of some or all business activities. Thus, banks had to meet the capital 
adequacy regulations to preserve their independent management after the introduction 
of the PCA system.
Fourthly, in the meantime, a sharp decline in the number of Japanese banks that 
adopted the BIS standard during the PCA period suggests that they attached a high 
priority to immediate costs that could be caused by their choice. The implementation of 
the PCA raised the risk that the banks could face regulatory penalties from the domestic 
regulatory authority, as their CARs were deteriorating. In the circumstances, banks were 
willing to bear potential market costs that could be generated by non-adoption of the 
BIS standard in order to avoid potential regulatory actions from the domestic regulatory 
authority, as the costs that would be caused by regulatory penalties were more concrete 
and tangible than the potential market costs.272 Indeed, disclosed CARs of Japanese 
banks increased after the implementation of the PCA system, despite their worsening 
actual financial condition. In addition, it should be noted that banks with overseas 
establishments had to adhere to the BIS standard even during the PCA period, because 
otherwise their business in foreign countries could be limited. As of end-March 2003, of 
a total of sixteen banks with overseas branches, all except for Shinsei Bank, whose 
overseas branch was a paper company in the Cayman Islands, had adopted the BIS 
rules.273
Last, but not least, the cosmetic compliance record of Japan shows that the operation
271 The PCA system was employed for domestic-standard banks from fiscal year 1999, one year 
later than for BIS-standard banks.
272 In fact, a good number o f banks that switched to domestic capital standard maintained their 
CARs at over 8 percent.
273 Precisely speaking, the Japanese capital adequacy regulations required a bank that had 
overseas branches or subsidiaries with a permanent executive director or permanent staff at its 
locations to comply with the BIS rules. Therefore, Shinsei Bank was not required to comply 
with the BIS standard under the Japanese regulations (author’s interview with Hirokawa Hitoshi, 
by email, 12 April 2004).
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Iof external compliance pressures failed to induce comprehensive compliance. In fact, 
whereas Japanese banks’ capital condition worsened from the late 1990s, market 
participants paid less attention to the soundness of individual banks after the 
government’s injection of public funds into the banks in the late 1990s: even though 
CRAs themselves argued that public funds were a weak form of capital, the injection of 
public funds had a positive effect on Japanese banks’ credit ratings.274 Likewise, the 
“Japan Premium,” which was a premium imposed on Japanese banks’ borrowing rates 
by U.S. and European banks in the Eurodollar or Euroyen markets, virtually 
disappeared after the injection of public funds (Ito and Harada 2003).275 Foreign 
countries had difficulty forcing Japan to strengthen its capital adequacy regulations, 
since the Japanese accounting standards that artificially inflated the disclosed BIS CARs 
of the banks were not expressly addressed by the Basel Accord, and it was not clear 
whether Japan’s application of such accounting standards was a noncompliance matter 
for the Basel Accord. Rules on asset classification and provisioning were not covered by 
the Accord; the accounting change to allow banks not to record their unrealised losses 
on securities holdings was not in violation of the Accord, because the Accord did not 
enforce the employment of mark-to-market accounting; the inclusion of unrealised gains 
on land holdings in tier 2 capital was explicitly allowed in the Accord; and the Japanese 
defended the inclusion of DTAs in the regulatory capital by arguing that the practice 
was reasonable since Japanese tax rules were extremely strict.
There were more factors that may have reduced foreign countries’ incentive to force 
Japan to implement the BIS standard more strictly. When the BIS standard was 
established in 1988, the immediate negative externality for foreign countries of Japan’s 
noncompliance with the BIS standard was the competitive advantage of Japanese 
banks.277 Yet, even though the number of the overseas footholds of the banks increased
274 The long-term ratings o f Moody’s and S&P’s for major Japanese banks, on average, rose or 
remained stable after the injection o f a massive amount o f public funds in April 1999 (see JCIF 
2001:9-10).
275 Meanwhile, credit ratings for Japanese banks were downgraded due to the introduction o f a 
PCA framework, which helped compliance with the BIS standard. The CRAs understood the 
measure as a decrease in the safety net and in the availability o f accounting flexibility or 
forbearance {Japan Economic Newswire 27 January 1997, 26 November 1997; Jiji Press 3 
December 1997).
276 Japanese tax authorities limited the ability banks to deduct the amount o f would-be 
uncollectible loans from their pretax income as an expense.
277 The S&P’s Long-Term Issuer Credit Ratings for most major Japanese banks were A, which 
was assigned to an obligor with “STRONG capacity to meet its financial commitments,” or AA, 
which was assigned to an obligator with “VERY STRONG capacity to meet its financial 
commitments,” during the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
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until the mid-1990s, their international market share began to decline from the early 
1990s due to their weakening financial situations. As a result, while Japanese banks 
accounted for almost 40 percent of international assets of all banks in the world in 1988, 
their share declined to about 20 percent by 1997, and fell below 10 percent by 2003 (see 
Table 4.1). As the international presence of Japanese banks rapidly shrank, the 
competitive threat from them also decreased. In addition, Japan’s comprehensive 
compliance could have had an adverse effect on foreign economies. As Japan’s 
economy did not show a sign of recovery through the 1990s, foreign countries were 
putting heavy pressure on Japanese authorities to stimulate the economy (Cargill, et al. 
2000: 163). Japan’s economic recovery could have been adversely influenced by 
stricter capital adequacy regulation in the short term.279
5.3 Regulatory forbearance during the pre-PCA period
The analysis of compliance of Japanese banks with the BIS standard demonstrated that 
the Japanese regulatory authority actively fostered banks’ cosmetic compliance by 
exercising regulatory forbearance. During the pre-PCA period, the effectiveness of 
compliance of the BIS standard was tarnished largely by the MFJ’s hiding of the actual 
size of NPLs in banks. In fact, Japanese securities companies were under considerable 
pressure from the MFJ and banks not to make an issue of bank accounting problems 
(The Nikkei Weekly 14 October 1996). This section addresses factors that led the 
regulatory authority to implement the BIS standard cosmetically during the pre-PCA 
period.
The MFJ, the LDP, and banks
The Diet (the legislature) had to approve financial legislation, and the MFJ as a ministry
9  QAcould not have formal independence from the government. However, its regulatory
278 G7 countries, the IMF, and the World Bank requested Japan to recapitalise banks by using 
public funds (Whitehead 2005: 35).
279 In 1999, William McDonough, President o f the Federal Reserve Bank o f New York, 
defended Japan’s application o f the BIS standard to only international banks, despite the 
weakening capital adequacy o f Japanese banks (Jiji Press 3 June 1999). Charles K. Whitehead 
(2005: 37) argues that foreign regulatory authorities showed considerable forbearance over 
Japan’s cosmetic compliance with the BIS standard as they may have agreed that the country 
needed time to deal with it under severe banking difficulties.
280 Normally, regulatory authorities that form part o f the executive branches tend to have a low
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forbearance during the pre-PCA was not caused by problems of independence of 
regulatory authority. Rather, the MFJ enjoyed a high degree of independence from the 
ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), until the autumn of 1997, when the 
financial system turned into a crisis.281 As long as the financial system was perceived as 
stable, politicians invested their political resources more in politically-sensitive niches 
of the economy such as agriculture, SMEs, and construction. As a result, while the 
Budget and Tax Bureaus of the MFJ were engaged in constant interaction with the LDP 
leadership, MFJ officials in Banking Bureau—and also those in Securities Bureau—had 
a good degree autonomy in policymaking from the LDP (Amyx 2003a: 4). In other 
words, the formal institutional arrangement that the bank regulatory authority was a 
government ministry did not lowered its policy autonomy.
In addition, the Japanese financial laws were written broadly and vaguely, and this 
raised the policy autonomy of the MFJ by giving it discretion to fill the details. The 
MFJ heavily drew on ordinances, ministerial regulations, administrative notices or 
administrative guidance in regulating the banking sector, avoiding the enactment of 
legislation, which could have risked politicisation of banking regulation. In the 
meantime, it was the MFJ that controlled the national budget, although the ministry 
worked closely with politicians on budgetary issues (Amyx 2003a: 6-7). As a result, the 
regulatory authority did not face the problem of budgetary independence.
More importantly, there were few incentives for politicians to hinder the MFJ in 
implementing the BIS standard more strictly. The implementation of the BIS standard 
did not cause a substantial adverse effect on the economy during the pre-PCA period, 
contrary to the PCA period: Although there was a decline in bank lending during the 
early 1990s, it was because of a decrease in firms’ demand for funds after the collapse 
of the bubble (Cabinet Office 2001).282 Accordingly, there was no strong opposition 
from firms or from politicians against compliance with the BIS standard.
Rather, the reasonable demand from politicians would have been the call for stricter 
prudential regulation, if they had been concerned over the stability of the country’s 
financial system. However, the LDP was not aware of the true financial condition of 
Japanese banks. The regulatory forbearance of the MFJ hindered politicians in 
understanding the actual financial status of banks. Banks also did not disclose
degree o f independence (Quintyn and Taylor 2002: 20).
281 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa.
282 Indeed, the MFJ understood that a decrease in the demand for funds caused the decline o f 
bank lending during the period (author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa).
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information on their finances to politicians, whereas they shared the information with 
the MFJ. Information sharing with politicians could have caused the banks potentially 
significant costs, given that LDP leaders were strong supporters of the government- 
subsidised postal saving system, which competed with banks for deposits, and that there 
was a risk of information leaks, which are common in the political world (Amyx 2003a: 
7).283
Meanwhile, there seemed to be a possibility that the cosy relations between the MFJ 
and banks may have induced the ministry to exercise regulatory forbearance in order to 
protect banks.284 A peculiar characteristic of Japanese financial regulation was the 
reliance on close informal ties linking the regulatory authority and financial institutions 
(Amyx 2003a: 5). The prominent examples of the informal ties were mofutan, ama- 
agari, and amakudari. Mofutan, literally “person in charge of Finance Ministry,” 
referred to positions in private financial institutions in charge of handling the MFJ, and 
they contacted MFJ officials face-to-face daily. Ama-agari, literally “ascent to heaven,” 
was the practice that employees from private institutions worked in the MFJ on 
temporary assignments. Amakudari, literally “descent from heaven,” referred to the re­
employment of former high-ranked MFJ officials in private institutions (Amyx 2003a: 
6).
The disclosure of the actual volume of NPLs could have lowered CARs of banks 
substantially. This would have damaged the banks’ overseas business and also tarnished 
their reputations in markets. In a worse scenario, public funds could have been injected 
into the banks in order to stabilise the banking sector, something that actually occurred 
in the late 1990s. The injection of public funds could have required the restructuring of 
banks, which could have limited managerial freedom, forced the resignation of senior 
bankers, and diluted the value of existing shares held by investors (see Amyx 2003a: 9). 
Therefore, banks had incentives to solicit lenient regulations from the MFJ through 
informal relations with the ministry.
However, although the MFJ’s regulatory forbearance during the pre-PCA period 
corresponded on the surface with preferences of banks, it did not appear to result simply 
from banks’ lobbying. A series of scandals engulfing financial industries occurred
283 Banks pretended their problems were not serious by continuing to pay regular dividends 
until 1997, even though they reported losses from 1995 on (Patrick 2001: 23).
284 See Amyx (2001), Hanazaki and Horiuchi (1998), Horiuchi (2001), and Rixtel (2002).
285 A bank failure meant one less potential depository for retiring MFJ officials (Amyx 2003a: 
6).
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during the early 1990s,286 and these increased the MFJ’s leverage over banks in banking 
regulation to a level they had not previously enjoyed so that the ministry could impose 
its will on banks (Amyx 2003a: 10). One notable example was the resolution of the
9 87  __jusen problem. In dealing with a massive amount of NPLs in jusen companies, which 
were non-bank subsidiaries of financial institutions specialising in housing loans, banks 
suggested the use of public funds to dissolve the companies in 1992. Yet, the MFJ 
rejected the proposal and introduced a 10-year restructuring plan in 1993, which 
required the jusen companies’ “parent banks” (major shareholders) to reduce the interest 
rate on outstanding loans to zero and other bank creditors to lower the interest rate to
1.5 percent (Amyx 2003a: 10,27 n. 36).288 Also, the MFJ prevented banks from 
realising unrealised gains on securities holdings or issuing new ordinary equities, as 
those measures could aggravate the weakening stock market. The alternative measures 
that the MFJ introduced for banks to raise capital were costly options for them.289 
Therefore, regulatory capture by banks was not likely to be a main factor to explain the 
regulatory forbearance by the MFJ during the pre-PCA period.
Lack o f the capacity to deal with compliance failures
Why did the MFJ exercise regulatory forbearance? The MFJ delayed recognising banks’ 
actual financial conditions during the early 1990s partly due to its optimistic view of 
economic recovery. The MFJ believed that the economy would be revitalised quickly 
and the volume of NPLs would decrease.290 However, as the economy did not show 
signs of recovery until the mid-1990s, the MFJ adjusted its expectations of the future 
economy and recognised that the NPL problem in the banking system was serious (see
286 The scandals included fraudulent loan scams by five banks in 1991, loss compensation 
scandals by brokerages in 1991 to 1992, illegal stock trading by Daiwa Securities in 1992, and 
“racketeering” scandals surrounding banks and brokerage wherein these firms employed thugs 
for shareholder meetings (Amyx 2003a: 27 n. 36).
287 On the jusen  problem, see Cargill, et al. (1997: 117-144).
288 Under the restructuring plan for jusen companies, other creditors (nokyo) were permitted to 
receive 4.5 percent in interest income from the companies (Amyx 2003a: 10). The final 
resolution o f jusen companies were also against preferences o f banks. This issue will be 
discussed again later in this chapter.
289 Fund-raising costs for subordinated debts were higher than those related with issuing 
ordinary equities, and asset securitisation could risk damaging banks’ relationships with their 
traditional clients.
290 Author’s interview with Nishimura Yoshimasa. In fact, a notable feature o f Japanese postwar 
economic history was that economic downturns were quickly overcome. Therefore, it was not 
unreasonable that the Japanese perceived the economic downturn after the collapse o f the 
bubble as little more than a short-term business cycle adjustment (Patrick 2001: 21-22).
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MFJ 1994: 19-23, 1996: 13-19). Accordingly, the soundness of banks became a salient 
issue for the MFJ, and the ministry had to deal with ailing banks.
Yet, the MFJ lacked the capacity to deal with insolvent banks. The convoy system 
began to lose effectiveness during the mid-1990s. The financial deregulation from the 
late 1980s undermined the convoy system, by reducing the amount of regulatory 
rewards that the MFJ could give to cooperative banks (see Hoshi 2002: 164-169).291 In 
addition, as the financial conditions of the overall banking sector deteriorated, there 
were few banks strong enough to merge with an ailing bank. Moreover, when rumours 
emerged that a bank was a candidate to rescue an ailing bank, the rescuing bank was 
penalised in markets with lower share prices. Therefore, banks cooperating in rescue 
mergers risked damaging their own creditworthiness in markets (Amyx 2003a: 12, 28 n. 
41). As a result, the MFJ could no longer find any banks to rescue failing banks.
The MFJ endeavoured to compensate the decline in the traditional safety net by 
utilising funds in the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ).292 The MFJ 
assisted rescuing banks with subsidised funds. The first case of a DICJ-assisted rescue 
was the rescue of Toho Sogo Bank by Iyo Bank: the DICJ provided subsidised loans of 
JPY 8 billion over five years to Iyo Bank with the interest rate of 5 percent points below 
the government bond of the same maturity. Following the Toho Sogo Bank, the MFJ 
continued to provide DICJ assistance to banks to help failing banks (Hoshi 2002: 170- 
171). However, the DICJ assistance scheme had limits. Because deposit insurance was 
originally to protect small depositors, the Deposit Insurance Act restricted the amount of 
financial assistance to an acquiring bank to the cost that it would incur if it paid off all 
insured deposits (deposits less than JPY 10 million). Moreover, the size of deposit 
insurance funds amounted only to JPY 876 billion, which accounted for about 0.15 
percent of total deposits in all banks and was smaller than the deposits of the average 
size of the smallest (second-tier regional) banks (USD 946 billion). Therefore, even the 
failure of a small bank could make the DICJ insolvent (Hoshi 2002: 171). As a result, 
the DICJ was not able to substitute for the convoy system, and the MFJ could no longer 
prevent bank failures (Murata and Hori 2004: 3).
Indeed, in August 1995, the MFJ allowed the Hyogo Bank, the thirty-eighth largest 
bank in Japan to fail. The bank failure was the first failure of a listed commercial bank
291 On financial deregulation in Japan, see Hoshi and Kashyap (1999).
292 The deposit insurance scheme was established in 1971, but under the operation o f the 
convoy system it was never intended to provide a foundation for a system o f guarantees (Cargill 
2000: 44-45).
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in postwar Japan (Peek and Rosengren 2001: 286). This event gave rise to investors’ 
scepticism about Japan’s financial safety net, and, as a result, a Japan Premium emerged 
that month for the first time since the first oil crisis in 1974 (Hanazaki and Horiuchi 
1998: 7; Peek and Rosengren 2001). Also, depositors reacted to the bank failure by 
transferring their deposits from banks with low credit ratings to those with higher credit 
ratings or to the postal savings scheme (Kanaya and Woo 2000: 25). In short, while the 
traditional financial safety net began to unravel, a new one to replace it had not been 
established.
In the circumstances, the full disclosure of the actual size of NPLs in banks risked 
triggering financial instability in the economy. A rise in the volume of NPLs would have 
led CARs of a large number of banks to fall below 8 percent. The failure of the banks to 
meet the 8 percent minimum could have signalled the weakness of the already fragile 
banking system to markets, and, at worst, triggered an outbreak of financial panic in the 
absence of an adequate financial safety net. The regulatory authority had to avoid such a 
crisis of financial confidence.293 The MFJ’s policy to spread recognising NPLs over a 
number of years was expected to preserve an aura of stability by allowing provisions to 
be paid from operating profits with no impact on capital, even if it would postpone the 
resolution of the NPL problem (Financial Times 30 January 1995).294 In other words, 
the MFJ had to help banks comply with the BIS standard formally, even though the 
compliance was cosmetic, in order to avoid a financial crisis in the absence of an 
adequate financial safety net.
It should be noted that this capacity problem in dealing with ailing banks had 
political causes, rather than it was purely resource-driven. Even though the convoy 
system stopped working properly, the government could resort to tax-payers’ money in 
stabilising the financial system if necessary. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the 
government injected a huge quantity of public funds into the banking sector during the 
late 1990s. The government budget deficit was smaller during the mid-1990s than 
during the late 1990s (see Table 5.4). Therefore, it is plausible to argue that the 
government could have developed the financial safety net during the mid-1990s, if it 
had wished to do so. However, the ruling party was not aware of the true financial 
condition of the banking sector until the overt financial crisis of 1997 as a consequence
293 The BoJ also understood by early 1993 that potential risks in the financial system could be 
larger than widely assumed, but it did not make its view public in order to avoid the possibility 
of triggering a financial crisis (Nakaso 2001: 18).
294 It was not until the introduction o f the Comprehensive Plan for Financial Revitalisation in 
June 1998 that an explicit plan to address the NPL problem was established.
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of the regulatory forbearance discussed above. The full disclosure of NPLs in banks 
could have exposed to the public eye the MFJ’s failure to effectively regulate the banks, 
and this would have led to intervention from politicians in the MFJ’s banking policies, 
constraining the MFJ’s policy autonomy. Therefore, there was a strong political 
incentive for the MFJ to keep the NPL problem away from eye of politicians. This 
prevented the government from developing the official financial safety net.295 
Furthermore, even if politicians had recognised the true status of the NPL problem, it 
would have been difficult for them to use and be accountable for a large volume of tax­
payers’ money to rescue ailing banks without political justification.296
Table 5.4 Central government overall deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP by country, 
1991-2004
(%)
Fiscal Year Korea Japan Taiwan
1991 0.2 -0.5 -3.6
1992 0.9 -1.5 -6.6
1993 1.7 -2.4 -4.9
1994 1.8 -2.8 -2.4
1995 2.1 -3.4 -2.8
1996 2.3 -3.5 -1.7
1997 2.4 -2.8 -2.4
1998 1.1 -4.6 1.2
1999 1.1 -5.5 0.5
2000 4.3 -4.5 -1.3
2001 2.6 -5.1 -2.5
2002 N/A -5.3 -2.5
2003 N/A -5.7 -3.2
2004 N/A -5.5 -2.7
Source: Directorate-General o f  Budget, Accounting and Statistic, Executive Yuan, Republic o f China, 
August 2005, Guomin Jingji Dongxiang Tongji Jibao (Quarterly National Economic Trends).
295 Indeed, as will be discussed in the following section, the overt financial crisis o f 1997 led 
politicians to actively engage in banking policies, to establish the new financial regulatoiy 
authority, removing the authority o f financial regulation from the MFJ, and to develop the 
official financial safety net.
296 Indeed, when the government used JPY 650 billion (about 7 percent o f the volume of the 
public funds injected into banks in the late 1990s) in order to resolve the jusen  problem in 1996, 
the government faced a strong public outrage. In this situation, using more public funds to 
resolve problems that could be regarded as caused by regulatory failure could have risked the 
political support for the ruling party. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the suggestion from banks to 
use public funds to resolve the jusen  problem was rejected by the MFJ in 1992, delaying the 
resolution o f the problem for a long time. Meanwhile, as will be discussed in detail in the 
following section, the injection of public funds into the banking sector during the late 1990s was 
politically driven.
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5.4 Regulatory forbearance during the PCA period
The main problem that hindered the regulatory authority in complying with the BIS 
standard comprehensively was rectified, or at least began to be cured after the late 
1990s. The official financial safety net developed significantly so that there was a low 
likelihood that the failure of banks to comply with the capital standards would trigger a 
systemic financial crisis. A strong deposit insurance scheme was put in place in 1996 
(see DICJ 2002, 2003b). A total of JPY 63 trillion (12 percent of GDP) was available for 
the government to stabilise the banking system, including the payment of deposit 
insurance claims, as at the end of 2003 (see DICJ 2003c).297 The political mechanism 
for crisis management was also simplified in 2000 so the government could authorise 
public capital injection even against the will of the bank in question (Callen and 
Muhleisen 2003: 33). However, new factors emerged to hinder the regulatory authority 
in implementing the BIS standard in earnest during the late 1990s and early 2000s: the 
diffusion of the compliance costs of the BIS standard from banks to SMEs, and the 
politicisation of banking regulation.
The diffusion o f compliance costs
The environment surrounding compliance with the BIS standard was drastically 
changed by the introduction of the PCA system in April 1998.298 As discussed earlier, 
the PCA system forced banks to meet the regulatory minimum CARs at all costs to 
preserve their management. One method they took was to switch to the domestic capital 
adequacy standard, whose required minimum CAR was only 4 percent. However, most 
major banks had to comply with the BIS standard because they had overseas 
establishments. Yet, under the stagnant economy, their capital bases were sharply 
contracting while they were not able to raise new capital.
Banks responded to the changed circumstances by shrinking lending, whose risk
297 It is not very certain that the size o f the funds would have been big enough to rescue all 
failing banks had compliance truly been complete. However, note that, as will be discussed in 
detail later, the Japanese bank regulatory authority established a plan to strengthen the Japanese 
BIS standard in the early 2000s. Without confidence in the financial safety net, it would have 
been difficult for the regulatory authority to build such a plan, given the weak financial 
condition o f Japanese banks.
298 The MFJ introduced the plan to introduce a PCA framework in June 1996 as an attempt to 
increase transparency in the financial administration, responding to criticisms o f its policy 
failures (The Nikkei Weekly 4 April 1996; Financial Regulation Report June 1996; The Yomiuri 
Shimbun 4 January 2000; MFJ 1997: 18-24).
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w eighting was 100 percent and which was the largest com ponent o f  the total assets, in 
order to m aintain their CARs above the regulatory m inim um s (Woo 1999: 8).299 The 
com bined balance o f  loans extended by banks declined 1.6 percent year-on-year in 
M arch 1998, the steepest monthly decline recorded since July 1991, and the economy 
suffered from  a credit crunch from 1997 to 1998 (Cabinet Office 2003; Kobayashi, et al. 
2002; Woo 1999) (see Figure 5.6). A num ber o f  corporations w ent bankrupt and the 
im plem entation o f  the PCA system was widely criticized as one o f  the main causes 
(Japan Economic Newswire 22 D ecem ber 1997).
Figure 5.6 The lending attitude of Japanese financial institutions, 1990-2002
(diffusion index; % points)
s
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Source: Bank o f  Japan, 2003, Economic and Financial Data on CD-ROM.
Note: This figure shows the judgement o f  financial institutions’ attitudes towards lending as perceived by 
the responding enterprises to the survey ( Tankan) by the BoJ; the responding enterprises were asked to 
choose one alternative among three— “accommodative”, “ not too severe”, “severe”— as the best 
descriptor o f  prevailing change, from three months earlier and three months hence, excluding seasonal 
factors.
In particular, SM Es were most harshly hit by the credit crunch. They relied heavily 
on bank borrowing whereas larger firms could rely on direct fund-raising from capital 
markets. W hile the ratio o f bank debt to total debt for large firms declined from 85 to 66 
percent between 1981 and 2001, the corresponding figure for SM Es stayed above 80 
percent throughout the same period (D ell’Ariccia 2003: 48).300 The num ber o f  bankrupt 
SM Es rose sharply from around 14,700 in 1996 to some 16,300 in 1997, and 19,000 in
299 Banks intensified their administrative cost-cutting efforts since the mid-1990s. As a result, 
they had a low cost structure, well below those of their U.S. and U.K. counterparts (Callen and 
Muhleisen 2003:36).
300 Large firms are defined herein as corporations whose capital size is over JPY 1 billion, while 
SMEs are those with capital size of under JPY 100 million.
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1998 (JSBRI 2003). Through the credit crunch mechanism, the costs of complying with 
the BIS standard were diffused from banks to the corporate sector, particularly to SMEs.
Although the kind of severe credit crunch that occurred during 1997 and 1998 did 
not recur, bank lending attitudes and the financial positions of SMEs remained tight 
during the early 2000s (Cabinet Office 2003). The injection of public funds into banks 
prevented further intensifying of the credit crunch by increasing the banks’ capital base, 
but the amount of funds almost corresponded to the losses that banks incurred from 
disposing of NPLs (EPA 1999: 99). Meanwhile, except for a short rise in 1999, stock 
prices continued to decline, eroding the banks’ capital bases. As a result, banks did not 
have enough capacity to increase their lending. Bankruptcies among SMEs increased 
again in 2000 after a brief decline in 1999, and more than 18,000 SMEs went bankrupt 
every year between 2000 and 2002 (JSBRI 2003).
The politicisation o f banking regulation
In the meantime, banking regulation became rapidly politicised from 1997 on. 
Politicians began to engage actively in banking policies as the deteriorating health of the 
banking system turned into a financial crisis in the autumn of 1997, following the 
failures of high-profile financial institutions (Takumi 2002: 21).301 Okihara Yasuoka, 
chairman of the LDP’s influential financial stabilisation committee, expressed the 
determination of politicians to wrest control of financial regulation from bureaucrats: 
“The recent financial crisis has shown we can no longer rely on the Ministry of Finance 
to create policies because that is too slow—the politicians must do it too” (Financial 
Times 28 January 1998). Breaking the traditional policymaking process where 
bureaucrats drafted bills, politicians drafted and submitted bills to the Diet during the 
financial crisis of 1997 to 1998 (Motohisa 2002: 43-49; Takumi 2002: 19-25).302
The influence of politicians, especially the ruling LDP, on banking policymaking 
remained strong in the post-crisis period despite the creation of the new financial
301 Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, which was the tenth largest commercial bank in the country, and 
Yamaichi Securities, which was the country’s fourth largest brokerage, failed— along with 
another bank and another brokerage— in November 1997. Their collapse shocked the Diet and 
the public (Amyx 2003a: 19).
302 The Government-Ruling Party Conference to Promote the Comprehensive Plan for Financial 
Revitalization was established in May 1998. It was a venue for government and the ruling party 
to discuss comprehensively effective measures to revive the financial system and promote 
concrete implementation o f the “from the entrance to the exit” measures included in the 
Comprehensive Economic Package announced in April 1998.
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regulatory authority, the Financial Supervisory Agency, which was reorganised into the 
Financial Services Agency (FSA) in July 2000.303 The Mori Cabinet (April 2000 to 
April 2001) depended wholly on the LDP for formulating the policy, increasing the 
concentration of power in the hands of the chair of the LDP Policy Research Council 
(Takumi 2002: 36).304 In addition, LDP’s powerful “financial policy tribe” (<okura zoku), 
which had previously focused on budgetary and tax issues (Amyx 2003a: 5), exercised 
much power in banking sector policy behind the scenes (Walter forthcoming).
The institutional framework of the new regulatory authority also made it vulnerable 
to political pressure. Even though the FSA inherited a large number of staff from the 
MFJ, the traditional strong informal network between bank regulators and banks 
virtually disappeared after the establishment of the new regulatory authority (Amyx 
2003b: 50-52; IMF 2003b: 76). However, although the FSA was an external agency of 
the Cabinet Office, the Minister for Financial Services, who was a member of the 
Cabinet and was answerable to the Diet, had effective control over the operation of the 
FSA. The management control of the Minister over the FSA created scope for political 
interference.305,306 In addition, unlike most supervisory agencies, there was no board 
with outside members or other form of collegiate decision making body to whom the 
Commissioner, the chief executive of the FSA, could be accountable. The FSA also had 
no budgetary independence, being funded from the central government budget (IMF 
2003b: 30, 38, 76). Moreover, the FSA had resource constraints, which slowed 
inspections of banks (Walter forthcoming).307
303 In June 1998, the government established the Financial Supervisory Agency as an 
administrative organ responsible for the inspection and supervision o f private sector financial 
institutions, with the objective o f removing control o f financial sector regulation from the MFJ. 
The Financial Supervisory Agency worked in conjunction with Financial Policy Bureau o f the 
MFJ until July 2000, when the two bodies were combined and reorganised to become the 
Financial Services Agency. The FSA became responsible for planning o f the financial system 
for which the MFJ had been responsible. The Financial Supervisory Agency and the FSA was 
under the auspices o f the Financial Reconstruction Commission (FRC), which operated from 
December 1998 to January 2001 as a temporary body to deal with failed financial institutions. 
The FSA assumed all the duties o f the FRC in January 2001, when it was abolished (FSA 2005; 
IMF 2003b).
304 See Takumi (2002: 37) for the policymaking mechanism of the LDP.
305 Financial Services Minister Yanagisawa Hakuo (2001-2) was sacked by the LDP because he 
was opposed to the party’s proposal to inject public funds into banks.
306 All significant reports on individual banks were referred to the Minister (IMF 2003b: 76). 
Minister Yanagisawa strongly defended that Japanese banks were healthy in terms o f capital 
adequacy {Japan Economic Newswire 12 April 2002). It was said that although the Inspection 
Bureau o f the FSA was willing to publish more accurate figures on NPLs, it was overruled by 
the Supervisory Bureau, which was under the control o f the Minister (Walter forthcoming).
307 Supervision and inspection o f regional banks were in practice delegated by the FSA to local 
branches o f the MFJ (Walter forthcoming).
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As the financial positions of SMEs deteriorated and their bankruptcies increased, the 
LDP began to make desperate efforts to protect them. SMEs were the major economic 
actors in the economy, accounting for more than 50 percent of value added generated by 
all corporations (JSBRI 2003: 50). They were also politically important actors, because 
the large number of SMEs made them potentially of great significance to the electoral 
process. The number of workers they employed accounted for more than 60 percent of 
total employees—that is, voters— in all industries. Furthermore, they were the 
traditional political supporters of the LDP (Allison 1993: 44; Pempel 1998: 165).308 
Indeed, the LDP subcommittee in charge of banking policies had a strong interest in 
protecting SMEs.309
In consequence, the LDP were opposed to policies to strengthen the regulations 
related to bank capital adequacy, while demanding regulatory forbearance in order to 
raise banks’ regulatory CARs and thereby increase loans to SMEs, even though the bank 
regulatory authority and opposition parties sometimes called for stricter regulation of 
banks.310 One important event was the establishment of the Financial Inspection 
Manual in April 1998. In its initial plan of December 1997, the bank regulatory 
authority was to adopt stronger rules of asset classification and loan loss provisioning. 
However, the final version of the manual was substantially attenuated in those areas due 
to opposition from banks that warned of aggravation of the already-rampant credit 
crunch, and from the LDP that worried about this as well.311 Also, the LDP influenced 
the regulatory authority to postpone the implementation of the PCA system for domestic 
banks for one year until April 1999 and to change accounting rules in order to raise 
banks’ CARs (Asia Pulse 24 December 1997). The government injected public funds to 
a total JPY 9.5 trillion to banks whose CARs were higher than the 8 percent minimum 
with the condition of the expansion of credit supply to SMEs, despite the objection from
308 For example, the construction industry, which was heavily in debt and lacked alternative 
sources o f financing through capital markets, funnelled large amount o f funds to the LDP. As a 
result, since the 1970s many had called Japan as “construction company” due to the massive 
amounts o f public works spending carried out by the government (Amyx 2003a: 8-9, 26 n. 26).
309 Author’s confidential interview with a senior BoJ official, Tokyo, 20 February 2004.
3,0 The dominance by the coalition o f opposition parties in the Upper House during the mid- 
1998 made a few progressive measures in banking supervision. However, banking policies 
quickly returned to regulatory forbearance once the LDP regained the majority with allies in the 
Upper House in late 1998.
311 Author’s interview with Iwahara Shinsaku (Chair o f the Work Group on Financial Inspection 
Manual), Tokyo, 16 February 2004. NPLs were concentrated in construction and real estate 
companies. As o f end March 2001, these industries accounted for 54 percent o f the outstanding 
balance o f RMLs. Therefore, the close relations between the LDP and the industries were also 
likely to lead the LDP to oppose the idea o f strengthening asset classification.
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opposition parties {The Asahi Shimbun 23 February 1998; Japan Economic Newswire
i p
12 October 1998). In addition, inspections of banks by the regulatory authority were 
carried out in a way that did not affect lending to SMEs.313
Another salient episode demonstrating the failure of the regulatory authority’s 
efforts to strengthen the capital adequacy regulations due to political intervention was 
the Programme for Financial Revival (PFR) of October 2002. As Japan’s economy 
remained stagnant for more than a decade, the FSA, the BoJ, and a minority of the LDP 
perceived that the weak capital position of banks had a negative effect on the country’s 
economic recovery.314 As a result, from the early 2000s, they began to argue 
aggressively that the Japanese BIS standard was too lenient, and the FSA established the 
PFR to strengthen the soundness of Japanese banks.315 In an earlier version of the PFR, 
the FSA planned to implement stricter rules on bank capital adequacy, including 
limiting DTAs to be counted as capital only to 10 percent of tier 1 capital. However, 
banks, fearing potential government intervention in their management, severely resisted 
the plan and warned of an extensive credit crunch.316 Concerns over this led the 
majority of the LDP to block the implementation of the plans, and, as a result, the FSA 
postponed the announcement of the programme, indicating “political reasons” 
{Financial Times 23 October 2002).317 The final version of the PFR was substantially 
eased down. The limited inclusion of DTAs in capital was abandoned, and detailed rules
312 Also, the LDP criticised a move by some local governments to set high capital adequacy 
standards for financial institutions, insisting that the trend further discouraged lending. In 
response, the central government promised to persuade local governments not to take such 
measures {Japan Economic Newswire 8 February 2002).
313 Special inspections by the FSA from October 2001 to April 2002 were limited to major 
banks and their large borrowers, ignoring loans to SMEs, which accounted for 60 percent of 
lending by the major banks’ {The Times 13 April 2002; FSA 2002). Also, the FSA kept arguing 
that the capital adequacy o f Japanese banks was sound and their NPL problem would normalise 
gradually.
314 They conceived that the weak capital position o f banks hindered the banks from responding 
to the loose monetary policies o f the BoJ.
3.5 BoJ Governor Hayami Masaru triggered the controversy over capital adequacy standards in 
October 2001 at a Diet testimony by saying that major banks’ CARs would only be around 7 
percent at the end of fiscal year 2001 if calculated using the stricter standards employed in the 
United States {Japan Economic Newswire 21 November 2001). The Minister for Economics and 
Fiscal Policy Takenaka Heizo also called for the amelioration o f the capital quality o f banks 
{Japan Economic Newswire 23 February 2002).
3.6 For example, Nishikawa Yoshifumi, President o f Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, a 
major Japanese bank, told Financial Services Minister, Takenaka Heizo, in a meeting: “If you’re 
going to change the rules overnight, I’m afraid it’s very likely there’ll be an extensive credit 
crunch” {The Asahi Shimbun 26 October 2002).
317 Minister for the Economy, Trade and Industry, Hiranuma Takeo also described the proposals
as “very severe” and argued that they “should not be implemented” before further discussion 
about soft landing measures {Financial Times 26 October 2002).
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on DTAs and a specific timetable for launch were not made. Also, regional banks, 
whose clients mostly consisted of SMEs, were not affected by the PFR. Even then most 
of the announced plans were not implemented.318
Banks or SMEs
One may question whether the LDP’s opposition to strengthening the capital adequacy 
regulations was an attempt to protect banks rather than SMEs. In fact, banks have been 
one of the biggest financial contributors to the LDP throughout the postwar period, the 
Japanese Bankers Association (JBA) being ranked as the LDP’s top three industry 
backers (Amyx 2003a: 9).319 However, banks’ ability to influence government policy 
was largely affected by their public reputation, along with the relative strength of any 
countervailing organised interests (Amyx 2003a: 10). Banks were heavily criticised by 
the public as the main culprit in the country’s economic downturn throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s. The public outrage directed at banks was more intensified due to 
bankers’ salaries, which were far higher than the rest of the working population. In the 
meantime, the LDP was losing its seats in the Diet throughout the period. In the 
circumstances, it was almost political suicide for the LDP to support the unpopular 
banking sector.320
Moreover, the tension between the LDP and banks drastically rose after the 
resolution of the jusen problem in 1996. As mentioned earlier, in resolving the jusen 
problem, the government required banks, which were a major lender group of jusen 
companies to bear more than a pro rata share of losses, in favour of agricultural 
corporations, which was the other major lender group and which was a politically 
powerful group.321 In addition, the LDP deflected public outrage at the use of public 
funds (USD 695 billion) in resolving the jusen problem from itself to banks and the 
MFJ by painting them as public enemies. The LDP pressured the heads of top banks to
3.8 Author’s interviews with Fukao Mitsuhiro (member o f the Working Group on Bank’s Capital 
Adequacy Ratios associated for the PFR), Tokyo 9 March 2004, and Okina Yuri, (member of the 
Working Group), Tokyo, 24 March 2004. The only significant measure implemented was the 
introduction of Discount Cash Flow methods on provisioning. However, their application was 
limited to major banks’ large borrowers classified as “needs special attention”.
3.9 The huge amount o f financial contributions from the JBA to the LDP were viewed largely as 
banks’ efforts to impede the possibility o f the Socialist Party, previously the largest Opposition 
force, coming to power (Amyx 2003a: 25 n. 17).
320 Traditionally, when bank interests conflicted with those o f more electorally important 
constituencies, banks’ interests were not favoured (Amyx 2003a: 10).
321 Agricultural cooperatives derived their political influence from their ability to mobilise 
voters at elections (Amyx 2003a: 27 n. 35).
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resign, to take responsibility for the jusen debacle, infuriating the banks. After the jusen 
resolution, the JBA ceased financial contributions to the party through the Japan 
Federation of Economic Organizations (Amyx 2003a: 10-11).
The injection of public funds into major banks whose BIS CARs were over 8 
percent in the late 1990s was a prominent example of policies to protect SMEs at the 
expense of banks’ interests. Banks were initially fiercely opposed to the injection of 
public funds because they were afraid of government intervention in their management 
and of a decline in their market image {Japan Economic Newswire 15 October 1998; 
Financial Times 18 February 1998). However, the LDP-led government forced banks to 
accept public funds, even by strengthening loan loss provisioning rules and launching 
inspections of banks to pressure them to apply for public funds. Finally banks 
reluctantly applied for public funds, and they were required to increase loans to 
SMEs.322 Banks may have benefited from lax capital adequacy regulations, but the 
major reason for the LDP to exercise regulatory forbearance toward banks was to 
increase loans to SMEs.
To conclude, Japan’s cosmetic compliance with the BIS standard during the PCA 
period is explained by the distributional effect of compliance with the BIS standard and 
the low independence of the regulatory authority from political influence. As banks 
reduced lending, costs of compliance with the BIS Standard diffused from banks to 
SMEs. As a result, the LDP was opposed to comprehensive compliance with the BIS 
standard in order to reduce the costs to SMEs, which were a politically important sector. 
Although the regulatory authority was willing to strengthen the capital adequacy 
regulations, their institutional arrangement made it vulnerable to political influence.
Conclusions
Japan’s compliance with the BIS standard was a clear case of cosmetic compliance. As 
the financial condition of banks deteriorated, the government aggressively implemented 
policies that conflicted with the objective of the BIS standard, in order to lower the 
banks’ costs of compliance with the BIS standard. External compliance pressures did 
force banks to comply with the BIS standard formally, but they were not effective in
322 See The Asahi Shimbun (14 January 1998), FRC (1999a; 1999b), Mainichi Daily News (16 
October 1998), and The Nikkei Weekly (23 February 1998). The government also relaxed tough 
conditions on management responsibility and restructuring in order to induce banks to apply for 
public funds {Asiaweek 1 May 1999).
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inducing comprehensive compliance. The Japanese regulatory authority faced the 
necessity of strengthening the capital adequacy of banks, as the soundness of the 
banking sector weakened while the convoy system was weakening. However, during the 
pre-PC A period, the country lacked an adequate financial safety net for political reasons. 
This induced the bank regulatory authority to exercise regulatory forbearance. This 
capacity problem was cured during the PCA period, yet compliance costs diffused from 
banks to SMEs, which was a politically important sector in the country. As a result, 
strong opposition from politicians to comprehensive compliance emerged in order to 
protect SMEs. Even though the regulatory authority was willing to strengthen the 
capital adequacy regulations, their low independence from the ruling party hindered 
them from doing so.
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CHAPTER 6
South Korea: A Shift from Cosmetic to More 
Comprehensive Compliance
Korea’s level of compliance with the BIS standard changed over time. External 
compliance pressure induced the country to adopt and comply with the BIS standard 
formally prior to the 1997 financial crisis. However, the weak link between compliance 
with the standard and prudential regulation in the country was reflected in the lenient 
implementation of the standard prior to the 1997 financial crisis. Yet, the financial crisis 
brought considerable changes and transformed the attitude of the Korean regulatory 
authority towards capital adequacy regulation. As a result, the country’s level of 
compliance with the BIS standard became more comprehensive, even though 
compliance was not truly complete because of domestic opposition. Foreign countries 
and markets also played a role in improving the country’s compliance with the BIS 
standard, but their effects were limited in comparison to impact of domestic regulatory 
pressures.
6.1 Compliance before the 1997 Financial Crisis
The BIS standard was introduced in Korea by the Korean regulatory authority due to 
their concerns for Korean banks’ international business. The regulatory authority 
initially set the Korean BIS standard largely in accordance with the Basel Accord. Also, 
banks’ formal compliance with the standard was remarkable during the pre-crisis period. 
However, as the financial condition of Korean banks was weakening, the regulatory 
authority implemented the BIS standard cosmetically by exercising regulatory 
forbearance. Meanwhile, external compliance pressures did not have much effect on 
Korean banks’ compliance with the BIS standard, either formal or comprehensive.
The South Korean BIS Standard
As noted earlier, the Korean regulatory authority, the OBS, had no intention to
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strengthen the domestic banking regulations by adopting the BIS standard.323 
However, concern over Korean banks’ international business led the regulatory 
authority to employ the BIS standard. Quoting from a former OBS official, the 
adoption of the BIS standard was “not a matter of choice but a must-do task” to 
protect the international business of Korean banks.324 The motivations for the 
regulatory authority’s adoption of the BIS standard were articulated in a press 
release from the OBS in October 1991, which announced the country’s plan to 
implement the BIS standard:325
As South Korea is not a member country o f the Basel Committee, we have no 
obligation to adopt the BIS standard. However, we expect that major advanced 
countries may restrict the establishment o f new branches by foreign banks that do not 
comply with the standard and also that banks which do not comply with the standard 
may face high costs o f borrowing in international financial markets. Thus, we cannot 
help adopting the international standard as soon as possible for Korean banks’ smooth 
operation o f international business. (OBS 1991b)
The legal groundwork for incorporating the BIS standard into the country’s banking 
regulations was laid by the amendment of the General Banking Act in December 1991. 
The amendment established a new article that required banks to maintain the soundness 
of management and empowered the competent authority, the OBS, to establish and 
impose prudential management guidelines for banks. The Korean BIS standard was 
finally established in July 1992 by the promulgation of the Prudential Management 
Guidelines for Banking Institutions and the Detailed Enforcement Regulations for 
Prudential Management Guidelines for Banking Institutions. The regulations required 
banks to maintain their BIS CARs above 7.25 percent from the end of 1993 and above 8 
percent from the end of 1995.326
The Korean BIS standard of July 1992 was formulated largely akin to the Basel
323 Although the regulatory authority introduced a few measures to strengthen the soundness of 
the banking sector in the early 1990s, the adoption o f the BIS standard was not a re-regulatory 
measure (author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 28 January 2005).
324 Author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 28 January 2005.
325 See also OBS (1990b: 40, 1992a: 55, 1994c: 5).
326 The regulatory authority had wanted to implement the BIS standard earlier than 1995 in 
order to prevent banks from facing difficulty in doing international business (Ha 1991: 4; OBS 
1991b). However, the regulatory authority anticipated that banks’ BIS CARs would fall below 8 
percent unless the banks adjusted their behaviour (OBS 1991b; Song 1998: 14). Therefore, the 
regulatory authority implemented the BIS standard from 1993, but did so with a transitional 
period o f the first two years.
159
Accord (see Table 6.1), although there were a few notable differences. Like the Japanese 
BIS standard, a risk weight of 10 percent was applied to claims on Korean public sector 
entities, excluding the central government or claims guaranteed by the central 
government or similar entities. Claims on the Korean government were treated in the 
same way as those of OECD countries, but such the practice of allocating a low risk 
weight for claims on the country’s own central government was typical for non-OECD 
countries, as is also shown in the case of Taiwan.327 The BIS standard was applied to all 
commercial banks in Korea. In fact, the regulatory authority initially considered 
applying it first of all to banks with overseas branches (OBS 1992b). However, the 
authority changed its initial plan and applied the BIS standard to all commercial banks 
because the other banks were expected to more actively engage in international business 
as financial liberalisation further developed.
Table 6.1 The Korean BIS Standard of 1992
A. Capital Elements 
Tier 1
(a) Paid-in capital
(b) Capita reserves
(c) Retained earnings (except declared but unissued stock dividends)
(d) Minority interests in equity accounts of subsidiaries 
Tier 2
(a) Asset revaluation reserves
(b) 45 per cent o f unrealised gains on securities holdings (except those in the trust accounts)
(c) Loan loss provisions
B. Deductions form the capital base 
From tier 1
The amount equivalent to goodwill and consolidation adjustment debit, and the treasury stock 
account
From total capital
(a) Investment in nonconsolidated subsidiaries engaging in financing business
(b) Holdings o f capital instruments issued by other banks. Where banks holdings o f other banks’ 
capital instruments bear a risk weight o f 100 per cent, no deduction can be applied
C. Risk weights by category o f on-balance-sheet asset
327 In addressing country transfer risk, the Korean BIS standard categorised countries into two 
groups: “First group” countries were composed o f Korea, OECD countries and countries with 
General Arrangements to Borrow with the IMF, and all other countries were categorised as 
“second group” countries.
328 Author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 16 February 2005. See also 
Song (1998: 15). In addition, the unitary application o f the BIS standard reflected the regulatory 
authority’s concern for the competitive disadvantages among banks in domestic markets 
(author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 16 February 2005).
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‘First group’ countries: Korea, OECD countries, and countries with General Arrangements to 
Borrow with the IMF
‘Second group’ countries: all other countries 
0%
(a) Cash
(b) Claims on the central governments or the central banks o f ‘first group’ countries and claims 
guaranteed by such entities
(c) Claims on the central governments or the central banks of ‘the second group’ countries 
denominated in national currency
(d) Claims collateralised by deposits in the lender’s own account 
10%
Claims on Korean public sector entities excluding central government or claims guaranteed by 
such entities 
20%
(a) Claims on banks incorporated in ‘first group’ countries and claims guaranteed by such banks
(b) Claims o f banks incorporated in ‘second group’ countries with a residual maturity o f up to 
one year and claims with a residual maturity o f up to one year guaranteed by such banks
(c) Claims on multilateral development banks (IBRD, IADB, AsDB, AfDB, EIB) and claims 
guaranteed by, or collateralized by securities issued by such banks
(d) Claims on public sector entities, excluding central government, o f ‘first group’ countries, 
excluding Korea, and claims guaranteed by such entities
(e) Cash items in process o f collection 
50%
Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property that is or will be occupied by the 
borrower or that is rented 
100%
All other claims and assets______________________________________________________________
Source: Office of Bank Supervision, 30 July 1992, Gumyung Gigwan Gyeongeong Jidoe Gwanhan. 
Gyujeong Sihaeng Sechig (Detailed Enforcement Regulations for Prudential Management Guidelines of 
Banking Institutions).
In terms of conformity to the Basel Accord, the most controversial area was the 
treatment of loan loss provisions. The Korean BIS standard included all loan loss 
provisions in capital, which was inconsistent with the Basel Accord. However, the 
inclusion of special loan loss provisions in capital in the Korean BIS standard was not a 
deliberate measure by the regulatory authority to reduce the compliance costs of Korean 
banks, at least at this time. At the time, Korean loan loss provisioning rules did not 
divide loan loss provisions into general and special provisions. While banks were 
required to classify their assets into five categories (“normal”, “precautionary”, 
“substandard”, “doubtful”, and “estimated loss”), the only loan loss provisioning 
regulation was that a bank had to maintain a ratio of provisions to the sum of loans, 
payment guarantee, purchased foreign exchange and some other claims above 2 percent. 
There was no classification of loan loss provisions until the introduction of new 
provisioning rules in 1994 (OBS 1991a).
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Formal compliance and domestic compliance pressure
The formal com pliance o f  Korean banks with the BIS standard was alm ost perfect 
before the outbreak o f  the 1997 financial crisis. For the pre-crisis period, the average 
BIS CA R o f  all banks reached 11 percent at the end o f  1993, and, even though it 
gradually declined, it stayed above 9 percent at the end o f 1996 (see Figure 6 .1).329 
M oreover, although banks were required to maintain their BIS CARs over 7.25 percent 
during the transitional period o f 1993 and 1994, all except one bank, whose BIS CAR 
was 7.62 percent at the end o f  1993, kept their BIS CARs higher than 8 percent. 
Likewise, all but one bank, which was privatised in 1995, m aintained their BIS CARs 
above 8 percent for 1995 and 1996.330 In addition, tier 1 capital ratio accounted for 
more than 80 percent o f  the total capital bases o f  Korean banks at the end o f  1996 (Song 
1998:27).
Figure 6.1 The average BIS CAR of Korean banks, 1993-2003
(end o f  period; %)
1993  9 4  9 5  9 6  9 7  9 8  9 9  2 0 0 0  01 0 2  0 3
113 N a t io n w id e  b a n k s  M  R e g io n a l b a n k s  O A II  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s  |
Source: Office o f  Bank Supervision (1993-1998) and Financial Supervisory Service (1999-2003), various 
issues o f  Unhaeng Gyeong-yeong Tonggae (Bank Statistics).
Note: The calculation formula o f  the BIS CAR was strengthened from 1998.
329 Korean banks’ disclosed BIS CARs were at the lowest level among Asian banks in the mid- 
1990s. At the end o f 1995, the average BIS CAR o f Singapore banks was 18.7 percent, followed 
by 17.5 percent o f Hong Kong banks, 12.2 percent o f Taiwanese banks, 11.9 percent o f 
Indonesian banks, 11.3 percent o f Malaysian banks and 9.5 percent o f Indian banks. The ratio of 
Korean banks was 9.3 percent (The Korea Economic Daily 12 March 1997). These ratios did not 
necessarily reflect the actual capital soundness o f the banks.
330 The BIS CAR o f the bank that failed to meet 8 percent was 6.1 percent at the end o f 1995, 
but had risen to 8.5 percent by the end o f 1996.
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This compliance record of Korean banks was in striking contrast to their shabby 
record of compliance with the previous capital regulations. Why did the banks respond 
to the BIS standard so differently from the previous regulations? The immediate factor 
was the threat of regulatory penalties from the domestic regulatory authority. Unlike the 
Japanese regulations, the 1991 amendment of the General Banking Act granted the 
Korean regulatory authority the legal power to punish banks that failed to comply with 
management guidelines.
The OBS could impose regulatory sanctions, Management Rationalisation Measures 
or Management Improvement Measures, for banks that failed to meet the required 8 
percent minimum. Management Rationalisation Measures included improvement in 
personnel and/or organisational management, cost reduction, improvement in the 
management of business offices and restrictions on investments in fixed assets and/or 
new capital investment. Management Improvement Measures could be issued when a 
bank’s BIS CAR was below 8 percent for more than two consecutive years, and they 
included capital increase, restrictions on distribution of dividends, accumulation of 
special loan loss provisions, closure or consolidation of business offices, restrictions on 
the establishment of new business offices, suspension of new capital investment, 
restrictions on holding risk assets and disposal of assets (OBS 1992c). In fact, the 
regulatory authority had discretion to exercise regulatory forbearance for noncompliant 
banks, and, moreover, they actually had little intention of penalising banks for 
noncompliance.331 However, the overt presence of regulatory penalties for 
noncompliance with the BIS standard led banks to comply with the capital adequacy 
regulation.332
The salience of domestic regulatory penalties in inducing Korean banks’ compliance 
with the BIS standard is confirmed by the fact that the banks did not make voluntary 
adjustments to improve their CARs until the official announcement of the 
implementation of the BIS standard by the OBS in October 1991. Responding to the 
announcement, Korean banks, for the first time, established measures to improve their 
CARs in their business plans for 1992 (Rym 1992). The ratio of loans and discounts in 
Korean won to the private sector in the banking account to total assets in nationwide 
banks, which were internationally more active than regional banks, showed an increase 
during 1991. However, the ratio began to fall from 1992 and declined more rapidly from
331 Author’s confidential interviews with senior FSS officials, Seoul, 15, 28 January 2005.
332 Author’s confidential interview with a senior banker o f a major Korean bank, by phone, 26 
August 2005.
1993, when the BIS standard officially took effect in the country (see Figure 6.2). 
A lthough Korean banks believed in the positive link between their com pliance with the 
BIS standard and their international business activities, the com pliance costs and a 
preparatory tim e to adjust their behaviour hindered them  from im proving their capital 
adequacy before the dom estic adoption o f  the BIS standard.333 In fact, if BIS CARs o f 
Korean banks had been com puted in accordance with the provisions o f the Basel Accord, 
the ratios o f  five out o f  the six largest Korean banks were lower than 8 percent in 1993 
(NA RK 1994a: 99).
Figure 6.2 The ratio of loans and discounts to the private sector to total assets for Korean 
nationwide banks, 1990-1997
(end o f  period; %)
29
27
25
21
19
17
1990 1991 1992 1995 1996 19971993 1994
Source: Office o f  Bank Supervision, various issues o f  Unhaeng G yeong-yeong Tonggae (Bank Statistics). 
Note: Loans and discounts to private sectors refer to those to corporations and households.
Cosmetic compliance and external compliance mechanisms
Although Korean banks were form ally in com pliance with the BIS standard, the BIS 
CARs o f  Korean banks were falling during the early and m id-1990s. This led the 
regulatory authority to actively help them  maintain disclosed BIS CARs over the 8 
percent m inim um . The regulatory authority helped banks diversify capital-raising 
measures, for exam ple, by allowing banks to issue overseas depository receipts and 
subordinated debt in 1996 and subordinated convertible bonds in 1997.334 The
333 Author’s confidential interview with a senior banker o f a major Korean bank, by phone, 26 
August 2005.
334 See Ahn (1996: 39), AsiaMoney (December 1996), Song (1998: 27), NARK (1997:
61; 1999e: 3), and Maeil Business Newspaper (8 May 1997). Korean banks issued subordinated
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regulatory authority also gave priority to banks with lower BIS CARs in raising equity 
capital in domestic markets (OBS 1993).
In addition, the regulatory authority implemented the BIS standard leniently in order 
to help banks formally maintain their BIS CARs over 8 percent (NARK 1999c: 3). Even 
though the regulatory authority adopted the “real BIS CAR” system in 1994, they did 
not implement it. The new provisioning rules, which required banks to provision 0.5 
percent of their “normal” loans, 1 percent of “precautionary” loans, 20 percent of 
“substandard” loans and 100 percent of “doubtful” and “estimated loss” loans, were 
introduced in 1994, and the real BIS CAR was computed by subtracting provisions for 
“bad loans,” which referred to “doubtful” and “estimated loss” loans. The real BIS CAR 
system could have substantially increased the Korean BIS standard’s conformity to the 
Basel Accord, as a large part of special loan loss provisions were not included in the 
regulatory capital for the real BIS CAR.335 The regulatory authority planned to require 
that banks maintain their real BIS CARs above 8 percent from the end of 1994 and to 
take regulatory action against banks for noncompliance (OBS 1994b). However, as the 
capital condition of banks deteriorated, the regulatory authority did not disclose the real 
BIS CARs of banks, nor did they impose regulatory sanctions on banks for failure to 
comply with the real BIS CAR regulation.336
Also, as the financial condition of banks worsened due to a fall in stock prices, the 
regulatory authority allowed banks to recognise only 30 percent of unrealised losses on 
securities holdings for the book closings of 1995 and 1996 (OBS 1996c). According to 
an estimate, the disclosed BIS CARs of the banks were inflated by 0.23 and 0.84 
percentage points in 1995 and in 1996 respectively, through the accounting change 
(Song 1998: 25-26).337
Furthermore, Korean banks were highly under-provisioned so that their BIS CARs
bonds in foreign currencies amounting to KRW 709 billion (2.7 percent o f total capital) and 
borrowed subordinated debt amounting to KRW 772 billion (3.0 percent o f total capital) in 1996, 
even though interest rates on subordinated bonds in foreign currencies were about 30 b.p. higher 
than those on floating rate notes (Song 1998: 26-27).
335 Loan loss provisions accounted for 62 percent o f Korean banks’ tier 2 capital at the end of 
1996 (Song 1998:39).
336 Author’s confidential interviews with senior FSS officials, Seoul, 28 January 2005 and 18 
February 2005. Also, note that the OBS did not disclose the volume o f “substandard” loans 
because it worried that the disclosure could have a negative effect on the creditworthiness of 
banks (NARK 1992: 94).
337 In addition, as banks’ BIS CARs declined, the regulatory authority postponed the 
introduction o f the 1996 amendment o f the Basel Accord from 1996 to 2000 in 1996. The 
introduction o f the 1996 amendment was expected to pull down BIS CARs o f banks by about 
0.4 percentage points.
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were inflated. The asset classification rules were lenient and reduced the volume of 
provisions that banks had to build. Loans in arrears for more than three months but less 
than six months were categorised as “precautionary” loans, only 1 percent of which 
were required to be provisioned. Restructured loans, such as loans whose interest 
payment was suspended or reduced, were classified as “substandard”, just 20 percent of 
which were required to be provisioned (OBS 1996a: 25-26).338 In addition, the 
regulatory authority lowered the required level of provisions for “doubtful” loans from 
100 percent to 75 percent as the financial condition of banks worsened (Ahn and Kim 
1996: 51). As a result, a large proportion of impaired loans in banks were under­
provisioned during the pre-crisis period (OBS 1994a, 1994b).339 Given that the amount 
of loan loss provisions surpassed 1.25 percent of the risk-weighted assets (Song 1998: 
25), an increase in the required amount of loan loss provisions could have brought down 
banks’ disclosed BIS CARs through a fall in the tier 1 capital.340
In consequence, the disclosed BIS CARs of Korean banks failed to reflect their 
actual capital conditions. Table 6.2 shows the actual capital conditions of nationwide 
banks during the pre-crisis period. Real BIS CARs of more than about a quarter of the 
banks dropped below 8 percent from 1995. Assuming that they wrote off all 
“substandard” or below loans, the adjusted BIS CARs of the majority of the banks fell 
below 8 percent from 1994. Indeed, when banks were required to compute BIS CARs 
based on an upgraded standard requiring 100 percent provisions in the wake of the 1997 
financial crisis, the BIS CARs of only twelve out of a total of twenty six commercial 
banks met the 8 percent minimum at the end of 1997 (OBS 1998).
338 In addition, banks provided new loans to firms that were unable to service their debt so that 
they could pay interest. This simple trick o f “evergreening” enabled banks to turn distressed 
assets into performing assets (The Korea Herald 13 June 2000).
339 In 1996, only 29 percent o f “substandard” or below loans were provisioned.
340 In 1996, banks recognised only 86 percent o f their loan loss provisions as tier 2 capital 
because o f the provision that limited the amount o f loan loss provisions eligible for inclusion in 
tier 2 capital to 1.25 percent o f the risk-weighted assets (Song 1998: 25).
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Table 6.2 The actual capital conditions of Korean nationwide banks, 1994-1996
(end o f period; %)
1994 1995 1996
Disclosed Real Adjusted Disclosed Real Adjusted Disclosed Real Adjusted
Cho Hung Bank 10.07 9.03 3.08 9.01 8.14 2.44 8.48 7.83 3.55
The Commercial Bank o f  Korea 10.56 9.98 -1.85 9.64 N/A N/A 9.25 N/A N/A
Korea First Bank 10.04 9.05 3.21 8.71 7.59 1.95 9.14 7.89 1.88
Hanil Bank 11.04 10.32 5.65 9.72 N/A N/A 8.89 N/A N/A
Bank o f Seoul 10.62 8.25 -0.29 8.97 6.21 -0.51 8.56 5.93 -2.65
Korea Exchange Bank 9.06 8.17 1.87 8.66 10.61 4.11 9.16 N/A N/A
Kookmin Bank - N/A N/A 6.06 5.81 4.01 8.46 8.16 6.44
Shinhan Bank 11.68 11.01 9.55 11.77 10.90 9.22 10.03 9.33 7.18
KorAm Bank 8.49 8.07 6.91 8.57 7.76 6.03 8.80 N/A N/A
Donghwa Bank 12.39 11.33 9.60 10.64 9.57 7.91 9.48 8.50 6.85
Dong Nam Bank 9.53 8.69 7.05 8.61 N/A N/A 8.76 N/A N/A
Dae Dong Bank 9.20 8.24 6.76 8.39 N/A N/A 9.07 N/A N/A
Hana Bank 8.12 8.08 7.88 8.35 8.30 7.65 8.71 8.61 7.90
Boram Bank 8.92 8.79 8.06 8.68 N/A N/A 8.70 N/A N/A
Peace Bank o f Korea 12.10 11.76 9.86 9.49 N/A N/A 8.92 N/A N/A
Average 10.13 9.34 5.53 9.02 8.32 4.76 8.96 8.04 4.45
Source: The author’s own estimation from Unhaeng Hyeonhwang (Bank Management Report) o f individual banks and various issues o f  Unhaeng Gyeong-yeong 
Tonggae (Bank Statistics) by Office o f  Bank Supervision.
Note: Real BIS CARs were estimated by subtracting provisions for “doubtful” and “estimated loss” loans from the capital bases; “adjusted” BIS CARs were estimated 
under the assumption that all “substandard”, “doubtful”, and “estimated loss” loans were written off.
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Despite the cosmetic characteristics of Korea’s compliance with the BIS standard 
during this period, there was no significant external pressure on Korean banks to 
improve their actual levels of capital adequacy. The inclusion of special provisions in 
the regulatory capital of the Korean BIS standard was a clear violation of the Basel 
Accord. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the high costs of enforcement and the low 
negative externalities for foreign banks and countries that would be generated by 
Korea’s cosmetic compliance with the BIS standard prevented foreign countries from 
exercising pressure on the Korean banks and the regulatory authority to 
comprehensively comply with the standard. The fact that Korea had no obligation to 
comply with the BIS standard may have even further reduced the incentive for foreign 
countries to put such pressure on the country, in the absence of perceived financial 
instability in Korea.341 Indeed, Korean banks increased their overseas footholds— 
subsidiaries, branches, or representative offices—in Basel Committee countries, 
including the United States and the United Kingdom, and also in countries that required 
a minimum BIS CAR higher than 8 percent (for example, Hong Kong and Singapore) 
throughout the early and mid-1990s (see KFB 1998).342
There was also no substantial market pressure on Korean banks to improve their 
capital adequacy levels. For example, in spite of the deteriorating capital condition of 
Korean banks, their credit ratings, including stand-alone ones, were not downgraded 
until the actual outbreak of the 1997 financial crisis.343 Non-downgrading of the banks’ 
traditional standard credit ratings, which took into account the probability of 
government support, may have resulted from the government’s “no bank failure” policy. 
Under the policy, CRAs may have had less reason to monitor banks, given that it was 
costly to gather and analyse information (see Karacadag and Taylor 2000: 32-33). Yet, 
stand-alone ratings did not take into account the probability of government support, and
341 After the 1997 financial crisis, as will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, the attitude 
o f foreign countries towards the Korean practice o f the BIS standard changed significantly.
342 Hong Kong and Singapore set up a required BIS CAR minimum for domestic banks o f 10 
percent and 12 percent respectively. However, for example, the BIS CAR of a Korean bank 
(Boram Bank), which established an overseas branch in Hong Kong in November 1994 and an 
overseas representative office in Singapore in March 1997, was lower than 9 percent throughout 
1994 to 1997 (KFB 1998).
343 For instance, from October 1995 to February 1997, the Moody’s stand-alone rating (Bank 
Financial Strength Rating) remained stable at D+ for Cho Hung Bank and at D for Korea First 
Bank and Korea Exchange Bank. The ratings o f Kookmin Bank and Shinhan Bank were stable 
at D+ from October 1995 to May 1998 and at C from October 1995 to December 1997, 
respectively. The ratings o f KorAm Bank and Hana Bank did not change from D from June 
1996 to December 1998. The ratings o f Daegu Bank and Pusan Bank were unchanged at D+ and 
D respectively, from September 1996 to December 1997.
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non-downgrading of Korean banks’ stand-alone ratings was a vivid case of the 
analytical failure of the CRAs. Likewise, even though the disclosed BIS CARs and the 
actual capital condition of Korean banks declined between the end of 1993 and the first 
half of 1995, their overseas borrowing costs for floating rate notes dropped by about 10 
b.p. on average during this period (Park 1996: 7).344 In fact, the failure to notice the true 
capital condition of Korean banks was common among most market participants prior 
to the 1997 financial crisis.
It may be asked whether a high proportion of tier 1 capital of Korean banks was a 
reflection of external pressures on them to strengthen their capital adequacy. However, a 
high level of tier 1 of Korean banks resulted from the small size of unrealised gains and 
the underdevelopment of other tier 2 capital instruments. Commercial and specialised 
banks’ holdings of securities (excluding Monetary Stabilisation Bonds, whose risk 
weight was zero percent) accounted only for 7 percent of their total assets in June 1990 
(BoK 1990: 50). Moreover, as stock prices declined, banks’ holdings of securities 
negatively affected their CARs. Hybrid debt capital instruments and subordinated debt 
were not included as tier 2 capital in the 1992 Korean BIS standard, because they were 
not introduced in the country at that time.345
6.2 Regulatory forbearance during the pre-crisis period
Along with the absence of pressure, either domestic or external, for comprehensive 
compliance, the lack of capacity to deal with the negative consequences of banks’ 
compliance failures on the overall economy was the main factor that explained Korea’s 
cosmetic compliance with the BIS standard during the pre-crisis period. There were also 
other factors—the relationships between the MFK and banks and chaebols, the 
weakness of the formal financial safety net, concern regarding credit squeeze, the 
country’s joining of the OECD and the BoK’s obtainment of BIS membership—that 
seemed to affect the implementation of the BIS standard in the country. However, their
344 A floating rate note is a bond whose coupon (interest) rate is reset periodically, based on a 
benchmark short term interest rate, for instance, three month or six month LIBOR. Korean 
banks’ costs o f borrowing in international markets increased in the autumn of 1995 and 
remained high during the following year. However, this rise in the borrowing costs was 
attributable mainly to the emergence o f a Japan Premium, over-competition for foreign funds 
among Korean financial institutions, and an increase in demand for foreign funds due to a rise in 
the size o f the county’s economy, rather than a decline in the banks’ capital soundness (Kim 
2003: ch. 5; Park 1996: 5).
345 As discussed above, as the financial condition o f banks was weakening, the regulatory 
authority allowed banks to issue such capital instruments.
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actual effects were limited.
Economic growth and regulatory emphasis on formal compliance
Korea’ cosmetic compliance with the BIS standard was induced largely by the 
regulatory authority’s emphasis on formal compliance in the absence of their strong 
intention to strengthen prudential regulation. Under the hierarchical structure of the 
MFK over the OBS, the adoption and implementation of the BIS standard was led by 
the MFK, whose priority was economic growth in administering Financial policies, 
while the OBS constructed detailed rules in accordance with directions from the 
ministry.346 As a result, compliance with the BIS standard was treated by the regulatory 
authority from a macroeconomic perspective rather than as a prudential regulation. For 
the country’s economic development, banks’ compliance with the BIS standard was a 
critical issue because compliance failure could result in a systemic crisis, an increase in 
their costs of borrowing foreign capital.347
Traditionally, the country’s economic development relied heavily on foreign capital. 
Domestic savings were well below investment levels, and therefore the gap between the 
level of domestic savings and the level of investments had to be filled by foreign capital 
(MFK and KDB 1993: 613; Cho and Kim 1997: 57-62) (see Table 4.3). According to an 
estimate (Cho and Kim 1997: 57), approximately 22 percent of total investment from 
1962 to 1991 was financed by foreign capital, primarily by loans. The supply of 
foreign capital was also necessary for domestic firms to settle international trade, as the 
country’s current account chronically recorded a deficit. The country enjoyed a current 
account surplus during a brief period from 1986 to 1989, when the reliance on foreign 
capital temporarily decreased. However, the current account balance turned to a deficit 
again from 1990 to 1997, with the exception of 1993, and firms suffered from a 
shortage of funds for investment. In addition, firms’ demand for funds in foreign 
currency was rapidly rising from the late 1980s due to their increasing foreign direct 
investment.
Korean banks played an important role in providing foreign capital for economic
346 Author’s confidential interviews with a senior MoFE official, Seoul, 21 February 2005, and 
a senior FSS official, Seoul, 16 February 2005.
347 Author’s confidential interview with a former senior OBS official, Seoul, 3 February 2005. 
See also NARK (1996: 154) and OBS (1996b).
348 According to an estimate (Cho and Kim 1997: 102-103), while the average economic growth 
rate between 1962 and 1982 was 8.2 percent, the average growth rate during the period could 
have declined to only 4.9 percent without the supply o f foreign capital.
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development by borrowing directly from international financial markets (Cho and Kim 
1997: 60). Foreign loans to Korean banks accounted for 22 percent of total medium and 
long-term capital (USD 80.2 billion) introduced into the country from 1962 to 1992, 
following commercial and public loans, which accounted for half the total amount 
(MFK and KDB 1993: 615). Banks held about 60 percent of the total foreign debt of the 
country at the end of 1997 (NARK 1999d: 89). Banks used most of their foreign 
borrowing in lending to domestic firms or in providing foreign exchange for settlement 
of international trade.349 Given the role of banks as an important provider of foreign 
capital to domestic firms, the regulatory authority had to help banks comply with the 
BIS standard formally, in order to reduce their costs of foreign borrowing.350
In addition, it was an important policy objective for the Kim Yong-Sam 
administration (1993 to 1997) to reduce firms’ financial costs. As the country’s 
economic growth became sluggish in the early 1990s,351 the government understood 
that the economic slowdown was a result of the “high cost and low efficiency” structure 
of the economy (see MoFE 1997: 36,42-46), and tried to strengthen “national 
competitiveness,” which became the buzzword in the economy at the time.352 Korean 
firms heavily relied on external funds (see Table 6.3), and as a result they paid high 
financial costs. Their ratio of interest expenses to sales reached 5.5 percent in 1995, 
which was far higher than that of their Japanese (1.3 percent) or Taiwanese competitors 
(2.2 percent). High financial costs of the firms were pointed out as a major factor in the 
weakening of Korean firms’ competitiveness vis-a-vis their foreign competitors.353 A 
further increase in the financial costs for businesses that would have resulted from the 
downgrading of Korean banks’ creditworthiness in international markets had to be 
prevented for economic growth reasons.354
349 For example, 36 percent o f foreign capital in domestic branches o f banks was lent to firms—  
mostly domestic firms— and 32 percent was provided for settlement o f international trade in 
1993, while less than 5 percent o f the foreign capital was invested in securities in foreign 
currency (Chae 1994).
350 Author’s confidential interviews with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 16 February 2005, and a 
senior MoFE official, Seoul, 21 February 2005.
351 The economic growth rate declined to less than 3 percent in the early 1990s, while the 
Korean authorities regarded 7 percent as the proper level o f economic growth at that time 
(NARK 1999g: 106-107).
352 See EPB (1994: 350-351) and Kim (1999: 452-453). The government launched a campaign 
o f “10 percent increase in competitiveness” (MoFE 1996: forewords).
353 Author’s confidential interview with a senior MoFE official, Seoul, 21 February 2005. See 
also EPB (1993: forewords) and MoFE (1995: 217-230, 1997: 336-343).
354 As mentioned earlier, Korean banks’ costs o f international borrowing increased in late 1995 
and in 1996. See note 344.
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Table 6.3 Debt ratios of manufacturing firms by country, 1990-1993
(%)
1990 1991 1992 1993
Korea 286.3 309.2 319.7 294.9
Japan 227.1 221.0 216.4 212.8
Taiwan 83.4 97.9 93.0 88.0
United States 148.7 147.3 168.2 174.5
Source: Bank o f Korea, various issue o f  Gi-eop Gyeongyeong Beunseok (The Analysis o f  Firms’ 
Statistics).
In the circumstance, as BIS CARs of Korean banks were declining, the regulatory 
authority implemented the BIS standard leniently in order to ensure banks’ formal 
compliance with the BIS standard and thereby help economic growth. A former OBS 
official commented: “The adoption of the BIS standard was meaningless if banks failed 
to comply with the standard [because the implementation of the BIS standard was to 
protect banks’ international business].”355 At this point, it should be noted that there was 
no resistance from the OBS to the lax implementation of the BIS standard nor was there 
any voice from the OBS about strengthening the Korean BIS standard.356 As discussed 
earlier, the lack of the independence of the OBS from the MFK and the presence of the 
“no bank failure policy” hindered the OBS from attaching priority to prudential 
regulation during the pre-crisis period.
Other sources o f  lax implementation o f the BIS standard
There are some other factors worth analysing for their effects on the implementation of 
the BIS standard in the country, Kim Yong-Ki (2003), among others, argues that the 
MFK had cosy relationships with banks and chaebols, and that these cosy relationships 
hindered the effective regulation of the banking sector. The cosy relationship between 
the MFK and banks was obvious. One prominent example was naghasan yinsa, which 
matched amakudari in Japan: high-ranked MFK officials were typically re-employed 
for three years in high profile private sector institutions controlled by the ministry—for 
example, nationwide banks—and thereafter they worked for another three years for less 
prominent private sector institutions—for example, regional banks or president of
355 Author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 28 January 2005.
356 In the wake o f the 1997 financial crisis, Lee Hen-Jai, former Chairman o f the FSC, 
commented: “[i]n hindsight the previous financial administration looks a mess, but, to be honest, 
it was not regarded as problematic at that time” (NARK 1999f: 2).
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merchant banks (Kim 2003: 80-82).357
However, most former MFK officials who were reemployed in banks took the 
position of auditors, and their major roles were to hide the banks’ problems from the 
regulatory authority’s inspections, or lobby for the individual banks (NARK 1999h: 50). 
In other words, the main negative result of the cosy relationships between the MFK and 
banks was the inefficient supervision or inspection of banks’ compliance. Yet, the first 
problem in the implementation of the BIS standard in the country was not supervision 
of banks’ compliance but the laxity of the capital adequacy standard and other related 
accounting rules themselves. In addition, at the time, banks had little autonomy in their 
management, and they usually followed government policies.358 In the circumstances, 
the lax regulations in regard to the BIS standard were not likely to be a result of 
regulatory capture by banks.
Nor did the MFK appear to relax capital adequacy rules to benefit particularly large 
businesses {chaebols), which had powerful leverage over public policy due to their 
oligopolistic position across the economy.359 From the late 1980s, in response to 
increasing social demands for equity, income distribution and balanced growth under 
political democratisation in progress, the priority of credit policies shifted from 
chaebols to previously disadvantaged sectors such as SMEs. The government adopted 
several measures to encourage banks to lend to SMEs, while intensifying credit control 
over large business groups, in order to ease the concentration of bank loans to chaebols 
(Cho and Kim 1997: 18, 45-47, 104-106; Haggard 2000: 28-29; Hahm 2003: 82-84;
Wad 2002: 185). Consequently, the share of loans to SMEs as a percentage of total loans 
by commercial banks increased from 48 percent in 1988 to 56 percent in 1995, while 
the share of loans to the top thirty chaebols decreased from 24 percent in 1988 to 14 
percent in 1995 (Hahm 2003: 85). Likewise the government treated SMEs more 
favourably than chaebols in policies regarding loans in foreign currency (BoK 1995; see 
NARK 1994b). Therefore, the likelihood that the regulatory authority implemented the 
BIS standard leniently to help supply of foreign capital exclusively for chaebols was not 
high.360
357 Formal high-ranked BoK or OBS staff members were also re-employed in private financial 
institutions, although their number was smaller than former MFK officials (Kim 2003: 81-82).
358 See Chapter 3 (section 3.2).
359 The performance o f the national economy was largely influenced by the performance o f 
chaebols.
360 As banks’ lending to chaebols declined, they began to depend more on non-bank financial 
institutions, which were increasingly under their control as an alternative financing source. In 
addition, they could raise funds in international capital markets without government help, due to
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The next factor to examine is the country’s financial safety net, given that the 
absence of an adequate financial safety net could have hindered the regulatory authority 
in implementing the BIS standard more strictly. The Korea government did not have 
formal mechanisms for closing ailing banks during the pre-crisis period, as shown by 
the fact that a deposit insurance system was not introduced until 1997. However, the 
absence of such mechanisms was a reflection of the government policy that did not 
allow banks to fail. Moreover, the regulatory authority thought that, although a large 
number of banks failed to meet the BIS standard, it would not cause a systemic financial 
crisis.361 The regulatory authority’s belief had reasonable grounds: the capital 
liberalisation of the country was still in its early stages until it joined the OECD in 
1996;362 in addition, the government had maintained a sound budget (see Table 5.4), 
unlike the Japanese or Taiwanese governments. Therefore, the absence of an adequate 
formal financial safety net was not a significant factor that led the regulatory authority 
to exercise regulatory forbearance in implementing the BIS standard.
Concern regarding a potential credit squeeze was another potential factor that may 
have hindered the country’s comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard. The 
regulatory authority’s decision to begin to implement the BIS standard from the end of 
1993, one year later than the deadline for Basel Committee countries, partly reflected 
their concern for a decline in credit supply from banks (NARK 1992: 94). Also, the 
regulatory authority worried that a stricter implementation of the BIS standard might 
have caused a credit squeeze in the economy.363 Given Korean firms’ high debt ratio, 
the regulatory authority’s concern was reasonable. Yet, a credit crunch was a secondary 
concern for the regulatory authority in implementing the BIS standard. Their primary 
concern was to ensure the smooth supply of foreign capital.364 In fact, a reduction in 
credit supply by commercial banks was partly compensated for by an increase in credit 
supply from specialised banks, which were not subject to the BIS standard.365 In 
addition, it is worth noting that, during the pre-crisis period, politicians did not raise 
questions regarding the negative effects of the implementation of the BIS standard on 
banks or on the overall economy. Politicians’ focus in regard to the BIS standard was on 
the negative consequences for banks if they failed to comply with it, although they did
their reputation and creditworthiness (Cho and Kim 1997: 16-17; Hahm 2003: 85-86).
361 Author’s confidential interviews with a senior MoFE official, Seoul, 21 February 2005, and 
senior FSS officials, Seoul, 28 January 2005 and 16 February 2005.
362 Author’s confidential interview with a senior MoFE official, Seoul, 21 February 2005.
363 Author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 31 January 2005.
364 Author’s confidential interview with a former senior OBS official, Seoul, 3 February 2005.
365 Author’s confidential interview with a senior MoFE official, Seoul, 21 February 2005.
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not exercise pressure on the country’s capital regulations.
The last factor to consider is the country’s joining of the OECD and the BoK’s 
acquirement of a full membership of the BIS. The BoK obtained membership in 
September 1996, and Korea became an OECD member in December 1996. The 
country’s compliance with the BIS standard might have helped it obtain the membership 
by improving its image as an advanced country. However, the introduction and 
implementation of the BIS standard was not directly related to those events.367 While 
the plan to adopt the BIS standard was announced in 1991, the government established a 
plan to obtain OECD membership between 1992 and 1994 (NARK 1999a: 45) and the 
BoK began to strive for BIS membership from around 1993 (The Korea Economic Daily 
18 June 1993; BoK 1994:39).
6.3 The 1997 financial crisis and the IMF
The 1997 financial crisis shifted Korea’s compliance with the BIS standard from 
cosmetic to more comprehensive compliance. After the financial crisis, the government 
embarked on financial restructuring, which included the strengthening of the Korean 
BIS standard to conform to the Basel Accord, and upgraded the accounting rules that 
influenced the effectiveness of compliance with the BIS standard. Given that Korea was 
under the influence of the IMF at this time and up until 2000, the improvement in the 
country’s compliance with the BIS standard, on the surface, seemed to be attributable to 
IMF pressure. However, closer examination of the implementation of the BIS standard 
during the IMF period shows that the role of the IMF was limited in strengthening the 
country’s compliance with the BIS standard.
The IMF programme
The outbreak of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which involved Korea, imposed 
significant costs on the world economy. The crisis accelerated major countries’ 
concerted action to strengthen financial regulation at the international level, which had
366 It should be stressed that the BIS standard had not attracted much attention from politicians, 
including members o f the Finance Committee in the National Assembly, until the 1997 financial 
crisis occurred.
367 Author’s confidential interviews with a former senior OBS official, Seoul, 3 February 2005, 
and senior FSS officials, Seoul, 28 January 2005, and 18 February 2005.
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been developing substantially after the 1995 Mexican peso crisis.368 The crisis 
countries’ lax prudential regulation— in particular, their weak compliance with 
international standards—was pointed out as a main cause of the financial crisis. A 1998 
IMF report (IMF 1998) on the strengthening the international monetary system argued:
A key lesson from the Asian crisis is the urgent need to strengthen domestic financial 
systems, including particularly prudential regulation.... There is an urgent need to 
further develop and disseminate internationally accepted standards— in areas such as 
accounting, auditing, bankruptcy and corporate governance— to encourage good 
practices and to allow financial markets to differentiate better across borrowers.
In short, the financial crisis radically increased the incentives for countries to force 
others’— in particular, the crisis countries’—comprehensive compliance with the BIS 
standard.
In the meantime, Korea’s seeking assistance from the IMF provided the latter with 
the means to induce the country to comply with the BIS standard comprehensively.
Korea entered into a stand-by arrangement with the IMF on 4 December 1997, through 
it received a USD 57 billion loan from the IMF. When a country borrowed from the IMF, 
its government had to make commitments on economic and financial policies—a 
requirement known as conditionality. These polices constituted the country’s “policy 
programme,” which was described in a letter of intent (to which a memorandum of 
economic and financial policies was often attached) that accompanied the country’s 
request for IMF financing. Most IMF loans featured phased disbursements so that the 
IMF could verify that a country continued to adhere to its commitments before 
disbursing successive instalments (IMF 2005).
Under the IMF programme (December 1997 to August 2000), the Korea 
government upgraded banking regulations to meet the Basel Core Principles, including 
the strengthening of the Korean BIS standard to conform to the provisions in the Basel 
Accord. Specific loan loss provisions—provisions against “substandard”, “doubtful”, 
and “estimated loss” loans—were no longer counted as tier 2 capital (GRK 1998a, 
1998c). Assets in all trust accounts with guarantee, of which risk weight had been 10 
percent, were risk-weighted at 50 percent in 1999 and at 100 percent in 2000 (The 
Korea Economic Daily 19 August 1998; GRK 1998a).
368 After the financial crisis, the FSF was initiated by the G7 countries. On the Forum, see 
Chapter 1 (section 1.2).
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Asset classification standards and provisioning rules were strengthened. A Forward 
Looking Criteria (FLC) method, which required banks to base their risk management 
and provisioning on borrowers’ ability to service their obligations in the future, was 
incorporated into the asset classification rules in 1999 (FSC 1999: 30). In addition, the 
existing backward-looking criteria were strengthened. Loans in arrears for one to three 
months were classified as “precautionary” loans, and loans in arrears for three to six 
months as “substandard” loans. Restructured loans could be categorised at best as 
“precautionary”, with prompt reclassification to “substandard” or below on evidence 
that the borrower could not fully perform their obligations under the restructuring 
agreement (GRK 1999). Provisioning rules were strengthened so that banks were 
required to maintain full provisioning for their impaired assets and for their securities 
holdings.
The new financial regulatory authority, the FSC, and its executive arm, the 
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), employed the BIS CAR as the criteria in 
restructuring the banking sector (GRK 1998a). Under the first round of financial 
restructuring, which was completed by the end of September 1998, five (three 
nationwide and two regional banks) out of a total of twelve undercapitalised banks 
were either closed or merged with stronger ones (in June 1998) (FSC 2000).
Moreover, although the formally required minimum BIS CAR was 8 percent, the 
minimum target ratio of banks was 10 percent in practice; the remaining seven 
undercapitalised banks were encouraged by the regulatory authority to increase 
their BIS CARs to 10 percent by December 2000 (GRK 1998b).369 A PCA system 
based on the BIS CAR and the CAMEL rating was implemented in April 1998 so 
that banks with a BIS CAR below 8 percent faced automatic regulatory penalties, 
which included the closure of the bank (see FSS 2005).370 As a result, Korean 
banks had to comply with the strengthened BIS standard, desirably with a BIS CAR 
over 10 percent, at all costs to survive or to avoid regulatory sanctions from the 
regulatory authority. Indeed, although two Korean banks failed to clear the required 
minimum CAR of 8 percent in 1999, all Korean banks met the requirement between 
2000 and 2003, and most Korean banks maintained their BIS CARs above 10 
percent between 1999 and 2003 (see Figure 6.1).
369 The government required banks to raise their BIS CARs to above 10 percent as new NPLs 
could arise (NARK 1999b: 10).
370 The CAMEL rating was a bank rating scheme whose components consisted o f capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity.
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The limitations o f  the role o f the IMF
Yet, even though the international community had a strong incentive to pressure Korea 
to strengthen the soundness of its financial system and an official means was available 
to do so, the IMF conditionality, it would be misleading to argue that the role of the 
IMF— in other words, foreign pressure—was foremost in strengthening Korea’s 
compliance with the BIS standard. As will be discussed in the next section, the Korean 
regulatory authority had a strong motivation and desire to improve Korean bank capital 
adequacy standards and regulations. In addition, as the implementation of the IMF 
programme gave rise to enormous domestic opposition, the Korean government 
negotiated with the IMF to relax its requirements, thereby responding to domestic 
demand.
During the first round of financial restructuring, Korean banks rapidly curbed loans 
to firms in order to meet the required 8 percent minimum (see Figure 6.3), and this 
caused a severe credit crunch, which lasted until the autumn of 1999 (MoFE 1999: 126; 
Choi 2000). The number of bankruptcies of firms soared to about 10,500 in 1998 from 
about 5,200 in 1996 (see Figure 6.4), and it generated much unemployment. As a result, 
the implementation of the BIS standard—along with the tight monetary policy—was 
heavily criticised as the main culprit. The Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(KCCI), which represented the interests of the overall corporate sector, called for a 
flexible application of the BIS standard in order to avoid bankruptcies of viable firms 
(The Korea Herald 14 August 1998). Also, the United Liberal Democrats, the coalition 
partner of the ruling party, demanded that the government ease the BIS standard to 
mitigate the credit crunch {The Korea Times 11 October 1998).
178
Figure 6.3 Loans and discounts in won by Korean commercial banks, 1996-2003
(end of period; KRW 100 million)
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Source: Financial Supervisory Service, various issues of Unhaeng G yeong-yeong Tonggae (Bank 
Statistics).
Figure 6.4 Bankruptcies of Korean firms, 1993-2003
(end of period; number; %)
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0 0
1993 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03
11——J B ankruptcies — Th e  ratio  o f  d ishonoured  b ills |
Source: Korea Federation of Small & Medium Business, 2004, Jeungsogi-eop Hyeonhwang (Statistics of 
Small & Medium Enterprises); Financial Supervisory Service, various issues of Monthly Financial 
Statistic Bulletin.
This severe credit crunch led the governm ent to object to the drastic strengthening 
o f  prudential regulations and to negotiate with the IMF to relax its requirem ents.371 The 
governm ent persuaded the IM F to advance the tim efram e for com puting BIS CARs o f  
banks for the first financial restructuring retroactive to the end o f  1997 (Maeil Business
371 Author’s confidential interviews with senior FSS officials, Seoul, 31 January 2005 and 15 
February 2005.
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Newspaper 11 January 1998\ Asia Pulse 12 January 1998; GRK 1997; 1998c). The 
government and the IMF agreed to give banks two years to meet the BIS standard, 
instead of the initial plan of six months {AFXNews 13 January 1998), and to allow a 
further delay for banks with little international business (GRK 1998b).372 The 
government prevailed on the IMF to allow banks to classify loans to “work-out” firms 
as “precautionary” instead of the initial plan of “substandard” (Maeil Business 
Newspaper 9 February 1999) and to postpone recording financial institutions’ losses 
that were generated by work-out borrowers from June 2000 to December 2000 {The 
Seoul Economic Daily 30 June 2000; Maeil Business Newspaper 5 July 2000).373 In 
November 1998, the government created a new provision that allowed supervisors to 
postpone issuing a PCA order for a specified period of time when they expected that 
banks could satisfy required standards (FSS 2005). The regulatory authority did not 
impose sanctions on the failure to meet the target BIS CAR of 10 percent.374 The 
government wanted to delay the introduction of the FLC for one year, although the plan 
was rejected by the IMF {The Korea Economic Daily 5 November 1998; Maeil Business 
Newspaper 30 June 1999); yet, the FSS announced that it would exercise forbearance 
by not issuing a PCA order to banks whose BIS CARs fell below 8 percent, because of 
the application of the FLC, if their restructuring plans were acceptable {The Korea 
Times 28 June 2000; The Korea Herald 13 June 2000).
In addition, the government injected public funds of KRW 64 trillion amounting to 
14 percent of the GDP into the financial sector in 1998 (earlier than planned) in order to 
ease the credit crunch {The Korea Times 31 August 1998; MoFE 1999: 100). Banks that 
received public funds were obliged to include programmes to expand corporate loans in 
their rehabilitation plans. Previously, the FSC had required the banks to include only 
programmes for layoffs, branch reductions, management changes and capital reductions 
{The Korea Times 16 September 1998).375 Also, there was a suspicion that the 
government did not fully disclose the impaired assets in banks, given that the BIS CARs
372 As a result, seven out o f twelve undercapitalised banks announced a stop in international 
business {Maeil Business Newspaper 23 June 1998).
373 The government estimated that the BIS CARs o f banks would fall by 1 to 2 percentage 
points if  the loans were categorised as “substandard” ( Maeil Business Newspaper 9 February
1999). Also, it was anticipated that the BIS CARs o f five commercial banks would fall below 8 
percent if  the losses were recorded for the book-closing o f June 2000 {The Seoul Economic 
Daily 30 June 2000, 5 July 2000).
374 Author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 31 January 2005.
375 By 2003 most banks that received public funds were privatised with the exceptions o f Woori 
Financial Holdings, Korea First Bank, Cheju Bank and Seoul Bank (MoFE and PFOC 2003: 
191).
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and net asset values of six banks that received public funds in the second round of 
financial restructuring, which began in September 2000, suddenly became negative (The 
Seoul Economic Daily 19 December 2000).376
In summary, the IMF did not have the omnipotence to force Korea to follow its 
policy recommendations. In fact, the limitations of the IMF in implementing its policy 
programmes despite its superior leverage over borrowing countries have been indicated 
by a number of studies on IMF conditionality. These studies suggest that even though 
governments favoured the IMF agreements ex ante, domestic political constraints force 
governments to not fully implement such agreements. These studies also suggest that 
without country ownership of IMF programmes—a firm commitment from the 
government and other relevant constituencies—the programmes are less likely to be
• "J77implemented. Apparently, Korea’s compliance with the BIS standard was improved 
to some extent under the IMF programme. However, this change was largely 
attributable to the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism after the financial 
crisis, which will be discussed in the following section.
6.4 The domestic compliance mechanism after the crisis
The financial crisis generated a domestic group that attached priority to prudential and 
effective financial regulation, including comprehensive compliance with the BIS 
standard. Although Korea was under the influence of the IMF during the IMF 
programme, strengthening of the country’s financial regulations was in practice driven 
by the domestic group. The significance of the domestic compliance mechanism in 
strengthening Korea’ compliance with the BIS standard becomes clear when comparing 
compliance with the BIS standard under the IMF programme with that of the post-IMF 
period. However, the diffusion of BIS standard compliance costs from banks to firms 
through a decline in bank loans and the limited independence of the regulatory authority 
from the government led the regulatory authority to exercise forbearance to some extent, 
preventing truly comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard.
376 The disclosed BIS CARs o f the six banks were 8.7, 10.4, 5.2, 8.3, 7.6, and 12.4 percent at 
the end o f 1999, and their net asset values were 2,245 billion, 438 billion, 28 billion, 5 billion, 5 
billion, and 131 billion at the end o f September 2000 (The Seoul Economic Daily 19 December
2000).
377 See, for example, Kahler (1993) and Khan and Sharma (2001).
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The operation o f the domestic compliance mechanism
The financial crisis did change the attitude of the Korean regulatory authority towards 
prudential regulation.378 The pre-eminent goal of financial reforms in the wake of the 
financial crisis was to avoid its recurrence. As a result, Korean authorities began to 
recognise the financial industry, whose main function had been to assist the growth of 
the real economic sector, as an independent industry and put great emphasis upon 
prudential regulation in order to normalise the role of financial institutions (see MoFE 
1998: 162-197, 1999: 95-106). In addition, the authorities explicitly pointed out the 
lenient implementation of the BIS standard in addressing the causes of the 1997 
financial crisis:
... The biggest changes in the Korean economy from the mid-1990s were the 
liberalisation o f foreign exchanges and the internationalisation o f financial institutions.
... However, regrettably a financial regulatoiy system to cope with the new 
environment was not established. ... The calculation method o f the BIS CAR, which 
was the most important regulation to ensure the soundness o f banks’ assets, was 
expedient on several accounts. (MoFE 1998: 168)
The new financial regulatory authority, the FSC, and its executive organ, the FSS, 
were established in April 1998 and January 1999 respectively, in order to achieve 
efficient and appropriate financial supervision and regulation. The new regulatory 
authority emphasised the importance of the conformity of the Korean BIS standard with 
the Basel Accord to strengthen the banking regulatory framework (NARK 2001: 69, 73, 
92). Indeed, “conformity with international standards” became the buzzword in 
financial regulation after the financial crisis.379 In short, the crisis provided the Korean 
financial regulatory authority the impetus required to improve domestic banking
I D A
regulation, since the crisis itself was partly attributable to their policy failure.
378 Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, the regulatory authority adopted an increasing number o f 
prudential regulatory measures, which included a plan to upgrade banking regulations to 
conform to the Basel Core Principles by the end of 2000 (OBS 1997). However, these were 
mainly to strengthen the competitiveness o f banks under the financial liberalisation in progress, 
with little intention to improve banks’ soundness (BoK 1997; see OBS 1994b).
379 Author’s confidential interviews with senior FSS officials, Seoul, 15 February 2005, and 18 
February 2005. Also see MoFE (1998: 162-197, 1999: 95-106).
380 There was no drastic change in the personnel o f the regulatory authority. Those who 
participated in negotiations with the IMF were mostly existing MFK or OBS officials (author’s 
confidential interviews with senior FSS officials, Seoul, 31 January 2005 and 16 February 2005).
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Learning occurred for the Korean regulatory authority due to the crisis.
One may raise the question whether the Korean regulatory authority could have 
strengthened the country’s compliance with the BIS standard without external pressure 
from the IMF, given the significant domestic opposition to the strengthening of 
prudential regulation. Yet, after the end of the IMF programme in August 2000, the 
country’s compliance with the BIS standard did not retreat to pre-crisis levels.381 The 
strengthened Korean BIS standard and the relevant regulations were largely maintained, 
even though the regulatory authority exercised some degree of forbearance.382 The BIS 
CARs of Korean banks remained at a level of 10 percent, the same as they were under 
the IMF programme (see Figure 6.1). Meanwhile, the actual capital soundness of the 
banks appears to have been higher during the early 2000s than during the IMF 
programme; Table 6.4 shows that Korean banks’ ratio of loan loss provisions to NPLs 
steadily improved throughout the late 1990s and the early 2000s, suggesting that 
disclosed BIS CARs of Korean banks generally reflected their actual capital adequacy. 
Indeed, in 2003, the IMF Financial System Stability Assessment on Korea commented: 
“[the country’s] capital requirements for banks are broadly in line with the Basel capital 
standard” (IMF 2003c: 35).
Table 6.4 Loan loss provisions ratios of Korean banks, 1994-2003
(end of period; %)
To NPLs To substandard and below loans
1994 20.7 N/A
1995 25.4 N/A
1996 28.8 N/A
1997 24.8 N/A
1998 48.4 N/A
1999 75.4 46.3
2000 86.5 64.6
2001 92.2 80.1
2002 91.3 88.0
2003 128.4 84.6
Source: The author’s calculation from Financial Supervisory Service, various issues of Unhaeng 
Gyeongyeong Tonggye (Bank Statistics).
Note: NPLs herein referred to loans overdue more than six moths (“substandard” or below loans under 
the old asset classification rules) until 1999. From 1999 NPLs included loans overdue more than three 
months and non-accrual loans (bankrupt loans, loans to borrowers whose capacity to repay was weakened, 
and non-performing restructured loans).
Also, officials in the OBS and in the MFK later moved to the new financial regulatory bodies; to 
the FSS and to the secretariat o f the FSC.
381 The Korea government’s obligatory policy o f consulting with the IMF ended in August 2000, 
when the government redeemed all the stand-by loans to it.
382 As noted earlier, regulatory forbearance also existed under the IMF programme. Regulatory 
forbearance during the early 2000s will be discussed later in the following section.
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This record of Korea’s compliance with the BIS standard during the early 2000s is 
remarkable, given that domestic opposition to strict implementation of the BIS standard 
during this period was as strong as, or even more than, it was under the IMF
383programme. As the second round of financial restructuring began in September
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2000, banks that worried about their charters again became reluctant to make loans to 
corporations in order to maintain their BIS CARs above 10 percent (see The Korea 
Herald 5 June 2000; MoFE 2002: 123). This caused a serious credit squeeze in the 
economy, affecting both SMEs and larger firms (see Figure 6.3).385 The impact of a 
decrease in bank loans on SMEs was enormous, as bank lending was almost the only 
credit supply for SMEs.386 Larger firms also suffered from a sharp decline in bank 
loans, and they, in addition, faced a capital market crunch at the time (MoFE 2001: 49, 
54, 2002: 12, 123).387 As a result, most major actors in the economy, including both 
SMEs and big businesses, called for the relaxation of the implementation of the BIS
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standard. In addition, BoK Governor Chon Chol-Hwan explicitly expressed 
opposition to the unitary application of the BIS standard to banks without international 
business {Maeil Business Newspaper 18 January 2001), even questioning the 
desirability of the application of the regulatory standard, which was set by developed 
countries, to less developed countries {The Korea Times 13 January 2001, 18 January
2001). The opposition party also attacked the government by arguing that the unitary 
application of the BIS standard was a “socialist policy” {The Korea Economic Daily 2 
August 2001). The fact that the country’s compliance with the BIS standard did not
383 Public criticism o f the credit crunch under the IMF programme was directed at both the tight 
monetary policy and the strict implementation o f the BIS standard. However, by the end o f the 
1990s, the government normalised its monetary policy, and, as a result, interest rates began to 
decline from mid-1998 (MoFE 1998: 204, 211, 1999: 126). Accordingly, strict implementation 
o f the BIS standard was perceived by the public to be the main culprit for the credit squeeze 
during the early 2000s.
384 The government carried out the second round o f financial restructuring to normalise 
financial institutions in the wake o f the bankruptcy o f Daewoo, one o f the top chaebols. The 
financial restructuring was completed by late 2001.
385 Most firms were negatively affected by the credit crunch during the late 1990s. Yet, the 
financial condition o f larger firms was relatively better than SMEs at the time because banks 
favoured lending to larger firms than SMEs and also because larger firms could rely on direct 
financing to some extent.
386 The ratio o f bank loans to total borrowing amounted to more than 80 percent for 
manufacturing SMEs (Kookmin Bank 1999).
387 According to a poll conducted by a local newspaper {JoongAng Ilbo), twenty six out o f the 
country’s top thirty chaebols were locked in a capital crunch {Asia Pulse 22 June 2000).
388 See, for example, Asia Pulse (16 May 2001), KCCI (2001), and The Seoul Economic Daily 
(8 December 2000).
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substantially worsen, or even appeared to improve, after the departure of the IMF 
despite such strong domestic opposition to the strict implementation of the BIS standard 
clearly demonstrates that pressure from the IMF was not the critical factor to explain the 
strengthening of compliance during the post-crisis period.
Factors that hindered more comprehensive compliance
There are some important questions that remain to be answered regarding Korea’s 
compliance with the BIS standard during the post-crisis period. Even though the 
country’s compliance during this period was far higher than during the pre-crisis level, 
the Korean regulatory authority, as indicated earlier, exercised forbearance during the 
IMF programme period and also during the post-IMF period. Examples of regulatory 
forbearance during the post-IMF period were as follows: a guideline to lower the target 
BIS CAR for banks without international business to 6 percent was issued in July 2001 
(Maeil Business Newspaper 11 July 2001); the risk weight of bonds guaranteed by the 
Seoul Guarantee Insurance Company was lowered from 100 percent to 50 percent in 
September 2001 (FSS Weekly Newsletter 25 August 2001); the FSC expressed that it 
would not penalise banks for failure to meet the required minimum CARs during the 
second round of financial and corporate restructuring (The Korea Herald 14 October
2000); and in July 2002, the FSC introduced a plan to allow banks to use average stock 
prices instead of the market prices for calculating the BIS CARs (The Korea Economic 
Daily 23 July 2002).389
Accordingly, one may question whether the improvement of Korean banks’ 
compliance was attributable to market pressure rather than enforcement by the 
regulatory authority. However, as discussed in Chapter 4 (section 2), markets did not 
credit the BIS standard with a reliable regulation. There were general market pressures 
on Korean banks to improve their soundness in the wake of the financial crisis. 
However, such market pressures were not directly related with compliance to the BIS 
standard. For instance, Brian Oak, who was responsible for the Korean banking sector 
at Moody’s, commented in August 2000:
The BIS CARs o f banks rarely affect their credit ratings. Because the government
389 The FSC also delayed the implementation o f the 1996 amendment o f the Basel Accord from 
the end o f 2000 to the first quarter o f 2001, as the implementation was expected to drop banks’ 
BIS CARs by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points (Maeil Business Newspaper 18 January 2001). See 
also note 45 for the implementation o f the 1996 amendment in Korea.
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requires banks to increase BIS CARs, it is important for the banks to do so. However, 
asset quality is a more important factor to affect credit ratings {The Seoul Economic 
Daily 3 August 2000).
Even though most Korean banks maintained their BIS CARs above 10 percent, 
higher than the required minimum of 8 percent, this was mainly attributable to potential 
penalties from the regulatory authority. As indicated above, the target BIS CAR 
proposed by the Korean regulatory authority was 10 percent in practice throughout most 
of the late 1990s and the early 2000s. In fact, along with the measure to lower the target 
BIS CAR for banks without international business to 6 percent, the regulatory authority 
temporarily lowered the BIS CAR to be rated the highest grade in the CAMELS ratings 
below 10 percent, to 8 percent in 2001 and to 9 percent in 2003 {Maeil Business 
Newspaper 25 July 2003; FSC 2001a, 2001b; NARK 2001: 88, 92, 2003: 39-40).390 
However, the closure of a massive number of banks by the government during the two 
rounds of financial restructuring gave Korean banks a firm incentive to maintain their 
BIS CARs above 10 percent to reduce the possibility of closure.391 In addition, banks 
with a BIS CAR lower than 10 percent were restricted to engage in potentially lucrative 
business such as insurance.392 Markets might provide banks an incentive to keep their 
capital soundness in the wake of the financial crisis, but, under the presence of strong 
pressure from the regulatory authority on banks to maintain their capital soundness, 
such market pressures appeared to be contributing factors rather than the major 
incentive for the banks to maintain their capital soundness.393
This leads to the question why did the Korean regulatory authority exercise 
forbearance, if it put great emphasis on banks’ comprehensive compliance with the BIS 
standard? It should be emphasised that the regulatory authority’s emphasis on the 
capital soundness of Korean banks was real. For example, in September 2002, the FSC 
established a plan to require banks to raise their tier 1 ratios over 5.5 percent (initially 
over 6 percent) by setting aside reserves equivalent to 10 percent of their earning every 
year to meet the ratio, although it subsequently abolished the plan due to government
390 The CAMELS system added sensitivity to market risk to the CAMEL system.
391 The number o f Korean banks declined from thirty-two to twenty-two between the late 1997 
and November 2000 (FSC 2000).
392 The FSC prohibited banks from engaging insurance business unless their BIS CARs were 
over 10 percent in August 2000 {The Seoul Economic Daily 11 August 2000).
393 Also, see Chapter. 4 (section 4.3) for an analysis o f banks’ perception o f market compliance 
pressures for the BIS standard.
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opposition.394 In fact, most regulatory forbearance by the regulatory authority during 
the early 2000s was led by the government, especially the MFK. For instance, the 2001 
guideline to lower the target BIS CAR for banks without international business to 6 
percent was led by the ruling party and the MFK {Maeil Business Newspaper 11 July
2001). The introduction of the plan to allow banks to use average stock prices in July 
2002 aimed to support and strengthen the stock market, a policy objective of the MFK, 
not the FSC {The Korea Economic Daily 23 July 2002). Also, the temporary lowering of 
the BIS CAR to be rated the highest grade in the CAMELS ratings in 2001 and in 2003 
was agreed in the Financial Policy Council, a discussion channel for the MFK, the FSC, 
and the BoK, in order to induce banks to make more loans to firms (FPC 2001).395 In 
other words, the regulatory forbearance by the FSC during the early 2000s was largely a 
result of government interference over the FSC’s regulatory policies.
During the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the Korean government was sandwiched 
between on the one hand firms demanding that the government increase bank credit and 
on the other hand banks that refused to cooperate with government policies for 
supplying credit to the firms.396 Furthermore, as the economy continued to be sluggish, 
support for the government was dwindling. According to a survey conducted by a local 
newspaper, approval ratings for President Kim Dae-Jung sharply declined to 20 percent 
at the end of 2000 from a high of 70 percent {The Nikkei Weekly 19 February 2001). In 
response, the government began to put growing emphasis on economic recovery and 
implementing the BIS standard leniently in order to facilitate economic recovery, and to
• n  • • 397prevent aggravation of an economic recession.
394 The FSC established the plan as Moody’s had placed Korean banks’ stand-alone rating at 
seventieth on a list o f seventy-nine countries in June 2002, and sixty-fourth out o f eighty 
countries in September 2002. The plan was rejected by the Regulatory Reform Committee, 
which was directly accountable to the President {The Korea Herald 16 September 2002, 29 
October 2002, 15 November 2002).
395 Also, the MFK led the increase o f the risk weight o f home mortgage loans from 50 to 60 
percent in order to cope with sharply-growing household debt, in spite o f opposition from the 
FSC, which worried about a fall o f banks’ BIS CARs {The Korea Herald 12 October 2002).
396 The traditional relationship between government and banks had unravelled because o f the 
financial crisis and the subsequent financial restructuring. Through the first round o f financial 
restructuring about 45,000 employees o f financial institutions (more than 30 percent o f the total) 
were laid off. Consequently, bank unions were strongly opposed to government intervention in 
the management o f banks, arguing that it was the government that had forced banks to extend 
loans to unhealthy firms during the pre-crisis period {Business Korea August 2000). As a result, 
direct intervention from the government in the operation o f banks virtually disappeared after the 
financial crisis, and the government could no longer compel banks to extend loans to the 
corporate sector.
397 A prominent example o f policies that promoted the economy at the expense o f financial 
regulation was credit card policy in the early 2000s. See Kim (2004a: 68-82, 111).
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Government intervention in regulatory policies of the FSC was effective due to the 
limited independence of the FSC from the government, especially from the MFK. The 
key objective in establishing the FSC was to improve its independence from 
government, especially from the MFK. As a result, the FSC was legally granted 
operational autonomy, although it was located under the office of the Prime Minister.398 
The main focus of the FSC was on financial regulatory and supervisory functions rather 
than various interests of the national economy, although it was also responsible for the 
restructuring of the corporate sector in the wake of the financial crisis.399 However, the 
independence of the FSC—and the FSS—was in practice undermined by its institutional 
characteristics. The Chairman was a cabinet member, which had the potential to 
jeopardise the independence of the FSC. Some in the FSC itself thought that the 
chairmanship had been politicised (Walter forthcoming). Indeed, despite the three-year 
tenure of the Chairmanship, there had been four Chairmen in six years by the end of 
2003. Also, six out of a total of nine Commissioners were government or semi- 
government officials, and this structure of the FSC weakened the independence of the 
FSC (Kim 2004b).400 Although the MFK was required to consult with the FSC when it 
established or amended financial supervisory laws, the authority of the MFK in 
establishing and amending financial supervisory laws in practice hampered the FSC in 
implementing regulatory measures; cases which could be dealt with regulations from 
the FSC were sometimes handled by Enforcement Ordinances, for which the competent 
authority was the MFK, on the ministry’s insistence (Kim 2004a: 101). In addition, 
legal protection for FSC/FSS staff against lawsuits for supervisory actions was not 
sufficient, and this had the potential to hamper the independence of regulators (IMF 
2003c: 24, 35).
398 The Chairman, who concurrently held the position o f the Governor o f the FSS, was 
appointed by the President through deliberations in a Cabinet council. The Chairman’s tenure o f  
office was legally secured for three years and was renewable once, unless he or she could not 
perform the required duties due to mental or physical disability or violated obligations under the 
law governing the organisation o f the FSC. Also, the FSS had sufficiently well trained staff to 
carry out their responsibilities, although there were indications o f shortages o f expertise in a few 
areas (IMF 2003c: 24).
399 Regulatory forbearance by the FSC may also have been partly attributable to its 
responsibility for corporate as well as financial restructuring. These two objectives had the 
potential to conflict with each other, leading the FSC to compromise with what might have been 
appropriate from a purely prudential regulatory perspective (IMF 2003c: 24; Walter 
forthcoming).
400 The nine members were the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, the Vice-Minister o f the MFK, 
the Deputy Governor o f the BoK, the President o f the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(KDIC), a financial expert recommended by the Chairman o f the FSC, an accounting specialist 
recommended by the MFK, a legal expert recommended by the Ministry o f Justice, and a 
representative o f the business sector recommended by the President o f the KCCI.
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Furthermore, the size and the functions of the secretariat of the FSC, which was a 
normal (not independent) government agency, had been substantially enlarged through 
the four reorganisations that had taken place since its establishment. The number of the 
secretariat staff increased from 19 to about 130, about half of whom were government 
officials. The secretariat was initially intended to help the operation of the FSC, but it 
grew to become almost another financial regulatory authority, which had two financial 
supervisory policy bureaux. Furthermore, the power to govern the secretariat was in the 
hands of the MFK so that the growth of the secretariat resulted in a rise of the influence 
of the MFK on the operation of the FSC.401 Conversely, the enlargement of the 
secretariat resulted in the impotence of non-standing Commissioners.402 Indeed, in 
discussions as to how to reform the FSC during the early 2000s, there was a strong 
voice to abolish the secretariat, which was regarded by many Koreans as a pawn of the 
MFK, in order to increase the independence of the FSC (see Kim 2004b; NARK 2004: 
51,69).
The institutional arrangements of the FSC seriously undermined its independence 
from government, especially from the MFK.403 A senior official of the task force for the 
reorganisation of the FSC/FSS commented in a National Assembly hearing (NARK 
2004: 50-51): “The impartiality [of the FSC] could continue to be a problem, because, 
given the relation between the FSC and the MFK, it is very difficult for the FSC to 
object to policies of the MFK.” The MFK occasionally intervened in financial 
regulatory policies to help its macroeconomic policies (NARK 2004: 103-105). As a 
result, when the regulatory policies of the FSC conflicted with other government 
policies, priority was frequently given to the latter.404
To conclude, regulatory forbearance by the Korean regulatory authority in the area 
of bank capital adequacy regulation during the post-crisis period was largely attributable 
to domestic opposition to strict implementation of the BIS standard and the limited 
independence of the regulatory authority from government. The regulatory authority put 
growing emphasis on comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard after the
401 The MFK obtained the power to govern the secretariat by an irregular amendment o f  
relevant laws (Kim 2004b).
402 Three Commissioners who were not government officials were not engaged in all four 
reorganisations o f the secretariat, nor were they given an ex post facto report (Kim 2004b).
403 Kim Hong-Beom (2004a: 12) argues that during the post-crisis period, the institutional 
setting in financial administration was in practice a vertical institutional hierarchy with the MFK 
on the top. The MFK, the argument goes, established policy directions and then other authorities, 
the FSC/FSS, BoK and KDIC, carried out policies according to the directions.
404 Author’s confidential interview with a senior FSS official, Seoul, 31 January 2005.
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experience of the financial crisis. Indeed, the country’s compliance with the BIS 
standard during the post-crisis period was far improved compared with the pre-crisis 
period. Yet, the heavy domestic opposition to strict implementation of the BIS standard 
gave the government a strong incentive to ease levels of implementation and 
compliance. The limited independence of the regulatory authority from the government 
allowed government intervention in regulatory policies. As a result, the regulatory 
authority could not strengthen the country’s compliance further, despite its own 
willingness to do so.
Conclusions
Korea’s compliance with the BIS standard during the pre-crisis period demonstrates the 
effect of external compliance pressure and its limitations. The Korean regulatory 
authority adopted the BIS standard and helped the banks maintain formal compliance 
because of concerns that noncompliance by banks would have adverse consequences for 
their international business. However, there were no external compliance pressures on 
Korea to comply with the BIS standard comprehensively. Meanwhile, the Korean 
regulatory authority had no intention of earnestly complying with the BIS standard. As a 
result, as the financial condition of Korean banks weakened, the BIS standard was 
implemented leniently in order to ensure formal compliance, thereby avoiding negative 
consequences for the economy as a whole due to the banks’ compliance failure.
The country’s compliance improved significantly during the post-crisis period. The 
Korean BIS standard was strengthened to be largely in line with the Basel Accord, and 
accounting rules that affected the effectiveness of the standard were also upgraded. As a 
result, Korean banks’ actual capital adequacy levels were significantly improved. 
Pressure from the IMF and from the markets made some contribution to this shift in the 
country’s compliance. However, the major factor explaining the improvement of the 
country’s compliance with the BIS standard was the operation of the domestic 
compliance mechanism. The financial crisis changed the attitude of the Korean 
regulatory authority towards the importance of prudential regulation, leading them to 
put unprecedented emphasis on comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard.
Obviously, the regulatory authority exercised forbearance to some extent in 
regulating bank capital adequacy levels even during the post-crisis period. Compliance 
efforts by Korean banks caused firms to suffer from a decline in bank loans. This gave 
rise to strong domestic opposition to strict implementation of the BIS standard, thereby
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politicising compliance with the BIS standard. The government responded to this 
domestic demand by intervening in regulatory policies to relax the implementation of 
the BIS standard. The government intervention in regulatory policies was effective due 
to the limited independence of the regulatory authority from the government. Yet, it 
would be misleading to argue that the regulatory authority failed to strengthen the 
country’s compliance with the BIS standard during the post-crisis period. The country’s 
compliance during the early 2000s did not shift to pre-crisis levels, nor was it lower 
than the compliance levels under the IMF programme.
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CHAPTER 7
Taiwan: Weakening Comprehensive Compliance
Contrary to the Japanese and the Korean regulatory authorities, the Taiwanese 
regulatory authority had the intention of using the BIS standard to strengthen the 
soundness of the banking sector when they adopted it. As a result, Taiwan’s initial 
compliance with the BIS standard was more comprehensive than in Japan or Korea. 
Also, Taiwanese banks’ formal compliance was largely attributable to compliance 
enforcement from the domestic regulatory authority, although external compliance 
pressures also gave incentives for banks to comply with the BIS standard. Yet, Taiwan’s 
compliance became cosmetic from the mid-1990s onwards. The country’s compliance 
failure during this period mainly resulted from systemic capacity problems, which were 
mainly generated by domestic politics.
7.1 Compliance costs
The Taiwanese regulatory authority adopted the BIS standard both to ensure the stability 
of the banking sector and to maintain Taiwanese banks’ international business. The 
intention of the Taiwanese regulatory authority to maintain the stability of the banking 
sector by adopting the BIS standard was reflected in the Taiwanese BIS standard, which 
was constructed largely in accordance with the Basel Accord. As a result, there was no 
arbitrary provision in the Taiwanese BIS standard to inflate the BIS CARs of Taiwanese 
banks. The costs for Taiwanese banks of complying with the BIS standard were, in 
general, not high, although they had to adjust their behaviour in order to meet the 
required minimum CAR of 8 percent. However, the compliance costs of Taiwanese 
banks rose sharply from the late 1990s and remained high during the early 2000s, as 
their financial condition weakened and as the government forced them to dispose of 
their NPLs.
The construction o f  the Taiwanese BIS standard
When the BIS standard was adopted in Taiwan, Taiwanese banks had to adjust their
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behaviour in order to comply with it, even though the adjustment was not likely to be 
very costly. The author’s rough estimation based on the comparison of Taiwanese banks’ 
net worth ratios and BIS CARs in 1993 shows that the BIS CARs of major Taiwanese 
banks—government-owned commercial banks—was on average about 6.8 percent in 
1988 (see Table 7.1).405 This ratio was lower than the required 8 percent minimum or 
the corresponding figure for Japanese or U.S. banks (9.6 and 8.8 percent 
respectively),406 although it was higher than that of Korean banks (4.6 percent) (see 
OBS 1990b).407 Therefore, Taiwanese banks’ compliance with the BIS standard would 
not be automatic, even though their compliance costs were not likely to be 
significant.408
Table 7.1 Estimated BIS CARs of Taiwanese banks in 1988
(end o f  period; %)
1988 1993
xt * .. Estimated BIS Net worth ratio „ . „ LAR Net worth ratio BIS CAR
Government-owned 
commercial banks
Specialised banks 
Private banks
4.1 6.8
5.9 9.3 
5.7 8.1
5.9 9.8
5.9 9.3 
7.0 10.0
Source: The author’s own estimation from Central Bank o f China, various issues o f Jinron Jigou Yewu 
Gaikuang Nianbao (Financial Institutions Business Operation Annual Report).
Note: Private banks do not include new private banks established after the 1989 amendment o f  the 
Banking Law.
Nevertheless, the adoption of the BIS standard in Taiwan preceded quickly, 
equivalent to its implementation in Basel Committee countries.409 The principles of the 
Basel Accord were incorporated into the country’s banking regulations by the 
amendment of the Banking Law in July 1989. Article 44 of the amendment required 
Taiwanese banks to maintain their capital to risk-weighted assets ratios at no less than 8
405 As discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.3), the capital levels o f major Taiwanese banks were not 
high by international standards during the late 1980s.
406 As indicated earlier, the comparison o f disclosed BIS CARs across countries does not 
necessarily reflect the actual capital soundness o f banks in the countries. Nevertheless, the 
disclosed BIS CARs can show the relevant costs o f the banks to comply with the required 
minimum BIS CAR o f 8 percent.
407 However, Korean nationwide banks’ BIS CAR rose to 13.6 percent in 1989 (OBS 1990b).
408 In fact, the Taiwanese regulatory authority did not expect that Taiwanese banks would face 
serious difficulty in meeting the BIS standard, although there were a few weakly-capitalised 
banks (author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih).
409 As indicated earlier, although some Taiwanese banks were initially opposed to the adoption 
o f the BIS standard, they withdrew their opposition as foreign regulatory authorities required 
Taiwanese banks seeking to expand operations in the countries to submit their BIS CARs.
193
percent and empowered the competent regulatory authority, the MFT, to penalise banks 
that did not meet the ratio. Detailed rules governing the calculation of the BIS CAR 
were issued in April 1992 by the promulgation o f ‘Rules Governing the Coverage, 
Calculation Method of Owned Capital and Risk-Weighted Assets and Limitation to 
Distribution of Earning for Those Without Meeting the Standard.’410 Although the rules 
were announced in the three years after the 1989 amendment, they took effect on 
promulgation so that Taiwanese banks were required to comply with the BIS standard 
from 1992 as was the case for banks in Basel Committee countries.
The Taiwanese regulatory authority formulated the Taiwanese BIS standard akin to 
the Basel Accord, reflecting their intention to maintain the stability of the banking 
sector by implementing it (see Table 7.2). Some categories of assets which were not on 
the list of risk-weighted asset categories in the Accord were allocated risk weights of 
less than 100 percent. Such assets were a bank’s claims collateralised by deposits in the 
bank and claims guaranteed by credit guarantee bodies established by the government. 
Zero percent risk weight was allocated to the first category and 20 percent to the second 
category. In a strict sense, these assets should have been allocated a 100 percent risk 
weight according to the Accord. However, the zero percent application could be 
justified given that the risk of loss was extremely low for the assets in the first category. 
Also, the 20 percent risk weight seemed to be plausible, as the credit guarantee bodies 
were public sector entities backed by the central government, which maintained its 
credit ratings at an ‘AA’ level.411 As in Japan and Korea, a risk weight of 10 percent 
was allocated to claims on Taiwanese public sector entities excluding central 
government or claims guaranteed by such entities or claims collateralised by securities 
issued by such entities; and 45 percent of unrealised gains on securities holdings were 
included in tier 2 capital.412 Yet, in contrast to Japan and Korea, all Taiwanese banks, 
including specialised banks, were subject to the BIS standard.413
410 The English title o f the regulation has grammatical problems, but it is the one used by the 
BoMA.
411 Taiwan’s sovereign rating was AA+ by S&P’s in December 1992, and it was Aa3 by 
Moody’s in March 1994.
412 The inclusion o f 45 percent o f unrealised gains on securities holdings in the regulatory 
capital was to help banks— particularly government-owned banks— to meet the required 8 
percent minimum (author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih). However, this capital element 
accounted for a trivial portion o f the total capital bases o f Taiwanese banks. This issue will be 
discussed later in this chapter.
413 It is misleading to argue that Taiwanese authorities constructed the Taiwanese BIS standard 
more strictly than other countries based on the unitary application o f the BIS standard to all 
Taiwanese banks. In fact, most o f the countries that adopted the BIS standard applied it to all 
(commercial) banks; a country that applied it only to international banks— for example, Japan—
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Table 7.2 The Taiwanese BIS standard of 1992
A. Capital elements 
Tier 1
(a) Common stockholder’s equity
(b) Non-cumulative perpetual stock
(c) Capital reserves (except fixed asset revaluation reserves)
(d) Retained earnings
(e) Minority interests in equity accounts of subsidiaries
(f) Cumulative effect of equity adjustments 
Tier 2
(a) Cumulative preference shares
(b) Fixed asset revaluation reserves
(c) 45 per cent of unrealised holding gains of long-term equity investments
(d) Operation reserves
(e) Convertible debt securities and allowances for loan and lease losses (except the reserves 
created against identified losses).
B. Deductions from the capital base 
From tier 1: Goodwill
From total capital: Banks’ holdings of equity capital issued by other banks
C. Risk weights by category of on-balance-sheet asset 
0%
(a) Cash
(b) Claims on the central Taiwanese government and the central bank or claims guaranteed by 
such entities
(c) Claims on OECD central governments and central banks or claims guaranteed by such 
entities
(d) Claims on non-OECD central governments and central banks denominated in national 
currency, and
(e) claims collateralised by cash, deposits in the lender’s own account, securities issued by the 
Taiwanese central government or central bank securities or securities issued by OECD central 
governments or central banks.
10%
(a) Claims on the Taiwanese public sector entities excluding central government or claims 
guaranteed by such entities
(b) Claims collateralised by securities issued by the Taiwanese public sector entities excluding 
central government.
20%
(a) Claims on multilateral development banks and claims guaranteed by, or collateralised by 
securities issued by such banks
(b) Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and claims guaranteed by such banks
(c) Claims on banks incorporated in countries outside the OECD with a residual maturity of up 
to one year and claims with a residual maturity of up to one year guaranteed by such banks
(d) Claims on non-OECD public sector entities, excluding central government, and claims 
guaranteed by such entities
(e) Claims on Taiwan banks or claims guaranteed by those banks_______________________
was exceptional. In addition, contrary to Korea, most specialised banks engaged in commercial 
banking in Taiwan (BoMA 1992: 1). The unitary application o f the BIS standard in Taiwan was 
partly to level the playing field for domestic banks (Author’s confidential interview with a 
senior BoMA official, Taipei, 2 November 2004).
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(f) Export negotiation and remittance purchased
(g) Claims guaranteed by credit guarantee entities authorised by the Taiwanese government 
50%
Loans secured by mortgage on residential property.
100%
All other claims and assets______________________________________________________________
Source: Bureau o f  Monetary Affairs, Jinrong Fagui Tonghan Huibian (Di-er-ji) (Series o f  Financial 
Regulations (the 2nd series)).
The changing financial condition o f banks
The adoption of the BIS standard in Taiwan led Taiwanese banks to adjust their 
behaviour. For instance, the annual rate of increase in the assets of Taiwanese banks 
continued to decline from 1992 onwards (see Figure 7.1). In addition, while the banks’ 
ratio of net worth to total assets ranged only from 2.7 to 3.9 percent between 1984 and 
1988, it rose to 5.6 percent in 1992 and continued to increase to 7.0 percent by 1999.414 
However, the costs of Taiwanese banks complying with the BIS standard appeared to be 
not very high in general, until the late 1990s. As Figure 7.1 shows, the annual increase 
rate of net worth of the banks surpassed the asset increase rate during most of the 1990s. 
Although NPLs began to increase from the early 1990s, their size was at a manageable 
level until the mid-1990s: the official ratio of NPLs to total assets of Taiwanese banks 
was below 3 percent until 1996.415 As a result, even though there were a few weakly- 
capitalised banks, the implementation of the BIS standard was, by and large, smooth 
until the late 1990s 416
4,4 The ratio began to drop from 2000, reaching 5.8 percent in 2002.
415 Until July 2005, official NPLs covered the following: loans for which payment of principal 
was overdue for more than three months; instalment repayments for medium and long-term 
loans that were overdue for more than six months; and any loan o f which repayment o f interest 
was overdue for more than six months.
416 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interview with a senior 
BoMA official, by email, 2 September 2004.
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Figure 7.1 Annual increase rates o f assets and net worth of Taiwanese banks, 1988-2002
(end o f  period; %)
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Source: Central Bank o f  China, Jinron Jigou Yewu Gaikuang Nianbao (Financial Institutions Business 
Operation Annual Report).
Note: All domestic general banks are included.
However, although Taiwan weathered the 1997 Asian financial crisis largely 
unscathed, the financial condition o f  Taiwanese banks began to deteriorate from the late 
1990s. A range o f  factors— the loss o f  com petitiveness o f  Taiw an’s traditional industries 
to their m ainland rivals from the m id-1990s, a decade long recession in the property 
m arket, strong com petition in an over-crow ded and fragm ented financial system, poor 
lending practices o f  banks, and so on— caused a sharp increase in N PLs (Fitch Ratings 
2002b: 2, 2002c: 2-3; S& P’s 2003: 15). The official volum e o f  N PLs in all domestic 
banks reached a record high o f  TW D 1,087 billion at the end o f  2001, raising the NPL 
ratio to 7.5 percent from 3.7 percent at the end o f  1997. In the meantim e, the operating 
incom es o f  the banks drastically declined from 1998. The aggregate volum e o f 
operating incom e in all dom estic banks contracted by more than 40 percent from 1998 
to 2000 (see Figure 7.2). In early 1999, a senior econom ist at the central bank came to 
com m ent: “A local-made banking crisis has already hit Taiwan” (China News 8 
February 1999).
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Figure 7.2 The financial condition o f Taiwanese banks, 1991-2003
(end o f  period; %; TWD million)
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Source: Central Bank o f  China, NPL Ratios o f  Domestic Banks', Central Bank o f  China, various issues o f  
Jinron Jigou Yewu Gaikuang Nianbao (Financial Institutions Business Operation Annual Report).
Note: Before 1992, the NPL figures only included the data o f  domestic banking units o f  Taiwanese banks. 
Since 1993, the figures were complied on a consolidated basis, and included the data o f  domestic banking 
units, offshore banking units and overseas branches o f  Taiwanese banks.
As fears o f  a banking crisis in the country were growing, the governm ent began to 
put substantial pressure on banks to improve their asset quality. The M FT required 
banks to cut their “overdue loan” ratios, which hit 5.1 percent at the end o f  M arch 1999, 
to under 2.5 percent in four years, despite opposition from banks, w hich argued that 
their BIS CARs would slide below 8 percent under the plan ( Taiwan Economic News 13 
M ay 1999).417 Also, in August 2002, the governm ent introduced a new policy, the “2-5- 
8 financial target.” Under the policy, banks were required to reduce their NPL ratios to 
below 5 percent w ithin two years while m aintaining their BIS CA Rs above 8 percent 
(BoM A 2003a: 31). These policies, which forced banks to reduce im paired assets, 
placed heavy dow nw ard pressure on their BIS CARs.
The disposal o f  N PLs caused operating losses for banks, leading to erosion o f  the 
capital bases o f  several. A ccording to an estim ate by Fitch Ratings (2003a: 2), the “2-5- 
8 financial target” was expected to reduce the banking sector’s average BIS CAR by 
roughly 2 percentage points, and about 35 percent o f  all Taiwanese banks were expected 
to face difficulty in m aintaining their BIS CARs above the required 8 percent minimum. 
B anks’ disposal o f  im paired assets began to accelerate from early 2000. Overall, banks
417 “Overdue loans” were essentially six months in arrears and were reported by banks to the 
MFT, which allowed several items to be deducted from the NPL calculation. Therefore, the size 
o f “overdue loans” was usually smaller than that o f NPLs. The data on “overdue loans” was 
published until March 2001 (Fitch Ratings 2001: 2).
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w rote o ff  over TW D 900 billion in problem  assets during 2001 to 2003, equivalent to 
about 60 percent o f  the sec to r’s aggregate net worth at the end o f  2000 (S & P ’s 
CreditW eek 2004). As a result, the sector reported its first pre-tax losses o f  TW D  47.3 
billion (about USD 1.5 billion) in the first ha lf o f  2002 (Fitch Ratings 2002d: 3). In 
short, costs for Taiwanese banks to com ply with the BIS standard drastically rose from 
the late 1990s and remained high through the early 2000s due to their w eakening 
financial condition and pressure from the governm ent on them  to accelerate the disposal 
o f  NPLs.
7.2 A shift from comprehensive to cosmetic compliance
Despite sharply rising com pliance costs from the late 1990s, Taiwanese banks’ 
com pliance showed a fair record on formal com pliance with the BIS standard 
throughout the 1990s to the early 2000s. BIS CARs o f  all dom estic banks reached an 
average o f about 20 percent, more than double the required m inim um  8 percent, at the 
end o f  1993. Even though the ratio dropped below 12 percent after 1997, it was still 
over 10 percent at the end o f  2003. M oreover, the capital bases o f  the banks were 
m ostly com posed o f tier 1 capital, which was a more reliable capital base than tier 2 
capital. The average tier 1 ratio was higher than 8 percent, staying at over 9 percent 
during the period. In fact, the tier 1 ratio surpassed the overall BIS CAR in 2000 and 
2001 (see Figure 7.3).
Figure 7.3 The average BIS CAR of Taiwanese banks, 1993-2003
(end o f  period; %)
1993 94  95  9 6  9 7  9 8  9 9  2 0 0 0  01 0 2  03
■  T o ta l B IS  C A R  O T i e r  1 r a t io  I
Source: Central Bank o f  China, various issues o f Benguo Yinhang Yingyun Jixiao Jibao  (Conditions and
199
Performance of Domestic Banks).
The high BIS CARs were not caused by a few banks with extremely high ratios. A 
large number of banks kept their BIS CARs above 10 percent even after the late 1990s, 
and more than half the banks had maintained their BIS CARs above 10 percent at the 
end of 2003. By contrast, a very limited number of banks failed to comply with the 8 
percent rule. There were only one or two compliance failures before 1999, with the 
exception of 1993, on an annual basis. As the financial condition of the banks 
deteriorated, the number of compliance failures slightly increased from 1999, marking a 
high of six in 2002 (see Table 7.3). However, the number of banks that failed to clear 
the minimum 8 percent was still limited to about one tenth of the total banks between 
1999 and 2003.
200
Table 7.3 The distribution of BIS CARs of Taiwanese banks, 1993-2002
(end o f period; number)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
10% and higher 28 35 31 35 37 23 30 29 29 31 28
8% and higher but 
lower than 10% 10 6 9 6 9 23 18 19 19 15 17
Lower than 8% 3 1 2 1 1 2 4 5 5 6 5
Total number o f banks 41 42 42 42 47 48 52 . 53 53 52 50
Source: Central Bank of China, various issues of Benguo Unhang Yingyun Jixiao Jibao (Conditions and Performance of Domestic Banks).
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In addition, during the early 1990s, the disclosed BIS CARs o f  Taiwanese banks 
largely reflected their actual capital condition. The ratio o f  loan loss provisions to 
official N PLs was about 110 percent in 1993 (see Figure 7.4). In fact, as w ill be 
discussed shortly, the official definition o f  N PLs was not strong, and, therefore, the 
disclosed BIS CARs should be discounted to some extent in order to fully reflect the 
actual capital soundness o f  the banks. However, given that Taiwanese banks carried a 
very lim ited am ount o f  im paired assets during the early 1990s, the discount o f the 
significance o f  the disclosed BIS CARs should be limited.418 Also, except for the rules 
on asset classification and provisioning, there was no other significant regulatory 
forbearance exercised by the Taiwanese regulatory authority in the area o f  bank capital 
adequacy during this period. Therefore, Taiw an’s com pliance with the BIS standard 
during the early 1990s was by and large com prehensive.
Figure 7.4 Loan loss provisions to NPLs ratio of Taiwanese banks, 1993-2003
(end o f  period; %)
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Source: Central Bank o f  China, various issues o f  Benguo Yinhang Yingyun Jixiao Jibao  (Conditions and 
Performance o f  Domestic Banks).
However, the disclosed BIS CARs o f  Taiwanese banks failed to reflect their actual 
capital condition from the mid-1990s. From this point on, N PLs in the banks were 
significantly under-provisioned, w hich inflated the level o f  tier 1 capital. As Figure 7.4 
shows, the ratio o f  loan loss provisions to official NPLs sharply dropped from the mid- 
1990s, w hen N PLs began to increase sharply. The ratio had since ranged m erely from
418 The official ratio of NPLs to total assets of Taiwanese banks was below 1 percent during 
1991 and 1992 and below 2 percent during 1993 and 1994.
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20 to 40 percent, hitting a low of 20 percent at the end of 2001.419 Moreover, the official 
definition of NPLs was narrow, not including either loans with interest payment overdue 
for more than three months but less than six months or restructured loans.420 According 
to an estimate by S&P’s and the Taiwan Ratings Corporation, which employed a 
broader definition of NPLs by adding loans overdue for more than three months, 
restructured loans and foreclosed assets, NPLs in Taiwanese banks amounted to 13 
percent of the total loans at the end of 2002, whereas the official volume of NPLs 
accounted for only 6.4 percent of them (S&P’s 2003: 15). Therefore, if a broader 
definition of NPL was employed, the loan loss provisions ratio of Taiwanese banks 
would have been lower. Indeed, Taiwanese banks admitted that a large portion of their 
performing loans would be categorised as NPLs under stricter regulations of asset 
classification, such as those employed by foreign countries such as, for example, the 
United States (see FFH 2003: 39).42'
In fact, the required level of loan loss provision was low, for example, even in 
comparison with the Korean rules before the financial crisis. Taiwanese banks were 
required to classify their loans into four categories: “normal”, “special mention”, 
“doubtful”, and “loss”. No provisions were required for loans categorised not only as 
“normal” but also as “special mention.” Also, only 50 percent of “doubtful” loans were 
required to be provisioned, although “loss” loans had to be fully provisioned (BoMA 
2004: 35). Because provisions for “doubtful” (and “loss”) loans were classified as 
special provisions (FFH 2003: 98), which were not eligible for inclusion in the 
regulatory capital, the low requirement of provisions for loans in the category could 
directly inflate the disclosed BIS CARs of banks through a rise in the tier 1 capital.
Accordingly, during the early 2000s, even though Taiwanese banks were in 
compliance with the required 8 percent, it was widely admitted—even by the banks (see 
FFH 2003: 38)—that a regulatory requirement of a substantial increase in their loan loss 
provisions would have driven their BIS CARs under 8 percent (see Fitch Ratings 2002c: 
4;S&P’s 2003: 38). Indeed, according to an estimate by Fitch Ratings using an official 
volume of impaired assets, thirteen banks out of thirty two under its coverage in 2001 
were technically insolvent—a net NPLs (the sum of official NPLs and “loans under
419 The ratio o f Taiwanese banks was at the lowest level compared with foreign banks. The ratio 
was 118 percent for U.S. banks, and 86 percent for German banks, 70 percent for U.K. banks in
2001. See IMF (2003a) for more international data.
420 See note 415 for the official definition o f NPLs until July 2005.
421 For example, Boadao Commercial Bank reduced its official volume o f NPLs by removing 
close to TWD 4 billion (3.5 times pre-provision profits) between the end o f 2000 and June 2001, 
largely by rescheduling NPLs (Fitch Ratings 2001: 4).
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surveillance”422) to net worth ratio in excess o f  100 percent (Fitch Ratings 2002c: 4). 
Nevertheless, the disclosed BIS CARs o f  most banks surpassed 8 percent in the year.
Figure 7.5 provides more information on the actual capital condition o f  Taiwanese 
banks during the early 2000s. The BIS CARs o f  First Commercial Bank, one o f  the 
three major commercial banks in Taiwan, at the end o f  2001 and 2002 were estimated 
under the assumption o f  stricter provisioning requirements. The items o f  “loans under 
surveillance”, as well as official NPLs, were included in NPLs. The bank’s BIS CARs 
were estimated under three different scenarios: write-offs o f  50, 75, and 100 percent o f  
the unprovisioned portion o f  the NPLs.423 While the bank’s disclosed BIS CAR was 9.3 
percent at the end o f  2001, the estimated BIS CAR amounted to only half o f  the 
disclosed figure under the 50 percent write-offs scenario and it became negative under 
the 100 percent write-offs scenario. Although the estimated BIS CARs increased at the 
end o f  2002, they were still far below 8 percent in all three scenarios.
Figure 7.5 Adjusted BIS CARs of First Commercial Bank, 2001-2002
(end o f  period; %)
[■ D it to —d BISCAR O undoS O H  D u n d f  75% M undw 1QO%|
Source: The author’s own estimation from First Financial Holdings, 2003, G lobal D epositary Shares 
Offering Circular.
The above analysis o f  the compliance record o f  Taiwanese banks concludes that
422 “Loans under surveillance” included the following: term loans overdue for three months but 
less than six months; loans with principal not yet overdue or overdue for less than three months 
but with interests payments overdue for more than three months but less than six months; and 
loans whose overdue period reached the official NPL standard but were exempt from being 
classified as a NPL (CBC 2003). Generally, the official NPL standard was treated as a narrow 
definition o f  NPLs while a broad definition o f NPLs aggregated official NPLs and “loans under 
surveillance”.
423 When First Commercial Bank sold its NPLs to a foreign asset management company in 
March 2000, an estimated loss rate o f  the sale was 75 percent (Fitch Ratings 2002b: 3).
2 0 4
since most Taiwanese banks were in formal compliance with the BIS standard despite 
their growing compliance costs, it appeared that the banks were under pressure to 
comply with it. Secondly, in spite of formal compliance, Taiwanese banks’ compliance 
shifted from reasonably comprehensive to cosmetic compliance from the mid-1990s 
onwards. The following sections address what explains the formal compliance record of 
Taiwanese banks and what caused the country’s failure of comprehensive compliance 
after the early 1990s.
7.3 The operation of compliance mechanisms
Taiwanese banks’ formal compliance with the BIS standard was attributable to 
compliance pressures of three kinds; from foreign countries, from markets, and from the 
domestic regulatory authorities. The regulatory enforcement by the domestic regulatory 
authority appeared to play the most pivotal role in ensuring the compliance, while the 
effect of pressure from foreign regulatory authorities on the compliance appeared to be 
most limited. Meanwhile, the cosmetic compliance of Taiwanese banks with the BIS 
standard after the early 1990s appeared to be partly attributable to the absence of 
substantial external pressures—both from foreign countries and from markets—on them 
to improve their capital soundness.
The domestic compliance mechanism
In Taiwan, the domestic compliance mechanism operated throughout the 1990s and the 
early 2000s, as the Taiwanese regulatory authority had the willingness to maintain the 
stability of the banking sector by implementing the BIS standard. In contrast to the 
Japanese or the Korean regulatory authorities during the early 1990s, the Taiwanese 
regulatory authority intended to punish noncompliant banks. In consequence, the 
primary pressure on Taiwanese banks to formally comply with the BIS standard came 
from the domestic regulatory authority through all the period from the 1990s to the 
early 2000s.424
Penalties that the MFT could impose on banks for noncompliance with the BIS 
standard were explicitly laid out in the 1989 amendment of the Banking Law. A bank 
that failed to meet the required 8 percent minimum could be prohibited from
424 Author’s confidential interviews with bankers in major Taiwanese banks, Taipei, 27 August 
2004 and 1 September 2004.
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distributing its earnings. A bank with a CAR beyond 6 but below 8 percent was not 
allowed to distribute more than 20 percent of its net profits after-tax. A bank with a 
CAR below 6 percent was entirely prohibited from distributing its earnings. A PCA 
system was not implemented in Taiwan, and the MFT had discretion in taking 
regulatory actions. However, the enforcement of the BIS standard by the ministry was 
by and large faithful. The penalties were, in practice, imposed against banks whose BIS 
CARs fell below these thresholds.425
Furthermore, the scope of penalties imposed against compliance failure was broader 
in practice than the provisions prescribed in the law. A bank’s compliance failure could 
invoke limitations on its business activities 426 The MFT prohibited a bank with its BIS 
CAR below 8 percent from engaging in the unsecured loan business in 1994, even 
though there was political pressure to protect the bank 427 When the BIS CAR of a bank 
dropped below 8 percent in 1995, the MFT forced it to either write off some NPLs or set 
aside sufficient provisions against overdue credit. The ministry required the bank to 
submit a plan covering capital infusion and improvement within a specified period of 
time, and also instructed the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) to send 
staff to be stationed at the bank to supervise and assist conduct of business (BoMA 
1996a: 47).
As the financial condition of Taiwanese banks was aggravated, it became a salient 
task for the regulatory authority to ensure the capital adequacy of the banks.428 As a 
result, regulatory penalties for noncompliance with the BIS standard were strengthened. 
The amendment of the Banking Law of November 2000 made a bank with a BIS CAR 
below the regulatory minimum subject to a fine of between TWD 2 million and TWD 
10 million (approximately between USD 60,000 and USD 310,000). When a bank failed 
to correct its violations within the period specified by the MFT, the ministry could 
impose additional fines on a daily basis, remove the responsible person of the bank, or 
revoke its banking license depending on the seriousness of violation.
Changes in the regulations of bank capital adequacy in October 2001 empowered 
the MFT to impose any of the following sanctions on a bank when its BIS CAR fell
425 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interview with a senior 
BoMA official, by email, 2 September 2004 . See also Taiwan Economic News (15 December 
2000).
426 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interview with a senior 
BoMA official, Taipei, 2 November 2004.
427 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih.
428 After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Taiwan government was carrying out the overall 
strengthening o f the financial system. See Liou (2002: 141-142).
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below 6 percent: prohibition of the distribution of any payments to directors; prohibition 
of equity investments; prohibition of the application for the opening of new branches; 
limitation on the business that could increase the bank’s risky assets; a regulatory order 
to dispose of equity investments; and a regulatory order to close branches.429 In addition, 
from 2003, a bank with a BIS CAR below 10 percent was prevented from establishing 
overseas branches (Taiwan Economic News 23 October 2002), and, from the same year, 
a bank was also required to maintain its BIS CARs above 8 percent in order to set up 
representative offices in China (BoMA 2003b).
The enforcement of compliance with the BIS standard by the regulatory authority 
gave a strong incentive for Taiwanese banks to formally comply with the standard. 
Indeed, during the late 1990s and the 2000s, as the financial condition of the banking 
sector deteriorated, some banks desperately tried to window-dress their balance sheets 
by classifying some NPLs as “normal” loans in order to avoid regulatory penalties for 
failure to comply with the BIS standard.430 Taiwanese banks’ formal compliance with 
the standard was largely attributable to the operation of the domestic compliance 
mechanism, as the following section demonstrates.
Limited role o f  external compliance pressure
There were also external pressures from foreign regulatory authorities and from markets 
on Taiwanese banks to comply with the BIS standard. Because the BIS standard was the 
domestic capital adequacy regulation for Taiwanese banks, they faced external pressures 
to comply with the standard formally. In addition, some features of the banks’ 
compliance seemed to reflect the operation of external pressures for comprehensive 
compliance. Yet, external compliance pressures played a limited role in inducing 
Taiwanese banks to comply with the BIS standard formally. Also, there was not 
substantial external pressure on banks to comply with the BIS standard comprehensively.
Regulation by foreign regulatory authorities over banks to comply with their home 
regulations was likely to force Taiwanese banks operating in these countries to comply 
with the BIS standard formally. However, the compliance pressure from foreign 
regulatory authorities did not appear to fully explain the banks’ formal compliance
429 The new regulations replaced the Rules Governing the Coverage, Calculation Method of 
Owned Capital and Risk-Weighted Assets and Limitation to Distribution o f Earning for Those 
without Meeting the Standard.
430 Author’s confidential interview with a banker in a major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 
2004.
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record. The number of Taiwanese banks that were exposed to this kind of compliance 
pressure was not high. As Table 4.2 showed, overseas activities of Taiwanese banks 
rapidly increased. Nonetheless, only a limited proportion of Taiwanese banks had 
overseas establishments. Only ten out of a total of thirty-two banks had overseas 
footholds at the end of 1992. In spite of an increase in the number of banks with 
overseas establishments, less than half of the total Taiwanese banks had branches or 
representative offices in foreign countries at the end of 2001. Thus, the pressure from 
foreign supervisory authorities to comply with the BIS standard could only be brought 
to bear on a limited number of Taiwanese banks during the 1990s and early 2000s.
There was no substantial pressure from foreign regulatory authorities on Taiwanese 
banks to comply with the BIS standard comprehensively, despite their weakening actual 
capital adequacy. In fact, some foreign regulatory authorities carefully observed the BIS 
CAR calculation process of Taiwanese banks with overseas branches in their countries. 
Nevertheless, they did not require those banks to improve their capital bases either 
qualitatively or quantitatively, since they accepted Taiwan’s required BIS CAR 
minimum of 8 percent.431 Also, even though some countries set a required minimum 
BIS CAR higher than 8 percent for domestic banks, Taiwanese banks that did not meet 
the country’s required minimum BIS CARs had no problem in doing business in those 
countries, as long as they cleared the Taiwan’s rule of 8 percent; neither did they feel 
pressure to increase their BIS CARs from the higher required minimum BIS CARs in 
the countries.432 The absence of an overt financial crisis in Taiwan may have reduced 
the willingness of foreign countries to put significant pressure on Taiwanese banks to 
improve their soundness. In addition, the Taiwanese BIS standard per se had no 
elements which could be regarded as conflicting with the Basel Accord.
As analysed earlier, a bank faces market pressure to clear the required regulatory 
minimum CAR, and indeed Taiwanese banks believed that their creditworthiness would 
be tarnished in markets if their disclosed BIS CARs failed to meet the regulatory 8 
percent minimum.433 Thus, market pressure, along with domestic regulatory
431 Author’s confidential interview with a banker in a major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 
2004.
432 Author’s confidential interviews with a banker in a major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 
2004, and a senior BoMA official, by email, 2 September 2004. For example, among Asian 
countries, Hong Kong set up a required BIS CAR minimum at 10 percent, and Singapore at 12 
percent for domestic banks, while the BIS CAR o f First Commercial Bank, which had branches 
in these countries, was below 10 percent from 1999 to 2003. However, the bank did not face 
problems in doing business in the countries.
433 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interview with a banker in a
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enforcement, played a role in ensuring Taiwanese banks formally complied with the BIS 
standard.
Yet Taiwanese banks did not feel strong pressure from markets to comply with the 
BIS standard comprehensively, or to increase their BIS CARs, as long as they cleared 
the regulatory 8 percent minimum.434 In fact, BIS CARs of the big three commercial 
banks were below 10 percent, which was widely cited as a level for competent banks, 
for much of the time between 1998 and 2003, reaching about 9 percent at the end of
2002. Nonetheless, the relatively low BIS CAR level of the banks did not cause them 
significant disadvantages in doing business in international financial markets during the 
period 435 Meanwhile, in Taiwan, “BIS standard” was still only jargon for financial 
experts, and there was little evidence that general domestic depositors shifted money 
according to banks’ compliance with the BIS standard 436
One may question why a good number of Taiwanese banks maintained a high level 
of BIS CARs and a high proportion of tier 1 capital when external pressures for 
comprehensive compliance were not substantial. In fact, the Taiwanese regulatory 
authority did not require, either explicitly or implicitly, Taiwanese banks to keep their 
BIS CARs higher than 8 percent or to maintain high tier 1 ratios, except for the new 
regulations governing the opening of overseas footholds introduced in 2003.437 On the 
contrary, the regulatory authority helped the banks increase their capital bases when 
their financial condition worsened, by allowing them to issue subordinate debt and 
preferred stocks 438 Yet, consideration of the following factors confirms the weak 
effectiveness of external pressure for comprehensive compliance.
For government-owned banks with a high BIS CAR, this high CAR resulted from
major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 2004.
434 Author’s confidential interview with a banker in a major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 
2004. This perception appeared stronger among government-owned banks or big banks 
compared with small private banks (author’s confidential interview with a banker in a major 
Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 2004). For an economic analysis to support this argument, 
see Yu (2000: 113).
435 Author’s confidential interview with a banker o f a major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 
2004.
436 Deposit growth rates o f Taiwanese banks that failed to meet the required 8 percent minimum 
sometimes exceeded the deposit growth rate o f the overall bank sector. For example, MaCoto 
Bank’s (private commercial bank) BIS CAR dropped to 5.7 percent at the end o f July 1998 (the 
ratio recovered to 8.5 percent at the end of year), but its deposits grew by 50 percent during the 
year, in which the annual deposit growth rate o f the banking sector was 10.7 percent. Also, Pan 
Asia Bank’s (private commercial bank) was below 8 percent between the end o f 1998 and the 
end o f 2003, but its annual deposit growth rate surpassed the annual growth rate o f the overall 
banking sector in 1999 and in 2001.
437 Author’s confidential interview with a senior BoMA official, by email, 2 September 2004.
438 Author’s confidential interview with a senior BoMA official, Taipei, 2 November 2004.
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their peculiar financial structures, which maintained a large volume of claims on the 
government and as a result reduced the size of the risk-weighted assets.439 For example, 
about half of the loans of the Bank of Taiwan, whose BIS CAR reached 14.6 percent (its 
historical low since 1995) at the end of 2003, consisted of claims on government 
agencies (42 percent) or government enterprises (3 percent) (Bank of Taiwan 2003)440 
For private banks, the minimum paid-in capital requirement was extremely high, 
amounting to TWD 10 billion, while their asset size was relatively small. Indeed, the 
BIS CARs of most private banks that were established after the 1989 amendment of the 
Banking Law were extremely high in the early 1990s, reaching 31 percent on average at 
the end of 1993. Finally, the poor development of local financial markets hindered 
banks from issuing tier 2 capital instruments;441 subordinated debt was not introduced 
in Taiwan until 1998.
7.4 Failure of comprehensive compliance
Taiwanese banks’ cosmetic compliance with the BIS standard after the early 1990s 
resulted from regulatory forbearance by the domestic regulatory authority. The 
regulatory authority maintained lenient rules on asset classification and provisioning for 
an extraordinarily long period, lagging behind other Asian countries. Furthermore, as 
the financial condition of Taiwanese banks deteriorated, the regulatory authority 
sometimes allowed banks to categorise NPLs as “normal” loans,442 and also allowed 
banks to not report their losses generated from holdings of securities (in 1998) (China 
News 8 February 1999b). In addition, the CBC permitted banks to amortise losses from 
selling NPLs over a five-year period and not to deduct the unamortised losses from the 
regulatory capital (Fitch Ratings 2002a: 2). Thus, it was obvious that the regulatory 
authority intentionally reduced the compliance costs of Taiwanese banks in practice as 
their financial condition weakened. This section addresses why the regulatory authority, 
which forced banks to comply with the BIS standard in order to maintain stability in the
439 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih.
440 According to Fitch Ratings (2003b: 4), banks from emerging markets tended to maintain 
higher tier 1 ratios due to their large holdings o f sovereign debt.
441 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih; author’s confidential interview with a senior 
BoMA official, by email, 2 September 2004.
442 Confidential author interview, banker o f a major Taiwanese bank, Taipei, 27 August 2004. 
For example, the MFT permitted the credit banks o f failed conglomerates such as Hong Kyo, 
Tuntex and Ever Fortune to classify the problem exposures as “normal” loans in late 1998 (Fitch 
Ratings 2002c: 2-3).
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banking sector, opted for cosmetic compliance as the financial condition of the banking 
sector deteriorated.
Systemic incapacity
The regulatory forbearance appeared to be an inevitable choice of the regulatory 
authority in order to maintain financial stability, in the absence of an appropriate 
financial safety net to deal with failed banks. As discussed earlier, the regulatory 
authority had traditionally put great emphasis on the stability of the financial system.443 
Yet, instability in the financial system was growing from the mid-1990s. In 1995, the 
MFT planned to close a troubled small credit cooperative association in the Changhua 
region, but all banks in the region faced bank runs the following day, and banks in the 
regions near to Changhua faced bank runs the day after that; eventually the ministry had 
to change its policy to request a state-owned bank to rescue the credit union.444 Since 
then, more than twenty bank runs have occurred at commercial banks and small 
financial institutions through the second half of the 1990s (Kuo 2000: 16). In the late 
1990s, fears of a banking crisis emerged, as mentioned earlier. Indeed, Taiwanese banks’ 
credit ratings were downgraded during the late 1990s and the early 2000s.445
In this situation, the stricter implementation of the BIS standard could have 
aggravated instability in the financial system in the short-term. The implementation of 
stricter accounting rules would have caused the capital bases of Taiwanese banks to 
contract, driving a large part of them to fail to meet the required 8 percent minimum or 
even to go bankrupt. To prevent financial instability in this situation, an appropriate 
financial safety net to deal with ailing banks should have been in place. Yet, there was 
no such financial safety net in the country. Therefore, there was the likelihood that the 
implementation of stricter accounting rules could trigger the outbreak of a financial 
crisis. Accordingly, the regulatory authority had to keep lenient accounting rules, 
helping banks maintain their disclosed BIS CARs over 8 percent.
The lack of an appropriate financial safety net was partly the result of financial
443 See Chapter 3 (section 3.3).
444 Author’s interview with Wang Jiunn-Chih.
445 For example, S&P’s Long-Term Issuer Ratings were downgraded for the Bank of Taiwan 
from AA- (since October 1995) to A+ in July 1997, for Taiwan Cooperative Bank from A (since 
February 1997) to BBB in May 1999, for China Development Industrial Bank from A (since. 
August 1998) to A- in May 2002, for International Commercial Bank o f China from A+ (since 
January 1998) to A in October 2002, and for Grand Commercial Bank from BB+ (since August 
1998) to BB in November 2002.
211
liberalisation, which was accelerated by the 1989 amendment of the Banking Law. 
Before the 1990s, when most banks were government-owned, the likelihood of a 
banking crisis may have not been high as the government could support the banks 
directly. However, the 1989 amendment allowed the establishment of a large number of 
new private banks. As a result, the number of private commercial banks increased from 
three in 1990 to twenty-two by 2000. The government traditionally forced healthy 
government-owned banks to take over troubled small financial institutions. However, 
the number of government-owned banks declined due to privatisation in the banking 
sector; nine government-owned banks were privatised by 2001, reducing the number of 
banks fully owned by the government to only five (BoMA 2002: 31). In addition, as the 
financial condition of the overall banking sector had been aggravated, it became 
difficult to find banks strong enough to take over weak banks.446 In March 2002, 
Finance Minister Lee Yung-San commented that the government would have to let 
banks go bankrupt, but under the condition that it would not trigger instability in the 
banking system, indicating: “[t]here are not enough big banks to absorb bad banks”
(Euromoney April 2002).
There was a deposit insurance system in the country, and, in fact, until 2001, the 
only official resource that the government could resort to in dealing with banking 
problems were the deposit insurance funds in CDIC (Fitch Ratings 2002d: 3). However, 
CDIC was so under-funded that its capacity to deal with troubled financial institutions 
was highly limited; the total insurance funds available amounted to only TWD 13 
billion in 2001. Given that the minimum paid-in capital requirement for commercial 
banks was TWD 10 billion, the insolvency of one bank could wipe out the funds in the 
CDIC and make it bankrupt (Yin 2001: 26).
The government strengthened the financial safety net to an extent by establishing 
public funds, the Financial Restructuring Fund (FRF), in July 2001.447 The FRF aimed 
to smooth the market exit of troubled financial institutions and thereby avoid triggering 
a financial crisis (CDIC 2004b). In addition, a temporary blanket insurance system was 
implemented during the operation of the FRF to maintain financial stability (CDIC 
2004a). However, the volume of the FRF was limited to TWD 140 billion, merely 
accounting for 1.4 percent of the nation’s GDP,448 while, according to an estimate by
446 Author’s confidential interview with a senior BoMA official, Taipei, 2 November 2004. See 
also Fitch Ratings (2002c: 4).
447 Author’s confidential interview with a senior BoMA official, Taipei, 2 November 2004. See 
also Financial Times (16 May 2002), and Fitch Ratings (2002d: 3).
448 The figure was much lower than Japan’s 12 percent and Korea’s 18 percent (Taiwan News 22
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the government in 2001, the total costs to recapitalise technically insolvent banks were 
expected to reach TWD 600 billion, 6 percent of the GDP (Fitch Ratings 2002c: 4). 
Moreover, the primary purpose of the FRF was to deal with community financial 
institutions, whose distressed financial condition was deemed an immediate threat to the 
financial system.449 Indeed, most of the funds were used in handling such institutions. 
As a result, although problems in the banking sector had not been properly tackled, only 
TWD 40 billion remained in the FRF by August 2002 (Taiwan News 24 August 2002).
Political sources o f  the systemic incapacity
The underdevelopment of the financial safety net in Taiwan was essentially generated 
by political factors, rather than the lack of necessary financial resources per se. The 
Taiwanese government had large financial resources that could be used, in principle, to 
bail out weak banks. However, institutional arrangements to implement such policies 
had been underdeveloped for political reasons. Indeed, even during the early 2000s, 
when the financial condition of the overall Taiwanese banking sector deteriorated, 
market participants believed that the Taiwanese government could recapitalise ailing 
banks, if there was no political problem. For instance, a Fitch Ratings (2002c: 4) report 
on Taiwanese banks in June 2002 commented:
It appears that Taiwan’s sovereign financial position (sovereign rating o f A+) should be 
able to afford this recapitalisation [of technically insolvent banks] but the current 
political deadlock would be the first hurdle to overcome if the government is 
determined to solve this problem.
The small size of deposit insurance funds was a result of the voluntary participation 
deposit insurance scheme, which was adopted due to opposition to a mandatory system. 
When the government introduced a deposit insurance system in 1985, large 
government-owned banks and local governments that exercised voting control at many 
of these banks were opposed to a mandatory deposit insurance scheme, arguing that 
banks’ costs for participating in deposit insurance were not justified.450 Only three out 
of eleven major government-owned banks participated in the deposit insurance system
August 2002).
449 Author’s interview with Chen Zhan-Shen; author’s confidential interview with a BoMA 
official, Taipei, 5 November 2004. See also (The Banker July 2001).
450 Author’s interview with Chen Zhan-Shen.
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(as of March 1990). In addition, most of small financial institutions did not join the 
system (Yang 1994: 315). As a consequence, the size of deposit insurance funds was 
very limited. In fact, several financial incidents during the mid-1990s led the MFT to 
amend the deposit insurance system in order to increase the size of the deposit insurance 
funds, and, as a result, a mandatory deposit insurance system was adopted in 1999 
(BoMA 1998, 1999, 2002).451 However, as discussed earlier, the size of the funds could 
not grow substantially by the early 2000s.
Also, the government’s plans to strengthen the financial safety net and the financial 
health of the banking sector during the early 2000s failed because of domestic political 
struggles, which had little to do with banking regulation per se. The regulatory authority 
and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration, which came to power in 
2000, had a strong sincere intention to enhance the soundness of the banking sector. As 
a result, the government established a plan to build an exit mechanism for distressed 
banks in order to restructure the banking sector. However, these government polices 
were blocked by opposition parties in the Legislative Yuan (the legislature), as conflicts 
between the government and the opposition bloc increased.
Along with the announcement of the “2-5-8 financial target,” the government set up 
a plan to expand the size and functions of the FRF in order to achieve the proposed 
targets (BoMA 2003a: forewords). The proposal aimed to raise the volume of the FRF 
to a total of TWD 1.05 trillion. The enlarged FRF was to purchase impaired assets from 
banks, and banks with negative net worth were to be forced to exit the market once the 
FRF had made up their negative net worth. Banks with positive net worth would remain 
in the market but if they lacked internal resources to raise further capital, the FRF was 
to contribute capital by way of preferred shares up to the required BIS CAR level of 8 
percent minimum. Also, the FRF was to increase banks’ loan loss provision coverage 
rates to 30 percent of remaining NPLs from the then average of 20 percent. Ultimately, 
the MFT aimed to reduce the number of banks from more than fifty at that time to 
fifteen in two years’ time by both phasing out poor quality banks and fostering mergers 
and acquisitions (Fitch Ratings 2002d: 1-2; Taiwan Economic News 22 August 2002; 
Taiwan News 10 October 2002).
Yet, the conflict between the ruling DPP and the KMT-led Opposition over the 
objectives and the size of the amended FRF blocked its passage in the Legislative Yuan,
451 Author’s interview with Chen Zhan-Shen.
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which was dominated by the Opposition.452 The Opposition primarily rejected the plan 
to recapitalise banks that had not yet suffered an open crisis, in order to increase their 
BIS CARs and to reduce their NPL ratios by injecting public funds. After the failure to 
secure the passage of the proposal, the minority government amended the initial plan, 
accepting most demands of the Opposition 453 The proposed enlargement of the FRF 
was reduced from the initial TWD 910 billion to TWD 540 billion, just for handling two 
banks already taken over by the government, which then abandoned the plan to 
recapitalise the banking sector (see Fitch Ratings 2002c: 4;2003c: 3; FT Investor 3 June 
2003; The Banker July 2003).454 Nevertheless, the issue of protection of non-deposit 
general creditors remained a disagreement between the DPP and the Opposition and 
even within the Opposition bloc, between the KMT and the People’s First Party 455 As a 
result, the revised proposal failed to pass in the Legislative Yuan 456
Some local and foreign media {Euromoney April 2002; Central News Agency 6 
October 2002) presented a view that the KMT-led Opposition turned down the proposal 
in order to protect banks. Indeed, banks were traditionally big contributors to the KMT, 
and financially distressed banks were fiercely opposed to the proposal as they feared 
government intervention in their management 457 However, it should be emphasised 
that the KMT-led Opposition agreed to the establishment of the FRF in 2001, which 
closed down more than forty local financial institutions. The cosy relationship between 
the KMT and such financial institutions had been well-known (see Ho and Lee 2001; 
Kuo 2000: 19-20). In fact, regarding the proposal to amend the FRF, the Opposition did 
agree on the plan to close banks with negative net worth. The ties between the KMT and 
banks under the former KMT government began to be broken by the change of 
government.458 In other words, the main reason why the KMT-led Opposition was
452 In the meantime, the government was under heavy criticism from opposition parties to 
reduce the budget deficit (author’s interview with Lee Jih-Chu [Vice-Convener, Finance & 
Monetary Division o f National Policy Foundation (KMT’s think tank)], Taipei, 16 November 
2004).
453 Author’s confidential interview with a BoMA official, Taipei, 5 November 2004.
454 The finance minister admitted that the “2-5-8 financial target” was no longer viable under 
the revised proposal {FTInvestor 3 June 2003).
455 Author’s interview with Lee Jih-Chu.
456 As o f November 2004, the government was planning to raise deposit insurance funds as an 
alternative scheme to increase funds, to deal with troubled financial institutions. Yet, the plan 
also had to be passed in the Legislative Yuan.
457 Author’s interview with Chen Zhan-Sheng.
458 Author’s interview with Lee Jih-Chu. For example, right after the change o f government, 
banks required KMT-owned firms to refurbish their collateral. The banks’ requirement caused 
the KMT to close unprofitable firms and withdraw about USD 30 billion from stock companies 
in order to restructure its fragile financial assets (Kuo 2000: 33).
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opposed to the financial reform, which would enhance the country’s comprehensive 
compliance with the BIS standard, was not to protect its major potential victims, that is, 
banks.
The politics of credit claim provides a more plausible explanation of the failure of 
the proposal. As the 2004 presidential election was approaching, the conflict between 
the DPP and the Opposition became intense. The DPP government had promoted a 
series of financial reforms, and financial reform was a key point that the ruling party 
could focus on for the election (Taiwan Economic News 28 April 2003; Taiwan News 18 
March 2004).459 However, the Opposition recognised this, and did not want to allow the 
DPP to get its way (Taiwan Economic News 28 April 2003). It was widely suspected 
that the Opposition boycotted the proposal in an attempt to undermine the DPP’s 
progress on financial reform ahead of the presidential election {Associated Press 
Worldstream 20 December 2002; World Markets Analysis 4 June 2003). It was also 
widely expected that the proposal would be passed if the Opposition won the 
election.460 However, they lost, and the political deadlock on the proposal was not 
resolved.
In addition, it is worth noting that there was not a strong demand from voters to 
increase financial stability immediately. Taiwan did not have the dreadful experience of 
an open financial crisis, weathering the 1997 Asian financial crisis. As a result, the 
public sentiment was generally negative towards the idea of injecting tax-payers’ money 
into troubled banks.461 Accordingly, the Opposition was able to delay the passage of the 
proposed amendment of the FRF. Also, the assessment of financial policy makers inside 
the opposition parties on the soundness of the banking sector system was relatively 
positive; they shared a view that that the sector was not in crisis and that it was not 
necessary to take drastic steps to improve its soundness.462
It should be pointed out that the DPP government did set forward a plan that would 
help enhance comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard. In 2003, the MFT 
established a plan to substitute the four-category loan classification with five categories 
and increase the level of loan loss provisioning. Loans in arrears by three months or 
more were to be classified as official NPLs (BoMA 2004: 7, 35). The new rules were to 
be introduced in July 2005, in which the operation of the FRF was to cease. However,
459 On the financial reform under the DPP government, see Leou (2005).
460 Author’s confidential interview with a BoMA official, Taipei, 5 November 2004.
461 Author’s interview with Lee Jih-Chu; author’s confidential interview with a BoMA official, 
Taipei, 5 November 2004.
462 Author’s interview with Lee Jih-Chu.
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the failure to enlarge the FRF made it unclear whether the rules could be faithfully 
implemented as scheduled. Indeed, after the failure, the Director General of the BoMA 
took a relaxed stance on the reform, by stating that the government had never said when 
it would implement the new accounting rules, but rather that the July 2005 date was 
merely a target (Finance Asia February 2004).463
After all, the country’s failure to comprehensively comply with the BIS standard 
from the mid-1990s was mainly attributable to the incapacity to deal with banks’ failure 
to comply with the BIS standard formally. Indeed, a PCA system was not implemented 
for the same reason, even though the regulatory authority was keen to introduce it.464 
This capacity problem did not result from the lack of necessary financial resources per 
se, as is shown in the fact that the government established a plan to inject a huge 
amount of public funds into the banking sector. However, political factors hindered the 
development of institutional arrangements to enable the orderly use of financial 
resources. Taiwan’s capacity problem in complying with the BIS standard was 
essentially political.
Other factors that hindered comprehensive compliance
Under such a risk of systemic financial crisis, financial regulatory authorities in most 
countries would have to reduce costs of banks to comply with the capital adequacy rules 
in order to prevent a crisis of confidence. Therefore, it may be plausible to argue that the 
absence of an appropriate financial safety net was the major factor that hindered 
comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard in Taiwan. Nonetheless, it is worth 
addressing whether there were additional factors to hinder the country’s comprehensive 
compliance with the BIS standard.
There was a decline in bank loans to firms, especially in 1996 and between 2001 
and 2002, during which the annual rate of loan increase to firms was negative. However, 
the decrease in bank loans did not result from Taiwanese banks’ efforts to comply with 
the BIS standard.465 Disclosed BIS CARs of a majority of Taiwanese banks were safely
463 The Financial Supervisory Commission, the new financial regulatory authority (established 
in July 2004), strengthened asset classification rules in July 2005. The financial condition of 
Taiwanese banks improved from 2003, as the national economy recovered; their average NPL 
ratio fell from 6.1 percent at the end o f 2002 to 2.7 percent at the end of 2004. Therefore, the 
likelihood that the strengthening o f the rules would cause financial instability was reduced 
during the mid-2000s.
464 Author’s confidential interview with a BoMA official, Taipei, 5 November 2004.
465 SMEs were important political partners o f the KMT in elections (Cheng 1993: 78).
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higher than the regulatory 8 percent minimum through the 1990s and early 2000s, 
despite their weak actual capital condition. Accordingly, there were few reasons for 
banks to reduce loans in order to clear the BIS CAR of 8 percent. In other words, the 
costs of compliance with the BIS standard were not diffused from banks to the other 
sectors of the economy, due to the relatively high level of banks’ BIS CARs.
The decline in bank loans mainly resulted from weak demand for bank loans due to 
an economic downturn, a decrease in the number of healthy firms or an increase in 
direct financing through capital markets.466 In other words, there was no credit squeeze 
generated by banks.467 In fact, when the MFT established the plan to strengthen the 
rules on asset classification and provisioning in the early 2000s, it carried out research 
on its impact on the credit supply in the economy; the conclusion was that the impact 
would be marginal 468 Accordingly, there was no demand from the corporate sector to 
relax the Taiwanese BIS standard throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, the 
BIS standard was never an important political issue in Taiwan throughout the period.
Yet, there were some factors that may have resulted in inducing cosmetic 
compliance with the BIS standard: cosy relations between politicians and business, and 
a decline in policy autonomy of the MFT from political intervention. Since the mid- 
1980s, Taiwanese conglomerates had grown rapidly due to the liberalisation of financial 
regulations and domestic markets in the country. These conglomerates developed close 
relationships with the ruling KMT by providing a massive amount of funds to the party, 
whose campaign expenses skyrocketed due to political democratisation from the late 
1980s (Kuo 2000: 12-13; Kuo and Tsai 1998: 171, 175-176).469 Also, conglomerate 
members’ direct participation in politics increased in the early 1990s (Kuo and Tsai 
1998: 176). As a result, conglomerates’ influences in the legislature were augmented.
When the banking sector was liberalised, licenses for most new private banks were 
given to those conglomerates, partly due to their close relationship to politicians. As a 
result, the banks adopted very lenient loan policies to subsidiaries of the conglomerates 
and also informally to political figures related to them (Kuo 2000: 19). In the meantime, 
legislators could pressure government-owned banks to give unqualified loans to
466 See annual reports o f the CBC. Taiwan’s economic growth rate gradually declined during the 
1990s to the early 2000s; it dropped from 7.6 percent in 1991 to 3.3 percent in 2003, recording a 
low o f -2.2 percent in 2001.
467 Also, note that, as Table 6.3 showed, Taiwan’s corporations appeared to maintain a relatively 
sound financing structure in comparison with their Japanese or Korean counterparts.
468 Author’s confidential interview with a BoMA official, Taipei, 5 November 2004.
469 The cosy relations between the KMT and business were well known in the country as “black 
gold” politics.
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business associates or their friends by using the Legislative Yuan’s right to review the 
budgets of government-owned corporations (The Banker July 2000). Yet, conglomerates 
had little incentive to improve their productivity as they operated in protected sectors 
(Kuo and Tsai 1998: 177). As a result, most of those loans later became non-performing 
(Kuo 2000: 19). In the circumstances, the borrowers of loans and the banks that wanted 
to protect them had strong interests in maintaining lenient rules on asset classification 
and delaying the disposal of NPLs, which otherwise would drive the borrowers into 
financial difficulty.
The interests of conglomerates and banks could be protected by their close relations 
with politicians. In the 1992 election, twenty-seven legislators with formal relationships 
with banks or credit unions were elected. Fifteen legislators elected in the 1995 vote 
were directors or supervisors of financial institutions. In the 1998 vote, twenty-one 
legislators with banking interests were elected. Most of these legislators joined the 
legislature’s Finance Committee, which had authority over banking polices, and 
frequently made proposals to protect the interests of banks and conglomerates (Kuo 
2000: 21- 22).470
The MFT was not an independent regulatory authority in nature. Nevertheless, 
during the martial law period (1949 to 1987), bureaucracy prevailed over the Legislative 
Yuan, in the economic policymaking process due to the coherence of the state under a 
strong presidency (Kuo 2000: 12; Kuo and Tsai 1998: 168).471 Influence from the 
independent CBC over the ministry was also likely to enhance the policy autonomy of 
the MFT from political intervention during the period.472 However, as martial law was 
abolished in 1987, legislators began to assert their legislative power over the financial 
administration, making the ministry vulnerable to political influence (Kuo 2000: 20). In 
the meantime, the influence of the CBC over financial regulation weakened over the 
1990s.473 As a result, from the late 1980s, the influence of legislators on banking
470 For example, during the evaluation process to license new private banks in the late 1980s, 
legislators who were shareholders of ten different banks supported these banks, and they in 
return purchased the unlisted stocks of the banks at about USD 3 a share; after the banks were 
established and listed their stocks, their stock prices immediately more than doubled (Kuo 2000: 
21-22).
471 The Legislative Yuan usually rubber-stamped bills to revise the Banking Law submitted by 
the MFT during the period (Kuo 2000: 20).
472 See Chapter 3 (section3.3).
473 The CBC was excluded from the process of licensing new private banks; the MFT 
orchestrated the entire process (Kuo 2000: 20-21). Although the MFT had the obligation to 
consult with the CBC in establishing capital adequacy regulations prior to the adoption of the 
BIS standard, the obligation of the ministry was abolished when it constructed the Taiwanese 
BIS standard of 1992. In April 1997, the status of the CBC was downgraded as an equal, if not
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regulation rapidly increased. In the 1989 revision of the Banking Law, legislators 
revised sixteen out of a total of twenty five articles proposed by the administration. 
Moreover, in the 1995 revision of the Banking Law, the Legislative Yuan itself proposed 
and passed two important items, against the preferences of the MFT (Kuo 2000: 21).
Therefore, there was a likelihood that the cosy relations between politicians and 
business may have hindered the MFT in dealing with NPL problems, which resulted in 
the failure to comply with the BIS standard comprehensively during the second half of 
the 1990s. However, it should be noted that the impact of the relations between business 
and politicians was likely to be substantially lower after the change of government in 
2000. The DPP was the main attacker of the cosy relations between politics and 
business, and, indeed, as mentioned earlier, the DPP government put enormous 
emphasis on financial reform. In addition, as discussed earlier, the traditional close 
relations between the KMT and business began to unravel after the government change. 
The cosy relations between the KMT and business may have been an additional factor 
that helped cosmetic compliance with the BIS standard indirectly during the second half 
of the 1990s, but its impact on compliance with the BIS standard became marginal 
during the early 2000s.
Conclusions
Taiwan’s regulatory authority’s intention of strengthening the soundness of the banking 
sector by adopting the BIS standard was reflected in the Taiwanese BIS standard and its 
enforcement. Compliance enforcement by the regulatory authority, along with the 
operation of the external compliance mechanisms, induced Taiwanese banks to formally 
comply with the BIS standard throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. In addition, the 
banks’ compliance was by and large comprehensive during the early 1990s despite the 
fact that there was not strong external pressure on them to comply with the BIS standard 
comprehensively. Moreover, as Taiwanese banks’ compliance with the BIS standard 
became cosmetic from the mid-1990s, the regulatory authority intended to improve the 
country’s compliance with the BIS standard by strengthening the financial safety net to 
deal with ailing banks and relevant regulations. Yet, the development of the financial 
safety net, which was necessary for strict implementation of the BIS standard, was 
hindered by political obstacles. As a result, the country’s cosmetic compliance
lower, partner of the MFT (Kuo 2000: 21).
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continued throughout the early 2000s. In addition, the growing political influence over 
banking policies was likely to have contributed to the country’s failure to comply with 
the BIS standard comprehensively during the second half of the 1990s. However, the 
effect of this factor became trivial during the early 2000s.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusions
The question of what determines compliance with international regulatory regimes has 
been a central theme of much recent IPE scholarship. Scholars have proposed three 
competing perspectives on this issue. Systemic theorists focus on compliance pressures 
on states from other states that will suffer from negative externalities of others’ 
noncompliance. Market-based theorists emphasise that market forces can enhance 
compliance, often using the BIS standard as a prime example. The domestic perspective 
argues that the existence of domestic groups whose preferences are in accordance with 
the regime of concern is critical for compliance. While these perspectives are in 
theoretical competition, the compliance mechanisms proposed by them are in practice 
complementary. All or some of these compliance mechanisms may operate 
simultaneously within an international regulatory regime.
This study has attempted to improve the understanding of the effectiveness of these 
compliance mechanisms by presenting an in-depth study of compliance with the BIS 
standard in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. The focus 
of this study has been on compliance that contributes to the effectiveness of the 
regulatory regime. In analysing the relationship between regime compliance and regime 
effectiveness, I have introduced the concepts of cosmetic compliance and 
comprehensive compliance. Then, I built hypotheses about the operation and the effect 
of each of the compliance mechanisms, and tested them. This final chapter will integrate 
the main observations and findings of this study, and will then discuss this study’s 
contributions to the literature on compliance and to broader IPE scholarship.
8.1 M ajor findings
What determined compliance with the BIS standard in the case countries? What caused 
the differences in the levels of compliance in these countries? These questions are 
answered first by revisiting the hypothesis constructed in Chapter 2 and secondly by 
making a comparative analysis of compliance with the BIS standard in the three case 
countries.
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Three compliance mechanisms
I formulated three main hypotheses in regard to the operation of each of the three 
compliance mechanisms. The first hypothesis regarding the externality-based 
compliance mechanism was as follows:
Hypothesis 1: the externality-based compliance mechanism is more likely to operate 
towards a country whose noncompliance generates high negative 
externality to other countries.
There has been an analytic problem in testing this hypothesis for compliance with the 
BIS standard because banks were required by foreign countries to comply with their 
home country capital adequacy regulations in order to do business in those countries, 
regardless of the type of the regulations. Yet, the analysis of the adoption of the BIS 
standard in the case countries has clearly demonstrated that this hypothesis is true. 
Japanese banks’ engagement in international banking was substantial during the late 
1980s, and, as a result, Japan faced strong direct foreign pressure to agree to establish 
the BIS standard. In contrast, the international business of banks from non-Basel 
Committee was trivial. In consequence, G10 countries did not put explicit direct 
pressure on these countries, including Korea and Taiwan, to adopt the BIS standard, and 
only mildly encouraged them to do so. It was not until the 1997 financial crisis that 
foreign countries (through the IMF) put strong pressure on Korea to strengthen its bank 
capital adequacy regulations to be in line with the Basel Accord.
An additional significant finding is that the regulatory authorities and banks in all 
three countries strongly believed that banks’ noncompliance with the BIS standard 
would be punished by foreign regulatory authorities. The belief appeared to be based on 
the perception that regulatory authorities had an effective means of enforcing foreign 
banks to comply with the BIS standard by closing their markets to the banks. Most 
major Japanese banks maintained overseas establishments, although Japanese banks’ 
overall overseas presence declined sharply during the second half of the 1990s. Also, 
the overseas presence of Korean and Taiwanese banks increased sharply during the 
1990s partially due to government encouragement. As a result, a large number of 
Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese banks were vulnerable to penalties for noncompliance 
with the BIS standard by foreign countries in which they did business. Therefore, the 
regulatory authorities perceived that they had to maintain the BIS standard in order to
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protect the banks’ overseas business, and banks believed that they had to comply with 
the BIS standard for the same reason. Importantly, this perception was strengthened due 
to the general recognition that the BIS standard was the best practice among existing 
bank capital adequacy regulations. This perception of regulatory authorities and banks 
was an important factor in explaining formal compliance with the BIS standard in the 
three countries. This finding supports the second hypothesis of the externality-based 
compliance mechanism:
Hypothesis 2: the externality-based compliance mechanism is more likely to be effective 
fo r  a country susceptible to the noncompliance response system other 
countries can employ.
In addition, as the hypothesis anticipated, the externality-based compliance 
mechanism was not effective in inducing compliance with the BIS standard by banks 
that were not exposed to the major noncompliance response system of the BIS-standard 
regime. The Japanese practice of the dual system of capital adequacy regulations was 
clear evidence to support the hypothesis; the Japanese authorities applied the BIS 
standard only to banks with overseas establishments, while adopting a different capital 
adequacy framework for domestic banks with no overseas presence. Even if the BIS 
standard was applied to both international and domestic banks in Korea and Taiwan, the 
unitary application of the BIS standard does not reject the hypothesis; the unitary 
application resulted from the regulatory authorities’ expectation of the increasing 
internationalisation of banks, their concerns about competitive inequality in domestic 
markets, or their intention to strengthen the soundness of the domestic banking sector.
The final hypothesis about the externality-based compliance mechanism was the 
following:
Hypothesis 3: the operation o f the externality-based compliance mechanism is likely to 
induce only formal compliance, unless enforcement costs are low.
This hypothesis has been supported by the finding that no significant foreign pressure
existed to comprehensively comply with the BIS standard in any of the case countries
(except for Korea under the IMF programme), and indeed these countries did not make
efforts to achieve comprehensive compliance in anticipation of foreign pressure. As
clearly shown in the case of Japan, whose cosmetic compliance with the BIS standard
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was well known, the absence of such foreign pressure was not always due to foreign 
countries’ failure to recognise problems in the countries’ implementation of the BIS 
standard. Rather, the critical factor in hindering the operation of the externality-based 
compliance mechanism for comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard was the 
high costs in exercising such compliance pressure; while there were few grounds to 
justify such extensive compliance pressure, the Basel Accord was allowed to be 
implemented according to national regulatory arrangements. Notably, even in Korea 
under the IMF programme, the IMF could not effectively force the country to fully 
implement its policy recommendations to strengthen the country’s capital adequacy 
regulations because of domestic opposition in the country.
As regards market compliance pressure, the first hypothesis was built as follows:
Hypothesis 4: the market compliance mechanism will promote fu ll regime compliance 
only when market participants accept both its generic principles and its 
detailed rules.
There was no independent operation of the market compliance mechanism for the BIS 
standard. There seemed to be an agreement from markets on the need for regulation of 
banks’ capital adequacy. Nevertheless, market participants heavily criticised the BIS 
standard as crude and arbitrary, and, accordingly, they did not accept the BIS standard 
as a reliable solvency regulation. Instead, market participants paid attention to economic 
capital ratios of banks in assessing their capital soundness, and a “desirable” economic 
capital ratio varied according to banks. As a result, markets did not penalise banks for 
not adopting the BIS standard, nor was there a positive association between BIS CARs 
of banks and markets’ assessments of banks’ soundness. In fact, there was limited 
pressure from markets on banks to improve their actual capital adequacy. However, the 
pressure was not directly related with the BIS standard per se, nor was the pressure 
consistent.
There was also evidence to support the second hypothesis concerning market 
compliance pressure:
Hypothesis 5: compliance pressures may come from markets as a reflection o f domestic 
enforcement, but will not induce compliance above and beyond that 
required by regulatory authorities.
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The findings relating to how market participants viewed banks’ noncompliance with the 
capital regulations governing them have supported this hypothesis. Even though market 
participants did not credit the BIS standard with a reliable solvency regulation, they did 
take into account banks’ formal compliance in assessing their creditworthiness. As 
expected, market pressure on banks to formally comply with the BIS standard was a 
reflection of domestic regulations. Market participants anticipated that banks that failed 
to comply would face action by the regulatory authorities, and the regulatory penalties 
could have negative consequences for the stakeholders of the banks, such as investors or 
creditors. In addition, market participants understood that banks that did not meet such 
an important requirement might have serious problems. As a result, market pressures 
did play a role in inducing banks to formally comply with the BIS standard. However, it 
should be reiterated that such pressures from markets on banks were not necessarily 
related to compliance with the BIS standard per se but to compliance with the relevant 
domestic regulations.
The last hypothesis regarding market compliance pressures was the following:
Hypothesis 6: market compliance pressures (of both types) are more likely to be
effective fo r a country in which regulatory targets are vulnerable to market 
forces.
There was a common perception of market compliance pressures for the BIS standard in 
all three countries, although there was a difference in banks’ sensitivity to market forces 
in the countries. The concern of banks’ competitiveness in markets was a key factor that 
led the Korean regulatory authority to adopt the BIS standard and to cosmetically 
implement the BIS standard during the early and mid-1990s. The perception of the 
relationship between banks’ competitiveness and their compliance with the BIS standard 
was also shared by the Japanese and the Taiwanese regulatory authorities and the 
countries’ banks. A notable example of this was that a number of Japanese banks 
without the obligation to adopt the BIS standard under the Japanese regulations 
voluntarily complied with the BIS standard from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s to 
raise their market image. Yet, this finding of the common perception of market 
compliance pressures for the BIS standard in the three countries, in spite of a difference 
in the banks’ market sensitivity, does not reject the hypothesis. The banks always had to 
care about their market images in order to raise and operate funds. As a result, they were 
highly sensitive to markets, even though some banks were more sensitive than others.
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An interesting finding is that the perception of market compliance pressures did not 
exactly correspond to either type of market compliance pressures. Regulatory 
authorities and banks in the countries believed that compliance with the BIS standard 
per se was necessary for banks to raise or at least to maintain their competitiveness in 
markets. Nevertheless, most banks in the countries believed that comprehensive 
compliance with the BIS standard was not necessary to maintain their market 
competitiveness. Also, even though this study has not directly addressed whether the 
regulatory authorities perceived that market compliance pressure for the BIS standard 
was for comprehensive compliance or for formal compliance, the analysis of their 
implementation of the BIS standard has shown that such a perception did not lead the 
authorities to implement it in earnest. This deformed perception of market compliance 
pressures by the regulatory authorities and the banks appeared to be generated by 
various factors, such as general agreement on the necessity of capital adequacy 
regulation, information asymmetries in markets, the status of the BIS standard as the 
best practice, confusing signals from markets, and risk-averse attitudes.
In addition, it should be emphasised that banks opted to adopt the BIS standard only 
when their compliance costs were low. Indeed, although most Korean and Taiwanese 
banks were not opposed to the decision by their regulatory authorities to adopt the BIS 
standard, they did not lead the adoption. Most Korean banks’ and a few Taiwanese 
banks’ capital conditions were not strong enough to meet the required minimum CAR of 
8 percent. In these circumstances, the implementation of the BIS standard could raise 
the risk that they would face regulatory action from the regulatory authorities. Also, as 
their capital condition deteriorated, and the PCA system was implemented, most 
Japanese banks abandoned the BIS standard to switch to the domestic capital adequacy 
regulation.
In regard to the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism, the first 
hypothesis was constructed as follows:
Hypothesis 7: the domestic compliance mechanism is more likely to operate when there 
is a high level o f  compatibility between domestic groups ’preferences and 
both the overall objectives o f the regime and its specific provisions.
This study has focused on bank regulatory authorities as the key potential domestic 
group to support compliance with the BIS standard, and its findings have strongly 
supported this hypothesis. When the Basel Accord was established, Japan maintained a
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convoy system. The main purpose of the implementation of the convoy system was to 
strengthen the stability of the country’s financial system. Therefore, the convoy system 
was not in conflict with the objectives of the Basel Accord. However, the convoy 
system did not allow banks to fail. Accordingly, the Japanese regulatory authority had 
not regarded capital adequacy regulation, of which the main purpose was to prevent 
bank failures, as necessary. Indeed, although there was a capital adequacy regulation 
prior to the adoption of the BIS standard, the regulatory authority had no strong 
willingness to enforce Japanese banks to comply with it. The attitude of the Japanese 
bank regulatory authorities towards capital adequacy regulation did not change until the 
mid-1990s, when the convoy system began to unravel. As a result, the regulatory 
authority did not penalise banks for their failure to comply with the BIS standard until 
the introduction of a PCA system in April 1998, even though it had the enforcement 
capacity. The condition for the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism was 
even weaker in Korea. The Korean regulatory authority had also maintained a “no bank 
failure” policy. Moreover, the regulatory authority had traditionally attached less 
attention to prudential regulation, sacrificing stability for growth when necessary. 
Consequently, the strengthening of bank capital adequacy had never been at the centre 
of banking regulation in the country until the outbreak of the 1997 financial crisis.
The second hypothesis with regard to the domestic compliance mechanism 
predicted:
Hypothesis 8: compatibility between domestic groups' preferences and an international 
regulatory regime is more likely when the following two conditions are 
met:
. The domestic groups do not have prior, strong beliefs inconsistent with 
the objectives o f  the regime and its methods to achieve the objectives.
. The domestic groups are in new and uncertain environments.
No direct evidence to prove the first element of the hypothesis has been found. It has, 
however, been indirectly supported by the initial wilful neglect of the BIS standard by 
the Japanese and Korean regulatory authorities. Meanwhile, the second element of the 
hypothesis has been proved. The Taiwanese regulatory authority expected that the 
implementation of the BIS standard would help maintain stability in the financial 
system, when stronger banking regulations were needed due to the liberalisation of the 
banking sector. Indeed, the regulatory authority did penalise banks that failed to comply
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with the BIS standard throughout the whole observation period. The Japanese regulatory 
authority changed with the intention to strengthen the Japanese BIS standard from the 
late 1990s, during which time they began to perceive that the previous bank regulatory 
policy and the resulting weak capital soundness of banks was a major hindrance to the 
recovery of the economy. The Korean bank regulatory authority also put significant 
emphasis on comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard after the 1997 financial 
crisis, which was largely attributed to the failure of previous financial regulation.
The last main hypothesis regarding the domestic compliance mechanism was the 
following:
Hypothesis 9: The operation o f  the domestic compliance mechanism is likely to result in 
pressure for comprehensive compliance.
This study indicates strong evidence to uphold the hypothesis; whenever the regulatory 
authorities made a voluntary commitment to the BIS standard, they attempted to achieve 
comprehensive compliance. By incorporating the BIS standard within domestic banking 
regulations, the Taiwanese regulatory authority did not stray far from the provisions in 
the Basel Accord, and its implementation of the BIS standard was largely faithful until 
the mid-1990s. Moreover, as the capital soundness of Taiwanese banks deteriorated, the 
regulatory authority did build plans to improve it, including those to strengthen the rules 
on asset classification and provisions. Also, after the Japanese and Korean regulatory 
authorities made a voluntary commitment to the BIS standard, they worked for 
comprehensive compliance. The initial plan of the PFR was a clear reflection of such 
efforts by the Japanese regulatory authority. The Korean bank regulatory authority also 
led the upgrading of the bank regulations after the 1997 financial crisis.
Factors that affected implementation
This study also formulated three supplementary hypotheses relating to the effect of the 
domestic compliance mechanism, drawing particular attention to three factors that affect 
the implementation capacity of regulatory authority: the domestic distributional effects 
of compliance, the independence of the regulatory authority, and the capacity of the 
authority to effectively deal with compliance failures. In relation to the domestic 
distributional effects of compliance, the following hypothesis was constructed:
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Hypothesis 10: compliance failure is more likely to occur when compliance costs are
diffusedfrom regulatory targets to other sectors comprised o f  politically 
important actors.
This hypothesis was strongly supported by the evidence and analysis. Notably, the 
regulatory targets’ capacity to comply with the international regulatory regime was a 
critical factor that affected the diffusion of compliance costs from targets to other 
sectors of the economy. When the capital conditions of the overall banking sector were 
relatively sound, banks’ compliance with the BIS standard did not substantially affect 
other sectors of the economy. However, as the capital conditions of a number of banks 
deteriorated, the costs of compliance with the BIS standard were partly transferred from 
the banks to the firms that relied on bank loans. The specific mechanism through which 
the compliance costs were transferred was a reduction in the volume of bank loans. A 
reduction in banks loans to raise the banks’ BIS CARs caused firms to suffer from a 
credit squeeze. In these circumstances, even though the regulatory authorities were 
willing to achieve comprehensive compliance, and sometimes overcame opposition 
from banks, the authorities had to withdraw from rigorous enforcement of the relevant 
standards due to increasing domestic opposition from firms and from politicians to 
protect them.
There were two primary examples that showed the effect of the diffusion of 
compliance costs on reducing overall compliance with the BIS standard. One was the 
implementation of the BIS standard in Japan during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 
Japanese regulatory authority attempted to strengthen the Japanese BIS standard during 
this period. The initial plan of the Financial Inspection Manual of 1998 was intended to 
adopt stricter regulations on asset classification and loan loss provisions. Also, the 
initial version of the PRF of 2002 included provisions such as limiting the inclusion of 
DTAs in the regulatory capital. However, these plans were abandoned due to opposition 
from banks that warned of a credit crunch and from politicians (the LDP) to protect 
firms. The other example was the implementation of the BIS standard in Korea in the 
period following the financial crisis. Although Korea’s compliance during the post-crisis 
period was more comprehensive than during the earlier period, the further strengthening 
of compliance was failed due to domestic opposition, which was caused by a credit 
squeeze resulting from strict implementation of the BIS standard. In the case of Taiwan, 
although the corporate finance system was a bank-centred system, as it was in Japan and 
Korea, the disclosed capital condition of the overall banking sector was relatively sound,
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partially due to regulatory forbearance. As a result, there was no credit crunch caused by 
the banks in Taiwan.
It was anticipated that institutional settings in the policy-making process would 
influence the compliance decisions of governments, and the following hypothesis was 
constructed as a result:
Hypothesis 11: where the independence o f  regulatory authorities is lower, compliance 
failure is more likely to occur, even i f  the regulatory authorities 
themselves favour compliance.
The negative effects of the limited independence of regulatory authorities from 
political intervention on compliance with the BIS standard were evidenced in all three 
countries. As discussed above, the Japanese regulatory authority’s attempts to 
strengthen the Japanese BIS standard during the late 1990s and the early 2000s were 
overruled by pressure from politicians to protect SMEs. The flexible implementation of 
the BIS standard in Korea during the early 2000s resulted from the lack of independence 
of the FSC from the government, especially from the MFK.474 In addition, the cosy 
relationship between politicians and businesses was likely to have hindered the MFT in 
addressing NPL problems in Taiwan during the second half of the 1990s.
In this regard, a noteworthy finding is that the formal independence of regulatory 
authorities based on official institutional arrangements did not necessarily increase their 
policy autonomy. Although Japan’s FSA was an external agency of the Cabinet Office, 
there were a range of formal and informal institutional factors that reduced the policy 
autonomy of the FSA from the ruling party. The independence of the FSC was 
embodied in law, but its policy autonomy was in practice undermined by the MFK. The 
legal independence of bank regulatory authorities without actual policy autonomy made 
few contributions to strengthening their capacity to implement their own policy 
objectives.
Finally, as regards compliance capacity, the following hypothesis was proposed: 
Hypothesis 12: when the cost o f  compliance for regulatory targets in a country is high,
474 During the pre-crisis period, the OBS was subordinated to the MFK. However, at the time, 
the relations between the two bodies hindered the OBS from paying much attention to 
prudential regulation, including capital adequacy regulations. As a result, the OBS did not 
demand comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard.
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and the government lacks the capacity to deal with compliance failures 
by the regulatory targets, cosmetic compliance is more likely to occur.
This hypothesis has been supported by evidence of cosmetic compliance with the BIS 
standard in Japan during the mid-1990s and in Taiwan during the second half of the 
1990s and early 2000s. Japan’s traditional financial safety net, the convoy system, 
began to unravel in the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, the deposit insurance system, which was 
intended to compensate for the decline of the convoy system, had not sufficiently 
developed, due to political reasons. In these circumstances, the MFJ could not disclose 
the true size of NPLs, because the full disclosure could have led the CARs of a large 
number of the banks to drop below the 8 percent minimum, possibly triggering financial 
instability. Taiwan’s cosmetic compliance during the second half of the 1990s and early 
2000s was also largely due to the lack of an appropriate financial safety net. While the 
number of private banks increased sharply, the official resources that could be used to 
handle ailing banks were very limited. Even though the government established a plan 
to strengthen the financial safety net, it was rejected by the Legislative Yuan, which was 
dominated by the opposition parties, in a volatile political situation. As a result, the 
MFT could not implement the BIS standard more strictly, because it could have 
aggravated instability in the financial system in the short term.
In addition, note that the lack of capacity to deal with compliance failures 
contributed to cosmetic compliance in Korea during the pre-crisis period. In the country, 
as the “no bank failure” policy was still effective, failure to comply with the BIS 
standard was believed to be unlikely to cause a financial crisis despite the absence of an 
adequate formal financial safety net during the pre-crisis period. However, the economic 
growth of the country relied significantly on the foreign capital that banks provided to 
the economy, while banks’ noncompliance with the BIS standard was expected to raise 
their costs of borrowing in international financial markets. In this situation, the 
government had to help banks formally comply with the BIS standard by exercising 
regulatory forbearance, due to the potential negative consequences that compliance 
failure could cause to the overall economy. Accordingly, this capacity problem in Korea 
was resource-driven, while that in Japan or Taiwan was political in essence.
The comparison o f  the case countries
This section identifies the differences in compliance with the BIS standard between the
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three cases more explicitly. Issues related to formal compliance are first discussed, 
followed by an analysis of issues relating to comprehensive compliance.
Although formal compliance with the BIS standard was generally quite good in all 
the case countries, there were noticeable differences between them. In terms of the 
frequency of compliance failure, formal compliance was higher in Japan than in Korea 
or in Taiwan. All Japanese BIS-standard banks complied with the minimum CAR 
requirement of 8 percent most years between 1992 and 2002; when compliance failures 
occurred, only 1 to 3 percent of the total BIS-standard banks failed to meet the required 
8 percent minimum. In the case of Korean banks, there were only two compliance 
failures between 1993 and 1996, and all of them complied with the required minimum 
CAR of 8 percent between 2000 and 2003. However, the BIS CARs of most Korean 
banks fell below 8 percent in 1997 and 1998 in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, 
though the CARs began to recover in 1999. Meanwhile, compliance failures by 
Taiwanese banks occurred every year between 1993 and 2003, and the number of 
noncompliant banks reached 2 to 12 percent of the total (BIS-standard) banks. These 
formal compliance records of the three countries are intriguing, considering that 
cosmetic compliance was persistent in Japan throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, 
while compliance with the BIS standard shifted from cosmetic to more comprehensive 
compliance in Korea after the 1997 financial crisis and Taiwan’s compliance was 
comprehensive until the mid-1990s. Accordingly, it is apparent that a country’s formal 
compliance with the BIS standard did not necessarily reflect the effectiveness of the BIS 
standard in the country.
In addition, the analysis of formal compliance with the capital adequacy regulations 
in the case countries demonstrates that potential penalties from the domestic regulatory 
authorities for noncompliance with the regulations gave the principal incentive for 
banks to maintain formal compliance. In Korea and Taiwan, regulatory penalties for 
noncompliance with the BIS standard were explicitly laid down in the countries’ 
banking regulations. In contrast, in Japan there was no formal enforcement mechanism 
that the regulatory authority could employ to penalise banks for noncompliance with the 
capital adequacy regulations, either the BIS-standard or domestic standard, until the 
introduction of the PCA system in 1998 (in 1999 for domestic standard banks). As a 
result, Korean and Taiwanese banks, including those that faced little compliance 
pressure from foreign countries or markets, tried to maintain their BIS CARs above the 
required 8 percent minimum in order to avoid regulatory penalties, though a few of 
them failed  to clear the required minimum. In contrast, about 20 percent of Japanese
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banks subject to the domestic capital adequacy regulations did not comply with the 
required minimum CAR of 4 percent during the pre-PCA period;475 however, most of 
them complied with the regulations after the introduction of the PCA system.
Importantly, insofar as regulatory penalties for noncompliance existed explicitly, the 
fact that the regulatory authorities had the discretion to actually punish banks for 
noncompliance did not reduce banks’ incentives to comply with the regulations. The 
Korean regulatory authority (until the introduction of the PCA system in 1998) and the 
Taiwanese regulatory authority had such discretion, but Korean and Taiwanese banks 
showed a strong willingness to comply with the BIS standard in order to avoid potential 
penalties from the domestic regulatory authorities. In other words, the domestic 
legislation of regulatory penalties for noncompliance with the relevant capital adequacy 
regulations had a significant effect on banks’ behaviour in the three case countries.
As for comprehensive compliance, this study has indicated that the degree of 
comprehensive compliance was high in two cases during certain periods, even though 
they had some caveats: Taiwan during the early 1990s, and Korea during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. The high degree of comprehensive compliance in these cases becomes 
clear when they are compared with other cases by using banks’ BIS CARs and their 
ratios of loan loss provisions to NPLs, although it is submitted that there are some 
problems with such a comparison.476
Figure 8.1 shows that Taiwanese banks’ disclosed BIS CARs were far higher than
Japanese or Korean banks until the mid-1990s, while Figure 8.2 indicates that the loan
loss provisions to NPLs ratio was much higher for Taiwanese banks than for Japanese or
%
Korean banks during the early 1990s. The definitions of NPLs in the countries were 
largely comparable until the mid-1990s, in principle covering only loans in arrears for
475 The noncompliance by the Japanese banks was not the result o f the strict implementation o f  
the domestic capital standard by the Japanese regulatory authority, but stemmed from the banks’ 
low willingness to comply with the standard. As discussed earlier, there was no legal basis for 
the Japanese regulatory authority to enforce banks’ compliance with the capital adequacy 
regulations during the pre-PCA period. In addition, the Japanese regulatory authority had no 
desire to enforce banks to comply with the regulations during the period. Also, note that even if  
most o f Japanese banks subject to the BIS standard met the required minimum CAR o f 8 
percent during the pre-PCA period, these banks’ formal compliance with the BIS standard was 
caused by the operation o f the external compliance mechanisms. Yet, it should be emphasised 
that the effectiveness o f the external compliance mechanisms in inducing banks to formally 
comply with the BIS standard was lower than that o f domestic regulatory enforcement. This was 
because the latter posed an immediate threat to banks’ managerial freedom, the primary concern 
o f most banks, while penalties for noncompliance from foreign countries or from markets did 
not, and mainly limited the business activities o f banks.
476 The problems in comparing the degree o f comprehensive compliance across the case 
countries include the fact that it is not possible to address all factors inflating banks’ BIS CARs 
and that the factors raising banks’ BIS CARs were not identical across the countries.
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more than six months. There was no significant regulatory forbearance related to bank 
capital adequacy regulations in Taiwan during the first half o f  the 1990s, and the 
financial condition o f  Taiwanese banks was sound during this period. Therefore, even 
though the lenient definition o f  NPLs increased Taiwanese banks’ BIS CARs to some 
extent, the increase was not likely to be substantial. In short, Taiwanese banks’ disclosed 
BIS CARs reflected their actual capital soundness to a large extent. By contrast, 
Japanese and Korean banks’ low ratios o f  loan loss provisions suggest that these banks’ 
BIS CARs should have been substantially discounted in order to reflect their true capital 
adequacy. Accordingly, it is plausible to conclude that Taiwan’s degree o f  
comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard was much higher than Japan’s or 
Korea’s during the early 1990s.
Figure 8.1 BIS CARs of banks by country, 1992-2003
(end of period; %)
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Source: Japanese Bankers Association, various issues of Zenkok Ginkou Zaimushyohyou Bunseki 
(Analysis of Financial Statements of All Banks); Office of Bank Supervision (1993-1998) and Financial 
Supervisory Service (1999-2003), various issues of Unhaeng Gyeong-yeong Tonggae (Bank Statistics); 
Central Bank of China, various issues of Benguo Yinhang Tingyun Jixiao Jibao (Conditions and 
Performance of Domestic Banks).
Note: The BIS CARs are those of banks subject to the BIS standard. Japanese banks’ BIS CARs are those 
at the end of the fiscal years.
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Figure 8.2 Loan loss provisions to NPLs ratio of banks by country, 1992-2003
(end o f  period: %)
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Source: Financial Services Agency, Total Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks, 
2003; the author’s calculation from Financial Supervisory Service, various issues of Unhaeng 
Gyeongyeong Tonggye (Bank Statistics); Central Bank of China, various issues of Benguo Yinhang 
Tingyun Jixiao Jibao (Conditions and Performance of Domestic Banks).
Note: The figures are those of all Japanese major banks, all Korean commercial banks, and all Taiwanese 
banks. Japanese banks’ figures are those at the end of the fiscal years.
M eanwhile, the loan loss provisions ratios in the three countries during the mid- 
1990s show that the degree o f  comprehensive compliance was low in all the countries 
during this period. The ratio was somewhat higher in Japan than in Korea or Taiwan, but 
the difference between the countries during this period was much less significant than 
during the earlier or the later period. In addition, the BIS CARs o f Japanese banks were 
lower than those o f Taiwanese banks and on a par with those o f  Korean banks’ during 
this period. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that there was no significant 
difference between the three countries in the degree o f  comprehensive compliance 
during the mid-1990s. All the countries’ compliance with the BIS standard was cosmetic 
during this period.
Yet, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, although banks’ BIS CARs were 
between 10 and 12 percent level in each o f  the three countries, the banks’ loan loss 
provisions ratios were much higher in Korea than in Japan or in Taiwan. The definition 
o f  NPLs was stronger in Korea and Japan than in Taiwan. Although the Korean 
regulatory authority exercised regulatory forbearance in bank capital adequacy 
regulation during this period, the inflation o f  Korean banks’ BIS CARs by regulatory 
forbearance was not likely to be significantly larger than an increase in Japanese or 
Taiwanese banks’ CARs caused by regulatory forbearance in Japan and Taiwan 
respectively. Accordingly, it can be evaluated that the degree o f  comprehensive
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compliance was higher in Korea than in Japan or Taiwan during this period. Moreover, 
when comparing Korea’ compliance before the late 1990s with the later period, it is 
clear that Korea’s compliance shifted from cosmetic to more comprehensive during the 
later period.
Why did a high level of comprehensive compliance occur in Taiwan during the early 
1990s and in Korea during the late 1990s and the early 2000s? Why not in Japan? A key 
necessary condition for comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard was the 
operation of the domestic compliance mechanism, which was generated when there was 
a high compatibility between the preferences of the regulatory authority and the 
objectives and provisions of the BIS standard. Until the late 1980s, the compatibility 
was low in all three case countries because the regulatory arrangements in these* 
countries did not allow banks to fail, while the main purpose of the BIS standard was to 
prevent bank failures. Yet, the compatibility increased in Taiwan in the late 1980s, when 
the regulatory authority needed a new regulation for preventing failures of new private 
banks. The Taiwanese regulatory authority expected that the implementation of the BIS 
standard would help maintain financial stability, which had been traditionally their 
major policy objective. As a result, the Taiwanese regulatory authority implemented the 
BIS strictly, in contrast to their Japanese or Korean counterparts, at least until the mid- 
1990s, when factors emerged to hinder strict implementation of the BIS standard. A 
shift in Korea’s compliance with the BIS standard from cosmetic to more 
comprehensive during the late 1990s and in the early 2000s also resulted from the 
operation of the domestic compliance mechanism, which was caused by the 1997 
financial crisis; the financial crisis led the Korean regulatory authority to place 
unprecedented emphasis on prudential regulation, including strengthening of the Korean 
BIS standard.
The importance of the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism vis-a-vis 
the external compliance mechanisms in inducing comprehensive compliance can be 
evaluated from the fact that external compliance pressures appeared to be far higher on 
Japan than on Taiwan (and on Korea) during the first half of the 1990s. As Table 4.1 and 
Table 4.2 show, Japanese banks’ engagement in international banking was far higher 
than Taiwanese banks. As a result, there were stronger external pressures to formally 
comply with the BIS standard on Japanese banks than on Taiwanese banks; Japanese 
banks were more vulnerable to these pressures than Taiwanese banks were. However, 
there was no substantial external pressure on the case countries for comprehensive 
compliance with the BIS standard. Exceptionally, Korea faced external pressure for
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comprehensive compliance when it was under the IMF programme. Yet, even in this 
case, the IMF could not effectively impose its policy recommendations on Korea. The 
strengthening of compliance with the BIS standard in Korea was mainly led by the 
Korean regulatory authority, as it was shown that the country’s degree of compliance 
after the end of the IMF programme was higher than that under the IMF programme.
Of course, the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism did not always 
result in comprehensive compliance. Cosmetic compliance in Japan during the late 
1990s and early 2000s, and in Taiwan from the mid-1990s, demonstrated that the 
regulatory authorities failed to achieve comprehensive compliance despite their 
willingness to do so. The Taiwan’s cosmetic compliance was mainly caused by the lack 
of capacity to deal with insolvent banks, which was due to political factors.477 The 
Japan’s cosmetic compliance was due to the diffusion of compliance costs from the 
regulatory targets, the banks, to a politically important sector, SMEs, and the limited 
independence of the Japanese regulatory authority from government. In fact, the factors 
that caused Japan’s cosmetic compliance during this period also hindered the Korean 
regulatory authority in achieving more comprehensive compliance during the post-crisis
A *TO
period. The effectiveness of the domestic compliance mechanism in ensuring 
comprehensive compliance was affected by the capacity to deal with banks’ compliance 
failures, the domestic distributional effects of compliance, and the independence of the 
regulatory authority from the government and political pressures.
477 The capacity problem also led the Korean and Japanese regulatory authorities to implement 
the BIS standard leniently during the mid-1990s. However, the regulatory authorities did not 
establish explicit plans to strengthen their capital adequacy regulations during this period. In 
other words, the operation o f the domestic compliance mechanism was not strong in Korea and 
Japan during this period.
478 The higher degree o f comprehensive compliance in Korea compared to Japan during the late 
1990s and early 2000s was attributable to the huge adverse effects o f the 1997 financial crisis on 
Korea. Japan’s financial system was also in a crisis during the late 1990s, when a number of 
large financial institutions collapsed. However, there was a significant difference between Japan 
and Korean in the severity of the crisis, since Korea was bailed out by the IMF. As a result, in 
Korea, the government itself, including the MFK, put a high emphasis on bank capital adequacy 
regulations after the financial crisis, although the political environment led it to respond to 
domestic demand to ease the implementation o f the BIS standard. Meanwhile, in Japan, even 
the regulatory authority itself did not put much emphasis on the BIS standard per se. The 
Japanese regulatory authority intended to strengthen the Japanese BIS standard primarily 
because it perceived that the weak capital soundness o f Japanese banks hindered the country’s 
economic recovery. The difference in the severity o f the crisis between the countries led to a 
difference between Japan and Korea in the degree o f permissible regulatory forbearance in the 
area o f bank capital adequacy regulations; in other words, there was a difference in the extent to 
which the domestic compliance mechanism operated in Japan and Korea.
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8.2 Contributions to the study o f compliance
The cases and the evidence presented in this study illuminate the following aspects of 
compliance with international regulatory regimes. First, international regulatory regimes 
can be effective only when they achieve their objectives; formal compliance with only 
their explicit provisions does not necessarily improve the effectiveness of the regimes. 
Thus, for the study of compliance with an international regulatory regime to have 
meaning for this critical issue of regime effectiveness, a close examination of the nature 
of the compliance—cosmetic or comprehensive—should be carried out. International 
regulatory regimes that allow more room for national discretion in implementing their 
provisions may be complied with by a larger number of countries, because their 
acceptability is high. Therefore, the importance of in-depth research on the nature of 
compliance increases for international regulatory regimes that are complied with by a 
large number of countries, in other words for seemingly more successful regimes. The 
effectiveness of an international regulatory regime should not be assessed merely in 
terms of the number of countries that formally comply with it.
Secondly, while external compliance pressures may induce formal compliance, they 
are less effective in promoting comprehensive compliance. At this point, it should be 
emphasised that the BIS standard was a least-likely case of noncompliance in terms of 
the exercising of external compliance pressures. This analysis of the establishment of 
the Basel Accord and its adoption in the three case countries has demonstrated that 
major countries in the international financial system intended to force or encourage 
other countries to comply with it, and additionally that all the case countries strongly 
believed the compliance pressures from other countries. Indeed, compliance pressures 
from foreign countries induced formal compliance with the BIS standard not only by 
Japan, but also by the non-members of the Accord, Korea and Taiwan. Nevertheless, 
there was no substantial foreign pressure on the countries to comply with the BIS 
standard comprehensively, except for Korea under the IMF programme.
One may ask whether the lack of extensive pressures for comprehensive compliance 
from foreign countries was due to the fact that the Basel Accord did not have a well- 
developed formal noncompliance response system. However, the absence of such a 
system is not a peculiar aspect of the Basel Accord, but a common characteristic of a 
growing number of “international standards”, or what is called “soft law”, which entails
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no institutionalised enforcement by definition (Ho 2002: 650).479 Rather, a remarkable 
finding was that there was no pressure from foreign countries for comprehensive 
compliance with the BIS standard, even though they had an effective means of 
influencing the behaviour of banks operating in their countries, which was to close their 
markets to the banks.
The absence of extensive compliance pressure from foreign countries was due to the 
high political costs of exercising such pressure; there were no firm grounds for countries 
to force others to comply with the BIS standard comprehensively. Exceptionally, there 
was foreign pressure on Korea to comply with it comprehensively when the country was 
under the IMF programme. Yet, this was because the stand-by arrangement with the 
IMF lowered the costs for the IMF to exercise extensive pressure. In addition, the 
degree of negative externalities of a country’s noncompliance with the BIS standard 
affected the incentives for foreign countries to force the country to comply with the 
standard. The lower the level of negative externalities of noncompliance, the lower the 
incentives were, and vice versa.
The likelihood of the exercising of market pressures to comply with the BIS 
standard was also high, given that the BIS standard was one of the most well-known 
regulations, even among financial regulations (FSF 2000b: 20). Nevertheless, the BIS 
standard, which was established by national regulators, failed to be accepted by market 
actors as a reliable regulation. In general, the likelihood that an international regulatory 
agreement is accepted by market actors is likely to be low when the agreement is 
designed to be applied to a large number of countries. This is because such an 
international agreement may set the level of regulation close to the point that appeals to 
the median country (see Globerman and Singleton 2001: 3), and, as a result, the 
desirability of the regulations may decrease for other countries. Yet, as discussed earlier, 
eyen if market actors do not credit an international regulatory regime with a reliable 
regulation, market forces may enhance formal compliance with the regime insofar as 
market participants expect that noncompliant targets will be punished by regulatory 
authorities. Therefore, an important task for a study of the role of market forces in 
compliance is to distinguish clearly between these two kinds of market pressures, noting 
that their natures are different.
Thirdly, the operation of the domestic compliance mechanism may be necessary to 
induce comprehensive compliance, although the actual compliance outcome may be
479 For more on soft law, see Abbott and Snidal (2000).
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affected by various domestic political economy factors. Remarkably, the emergence of 
domestic support for an international regulatory regime depends on any peculiar 
characteristics of the country’s existing regulatory arrangements, rather than the general 
assessment of the regulatory regime. As indicated, the BIS standard was usually referred 
to as the international standard for bank capital adequacy regulation. Nevertheless, the 
necessity or the desirability of implementing the BIS standard appeared to be lower in a 
country whose banking system was less market-oriented; as a result, domestic support 
for the BIS standard was weak in the country. Without a country’s endogenous support 
for an international regulatory regime, even if the country complies with it due to 
external pressures, the compliance is likely to be only cosmetic.
Fourthly, compliance capacity is a critical factor to determine compliance outcomes. 
Ironically, when a country faces substantial negative consequences due to its 
compliance failure, but lacks the capacity to deal with them, its compliance tends to be 
cosmetic. The more destructive the consequences of noncompliance with an 
international regulatory regime, the more efforts a country may make to comply with it. 
Under these circumstances, if they do not have the capacity to comprehensively comply 
with the regime, they exert themselves to maintain at least formal compliance with it. 
However, such compliance is likely to be cosmetic, as national authorities may actively 
reduce the compliance costs of the regulatory targets in order to help them comply with 
the regime. Importantly, capacity problems do not always stem from resource 
constraints per se. They can have political or institutional sources. Therefore, capacity 
problems can occur not only in less-developed countries, which tend to face resource 
constraints, but also in developed countries due to political reasons.
As a next step, even if a country has the systemic capacity to comply with an
international regulatory regime, the domestic distributional effects of the regime affect
the implementation capacity of national authorities to ensure that regulatory targets
comply with the regime. In particular, this study has pointed out the adverse effects of
compliance on a non-target sector comprised of politically important actors as a critical
cause of compliance failure, going beyond the traditional focus on opposition from
regulatory targets. This finding may be applicable to various other issue areas.
Regulations in other financial sectors are strong candidates for the application of this
finding, given that financial institutions are closely linked, in general, to other economic
sectors. In this regard, it is noteworthy that a recent IMF report assessing the
implementation of three international financial standards identified “public policy
considerations” as a factor that caused regulatory forbearance (IMF 2004:21). Also, on
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closer examination, it is clear that the cost of compliance with environmental, health or 
labour regulations is not exclusively imposed on the regulatory targets. Indeed, many 
environmental regulations affect not only regulated firms but also consumers, either 
directly, by raising the prices of particular commodities, or indirectly, by banning them 
from using particular products or requiring them to use them in a particular way (Vogel 
and Kessler 1998: 35).
When political struggles regarding compliance with an international regulatory 
regime emerge in a country, the compliance outcome is influenced by institutional 
arrangements that affect the regulatory policy-making process. This study has paid 
particular attention to the independence of regulatory authorities responsible for the 
issue areas, given that they are in a key position to affect overall compliance decisions. 
In this study, there were periods during which bank regulatory authorities acted as the 
major supporters for comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard. However, they 
were not able to implement the BIS standard in earnest when they lacked policy 
autonomy due to their lack of independence from governments or politicians. Of course, 
regulatory authorities’ attitudes towards international regulatory regimes in other areas 
may be different; they can be the key opponents of some international regulatory 
regimes. Therefore, the analysis of regulatory authorities’ attitudes towards an 
international regulatory regime should be preceded by a study of their independence.
Finally, this study suggests that it is necessary to rethink the desirability of
compliance with certain international regulatory regimes. In general, studies on
compliance—especially those addressing the issue from a perspective of international
cooperation, and those that support international standards—tend to conceive of
compliance in a positive sense. However, the findings in this research have
demonstrated that international regulatory regimes may not always be desirable—at
least not for all countries. There may be little objection to the Basel Accord’s objective
to strengthen the stability of the international banking system. However, the Accord’s
measures to achieve the objective did not always appear to be the optimal policy for
every country. In addition, this study has shown that cosmetic compliance with the BIS
standard occurred frequently due to concerns about a systemic financial crisis or the
financial conditions of the corporate sector. In those circumstances, the enforcement of
comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard may have had an adverse effect on the
overall economy, at least in the short term. The presumption that compliance is always
good should be avoided, even for international regimes that are generally regarded as an
international standard or a best practice. Instead, the study of compliance should pay
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more attention to the reasons that actors intend to comply with international regulatory 
regimes.
8.3 Contributions to international political economy
The findings of this thesis raise two broad questions for IPE scholarship. First, power in 
the global economy should be reconsidered. The underlying logic of the compliance 
mechanisms based on external pressures is that states and markets have the power to get 
others (states) to do things that they would not otherwise do. On the one hand, given 
that external compliance pressures did induce formal compliance, that power has been 
partly proved. As shown in the adoption of and compliance with the BIS standard in 
Korea and Taiwan, it may not be necessary that power is exerted by states or markets 
towards all other states in order to lead them to comply with the international regulatory 
regime of concern. Insofar as a state believes in the power of other states and markets to 
negatively affect its interests and anticipates that its compliance with the regime 
conforms to their desires, it appears to comply “voluntarily” with the regime in order to 
avoid the cost that it expects to otherwise bear.480 The state’ perception of the power of 
other states and markets appears to be influenced by its vulnerability to power resources 
that they can employ. Additionally, the anticipation of the exercise of power appears to 
be based on certain reasonable grounds.
On the other hand, this thesis has also drawn attention to the limitations of such 
power by demonstrating that the governments in the three case countries could 
manipulate the implementation of the BIS standard, thereby responding to domestic 
political and economic situations. In this study, I have argued that there was no strong 
signal that could lead bank regulatory authorities and banks in the case countries to 
anticipate that their cosmetic compliance with the BIS standard would be penalised by 
other states or by markets, in contrast to the case of external compliance pressures for 
formal compliance. The absence of such a signal was partially originated from the 
shortage of resources to monitor the nature of compliance and from the cost of 
exercising power to compel comprehensive compliance. Accordingly, I cast doubt on 
the case of “anticipated reactions,” which refers to situations in which “one actor, B, 
shapes his behaviour to conform to what he believes are the desires of another actor, A, 
without having received an explicit message about A’s wants or intentions from A or A’s
480 The role o f implicit threats and perceptions in affecting states’ behaviours has been widely 
recognised by IR scholars. See, for example, Jervis (1976).
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agent” (Nagel 1975: 16, emphasis added), especially under the circumstances in which 
such behaviour changes are costly to B.481 For B to change her behaviour as an 
anticipated response to the power of A, there should be plausible grounds for B to 
believe that A is willing and able to exercise power over B. Of course, even if a country 
faces external pressures to change its regulations, the effectiveness of such pressures in 
ensuring the country’s regulatory changes may not be high without the domestic support 
for the changes, when the changes impose high costs on the country. Power does not 
come from the power holders alone, but from the relations between them and those 
interacting with them (Guzzini 1993: 452-453).
Secondly, this study raises a question about the significance of international 
regulatory harmonisation, as well as its desirability 482 The study of international 
regulatory harmonisation has been a central theme of much recent IPE scholarship. In 
fact, the BIS standard has attracted much attention from IPE scholars as a primary 
example of international regulatory harmonisation. However, much research on the BIS 
standard from the perspective of harmonisation has addressed its establishment with 
almost exclusive focus on U.S. (and U.K.) policies, even though Japan was a key player 
in creating the Basel Accord. Also, although there are some studies that provide a 
theoretical framework to analyse the international harmonisation of the BIS standard 
beyond the Basel Committee, there has been little empirical research to address it. This 
thesis has filled some of the gaps in the literature on harmonisation by examining why 
Japan agreed to create the BIS standard and by exploring why Korea and Taiwan 
adopted it. The international harmonisation of the BIS standard was largely attributable 
to its status as the international standard or the best practice in the area of bank capital 
adequacy regulation, even though the status was constructed without a solid theoretical 
case 483 In this regard, it may be expected that a set of regulations established by an 
exclusive group of advanced countries submitting that they represent the international 
best practice or the global standard is likely to proliferate into other countries.
However, it is doubtful what contributions a superficial international harmonisation 
of the regulations can make to the world, even if it is presumed that they are actually 
best practice. Given the analysis of the actual capital adequacy of banks in the case 
countries, it is difficult to argue that the BIS standard has increased the soundness of the
481 For anticipated reactions, see also Baldwin (1980: 499).
482 David A. Singer (2004: 562-563) distinguishes harmonisation into three categories according 
to its nature.
483 In this regard, this research also carries implications for the study o f the effects of 
international regimes.
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international banking system.484 It was even difficult to compare the capital soundness 
of banks by using their disclosed CARs based on the BIS standard. Therefore, this study 
suggests that the analysis of harmonisation should pay equal attention to two related but 
separate issues—why countries make a commitment to a certain international regime, 
and how they actually implement the regime—to provide the meaning of international 
regulatory harmonisation.
8.4 Parting words
In June 2004, the Basel Committee established the new bank capital adequacy 
framework, which is commonly known as Basel II, by publishing International 
Convergence o f  Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework. 
The fundamental objective of Basel II is similar to that of the 1988 Basel Accord:
[t]o develop a framework that would further strengthen the soundness and stability o f 
the international banking system while maintaining sufficient consistency that capital 
adequacy regulation will not be a significant source o f competitive inequality among 
internationally active banks (BCBS 2004b: 2).
Basel II also retains some key elements of the 1988 Accord, including the general 
requirement for banks to hold a total capital equivalent to at least 8 percent of their risk- 
weighted assets, the basic structure of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment regarding the 
treatment of market risk, and the definition of eligible capital (BCBS 2004b: 2, 12)485 
However, the creation of Basel II stemmed largely from the recognition that the 
1988 Basel Accord has not kept pace with advances in risk management practices and, 
as a result, it may not reflect banks’ actual business practices. Accordingly, although 
Basel II is built on the 1988 Accord’s basic structure for setting capital requirements, it 
is substantially different from the previous framework. Basel II is based on “three 
pillars”: minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1), supervisory review (Pillar 2), and 
market discipline (Pillar 3) (BCBS 2004b: 2). Pillar 1 aligns the minimum capital 
requirements more closely to each bank’s actual risk of economic loss. Pillar 2
484 In fact, economists disagree over whether the imposition o f capital requirements actually 
curtails or promotes bank performance and stability. See Barth, et al. (2001b: 9).
485 The required minimum CAR of 8 percent is not based on scientific reasons, but is a result of 
a concern to ensure some continuity between the 1988 Accord and Basel II, suggesting path 
dependence. (I thank Andrew Walter for this point.)
245
recognises the necessity of exercising effective supervisory review of banks’ internal 
assessments of their overall risks to ensure that the bank’s management is exercising 
sound judgement and has set aside adequate capital for these risks. Pillar 3 leverages the 
ability of market discipline to motivate prudent management by enhancing the degree of 
transparency in banks’ public reporting (BCBS 2004a).
Under Pillar 1, higher levels of capital are required for borrowers carrying higher 
levels of credit risk, and vice versa. Also, banks and supervisors are allowed to choose, 
among three options, an approach that seems most appropriate for the level of 
sophistication of a bank’s activities and internal controls. Banks with a more 
sophisticated business and more advanced risk measurement systems may, with the 
approval of their supervisors, select from one of two “internal ratings-based” 
approaches to credit risk, and, under the approach, banks rely partly on their own 
measures of borrowers’ credit risk to determine their capital requirements. Meanwhile, 
banks with a less complex business and simpler control structures may use external 
measures of credit risk to assess the creditworthiness of borrowers under the 
“standardised approach.” In addition, there is an explicit capital charge for a bank’s 
exposures to operational risk, and, similar to the range of options provided for assessing 
exposures to credit risk, banks will choose one of three approaches for measuring their 
exposures to operation risk. Pillar 1 allows banks adopting more comprehensive and 
accurate measures of risk as well as more effective processes for controlling their 
exposures to risk to maintain lower capital levels. Under Pillar 2, supervisors will 
determine whether banks should hold higher levels of capital than the minimum 
requirements in Pillar 1 would specify and whether there is any need for remedial 
actions, by evaluating the activities and risk profiles of the banks. Pillar 3 sets out the 
public disclosures that banks must make that lend greater insight into the adequacy of 
their capitalisation. The introduction of Pillar 3 is a reflection of the Committee’s belief 
that, when market participants have a sufficient understanding of a bank’s activities and 
the controls it has in place to manage its exposures, they are better able to distinguish 
between banks so that they can reward those that manage their risks prudently and 
penalise those that do not (BCBS 2004a).
There are a few significant factors that may lead observers to anticipate high levels
of compliance with Basel II. The Committee has explicitly emphasised comprehensive
compliance, as shown in the phase, “the Committee expects national supervisors will
focus on compliance with the minimum requirements as a means of ensuring the overall
integrity of a bank’s ability to provide prudential inputs to the capital calculations and
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not as an end in itself’ (BCBS 2004b: 2, emphasis added). Also, in contrast to the 1988 
Accord, the Committee intends to monitor and review the application of Basel II. 
Indeed, the Committee established the Accord Implementation Group to promote 
consistency in Basel II application by encouraging supervisors to exchange information 
on implementation approaches (BCBS 2004b: 2). In other words, Basel II appears to be 
equipped with a formal compliance monitoring system at the inter-national level. 
Moreover, Pillar 3 is directly intended to enhance the role of markets in ensuring the 
capital adequacy of banks (see BCBS 2004b: 175-190). In addition, Pillar 2 requires 
national authorities to strengthen their supervision of banks’ compliance with regulatory 
capital ratios (see BCBS 2004b: 158-174).
Basel II has replaced the status of the 1988 Accord as the best practice for capital 
adequacy regulation, and has already begun to proliferate globally. G10 countries are 
expected to implement Base II from 2006, and non-GlO countries have been 
encouraged by the Committee to adopt it (BCBS 2004b: 1). Indeed, a good number of 
non-GlO countries, including Korea and Taiwan, have announced their plans to 
implement Basel II, although the Committee has recommended that “they proceed at 
their own pace, based on their own priorities” (BCBS 2004a). What is actual 
compliance with Basel II? What determines compliance with it? Is compliance with 
Basel II different from compliance with the 1988 Accord? If so, what explains the 
difference? As discussed above, Basel II includes some significant factors to increase 
the operation of both external and domestic compliance mechanisms, even for 
comprehensive compliance. Therefore, compliance with Basel II is likely to be higher 
than that with the 1988 Accord. Yet, it still remains doubtful whether such factors will 
actually be effective in inducing compliance. Future research should address these 
questions more systematically in order to increase understanding of contemporary 
global governance. It is hoped that this study will serve as a platform from which future 
studies of these important questions may be undertaken.
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Explaining Cosmetic Compliance with International 
Regulatory Regimes: The Implementation of the Basle Accord 
in Japan, 1998-2003
HYOUNG-KYU CHEY
A central theme of much recent IPE scholarship has been the question of what 
determines compliance with international regulatory regimes.1 The contemporary debate 
on the issue centres around three competing perspectives on addressing non- 
compliance: enforcement, management, and market-based.2 Enforcement theorists stress 
coercive measures against non-compliant states by other states. Management theorists 
emphasise a problem-solving approach, such as building transparent information 
systems. The market-based approach argues that market forces can enhance compliance. 
Although these compliance strategies may reflect important aspects of non-compliance, 
all these perspectives mostly diagnose and seek to resolve compliance problems at the 
systemic level. As a result, the analysis of domestic political causes of non-compliance 
is still in its early stage, not going much beyond indicating opposition from regulatory 
targets as the major cause.3 Moreover, much research from all three perspectives limits 
its analytic focus to formal compliance with explicit rules of regimes, while defining 
non-compliance strictly as behaviour in breach of them.4 Consequently, non-compliance 
in a broader sense and the effectiveness of the compliance strategies in addressing such 
non-compliance are still vastly underexplored.5 This article attempts to fill some of 
these important gaps in the literature by presenting an in-depth study on a specific but 
prevalent form of non-compliance.
In certain circumstances, governments manipulate the implementation of a 
regulatory regime in their jurisdictions to help the regulatory-target firms formally 
comply with its explicit provisions, but still allow them, in practice, to defect from its 
objectives. In this situation, both the governments and the regulatory targets are in 
formal compliance, but the formal compliance is only cosmetic. Cosmetic compliance 
should be considered a form of non-compliance in terms of regime effectiveness, which 
is the fundamental issue of compliance, because regimes facing it cannot solve the 
problems they were established to solve. A growing number of studies suggest that 
cosmetic compliance is not an extraordinary problem but a common, serious challenge
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to various environmental and financial regulatory regimes.6 This study provides an 
explanation as to why cosmetic compliance occurs, by examining the effectiveness of 
compliance strategies proposed by the three perspectives to constrain it and, going 
further, by conducting a deep analysis of domestic political causes of non-compliance.
I argue that compliance strategies relying on external pressures are not an effective 
means to restrain cosmetic compliance, although they may induce formal compliance. 
Comprehensive compliance— in other words, compliance with not only the explicit 
provisions but also the objectives of regimes—fundamentally relies on the willingness 
and capacity of national authorities. Second, I identify a salient channel through which 
domestic opposition to compliance with an international regulatory regime can be 
magnified: diffusion of compliance costs from the regulatory targets to non-target 
sectors which are politically important groups. In these circumstances, even if national 
regulatory authorities are willing to comply with the regime in earnest and overcome 
opposition from the regulatory targets, they may fail to achieve comprehensive 
compliance.
To develop these claims, this study addresses compliance with the Basle Accord of 
1988 (the BIS bank capital adequacy standard) in Japan during the period of 1998 to 
2003.7 The BIS standard has symbolic significance for regime compliance, given that it 
has been a keystone of financial regulatory regimes over the past two decades, by being 
adopted by more than 100 countries. Moreover, the BIS standard may provide a useful
• Qexample of cosmetic compliance, as it presents a least-likely case of non-compliance: 
bank regulatory authorities have had strong incentives to ensure sound bank capital 
regulations in other countries due to the high possibility that any bank failures in the 
dense network of interbank relations can cause systemic instability in the international 
financial system;9 and the BIS standard has been a most well-known regulation to 
market actors, even among financial regulations.10 In addition, Japan was carefully 
selected to minimise the limitations of a single-case study: Japan was under strong 
pressure from the US and the UK to agree to create the Accord;11 the fact that Japanese 
banks faced a Japan premium in raising funds during the mid-1990s suggests that 
markets could respond to a change in the soundness of Japanese banks;12 and, as will be 
discussed later, Japan’s bank regulatory authority did have the intention to work for 
comprehensive compliance with the BIS standard. Thus, Japan’s cosmetic compliance 
with the BIS standard can provide some support for the inference that cosmetic 
compliance is even more likely to occur in other countries and in other regulatory areas, 
such as environment, health, or labour.
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This article proceeds as follows. I first review the literature on compliance and 
outline the basic argument. Next, I give a brief introduction to the Basle Accord and 
assess the compliance of Japanese banks with the BIS standard. In the following section, 
I examine whether there was external compliance pressure to hinder Japan in 
cosmetically complying with the BIS standard. I then analyse the factors that led 
Japanese authorities to exercise regulatory forbearance in implementing the BIS 
standard. I offer conclusions in the final section.
Compliance theory and cosmetic compliance
What determines compliance with international regulatory regimes? The two traditional 
perspectives on this compliance puzzle are referred to as the enforcement school and the 
management school. In addition to these dominating perspectives, a growing number of 
recent studies have developed the claim that market forces can facilitate compliance. In 
this section, I review these three compliance theories and develop the main argument of 
this article.
Enforcement theorists conceive states as rational actors that make compliance 
decisions based on cost/benefit calculations.13 ‘Collaboration’ regimes, in which states 
have mixed motives (to cooperate and to defect), are prone to non-compliance because 
states can take advantage of another’s compliance by defecting from the regimes.14 Thus, 
to ensure compliance, defection has to be monitored and punished by other states to hurt 
the transgressor states to a point at least equal to that which could be gained by the 
violation.15 The enforcement strategy may work effectively if the costs to the states 
imposing sanctions on defectors are not high, and the sanctions are specifically targeted 
at violators.16 With regard to the Basle Accord, studies of its establishment suggest that 
the dominant powers in the international financial system—the US and the UK—had a 
strong intention of forcing other countries to comply with it.17
Market-based theorists argue that market forces can facilitate compliance with
1 ftinternational regulatory regimes that are accepted by the market. Market actors
monitor the regulatory targets’ compliance and force them to abide by the regimes by
punishing them if they do not. Non-compliant regulatory targets are penalised in
markets because they are considered non-competitive by market participants.19 A
noteworthy element of the market-based approach is that the importance of national
authorities’ capacity to implement regulations in ensuring the regulatory targets’
compliance with them may decrease under the operation of compliance pressures from
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markets. Market forces can compel the regulatory targets to comply with the regulations 
by directly affecting the cost/benefit calculations of their compliance.20 Indeed, the 
Basle Committee, which established the Basle Accord, and a group of political 
economists have attributed the voluntary compliance of non-Committee countries with 
the BIS standard to competitive pressure on banks exerted by markets.21
In contrast to the two foregoing compliance approaches, the management school is 
doubtful about the effectiveness of external pressure in ensuring compliance.22 
Management theorists argue that compliance with international agreements is generally 
quite good and that enforcement has played little role in achieving the high level of 
compliance.23 Non-compliance is not necessarily, or not even usually, the result of a 
deliberate decision based on a cost/benefit calculation.24 Instead, it may occur due to the 
ambiguity of international agreements, limitations on capacity or unexpected social and 
economic changes.25 Accordingly, management theorists argue that non-compliance can 
be addressed by managerial solutions rather than formal enforcement measures or 
coercive informal sanctions, except in egregious cases. Managerial strategies for 
compliance involve the improvement of dispute resolution procedures, technical and 
financial assistance, the development of transparent information systems, and so forth.26
How effective are the compliance strategies proposed by the three schools of 
thought in constraining cosmetic compliance? Enforcement strategies are not likely to 
be easily resorted to by a state to punish another’s cosmetic compliance. Even if 
cosmetic compliance with an international regulatory agreement is detected, it would be 
difficult to say with precision whether it is a violation of the agreement from the legal 
perspective. Even some ‘defections’ may stem from the areas that the international 
agreement does not formally address.27 Insofar as ‘transgressor’ states are in compliance 
with the formal provisions of the agreement, imposing sanctions on their defection from 
its object is likely to be politically costly to the punishing states.
As to the market-based approach, if market participants approve of both the object 
and the provisions of a regulatory regime, market forces may facilitate comprehensive 
compliance with the regime. Yet, the primary condition for the operation of market 
pressures for comprehensive compliance is not likely to be easily met. For such market 
pressures to operate, international agreements established by national regulators have to 
be accepted by market participants as reliable regulations. In general, national regulators 
tend to put more weight on the public-good aspect of regulations, while market 
participants weigh their efficiency more heavily. In this situation, it may not be difficult 
to see that although market participants agree on the desirability of regulation, they do
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not agree on regulations set by national regulators. Moreover, although the regulations 
are initially accepted by the market as dependable ones, market participants’ scepticism 
of them may increase over time as they become outmoded. Yet, note that even though 
market actors do not credit the provisions of an international regulatory agreement with 
appropriate regulations, regulatory targets failing to comply with the provisions 
formally may be punished in markets. This is because non-compliant regulatory targets 
may face penalties from the regulatory authorities, which has negative effects on the 
regulatory targets’ business. Thus, whereas the likelihood that market pressures for 
comprehensive compliance operate is not high, formal compliance may be enhanced by 
markets.
Therefore, although external pressures, from states or from markets, may induce 
formal compliance, they are not likely to be effective in strengthening comprehensive 
compliance. Accordingly, comprehensive compliance may depend primarily on the 
willingness and ability of national authorities to ensure it. In this article, I do not 
directly address whether the compliance strategies proposed by the management school 
are conducive to inducing comprehensive compliance; instead, I develop their argument 
of causes of non-compliance, in particular capacity problems, indirectly supporting 
managerial solutions as a means to constrain cosmetic compliance. Capacity limitations 
stem from diverse sources, administrative, economic or political.28 Among these, 
political capacity problems are of particular interest to this study, because administrative 
or economic limitations are frequently the result of political problems.
The domestic distributional effects of an international regulatory regime affect the 
political capacity of national authorities to ensure the regulatory targets comply with the 
regime. It may be obvious that the regulatory targets’ opposition to compliance with the 
regime will increase as their compliance costs grow. Yet, importantly, the costs of 
complying with the regime can be diffused from the regulatory targets to other sectors 
of the economy. If the sectors negatively affected by the regulatory targets’ compliance 
are politically important or influential, and the sectors’ damage is substantial, the 
likelihood of political intervention to oppose compliance in order to protect these non­
target sectors will increase. Under the circumstances, even if the national regulatory 
authority is willing to force the regulatory targets to comply with the regime in earnest 
and can overcome the regulatory targets’ own opposition, the regulatory authority may 
fail to implement the regime in earnest. In this article, I show how this mechanism of 
compliance failure actually occurred for the Basle Accord in Japan.
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The Basle Accord and Japan’s illusory compliance
The Basle Committee, which consisted of bank regulatory authorities from G-10 
countries, established the Basle Accord in 1988 with two objectives—to strengthen the 
soundness of the international banking system, and to level the playing field for 
international banks. The Accord formulated a common framework to measure banks’ 
capital adequacy ratios (CARs), and set a required minimum CAR at 8 per cent. The 
CAR in the framework (hereafter BIS CAR) was computed by dividing total capital by 
risk-weighted assets on a consolidated basis. Capital was divided into tier 1 capital (core 
capital) and tier 2 capital (supplementary capital). The total of tier 2 elements was 
limited to a maximum of 100 per cent of the total of tier 1 elements. A risk weight of 0, 
10, 20, 50, or 100 per cent was applied to assets according to their types. The BIS 
capital adequacy standard was formally intended to be fully applied to international 
banks from the end of 1992, although the definition of international bank was not 
clearly given in the Accord.
Japan’s bank regulatory authority narrowly defined ‘international bank’ as a bank 
with overseas branches or representative offices, and required that they meet the BIS 
standard from the end of March 1993 (Japanese 1992 fiscal year-end). The 
implementation of the BIS standard in Japan during the late 1990s to early 2000s is 
particularly interesting in that the regulatory authority aggressively exercised regulatory 
forbearance in the area of bank capital adequacy, whereas a Prompt Corrective Action 
(PCA) system, which required the authority to take punitive actions against banks 
automatically when their BIS CARs fell below the regulatory minimum of 8 per cent,
90was implemented from April 1998.
Japanese banks, on the surface, showed a good record of compliance with the Basle
Accord during the PCA period, although Japan’s prolonged economic recession
throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s put heavy downward pressure on their CARs.
The banks were able to withstand the downward pressure until the mid-1990s, partly
relying on unrealised gains on securities holdings, which was a tier 2 capital element, or
utilising asset securitisation or new capital instruments such as subordinated debt and
preferred stocks. However, the value of the unrealised gains became negative in 1998.
The banks’ losses on disposal of non-performing loans surpassed their operating profits
from the mid-1990s, encroaching on their capital. Meanwhile, they faced serious
difficulties in raising new capital at affordable rates during the economic recession.
Nevertheless, most of the banks that adopted the BIS standard complied with the
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required 8 per cent minimum; there were only two compliance failures by the banks per 
year between fiscal years 1998 and 2002. As well, their BIS CARs on average surpassed 
10 per cent during the period.
However, the record of Japanese banks on formal compliance with the BIS standard 
was illusory. The number of banks that employed the BIS standard sharply declined 
from April 1998, when the PCA system took effect. One day before the implementation 
of the PCA system, the Japanese regulatory authority abolished a regulation that 
prevented a bank that had adopted the BIS standard from switching to the domestic 
capital standard, which set the required minimum CAR at 4 per cent.30 Half of the banks 
that had employed the BIS standard switched to the domestic standard on that day. The 
number of banks that adopted the BIS standard continued to decline until, in March 
2003, only about 10 per cent of all Japanese banks adhered to it (see Table 1). It should 
be noted that, although the banks that switched to the domestic capital standard were not 
‘international banks’ under the narrow Japanese definition of that term, they did engage 
in international business activities by undertaking transactions with foreign banks. In 
fact, in most countries, the BIS standard was applied to all (commercial) banks.
Table 1. The number of Japanese banks that adopted the BIS standard
(fiscal year end; number)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
BIS banks 90 89 89 86 82 45
(Total banks) (151) (150) (150) (150) (149) (148)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
BIS banks 35 27 26 21 17 n.a.
(Total banks) (144) (145) (141) (138) (134) (n.a.)
Source: Japanese Bankers Association, Zenkok Ginkou Zaimushyohyou Bunseki [Analysis o f  Financial 
Statements o f All Banks], 1993-2003
Disclosed BIS CARs of Japanese banks were also artificially inflated, as accounting 
standards that affected the BIS CAR calculation were lenient.31 Firstly, the rules of asset 
classification and loan loss provisioning were so lax that the regulatory capital of 
Japanese banks increased.32 Assuming that all non-performing loans in Japanese banks 
were provisioned, their tier 1 capital could have been extinct by 2002.33 Secondly, the 
regulatory authority altered several accounting standards in order to help banks maintain
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their BIS CA Rs above the m inim um  8 per cent. For instance, banks were permitted not 
to record their unrealised losses on securities holdings,34 w hile they were allowed to 
count 45 per cent o f  unrealised gains on land holdings as tier 2 capital. Thirdly, the 
regulatory authority lowered risk weights for certain assets. Fourthly, the banks were 
allow ed to include deferred tax assets (DTAs) in tier 1 capital from  fiscal year 1998,35 
even though DTAs lacked the prim e characteristic o f  bank capital, that is, the 
availability to m eet losses in the event o f  bank failure.36 DTAs accounted for more than 
ha lf the tier 1 capital o f  m ajor Japanese banks in M arch 2003.37 Finally, a large part o f 
Japanese banks’ capital was com posed o f  public funds injected into the banks from 
1998. In a strict sense, the public funds were not a reliable capital base, as they were 
debts that had to be paid back to the governm ent.
In Figure 1 ,1 estim ated the actual tier 1 capital condition o f  m ajor Japanese banks 
from M arch 1993 to M arch 2003 by deducting tax effects— including DTAs— and 
public funds from the tier 1 capital. The banks’ disclosed tier 1 ratio was well beyond 
the required m inim um  o f 4 per cent during the period. However, the quality o f  the tier 1 
capital rapidly deteriorated due to an increase in the w eaker capital elem ents from the 
late 1990s. The adjusted tier 1 ratio dropped to zero per cent in M arch 2003. Given that 
this estim ation did not take into account other problem s related to the banks’ regulatory 
capital— such as under-provisioning— their actual capital condition was likely to be far 
worse than the adjusted tier 1 ratio shows.
Figure 1. The adjusted tier 1 capital ratios of major Japanese banks
(end of period; %)
1993 3 1994.3 1993.3 1996 3 1997.3 1998.3 1999.3 2000.3 2001.3 2002.3 2003.3
Source: own elaboration based on data (personally-obtained) from Fitch Ratings 
Note: the number of major banks varies according to year
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Lim itations o f external compliance pressure
The record of Japanese banks on compliance with the BIS standard shows that external 
compliance pressure was not effective in ensuring that they adopt the BIS standard or 
maintain actual capital soundness. This section explains why foreign bank regulatory 
authorities and markets could not provide a strong incentive for the Japanese bank 
regulatory authority and Japanese banks themselves to comply with the BIS standard in 
substance.
Compliance pressure from foreign regulators
Bank regulatory authorities in G-10 countries could, to some extent, enforce Japanese 
banks to comply with the BIS standard, relying on their power to close their markets to 
Japanese banks. This form of enforcement of compliance lowered the costs to the 
regulatory authorities of enforcing foreign banks’ compliance with the BIS standard as 
the de jure scope of the enforcement was limited to the authorities’ own jurisdiction. In 
addition, it had the merit of imposing sanctions directly on the regulatory targets. In fact, 
even though the number of Japanese banks that were required to comply with the BIS 
standard under the Japanese regulations was limited to about 50 in March 1993, in 
practice, 91 banks opted to adopt the BIS standard. Most of the banks that voluntarily 
complied with it did so in preparation for their future advance into foreign markets.
However, the compliance pressure from capital regulations in foreign countries 
could materialise fundamentally for a limited portion of Japanese banks, that is, those 
with overseas establishments. Accordingly, the compliance pressure could not restrain 
the banks from abandoning the BIS standard. As the PCA system was implemented, and 
the risk of domestic regulatory punishment for non-compliance with the BIS standard 
increased as a result, Japanese banks began to withdraw rapidly from overseas 
operations and switch to the domestic capital standard, for which the required minimum 
CAR was only 4 per cent. In March 2003, 15 Japanese banks had overseas branches, 
and, reflecting this, only 17 out of a total of 134 Japanese banks adhered to the BIS 
standard at that time.
Meanwhile, although it was not a secret that the Japanese calculation method for the
BIS CAR was lenient, foreign bank regulatory authorities were reluctant to put direct
pressure on their Japanese counterparts to strengthen the Japanese BIS standard, or on
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Japanese banks to improve their actual capital adequacy,40 In fact, the Japanese 
accounting standards that artificially inflated the disclosed BIS CARs of the banks were 
not explicitly addressed by the Basle Accord, or manifested as controversial cases to be 
regarded as breaches of the Accord.
Although the Japanese rules on asset classification and the required levels of 
provisions were lax from the perspective of prudential regulation, they were not part of 
the areas that the Accord covered. The accounting change that allowed banks not to 
record their unrealised losses on securities holdings was not in breach of the Accord, 
because the Accord did not enforce the employment of mark-to-market accounting. The 
inclusion of unrealised gains on land holdings in tier 2 capital was explicitly allowed in 
the Accord, even though this practice was in conflict with the accounting standard for 
unrealised losses on securities holdings. The Japanese defended the inclusion of DTAs 
in regulatory capital by arguing that the practice was reasonable since Japanese tax rules 
were extremely strict (vis-a-vis US rules): Japanese tax authorities seldom allowed 
banks to deduct the amount of would-be uncollectible loans from their pretax income as 
an expense.41
In addition, G-10 countries had established the so-called Basle Concordat in 1975, 
which was revised in 1982 and in 1992. The Concordat established the principle of 
home country supervision of the solvency of foreign branches of banks.42 Therefore, it 
was the responsibility of the Japanese regulatory authority to supervise the capital 
adequacy of Japanese banks operating in foreign countries through their branches in 
those countries. Given no explicit violation of the Accord and the principle of home 
country supervision, the political costs to foreign regulatory authorities of pressuring 
their Japanese counterparts to strengthen the Japanese BIS standard, or of forcing 
Japanese banks to improve their actual capital adequacy, were high.
Finally, it is also worth noting that the incentive for foreign regulatory authorities to 
strengthen the Japanese BIS standard might not have been high. It was widely pointed 
out that an underlying reason for establishing the Accord was the hope of US and 
European banks to curb the international expansion of Japanese banks 43 This objective 
was achieved, perhaps more drastically than expected, when the presence of Japanese 
banks in international markets shrank rapidly during the 1990s. While nine of the 
world’s top 10 banks in terms of asset size were Japanese in 1989, that number dropped 
to two by 2001.
Compliance pressure from markets
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The Basle Accord was criticised by financial practitioners and academics for its failure 
to incorporate key insights of the theory of finance from the outset.44 Its risk 
measurement framework did not generate a capital advantage for banks with well- 
diversified portfolios. Its system of five risk-weight categories was crude. The 8 per 
cent minimum CAR and the different risk weights for OECD and non-OECD countries 
were arbitrary. In addition, innovation by financial markets, in some cases with the 
intention of circumventing the BIS-standard regulation, eroded the Accord’s 
effectiveness further.45 In developing the analysis of market participants’ view on the 
BIS standard, I focus on how the three major credit rating companies (CRCs)— 
Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings— incorporated banks’ 
BIS CARs in rating them. This analytical shortcut may be appropriate given that market 
participants examine the credit ratings of their investment targets, and, therefore, banks’ 
credit ratings affect their cost of borrowing in markets.46
The BIS standard was not accepted by the CRCs as a reliable solvency regulation, 
and, accordingly, the CRCs did not consider the BIS CAR a dependable solvency 
indicator. They did examine BIS CARs of banks, and frequently referred to them when 
altering the banks’ credit ratings; however, after examining banks’ BIS CARs, they 
adjusted them to calculate the economic capital ratios by taking into account various 
factors.47 It was these capital ratios that influenced the CRCs’ rating decisions. In 
addition, for the CRCs, the appropriate levels of capital that banks needed to hold 
differed according to their risk profiles.48
Moody’s Investors Service commented:
One common misconception is that the higher the level o f capital the stronger the 
bank, regulatory solvency being considered as the defining factor for bank safety.
This however is an analytical shortcut that most often leads nowhere and in fact 
has repeatedly proved to be wrong.... Stated differently, Moody’s sees no 
automatic correlation between a bank’s level o f regulatory capital and its credit
49ratings.
Moody’s also said: ‘Regulatory capital ratios give a very imprecise indication of capital 
strength. This is so even when regulatory capital ratios are based on risk-weighted 
models, such as the Basle criteria'.50 An analyst at Standard & Poor’s commented: 
‘Standard & Poor’s did not [penalise banks that did not adopt the BIS standard]. Rather,
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Standard & Poor’s relies on its own assessment of the appropriate level of capital it 
considers a bank would require given the bank’s risk profile’.51 Fitch Ratings also 
published a report showing that there was no correlation between BIS CAR and credit 
rating.52 Indeed, even though Daiwa Bank, a major Japanese bank, switched to the 
domestic capital standard, resigning the BIS standard in March 2000, its Standard and 
Poor’s credit rating did not change, staying stable at BB+ from December 1998 to 
September 2001.
The CRCs, to some extent, put pressure on banks to improve their actual capital 
quality. In general, they put more weight on tier 1 capital vis-a-vis tier 2 capital in 
assessing the creditworthiness of banks. Also, a huge proportion of DTAs in the tier 1 
capital of Japanese banks had negative effects on their credit ratings.53 However, the 
pressure from the CRCs on the banks to strengthen their actual capital adequacy was not 
effective because they also took into account a number of other factors when rating the 
banks. A rise in a bank’s insolvency risk caused by one factor could be compensated for 
by a decrease in the risk due to other factors. For instance, the injection of public funds, 
which were perceived as a weak capital component by the CRCs themselves, to 
Japanese banks did have a positive effect on their credit ratings. The long-term ratings 
of Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s for major Japanese banks, on 
average, rose or remained stable after the injection of a massive amount of public funds 
in April 1999, despite continuing deterioration of the banks’ capital quality.54 Also, of 
note is the fact that a Japan premium, which Japanese bank used to pay for interbank 
borrowing during the mid-1990s, virtually disappeared after the injection of the public 
funds.55
The only area in which the CRCs played a role regarding compliance of Japanese 
banks with the BIS standard was that involving formal compliance of those that had 
already been regulated by the BIS standard. Although the BIS CAR was not a reliable 
solvency indicator, the CRCs emphasised that it was important for a bank to meet the 
regulatory minimum CAR requirement. A bank’s failure to comply could be punished 
by the regulatory authority, and this could have negative consequences for the bank’s 
investors and general creditors.56 Thus, the CRCs could provide an incentive for banks 
regulated by the BIS standard to meet the required 8 per cent minimum. However, this 
compliance pressure from the CRCs on the banks was a reflection of domestic 
regulation. As a result, only a very limited number of Japanese banks faced this 
additional pressure from the CRCs to formally comply with the BIS standard during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, as most of them were not adopting the standard.
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R egulatory forbearance
After all, it was the Japanese regulatory authority that could compel Japanese banks to 
comply with the BIS standard in earnest. However, as discussed earlier, the regulatory 
authority aggressively exercised regulatory forbearance. This practice during the late 
1990s and early 2000s is particularly intriguing because by that time many of the 
problems that had hindered the regulatory authority in carrying out strict regulation of 
the banking sector had been rectified, or had at least begun to be resolved. The Financial 
Supervisory Agency, the new bank regulatory authority, was established in June 1998 
and was reorganised to become the Financial Services Agency (FSA) in July 2000.57 
Although the FSA inherited a large number of staff from the previous regulatory 
authority, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the traditional strong informal network 
between bank regulators and banks virtually disappeared after the establishment of the
r o
new regulatory authority. In addition, the official financial safety net developed 
significantly, and, as a result, there was a low likelihood that the failure of a bank to 
comply with the capital adequacy rules would trigger a systemic financial crisis.59 
However, new factors emerged to hinder the regulatory authority in implementing the 
BIS standard in earnest during the late 1990s and early 2000s: the diffusion of the 
compliance costs of the BIS standard from banks to small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), and the politicisation of banking regulation.
The diffusion o f compliance costs
Until the implementation of a PCA system, the Japanese regulatory authority had 
discretion in taking regulatory action against banks that failed to meet the required 
minimum capital ratios, either BIS or domestic, and, in practice, they merely suggested 
that those banks should raise their CARs.60 However, the introduction of a PCA system 
in April 1998 changed the ‘rules of the game’ in Japanese capital adequacy regulation. 
Under the PCA system, the regulatory authority had to take punitive actions 
automatically against banks when their CARs fell below the regulatory minimum CARs. 
The regulatory penalties for compliance failure ranged from the improvement of 
management to the suspension of small or all business activities. Therefore, banks had 
to meet the regulatory minimum CARs at all costs in order to preserve their 
management when the PCA system took effect. One method of doing this was to switch
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to the dom estic capital adequacy standard, whose required m inim um  CAR was 4 per 
cent. However, m ost m ajor banks had to com ply with the BIS standard because they had 
overseas establishm ents. Yet, under the stagnant economy, their capital bases were 
sharply contracting while they were not able to raise new capital.
They responded to the changed circum stances by shrinking their risk-weighted 
assets to m aintain their BIS CARs above the regulatory m inim um  o f  8 per cent. A 
reduction in risk-w eighted assets could be achieved, with the least effect on total bank 
assets, by curtailing loans, w hose risk w eight was the highest at 100 per cent.61 As a 
result, the econom y suffered from a credit crunch during 1997-8 (see Figure 2).62 A 
num ber o f  firm s w ent bankrupt, and the im plem entation o f  the PCA system was widely 
criticised as one o f  the m ain causes.6j
Figure 2. The lending attitude of Japanese financial institutions
(diffusion index, %)
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Source: Bank of Japan, Economic and Financial Data on CD-ROM, 2003
In particular, SM Es were m ost harshly hit by the credit crunch, because they relied 
heavily on bank borrow ing, whereas larger firm s could rely on direct fundraising from 
capital m arkets.64 The num ber o f bankruptcies o f  SM Es rose sharply from around 
14,700 in 1996 to some 16,300 in 1997, and 19,000 in 1998. A lthough the kind o f  
severe credit crunch that occurred during 1997-8 did not recur, bank lending attitudes 
and the financial positions o f  SM Es remained tight during the early 2000s.65 Despite the 
injection o f  public funds in 1998 and 1999, banks could not generate enough capacity to 
increase their lending, and bankruptcies am ong SM Es increased again in 2000 after a 
b rief decline in 1999. Through the credit crunch m echanism , the costs o f com plying
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with the BIS standard were diffused from banks to other sectors of the economy, 
particularly SMEs.
The politicisation o f banking regulation
In the meantime, banking regulation became rapidly politicised from 1997-on. 
Politicians began to engage actively in banking policies as the deteriorating health of the 
banking system turned into a financial crisis in the autumn of 1997, following the 
failures of high-profile financial institutions.66 The influence of politicians, especially 
those of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), on the banking policy-making 
process remained strong during the late 1990s and the early 2000s, despite the creation 
of the new financial regulatory authority, the FSA.67 In addition, the institutional 
framework of the FSA made it vulnerable to political pressure: the Minister for 
Financial Services, who was a member of the Cabinet and was answerable to the Diet 
(the legislature), had effective control over the operation of the FSA; meanwhile there 
was no board with outside members to whom the Commissioner, the chief executive of 
the FSA, could be accountable, and the FSA had no budgetary independence, being 
funded from the central government budget.68
As the financial positions of SMEs deteriorated and their bankruptcies increased, the 
LDP began to make desperate efforts to protect them. SMEs were the major economic 
actors in the economy, accounting for more than 50 per cent of value-added generated 
by all corporations. Moreover, they were politically important actors, because the large 
number of SMEs made them potentially of great significance to the electoral process.69 
The number of workers they employed accounted for more than 60 per cent of total 
employees—that is, voters— in all industries. In addition, they were traditional political 
supporters of the LDP.70 Indeed, it was indicated that the LDP subcommittee in charge
71of banking policies had a strong interest in protecting SMEs.
In consequence, the LDP were opposed to policies to strengthen the regulations
related to bank capital adequacy, while demanding regulatory forbearance in order to
raise banks’ regulatory CARs and thereby increase loans to SMEs, even though the bank
regulatory authority and Opposition parties sometimes called for stricter regulation of
banks.72 One important event was the establishment of the Financial Inspection Manual
in April 1998. In its initial plan of December 1997, the bank regulatory authority was to
adopt stronger rules of asset classification and loan loss provisioning. However, the
final version of the manual was substantially attenuated in those areas due to opposition
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from banks that warned of aggravation of the already-rampant credit crunch, and from 
the LDP that worried about this as well.73 Also, the LDP influenced the regulatory 
authority to postpone the implementation of the PCA system for domestic banks for one 
year until April 1999 and to change accounting rules to raise banks’ CARs.74 In addition, 
inspections of banks by the regulatory authority were carried out in a way that did not 
affect lending to SMEs.75
Another salient episode demonstrating the failure of the regulatory authority’s 
efforts to strengthen the capital adequacy regulations due to political intervention was 
the Programme for Financial Revival (PFR) of October 2002. As Japan’s economy 
remained stagnant over more than a decade, the FSA, the Bank of Japan (the central 
bank), and also a minority of the LDP perceived that the weak capital position of banks 
had a negative effect on the country’s economic recovery. As a result, from the early 
2000s, they began to argue aggressively that the Japanese BIS standard was too
n(\lenient, and the FSA established the PFR to strengthen the soundness of Japanese 
banks. In an earlier version of the PFR, the FSA planned to implement stricter rules on 
bank capital adequacy, including limiting DTAs that could be counted as capital to only 
10 per cent of tier 1 capital. However, banks, fearing potential government intervention 
in their management, severely resisted the plan and warned of an extensive credit 
crunch.77 Concerns over this led the majority of the LDP to block the implementation of 
the plans.78 As a result, the announced plans of the PFR were substantially eased so that 
SMEs were not affected by the PFR. Even then, most of the announced plans were not 
implemented.79
One may question whether the LDP’s opposition to strengthening the capital 
adequacy regulations was an attempt to protect banks rather than SMEs. Yet the LDP 
did employ measures against banks’ interests in order to protect SMEs. The injection of 
public funds to major banks whose BIS CARs were over 8 per cent in 1998 and 1999 
was a prominent example of these measures. Banks were initially fiercely opposed to 
the injection of public funds because they were afraid of government intervention in 
their management and of a decline in their market image.80 However, the LDP-led 
government forced banks to accept public funds, even by strengthening loan loss 
provisioning rules and launching inspections of banks to pressure them to apply for 
public funds. Finally banks reluctantly applied for public funds, and they were required 
to increase loans to SMEs.81 Banks may have been benefited from lax capital adequacy 
regulations, but the major reason for the LDP to exercise regulatory forbearance toward 
banks was to increase loans to SMEs.
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Conclusion
International regulatory regimes can be effective only when they achieve their 
objectives. Thus, for the study of compliance with a regulatory regime to have meaning 
for this critical issue of regime effectiveness, a close examination of the nature of the 
compliance—whether it is cosmetic or comprehensive—should be carried out. This 
article has cast serious doubt on the validity of compliance strategies based on external 
pressures in enhancing comprehensive compliance, by finding severe cosmetic 
compliance in a least-likely case of non-compliance in terms of the operation of external 
compliance pressures. This finding raises further questions about power in the global 
political economy. The underlying logic of enforcement and market-based compliance 
strategies is that states and markets have power to influence a nation’s behaviour. Yet 
this article has drawn attention to limitations of that power by demonstrating that the 
Japanese government could manipulate the implementation of the Basle Accord, thereby 
responding to domestic opposition to comprehensive compliance with it.
Accordingly, this research has highlighted domestic politics as a key area for 
comprehending compliance problems. In particular, this study has shed light on the 
adverse effects of compliance on a non-target sector comprised of politically-important 
actors, and has pointed to this as a critical cause of compliance failure. Given that SMEs 
in most countries rely heavily on bank loans, and their employees account for a majority 
of voters, this finding is very likely to be useful in analysing other countries’ 
compliance failures for the BIS standard, even more so for those whose capital markets 
are less developed than Japan’s.
Of course, the significance of the finding will depend more generally on its
applicability to other issue areas. Regulations in other financial sectors are strong
candidates to which the finding may be applicable, given that financial institutions are,
in general, closely linked to other economic sectors. In this regard, it may be noteworthy
that an International Monetary Fund report assessing the implementation of 12
international financial regulatory standards indicates ‘public policy considerations’ and
low independence of regulatory agencies as factors that caused regulatory forbearance
or impeded high levels of implementation.83 Also, on closer examination, it may not be
unusual to see that the cost to comply with environmental, health or labour regulations
is not exclusively imposed on the regulatory targets. For instance, many environmental
regulations affect not only regulated firms but also consumers, either indirectly, by
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raising the prices of particular commodities, or directly, by banning them from using 
particular products or requiring them to use them in a particular way.84 The analysis of 
non-compliance should pay attention to the broader domestic distributional effects of 
international regimes, going beyond focusing on the regulatory targets, in order to avoid 
missing important explanatory variables.
This article concludes by briefly suggesting one method to reduce compliance 
failures: the strengthening of the policy autonomy of regulatory authority from political 
influence. In fact, the favourable effect of the policy autonomy of regulatory authority 
on compliance with environmental or financial regimes has been often pointed out.85 
This research’s finding that the Japanese regulatory authority failed to strengthen the 
Japanese BIS standard due to political pressures, despite their willingness, provides an 
additional support for the importance of strengthening measures to protect regulatory 
authorities from political intervention. Certainly the strengthening of their policy 
autonomy should be accompanied by measures for holding them accountable for the 
discharge of their actions.
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